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The focal research question of this thesis is the relevance of the contract of 
employment in modern employment. In answering this question three broad 
areas associated with the contract are explored: (1) the evolution of the 
contract of employment in South Africa and the dichotomy between the 
contract of employment and the independent contract; (2) the forms of 
engagement of workers in the South African labour market; and (3) alternative 
regulatory models with specific reference to models that are consistent with 
the South African Constitution. Using a comparative approach it is shown that 
the contract of employment in South Africa is in a relative state of unification. 
However, some assumptions about its historical evolution and the influence of 
Roman and Roman-Dutch law are overstated, and more recent 
developments, such as tax legislation, arguably had a greater influence on the 
dichotomising of labour law. The study of the South African world of work 
illustrates that modern work is performed in diverse ways. After illustrating that 
labour law has both countervailing and social developmental roles, it is 
concluded that the contract of employment as traditionally understood is no 
longer capable of performing these roles. It is further claimed that a process of 
diversification (as opposed to the unification of the contract of employment) 
will help to redefine the contract of employment and this may extend the 
coverage of labour legislation to those who, bearing in mind the purpose of 
labour law, ought to be protected by labour laws. Finally, it is argued that the 
South African Constitution provides a ready paradigm within which to achieve 
such a process of diversification which would ultimately lead to an extension 
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1.1 Focal research question, rationale for and aim of the research 
 
The focal research question of this thesis is the relevance of the 
contract of employment in modern employment. 
 
Late twentieth-century employment legislation in South Africa is based 
on the belief that the common-law contract of employment and the 
concomitant principles are not adequate to regulate modern employment 
relations. The common-law contractual regime provided little or no protection 
against arbitrariness and simply allowed the employer to dictate terms, the 
only restriction being that the conduct of the employer had to be lawful. While 
this inability of the common law to protect employees adequately against 
unfairness can be attributed to many causes, it is essentially founded in the 
common-law maxim of pacta sunt servanda and the assumption that both 
contracting parties have equal bargaining power; however, neither the maxim 
nor the assumption are consistent with the realities of employment in South 
Africa.  
 
The introduction of the unfair labour practice doctrine to labour 
legislation in 1979 and the later refinement of un/fairness in the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) intended to ameliorate these deficiencies of 
the common law. The unfair labour practice doctrine seeks to limit the 
exploitation of vulnerable contracting parties – more often than not this would 
be the individual seeking employment or hoping to remain in employment. 
This, however, does not imply that the contract of employment or other terms 
and conditions originating in the common law are no longer relevant. Indeed, 
not only is the legislative definition of an employee very narrowly interpreted 
and heavily premised on the distinction between a contract of employment 
and that of an independent contractor (known as an independent contract), 
but the protection against unfair dismissal presupposes the termination of a 













meaning.1 The role of the contract of employment during the currency of the 
employment relationship, although tempered by the collective bargaining 
regime and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (BCEA), is 
basically to provide a default position. Hence, while s 199 of the LRA 
regulates the potential tension between collective agreements and individual 
contracts of employment, it certainly does not negate the common-law 
contract of employment as the basis of the employment relationship. Similarly, 
while s 4 of the BCEA regulates the tension between statutory basic 
conditions of employment and contractual provisions, it still acknowledges the 
contract as the basic source of employment terms. Even the definition of an 
unfair labour practice which aims to regulate unfair employer practices short 
of dismissal, incorporates, albeit impliedly, some breaches of contract. 
 
The South African labour courts have until recently insisted that the 
contract of employment is the starting place when determining the status of an 
alleged employee,2 or have at least required an intention to contract3 when 
assessing the status of an alleged employee. In 2005, in Denel (Pty) Ltd v 
Gerber,4 the Labour Appeal Court (LAC) apparently downgraded the 
significance of the contract of employment when it gave preference to the 
reality of the relationship between two parties despite the fact that the contract 
between them (which was not a sham) pointed towards a different type of 
contract.5 
 
Many, however, have in recent times questioned whether, for 
regulatory purposes, work performed under the contract of employment, 
regardless of whether attention is paid to its substance or form, is really 
                                               
1  All but one component of the definition of dismissal in section 186(1) of the LRA refers to the 
termination of the contract of employment Bosch, C ‘What’s in a Word? Giving Definition to 
“Dismissal”’ paper delivered at the 18th Annual Labour Law Conference, Johannesburg, South 
Africa, July 2005. 
2  SABC v McKenzie (1999) 20 ILJ 585 (LAC); Borcherds v C W Pierce & J Steward t/a Lubrite 
Distributors (1993) 14 ILJ 1262 (LAC) and Liberty Life Association of SA v Niselow (1996) 
17 ILJ 673 (LAC). 
3  Church of the Province of Southern Africa Diocese of Cape Town v CCMA & Others (2001) 
22 ILJ 2274 (LC) and Salvation Army (South African Territory) v Minister of Labour (2005) 
26 ILJ 126 (LC). 
4  (2005) 26 ILJ 1256 (LAC). 













distinct from work performed under the so-called independent contract to 
perform work, or, for that matter, worked performed under any other 
arrangement. The proponents of this view argue that these forms of work, or 
at least some of them, call for (some) labour law regulation.6 
 
This inevitably raises a number of distinct but interlinked questions:  
What are the realities of employment? What legislative policy underlies the 
dichotomy between the contract of employment and the contract to perform 
work independently and is this policy still valid? What is the purpose of labour 
law? Is it possible to distinguish work performed under the contract of 
employment from work performed under other arrangements? Does the 
contract of employment explain all forms of work?  How do individuals perform 
work if it is not via the route of the contract of employment? Should 
contractual rights and statutory employment rights be de-linked?  
 
These questions must be viewed against the backdrop of a constantly 
changing world of work (discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4), 
brought about by the collective impact of processes such as ‘vertical 
disintegration’,7 globalisation, casualisation, externalisation, informalisation 
and feminisation of work and the concomitant collapse of the paradigm of 
employment that assumed a full-time job for life. These processes have had 
at least two results: first, the engagement of work through arrangements other 
than the contract of employment, such as subcontracting, outsourcing, labour 
broking, homeworking and franchising, and, second, the associated increase 
in the number of workers who are neither employees nor independent 
contractors or who have become invisible to labour regulation, despite the fact 
that some of these workers, in substance and/or reality, are employees.8 
Ultimately, the aim of this research is to explain the roles of the contract of 
employment, considering the many ways in which work is performed, and to 
                                               
6  An early proponent of this view was Brooks, A ‘Myth and Muddle – An Examination of the 
Contracts for the Performance of Work’ (1988) 11 UNSW Law Journal 48. More recently it 
has been advanced by, for instance, Freedland, M ‘From the Contract of Employment to the 
Personal Work Nexus’ (2006) 35 ILJ (UK) 1. 
7  Collins, H ‘Independent Contractors and the Challenge of Vertical Disintegration to 
Employment Protection Laws” (1990) 10 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 353. 













establish whether and to what extent the contract needs to transform itself in 
order to fulfil these roles. 
 
1.2 Areas of research and methodology 
 
In an effort to answer the focal research question, three broad areas 
associated with the contract of employment will be explored. These are: 
(1) the evolution of the contract of employment in South Africa and the 
dichotomy between the contract of employment and the independent contract;  
(2) the forms of engagement of workers in the South African labour market; 
and  
(3) alternative regulatory models with specific reference to models that are 
consistent with the South African Constitution.  
 
1.2.1 The evolution of the contract of employment 
 
This area explores the evolution of the contract of employment in South 
Africa and, more specifically, considers the nexus between the contract of 
employment and the Roman-Dutch dichotomy between the locatio conductio 
operarum and the locatio conductio operis, as well as the relationship 
between the contract of employment and the development of social welfare 
legislation in South Africa. It also explores alternative explanations for this 
dichotomy.  
 
This historical overview has at least two purposes. First, by 
understanding the historical development of the contract of employment and 
this dichotomy, and by re-evaluating certain assumptions about their historical 
development, a better perspective on the future of the contract of employment 
is provided. Second, this study seeks to demonstrate that the contract of 
employment, as it is currently understood, is a relatively new concept and in a 
state of relative unity. This reality must be fully grasped when engaging with 














The historical evolution of the contract of employment is not studied in 
isolation – the comparative historical development in England and the 
Netherlands is also considered. This is done not only for the sake of 
comparison, but because South Africa has very strong historical ties with both 
countries and also because these two countries represent two different legal 
systems. It is hoped that the differences and similarities that emerge from 
comparing the historical evolution of the contract of employment in these two 
countries can be usefully employed to plot the future of the contract of 
employment in South Africa. 
 
This research, covered by Chapter 2, focuses on an analysis of 
legislative enactments and case law, and relies heavily on comparative 
materials.  
 
1.2.2 The world of work 
 
This part of the research focuses on the different forms of engagement 
in the South African labour market and also endeavours to identify and 
describe the forms of work which are currently not regulated by labour law. It 
also compares the regulation and access to social security of these different 
forms of engagement and establishes common themes. The intention of this 
research is not only to identify additional forms of work for regulation, but also 
to understand more fully how work is performed. This research, which is 
covered by Chapter 4, is based on the results of some empirical work and a 
review of case law, and has some comparative content.   
 
1.2.3 The future of the contract of employment and the Constitution 
 
If the contract of employment is unsuited to ensuring legislative 
protection for a person performing work, the next question is what alternative 
regime ought to be introduced to facilitate access to the protection offered by 
labour and social welfare legislation. This part of the research focuses on the 
Constitution and models which are compatible with the Constitution. In this 













‘employee’, the ‘worker category’ in employment legislation in England, the 
personal employment contract/nexus model as developed by Mark Freedland, 
labour force membership as advocated by Alain Supiot and the possibility of 
multiple employers are explored. In reviewing these models the wisdom of a 
diverse approach, as opposed to a unitary approach, is considered. This part 
of the research, covered by Chapter 5, relies on a review of existing literature 
and an analysis of the Constitution with reference to case law, and has a 
strong comparative element.  
 
1.2.4 The purpose of labour law 
 
While the purpose of labour law is not the central focus of this thesis, 
none of the areas referred to above can be meaningfully addressed without 
understanding the purpose of labour law. It has been said that the contract of 
employment embodies certain normative aims,9 and a review of the contract 
of employment and a consideration of its future therefore also requires a 
review of these normative values and their validity.  This part of the research 
relies mostly on a review of literature and case law and has a comparative 
element. 
 
The purpose of labour law is discussed in Chapter 3 and aims to 
provide a nexus between the discussion of the evolution of the contract of 
employment in Chapter 2, on the one hand, and the discussions of the world 
of work and possible alternative models in Chapters 3 and 4, on the other 
hand. 
 
1.3  Literature survey 
 
The available South African literature on the subject matter shows 
interesting patterns. It either tends to focus on prevailing conditions or it is 
                                               
9  Deakin, S ‘The Many Futures of the Contract of Employment’ in Conaghan, J; Fischl, RM 
and Klare, K Labour Law in an Era of Globalization: The Transformative Practices and 













forward-looking, but it is seldom retrospective. In other words, the literature 
does not search our history for answers. 
 
 South African literature on the evolution of the contract of employment 
is limited and fragmented in the sense that it focuses on specific periods and 
never questions the claim that the dichotomy between the contract of 
employment and the contract to do work independently has its roots in the 
Roman-Dutch dichotomy between the locatio conductio operarum and the 
locatio conductio operis. This thesis aims to provide a holistic consideration of 
the evolution of the contract of employment in South Africa from the 
establishment of a replenishment station at the Cape in 1652 to date. 
However, the importance of understanding the historical evolution and 
patterns of the contract of employment has been recognised and researched 
by many international scholars. While these international scholars are by no 
means the only scholars in this regard, this thesis relies extensively on the 
work of, inter alia, Simon Deakin (whose work on Britain to a large extent 
provided the template for the research of the evolution of the contract of 
employment in South Africa), Willibald Steinmetz (Europe), Bruno Veneziani 
(Europe), Richard Mitchell (Australia), Adrian Brooks (Australia), Evert 
Verhulp (Netherlands), Robert Knegt (Netherlands) and CJH Jansen 
(Netherlands).  
 
The most important South African literature focusing on the world of 
work in South Africa is by Jan Theron, Shane Godfrey, Marlea Clarke and 
Edward Webster, and their empirical work has been extensively relied upon. 
Since the aim of this part of the research was to establish the realities of work 
in South Africa, comparative literature was used only for purposes of 
clarification and emphasis. For an international perspective, a recent 
Australian publication edited by Richard Mitchell and others has been 
extremely helpful in developing the South African argument.10 
 
                                               
10  Arup, C; Gahan, P; Howe, J; Johnstone, R; Mitchell, R and O’Donnell, A (eds) Labour Law 













An abundance of literature is available on the South African 
Constitution and a selection was necessary. However, for a detailed analysis 
of the constitutional right to fair labour practices, the works of Halton Cheadle, 
Paul Benjamin and Darcy Du Toit remain unparalleled in this regard. While 
there is South African literature available on the potential of the Constitution 
for regulating the contract of employment (or work) differently, these studies 
appear to be fragmented, do not search the evolution of the contract for 
possible solutions and do not suggest holistic alternatives to the current 
regulatory regime. They were nonetheless useful in developing the arguments 
in Chapter 5. These include the works of Marius Olivier, Craig Bosch and Paul 
Benjamin. There is no similar international dearth on possible alternative 
regulatory models and again a selection was necessary. In this regard the 
works of Mark Freedland, Alain Supiot and Richard Mitchell were preferred. 
 
Apart from an article by Dennis Davis, the purpose of labour law has 
received very limited scholastic attention in South African literature. Even 
internationally, compared to the other areas of labour law, the purpose of 
labour law appears to have received less attention. In this thesis, apart from 
the article by Dennis Davis, I have relied on the views of, inter alia, Otto Kahn-
Freund, Brain Langille, Simon Deakin, Guy Davidov, and Evance Kalula. 
 
1.4 A note on dates 
 
The period covered by this research, at least as far as the South 
African content is concerned, starts in 1652. For the sake of demarcation and 
containment, 29 February 2008 is the cut-off date for this thesis, and 
jurisprudential and legislative developments after this date are not included. 
For the same reason the Labour Force Survey of September 2006 is relied on 
in Chapters 3 and 4.11 The Labour Force Survey of September 2007 was 
                                               
















published only on 27 March 200812 and the Labour Force Survey of March 
200713 was embargoed until 26 September 2007. However, in the latter case 
the key indicators showed only very small variations compared to the 
September 2006 survey and it was decided not to adjust the initial research 
which was based on the Labour Force Survey of September 2006. 
 
1.5 A note on labour dispute settlement in South Africa14 
 
This thesis does not specifically address the institutions of labour 
dispute settlement provided for in the LRA. However, these institutions are 
often referred to in this thesis and this paragraph aims to provide a brief 
overview of these structures. 
 
The statutory dispute resolution structures provided for in the LRA 
include the Commission for Arbitration, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA),15 
the Labour Court (LC)16 and the Labour Appeal Court (LAC).17 Unless a 
privately agreed procedure is in place, more or less all disputes must be 
referred to the CCMA for conciliation before being referred either to 
arbitration,18 also by the CCMA, or for adjudication by the LC.19 Arbitration 
awards may be taken on review to the LC.20 The LC has High Court status21 
and has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of all matters arising from the LRA,22 
                                               
12  See http://www.statssa.gov.za/Publications/statsdownload.asp?PPN=P0210&SCH=4133 
(31March 2008). 
13  See http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0210/P0210March2007.pdf  (20 September 
2007). 
14  This paragraph was taken from a previous publication by the author. See Le Roux, R 
‘Employment’ in Du Bois, F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9ed (2007) 924-940 
at 931-932. 
15  Section 112 of the LRA. 
16  Section 151 of the LRA. 
17  Section 167 of the LRA. 
18  Section 191(5A)of the LRA provides that the so-called ‘conarb’ procedure must be followed if 
the issue in dispute relates to the dismissal of an employee for any reason relating to 
probation, an unfair labour practice relating to probation or in any other dispute in which a 
party does not object. This means that the arbitration follows immediately after a failed 
conciliation.  
19  Cf s 191(5) of the LRA. 
20  Section 145(1) of the LRA. 
21  Section 151 of the LRA. 













except where the LRA requires a matter to be resolved through arbitration.23  
The LAC may hear appeals against final judgements and final orders24 of the 
LC as well as any question of law referred to it by the LC.25 If the dispute 
involves a constitutional matter, an appeal from the LAC to the Constitutional 
Court is possible.26 In addition to the statutory dispute resolution structure, the 
Constitutional Court has also held that, in constitutional matters, litigants may 
appeal from the LAC to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA).27  
 
Furthermore, the BCEA provides that the LC has concurrent jurisdiction 
with the civil courts to hear and determine any matter concerning a contract of 
employment.28 
 
1.6  Structure 
 
The structure of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 is entitled ‘The 
evolution of the contract of employment’ and consists of two sections briefly 
addressing the evolution of the contract of employment in Britain and the 
Netherlands, and a third section which comprehensively explores the 
evolution of the contract of  employment in South Africa. 
 
Chapter 3 is entitled ‘The purpose of labour law’. It is brief and provides 
an overview of the purpose of labour law. Chapter 4 is entitled ‘The work of 
world: Forms of engagement in South Africa’ and explores the different forms 
of work in South Africa. Chapter 5 is entitled ‘Whither the contract of 
employment? Evolution or metamorphosis’ and explores, with reference to the 
South African Constitution, alternative regulatory models for labour. Chapter 5 
is followed by the conclusion. 
 
 
                                               
23  Section 157(5) of theLRA. 
24  Section 173(1)(a) of the LRA. 
25  Section 173(1)(b) read with s 158(4) of the LRA. 
26  Section 167(4) and (6) of the Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) read with Rules 18(2) of the 
Rules of the Constitutional Court. 
27  NEHAWU & Others v University of Cape Town & Others (2003) 24 ILJ 95 (CC) at 108C.   















THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT IN SOUTH 




The purpose of this chapter is to consider the evolution of the contract 
of employment in South Africa. More specifically, the aim of this chapter is to 
consider the nexus between the contract of employment and, first, the 
Roman-Dutch dichotomy between the locatio conductio operarum and the 
locatio conductio operis and, second, the development of social welfare 
legislation.  
 
While the focus of this chapter is on the evolution of the contract of 
employment in South Africa, the comparative development in England and the 
Netherlands is also considered. These two countries were selected for two 
reasons. First, South Africa has close historical ties with both countries and as 
a result the legal systems in both countries influenced the development of 
South African law. Second, these two countries represent a common-law and 
a civil-law system respectively and therefore provide useful benchmarks 
against which to consider aspects of the evolution of the contract of 
employment in South Africa and the claim that the contract of employment as 
a unitary concept is relatively new, shaped to a large extent by social welfare 
legislation. 
 
This chapter will commence with an overview of the evolution of the 
contract of employment in England. In this regard great reliance is placed on 
the insights and work of Simon Deakin. This is followed by a discussion and 
analysis of the evolution of the contract of employment in South Africa, relying 
on patterns identified by Deakin. Finally, the evolution of the contract of 
employment in the Netherlands, relying primarily on the work of Evert Verhulp, 
is briefly considered, particularly with a view to establishing the enduring 



















Veneziani claims that the contract of employment had reached maturity 
throughout Western Europe, including England, by the beginning of the 
twentieth century.1 This claim, insofar as it concerns England, has recently 
been disputed by Deakin.2 Deakin’s view, now widely accepted,3 suggests 
that the contract of employment as a concept embracing ‘all forms of wage-
dependent labour’4 or as a ‘unitary’5 concept of employment only reached 
maturity towards the middle of the twentieth century, mostly as a result of 
social welfare legislation. 
 
To fully understand the significance of this view it is necessary to trace 
the origins of the regulation of labour in England. The first known instances of 
labour regulation, commencing with the Ordinance of Labourers in 1349, the 
Statute of Labourers in 1350 and subsequent statutes (the pre Elizabethan 
statutes) were efforts to address the shortage of labour and the ‘bidding up’ of 
wages that followed the Black Death. However, these statutes were no more 
                                                        
1  Veneziani, B ‘The Evolution of the Contract of Employment’ in Hepple, B (ed) The Making of 
Labour Law in Europe (1986) 31-72. 
2  Deakin, S ‘The Evolution of the Contract of Employment, 1900-1950: The Influence of the 
Welfare State’ in Whiteside, N and Salais, R (eds) Governance, Industry and Labour Markets 
In Britain and France; The Modernising Sate in the Mid-Twentieth Century (1998) 212- 230; 
Deakin, S ‘The Many Futures of the Contract of Employment’ in Conaghan, J; Fischl, RM 
and Klare, K Labour Law in an Era of Globalization: The Transformative Practices and 
Possibilities (2000) 177-196; Deakin, S ‘Legal Origins of Wage Labour; The Evolution of the 
Contract of Employment from Industrialisation to the Welfare State’ in Clarke, L;  De Gijsel, 
P and Janssen, J The Dynamics of Wage Relations in the New Europe (2000) 32-44; Deakin, S 
‘The Comparative Evolution of the Employment Relationship’ in Davidov, G and Langille, B 
Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law (2006) 89-108; Deakin, S ‘Does the “Personal 
Employment Contract” Provide a Basis for the Reunification of Employment Law?’ (2007) 26 
ILJ (UK) 68 and Deakin, S and Wilkenson, F The Law of the Labour Market (2005) at 41-
109. 
3  See Freedland, M The Personal Employment Contract (2003) at 14-22 and Howe, J and 
Mitchell, R ‘The Evolution of the Contract of Employment in Australia: A Discussion’ (1999) 
12 AJLL 113 at 114-115. 
4  Deakin ‘The Evolution of the Contract of Employment 1900-1950: The Influence of the 
Welfare State’ (n 2) at 213. 














than efforts to control the supply of labour and wages and did not introduce a 
contractual element to labour regulation.6 
 
The Statute of Artificers 1563, the Poor Law Act 1601 and the guild 
system collectively continued the regulation of the labour force7 by providing 
for a compulsory seven years’ apprenticeship, reserving superior trades for 
the sons of the more wealthy, imposing a general duty to work on all able-
bodied persons, empowering justices to require unemployed artificers to work 
in agriculture, regulating the transfer of a workman from one employer to 
another, restricting the freedom of movement of the poor and allowing justices 
to fix wage rates for all classes of workmen.8 In exchange, the Poor Law 
provided some poverty relief and yearling contracts.9 At this time labour 
regulation was still largely a matter of status and not contract.10  
 
2.2.2 The rise and fall of the Master and Servant Laws 
 
1750 is generally regarded as the year when the Industrial Revolution 
commenced, and the uncertainty of the application of the Statute of Artificers 
1563 to industrial workers led to the enactment of several Master and 
Servants Acts between 1747 and 1867.   
 
While the master and servant relationship under these laws was 
formally founded in contract, its substance suggested very little mutuality.11 
Criminal law was used to enforce contracts and breaches of contract by 
servants were adjudicated by magistrates and could result in imprisonment, 
                                                        
6  Johnstone, R and Mitchell, R ‘Regulating Work’ in Parker, C; Scott, C Lacey, N and 
Braithwaite, J (eds) Regulating Law (2004) 101-121 at 104. 
7  On the general nature of the guild system see Venziani (n 1) at 37-41. 
8  For more background on the assessment of wages during this period see McArthur, EA ‘The 
Regulation of Wages in the Sixteenth Century’ (1900) 15(59) The English Historical Review 
445 and Woodward, D ‘The Background to the Statute of Artificers: The Genesis of Labour 
Policy, 1558-63’ (1980) 33(1) The Economic History Review 32. 
9  Atiyah, PS The Rise and Fall of the Freedom of Contract (1979) at 68 and 524-528. Also see 
Kahn-Freund, O ‘Blackstone’s Neglected Child: The Contract of Employment’ (1977) 93 Law 
Quaterly Review 508 at 513. 
10  Kahn-Freund (n 9). 
11  See Hay, D ‘Master and Servant in England: Using the Law in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Centuries’ in Steinmetz, W (ed) Private Law and Social Inequality in the Industrial Age 














fines or even whipping.12 Similar recourse, however, was not available to 
servants. The original Master and Servant Act applied to servants in 
agriculture and a number of other trades such as miners, keelers, pitmen and 
glassmen, but the laws were eventually extended to apply to all trades. After 
1867 these laws applied to all servants and labourers and this was 
determined by relying on the criterion of exclusive service which resulted in 
skilled artisans with a ‘tradition of independence’ falling within the operation of 
these laws.13 This, however, only served to bring the worker under the 
disciplinary net of these laws and masters could still renege on long-term 
contracts without any consequences.14 The inherent inequalities of this 
system, backed up by the criminal jurisdiction of the magistrates’ courts,15 
leads Deakin to conclude that for the majority of the industrial and agricultural 
workers in the nineteenth century there was no ‘developed contractual theory 
of the employment relationship’ based on mutuality.16 This is not to suggest 
that discrete contractual doctrines were not emerging in the context of 
employment during the height of the Master and Servant era, but these were 
limited and only developed in respect of middle class or professional workers 
who were not regarded as subject to the Master and Servant laws.17  The 
binary divide at that point in time was thus not one of dependence and 
independence, but rather one of social classification ‘within the broad 
category of wage-dependent workers’.18  
 
The last Master and Servant Act 1867 was repealed by the Conspiracy 
and Protection of Property Act 1875. In the same year the Employers and 
Workmen Act 1875 was passed. For many this Act represented formal 
                                                        
12  See Hay (n 11) at 240, 246, 258 and 263-264. Also see Steinmetz, W ‘Was there a De-
juridification of Individual Employment Relations in Britain?’ in Steinmetz, W (ed) Private 
Law and Social Inequality in the Industrial Age (2000) 265-312 at 269-282. 
13  Also see Merritt, AS ‘The Historical Role in the Regulation of Employment – Abstentionist or 
Interventionist?’ (1982) 1 Australian Journal of Law & Society 56 at 57-58 where she 
describes how the notion of employment came to incorporate independent contractors. 
14  Deakin ‘The Evolution of the Contract of Employment 1900-1950: The Influence of the 
Welfare State’ (n 2) at 213-214 and Deakin ‘Legal Origins of Wage Labour’ (n 2) at 33-36. 
15  Wedderburn, KW The Worker and the Law (1965) at 49 reports that in 1872 prosecutions 
under the Master and Servant Act 1867 reached 17 100 with 10 400 convictions. 
16  Deakin ‘Legal Origins of Wage Labour’ (n 2) at 36. 
17  Such as the right to sue for damages for wrongful dismissal and the rights to be provided 
work. Deakin ‘Legal Origins of Wage Labour’ (n 2) at 36. 
18  Deakin ‘Does the ‘Personal Employment Contract’ Provide a Basis for the Reunification of 














recognition that employment was now firmly founded in a contract established 
between equal contracting parties.19 In fact Kahn-Freund, one of the 
proponents of this view, argued ‘that employment everywhere, in industry and 
trade, in agriculture and in domestic service . . . rested on a contractual basis . 
. . long before Benthams’s death [1832]’ and that by 1875 ‘a manual worker 
and his employer were made equal contracting parties’.20 This view was 
propounded by Kahn-Freund in his well-known lecture21 in which he lamented 
Blackstone’s treatment22 of labour law as an extension of domestic (and thus 
status) law. He basically argued that Blackstone’s view of the master-servant 
relationship as based on status at a time when it was, in the view of Kahn-
Freund, already clearly founded in contract, crippled the development of 
labour law and concomitant legislation.  
 
It is in this regard that Deakin and others, while not denying that some 
elements of contract were present in the employment relationship, are of the 
view that the service model survived until much later and was only displaced 
by a model assuming consensual agreement long after the repeal of the 
Master and Servant laws.23 Merritt,24 one of the early proponents of this view, 
already in 1982 bemoaned the claim that the contract of employment is 
backed up by a ‘tradition’ and an ‘elaborate corpus’25 of law when in fact it 
was still a new and developing concept, battling to break the shackles of the 
Master and Servant laws and their legacy. 
 
 
                                                        
19  Kahn-Freund (n 9) at 525. See Wedderburn (n 15) at 32 where he states that ‘the general law 
of contract concerning employment was largely developed in judicial decisions of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.’ Also see Veneziani (n 1) at 33. 
20  Kahn-Freund (n 9) at 525. 
21  Kahn-Freund (n 9). 
22  Kahn-Freund is alluding to the fact that in Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, the Law of Master and Servant is included in the Law of Persons. 
23  See Deakin ‘The Evolution of the Contract of Employment 1900-1950: The Influence of the 
Welfare State’ (n 2) at 214. 
24  Merritt (n 13) at 57-60.  Ironically Merritt’s view is exactly the opposite of the one supported 
by Kahn-Freund in his famous Blackstone lecture (n 9), published five years prior to the 
Merritt article.  















2.2.3 Social welfare legislation and the contractualisation of 
employment 
 
Far from being egalitarian, the Employers and Workmen Act 1875, 
albeit under the guise of the magistrates’ civil jurisdiction, perpetuated the 
disparities of the Master and Servants laws. The courts, for instance, could 
order specific performance against an employee in breach of contract - a 
claim to this day not possible under English contract law.26 Claims for arrear 
wages could be set off against the employer’s counterclaim for breach of 
contract and an award for damages against an employee took the form of 
fines; for example, instead of calculating actual loss, the courts simply 
awarded damages up to the statutory limit of £10.27 Significantly, Deakin 
points out that this Act applied only to labourers, artisans or servants. As in 
the case of the Master and Servant laws, higher status employees were still 
not subject to the magistrates’ court disciplinary jurisdiction.  The social divide 
entrenched in the Master and Servant model thus lingered on well beyond the 
repeal of these laws: 
 
The legal influence of the master-servant regime was just as far 
reaching as its considerable social and economic impact. The model of 
command relation, with an open-ended duty of obedience imposed on 
the worker, and reserving far reaching disciplinary powers to the 
employer, spilled over into the common law, so that long after the 
repeal of the Master and Servant Acts in 1875, not just the terminology 
                                                        
26  For an interesting discussion of this principle in the context of sport see Caiger, A and O’ 
Leary, J ‘The End of the Affair: The “Anelka Doctrine” – The Problem of Contract Stability 
in English Professional Football’ in Caiger, A and Gardiner, S (eds) Professional Sport in the 
EA: Regulation and Re-regulation (2000) 197-215. Generally this has been the approach of 
the South African courts regarding specific performance in the context of the contract of 
employment (see Schierhout v Minister of Justice 1926 AD 99) until the judgment in Stewart 
Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v Thorpe 1977 (2) SA 943 (A). For more recent jurisprudence on this see 
Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund and Another 2003 (5) SA 73 (C). Also 
see Golden Lions Rugby Union v Venter and Others (Case No 2007/2000, unreported) where 
the TPD indicated (obiter) that it would have enforced a renewal clause and ordered a rugby 
player to continue playing for a specific provincial team had the terms of the renewal clause 
been met by the employer province. Also see Roberts and Another v Martin 2005 (4) SA 163 
(C) and Le Roux, R ‘How Divine Is My Contract? Reflecting on the Enforceability of Player 
or Athlete Contracts in Sport’ (2003) 15 SA Merc LJ 116. 
27  See Deakin ‘Legal Origins of Wage Labour’ (n 2) at 37. Also see Deakin, S ‘Logical 
Deductions? Wage Protection Before and After Delaney v Staples’ (1998) 55 Modern Law 














of master and servant but also many of the old assumptions of 
unmediated control were still being applied by the courts as they 
developed the common law of employment.28 
 
While there is evidence suggesting that from the early twentieth 
century the courts began to apply general contractual principles to lower 
status employees,29 the complete ‘contractualisation’ of the employment 
relationship (that is, the displacement of the status model of hierarchical 
control with a model based on reciprocity and mutuality) was, Deakin argues, 
delayed until at least the 1940s. A different, but associated, development was 
the establishment of what became known as the dichotomy between the 
employee and the self-employed. It will be recalled that by virtue of the 
requirement of exclusive service under the Master and Servant laws, many 
workers with a tradition of independence were caught in the net of these laws 
and this dichotomy was therefore not visible in employment disputes during 
the early twentieth century. Deakin argues that the final ‘contractualisation’ 
and the attendant dichotomisation of the employment relationship was not the 
legacy of the Master and Servant laws: it only happened as a result of the 
introduction and development of social welfare legislation. The argument can 
be summarised as follows:30 
 
The early workmen’s compensation legislation,31 either by judicial 
interpretation or by listing exceptions to the definition of workman (defined in 
terms of a ‘contract of service’ or apprenticeship) did not apply to non-manual 
workers earning above a certain threshold, casual workers, outworkers and 
family workers. Similarly the National Insurance Act 1911 applied to employed 
persons employed under a contract of service or apprenticeship, but once 
again excluded non-manual workers earning above a certain threshold, 
                                                        
28  Deakin, S ‘Labour Law and Economic Development’ paper presented at the 19th Annual 
Labour Law Conference, Johannesburg, South Africa, July 2006. Also in Deakin ‘The 
Comparative Evolution of the Employment Relationship’ (n 2) at 97. 
29  For instance, the right of the employee to payment for work done, despite not completing the 
agreed period of service. See Deakin ‘The Legal Origins of Wage Labour’ (n 2) at 38. Also 
see Deakin and Wilkenson (n 2) at 80-81. 
30  See works cited in notes 2 and 28.   
31  These included the Employer’s Liability Act 1880, the Workmen’s Compensation Act 1897 














casual workers, commission agents, some public servants32 such as civil 
servants, military personnel and teachers as well as some female outworkers. 
Thus under both legislative schemes higher status and lower status workers 
were excluded from protection. It was in this context that the control test was 
introduced by the courts in the early twentieth century. It was an effort to limit 
the application of social legislation by reinforcing ‘the status-based distinction 
between the “labouring” and “professional” classes, while on the other hand it 
excluded casual and seasonal workers to whom the employer made a limited 
commitment of continuing employment’.33 The control test, while used during 
the nineteenth century, was not as important as the concept of exclusive 
service to determine the application of the Master and Servants law and 
initially it was not even used in the context of employment disputes. For 
instance, Yewens v Noakes,34 the nineteenth century case regarded by many 
as the locus classicus of the control test, in fact dealt with a statutory 
exemption from house duty where premises were occupied by a servant. In 
the context of social welfare legislation the control test was therefore relied 
upon, not because it was already in use and readily available, but because it 
served to buttress the status divisions entrenched in the social welfare 
legislation.35 The contract of service, a prerequisite to unlocking the benefits 
of social legislation, through the combined effect of the definitions used in the 
legislation and the use of the control test, thus remained a matter of status.  
 
This only changed during the 1940s, principally as result of the 
publication of the Beveridge Report in 1942,36 which, in an effort to eradicate 
                                                        
32  Due to its peculiar history, the regulation of the public service developed, at least until the 
twentieth century, outside the contract of employment. See Veneziani (n 1) at 50-54.  
33  Deakin ‘The Evolution of the Contract of Employment’ (n 2) at 219. 
34  Also see comments by Brooks, A ‘Myth and Muddle – An Examination of Contracts for the 
Performance of Work’ (1988) 11 UNSW Law Journal 48 at 56-57. 
35  Deakin and Wilkenson (n 2) at 90-92. 
36  Beveridge, WH Social and Allied Services: The Beveridge Report in Brief (1942). This report, 
regarded by some as a ‘magnificent essay in social engineering’ was the result of an inquiry 
commissioned in 1941 to undertake a survey of existing national schemes of social insurance 
and allied services, including workmen’s compensation at a time when large sections of the 
population were excluded from existing social insurance coverage. See Wolman, L ‘The 
Beveridge Report’ (1943) 58 Political Science Quarterly 1. Its main thrust was a ‘single “All-
in” social insurance scheme embracing all citizens without upper income limit, and providing 
flat rates of benefit (sufficient to cover subsistence needs) in the event of a wide range of 
social contingencies’. See Owen, ADK ‘The Beveridge Report – Its Proposals’ (1943) 53 














class differences, recommended two main groups of contributors under 
National Insurance legislation: employees under a contract of service (which 
soon became interchangeable with the phrase ‘contract of employment’) and 
‘others gainfully employed’, including employers and independent traders 
such as  shopkeepers, hawkers, farmers, small holders and crofters, shore 
fishermen, entertainers and the providers of professional and personal 
services and out-workers.37 This distinction was subsequently introduced into 
the National Insurance Act 1946 and a similar distinction is seen under the 
Pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) system introduced by the Income Tax Act 
(Employment) 1943. The collective effect of this legislation was first, to 
remove the class differences so prevalent under the Master and Servant laws 
and also in early social welfare legislation, and to introduce a model of the 
contract of employment that extended to all wage earners (the so-called 
unitary model of the contract of employment), and second, to firmly establish 
the dichotomy between the employee and the independent contractor. Due to 
the fact that the courts no longer identified the contract of employment on the 
basis of status, the control test could obviously not explain the employee 
status of higher income or professional employees and different techniques 
such as the ‘business’ test, ‘mutuality of obligation’, ‘risk of profit and loss’  
and the ‘multi-faceted’ test were developed to identify employees.38 According 
to Freedland this dichotomy came to dominate the social security and income 
tax systems to such an extent that ‘when, during the 1960s and 1970s, the 
major expansion of statutory individual employment rights took place, it was 
usually seen as obvious and uncontroversial to confer those rights on 
employees working under contracts of employment, but not upon other 
workers’.39  
 
                                                        
37  Pars 309 and 314-319 of the Beveridge Report (n 36). A third, though less significant, group 
of contributors was those of working age not gainfully employed. 
38  See Davies, ACL Perspectives on Labour Law (2004) at 84-87 and Deakin, S and Morris, GS 
Employment Law 4ed (2005) at 149-161. 
39  Freedland (n 3) at 19. These statutes include the Contracts of Employment Act 1963, the 
Redundancy Payments Act 1965 and the Industrial Relations Act 1971. One wonders whether 
the subsequent tendency to develop the application of natural justice to employment discipline 
along the lines of status is not a legacy of the evolutionary pattern identified by Deakin. Both 
Napier, B ‘Judicial Attitudes towards the Employment Relationship – Some Recent 
Developments’ (1977) 6 ILJ (UK) 1 at 3-4 and  Wedderburn, KW ‘Labour Law: From here to 














Deakin argues that the basic logic of the social insurance and tax 
schemes that followed the Beveridge Report involved a trade-off: While the 
self-employed were not excluded from the operation of the social insurance 
scheme, their protection was limited. This, however, was countered by the 
fact that they, unlike employees, were able to set off work related expenses 
against income for tax purposes: 
 
Thus there was, in Beveridge’s scheme, a real sense that 
employment and self–employment involved different trade-offs 
between security on the one hand and support for enterprise on the 
other.40 
 
However, because the courts took a narrow view of the contract of 
employment (by emphasising, for instance, mutuality of obligation) and 
disregarded the role of tax and social security trade-offs, many dependent 
workers were excluded from the protection of employment laws.41 
 
Finally, the rise of collective bargaining, while perhaps not the primary 
stimulus in establishing the unitary model of the contract of employment, 
abetted the ‘unification’ process mainly by gradually substituting the resorting 
of employers to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the magistrates’ courts under 
the Employers and Workmen Act 1875 with collective bargaining and 
arbitration and by reducing the level of labour-only subcontracting42 





                                                        
40  Deakin, S ‘Does the “Personal Employment Contract” Provide a Basis for the Reunification of 
Employment Law?’ (n 2) at 77.  
41  Deakin, S ‘Does the “Personal Employment Contract” Provide a Basis for the Reunification of 
Employment Law?’ (n 2) at 77-78. 
42  For an overview of the nature and extent of labour-only subcontracting in mid-twentieth 
century England see Clark, G De N ‘Industrial Law and the Labour-only Sub-contract’ (1967) 
30 Modern Law Review 6 . 
43  See Deakin ‘The Evolution of the Contract of Employment’ (n 2) at 222-223. Also see 














2.2.4 The ‘worker’ concept 
 
One further development in employment-related legislation warrants 
mention. It was soon realised that the above dichotomy resulted in a group of 
workers who were distinguishable from employees, ‘but nonetheless 
suffer[ed] from some of the same vulnerabilities, in particular being dependent 
on a single user of their labour’ and who needed some protection.44 This 
resulted in the introduction of two additional, but very similar legislative 
categories: first, a contract personally to execute work or labour, found in 
discrimination legislation45 and, second, a contract to do or perform personally 
any work or services for another party to the contract whose status is not by 
virtue of the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or business 
undertaking carried on by the individual, found in legislation regulating 
conditions of employment.46 The exact content of these categories remains 
unclear; what is clear is that they do not embrace contracts of employment, 
but exist alongside the contract of employment. As such they should perhaps 
not be regarded as a part of the evolutionary process of the contract of 
employment, but rather as a response to its pace.47   
 
2.2.5 Concluding remarks 
 
 The focus of this thesis is to establish the relevance and future of the 
contract of employment in modern employment relationships. The significance 
of the above overview of the evolution of the contract of employment, however 
broad it may be, is that it tells us something about the forces that shaped its 
character, at least in England. Out of the iniquitous Master and Servant 
regime a concept was moulded to accommodate the distribution of social 
risks. This concept, contrasted mainly with independent contractors, 
                                                        
44  Davidov, G ‘Who is a Worker?’ (2005) 34 ILJ (UK) 57 at 62. Also see Deakin and Morris     
(n 38) at 164-170. 
45  The Equal Pay Act 1970, Sex Discrimination Act 1975, Race Relations Act 1976 and the 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995. 
46  The Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, Employment Rights Act of 
1996, the National Minimum Wage Act 1998, Employment Relations Act 1999, Working 
Time Regulations 1998 and the Part-Time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable 
Treatment) Regulations 2000. 














eventually viewed all wage earners as equals. Answering the research 
question will therefore require consideration of the continued validity of the 
contract of employment as a means of channelling social risks, the equal 
treatment of employees and the employee/independent contractor dichotomy 
as employment’s fault line.48 The extent to which the evolution of the contract 
of employment in South Africa was shaped by similar forces will be 
considered in the following section. 
 




To understand the evolution of the contract of employment in South 
Africa it is necessary to reflect briefly on the country’s history and the context 
within which its regulation of labour developed. In England the early forms of 
labour regulation can be traced back to at least the mid-fourteenth century. By 
the time Jan van Riebeeck established a replenishment station in 1652 at the 
Cape of Good Hope on behalf of the Dutch-East Company (VOC), the Statute 
of Artificers 1563 had been in operation for almost ninety years in England. 
 
While Van Riebeeck introduced Roman-Dutch law to the Cape,49 
history suggests that the administration of justice at the Cape was poor and it 
was only towards the end of the eighteenth century that an attempt was made 
to improve this by the establishment of a law library and the recruitment of 
trained lawyers. A Council of Polity under the chairmanship of the Governor 
and consisting of VOC officials functioned as the Council of Justice.  
 
                                                        
48  See Johnstone and Mitchell (n 6) at 128-130. Also see Deakin ‘The Comparative Evolution of 
the Employment Relationship’ (n 2) at 102-108.   
49  For a more comprehensive discussion of this over-simplified statement see Fagan, E ‘Roman-
Dutch Law in its South African Historical Context’ in Zimmerman, R and Visser, D Southern 
Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 33-63. The VOC decreed that the 
law of Holland, where Roman-Dutch law was the common law, should be applied in the Cape, 
probably because Holland exercised the dominant influence in the affairs of the VOC. Also 















Territorial expansion occurred from 1656 onwards as former VOC 
officials (freeburghers) were allowed to settle on farms and also with the 
arrival of the French Huguenots in 1688.50 From 1657 onwards these civilians 
were allowed to sit on the Council of Justice and landdrosten and heemraden 
were appointed to oversee the administration of justice in the country.51 
 
While ‘free’ artisans no doubt existed at the Cape, it is clear that by the 
time of the British occupation, first in 1795 and finally in 1806, no culture of 
employment had developed during the Dutch control of the Cape.52 The 
reason for this is unsurprising. Labour demands were met by slaves that were 
imported from East Africa, India and Indonesia and by the time of the first 
British occupation in 1795 there were approximately 26 000 slaves in the 
Cape as opposed to 17 000 free civilians.53 The enslavement of the local 
KhoiKhoi was prohibited since it was thought that that they were likely to 
abscond.54 At this time it was not uncommon for masters to rent out their 
slaves; these arrangements were managed as locatio re (letting and hiring of 
things).55 The VOC also made white labourers available to farmers on loan. 
This arrangement (possibly a forerunner of modern labour brokering), was 
regarded as a contract sui generis and was apparently less successful 
because of the master’s lack of meesterskap (mastership). By the end of the 
Dutch reign there were calls for this arrangement to be replaced with a ‘direct’ 
                                                        
50  For a comprehensive overview of the territorial expansion from 1652 onwards see Giliomee, 
H The Afrikaners: Biography of a People (2003), in particular at 1-192. 
51  See Fagan (n 49); Wessels, JW History of the Roman Dutch Law (1908) at 355-371 and 386-
401; Thomas, PhJ; Van Der Merwe, CG and Stoop, BC Historical Foundations of South 
African Private Law 2ed (2000) at 95-97; Hahlo, and Kahn (n 49) at 566-575; Visagie, CG 
Regspleging en Reg aan die Kaap van 1652-1806 (1969) at 40-78 and Jordaan, B 
‘Employment Relations’ in Zimmerman, R and Visser, D Southern Cross: Civil Law and 
Common Law in South Africa (1996) 389-415.   
52  In 1752, for instance, 109 employees (out of a total of 1 563) were listed as artisans (including 
supervisors) in the annual Cape muster rolls. This included 22 blacksmiths, 36 house 
carpenters, 14 ship carpenters, 26 bricklayers, 11 persons who worked in the cooper’s 
workshop, and 10 wagon makers. A few glass makers and tailors were listed under ‘diverse 
services’. The rest were soldiers. See Worden, N ‘Forging a Reputation: Artisan Honour and 
the Cape Town Blacksmith Strike of 1752’ 2002 Kronos 43 at 50, particularly note 47. 
53  For an overview of the rise and fall of slavery in South Africa, see Dooling, W Slavery, 
Emancipation and Colonial Rule (2007). Also see Thomas et al (n 51) at 96. Giliomee (n 50) 
at 93 estimates that there were 32 000 slaves by 1820. 
54  Roux, E Time Longer Than Rope 2ed (1964) at 20-29. 














contract between the farmer and the white labourer with the aim of giving 
more control to the former.56 
 
After the final British occupation in 1806, Roman-Dutch law was 
retained as the law of South Africa, but English law nonetheless influenced 
the administration of justice. Circuit courts for all were introduced; the Council 
of Justice was replaced by a supreme court; resident magistrates in 
accordance with the English system replaced the landdrosten and 
heemraden; the Privy Council became the court of appeal; English became 
the official language of the courts and only British and colonial advocates (the 
latter had to be educated at British universities) could be appointed as judges. 
It is therefore small wonder that English procedural law and law of evidence 
were introduced.57 An important break with Dutch tradition was the 
introduction of the English doctrine of stare decisis and the consequent 
reporting of judgments from 1828 onwards.58  Also, in 1838 the Dutch Civil 
Code was introduced in Holland with the result that further developments in 
Holland had no more influence on the development of law in South Africa.59  
 
The British occupation prompted a further expansion of territory 
northwards. Apart from the annexation of certain territories by the British, the 
Voortrekkers migrated (known as the Great Trek) northwards and up the 
eastern coast in search of independence.60 In 1838 the Republic of Natalia 
                                                        
56  Visagie (n 51) at 89-90. 
57  See Hahlo and Kahn (n 49) at 576 and Jordaan (n 51) at 392-394. On a social level the nature 
of life in the Cape changed in 1820 with the arrival of 5 000 British Settlers, the establishment 
of English schools and the proclamation of English as the official language in 1822. 
58  In the Cape the reports commenced in 1828, in Natal they commenced in 1858, in the Free 
State in 1874 and in the Transvaal in 1877, but these developments were largely due to 
individual efforts.  After unionisation in 1910 a Supreme Court with an Appellate Division 
and four Provincial Divisions, to which a number of Local Divisions were attached, came into 
being. The judgments were reported in different series dedicated to each division, but in 1947 
the reports of all the divisions were consolidated into the South African Law Reports. These 
are supplemented by reports such as the Prentice Hall Weekly Legal Service (1923-1995) and 
the All South African Law Reports, published weekly from 1996, as well as a number of 
specialised law reports on cases concerning, for instance, tax, industrial and commercial 
matters. For more on law reporting in South Africa see ‘editorial note 1’ in Zimmerman, R 
and Visser, D Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 15-19. 
59  Wessels (n 51) at 363-367 and Thomas et al (n 51) at 98-99. For a comprehensive overview of 
the influence of English law see Hahlo and Kahn (n 49) at 575-596. Also see § 2.4. 
60  See Giliomee (n 50) at 161-192. The Great Trek roughly coincided with another great 
migration known as the Mfecane which commenced in 1817 in Natal and resulted in the 














was established by the Voortrekkers and in 1854 and 1858 respectively the 
Republics of the Orange Free State and Zuid Afrika were founded. In 1845 
Natalia was colonised by the British and the Orange Free State and the Zuid 
Afrikaanse Republic (later Transvaal) were annexed by the British after the 
Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). Throughout this expansion period and also with 
the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910, both the Boers and the 
British maintained Roman-Dutch law as the common law. However, due to 
British rule, the trend for lawyers to train in England (uninterrupted teaching of 
law in South Africa only commenced in 1890) and the failure of Roman-Dutch 
law to address modern institutions, the influence of English law lingered on, 
waxing and waning over the next decades as the political tensions between 
the English and the Afrikaners fluctuated after the Anglo-Boer War. This often 
resulted in attempts by purists to eradicate English influences.61 The purists, 
while prepared to seek reforming influences in Continental legal writing, 
insisted ‘that Roman-Dutch law was the basis of the modern law’.62 To them 
the task of the judge was to ‘eradicate from South African law all that was 
regarded as impure accretions emanating from the perfidious Albion’.63 While 
difficult to delineate, the height of the purist movement in South Africa roughly 
covered the third quarter of the twentieth century and the concomitant rise of 
Afrikaner politics during the same period is no coincidence.64 The modernists 
constituted the rival movement. Since they were always ‘less characteristically 
“modernist” than the purist [were] characteristically “purist”’,65 they 
represented a relatively loose alignment and were more difficult to identify. 
                                                                                                                                                              
wars on rival tribes; others associate it with the European migration northwards and the 
increasing demand for cheap or slave labour. See Fagan (n 49) at 52. 
61  See Du Plessis, L An Introduction to Law 3ed (1999) at 55-63 for a brief overview of the 
influence of the purist movement. Also see Fagan (n 49) at 60-64; Forsyth, CF In Danger for 
their Talents: A Study of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court from 1950-80 (1985); 
Cameron, E ‘Legal Chauvinism, Executive Mindedness and Justice – LC Steyn’s Impact on 
South African Law’ (1982) 99 SALJ 38; Visser, D ‘The Legal Historian as Subversive or: 
Killing the Capitoline Geese’ in Visser, D Essays on the History of Law (1989) 1-31, 
especially at 20-21 as well as the comments of Sachs, A ‘The Future of Roman-Dutch Law in 
a Non-Racial Democratic South Africa: Some Preliminary Observations’ (1992) 1 Social & 
Legal Studies 217 at 220. 
62  Forsyth (n 61) at 184. For similar sentiments see Proculus ‘Bellum Juridicum: Two 
Approaches to South African Law’ (1951) 68 SALJ 306 at 306. 
63  Fagan (n 49) at 62. For similar sentiments see Proculus ‘(n 62) at 306. Also see Mulligan, GA 
‘Bellum Juricum (3): Purists, Pollutionists and Pragmatists’ (1952) 69 SALJ 25 written in 
response to the note by Proculus. 
64  Fagan (n 49) at 63. 














However, generally, while still respecting Roman-Dutch law, they were happy 
to import English law in order to modernise the rapidly dating Roman-Dutch 
law.66 Although in retrospect it is clear that certain authors, universities and 
even publications67 were clearly inclined to support one of these movements, 
it stopped short of the establishment of formal schools endorsing the one or 
the other movement. Yet, as will be illustrated below, it cannot be denied that 
the purist mindset of certain judges certainly resulted in the prolonging of 
some dated concepts which in turn undermined the development of new 
law.68 The purist/modernist movements started waning from the 1980s and 
were eventually overtaken by the positivist and non-positivist movements.69 
 
Despite the tension between the purists and the modernists, Roman-
Dutch law was always and still is generally regarded as the common law of 
South Africa, and some regard it as more appropriate to call it South African 
law.70 One debate, still unsettled, is whether the courts should only revert to 
Roman-Dutch law as it was understood during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries or whether broad regard should be paid to Roman law 







                                                        
66  See Du Plessis (n 61).  
67  Du Plessis (n 61) at 59-60 mentions Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse 
Reg,(THRHR) founded in 1937 which was the mouthpiece of the purist movement and the 
South African Law Journal (SALJ) which was inclined to accommodate the views of the 
modernists.  
68  See § 2.3.4.6. Also see Cameron (n 61) for the influence of Chief Justice Steyn and the 
examples cited by Proculus (n 62) at 309-31. 
69  This rivalry was introduced by Dugard, J ‘The Judicial Process, Positivism and Civil Liberty 
(1971) 88 SALJ 181. 
70  Fagan (n 49) at 64. In ex parte De Winnar 1959 (1) SA 837 (N) at 839 Holmes J commented 
that: ‘Our country has reached a stage in its development when its existing law can better be 
described as South African than Roman Dutch . . . The original sources of the Roman-Dutch 
law are important, but exclusive preoccupation with them is like trying to return an oak tree to 
its acorn.’ 














2.3.2 Master and Servant laws and social welfare legislation: Towards 
unification 
 
2.3.2.1 Master and servant laws 
 
The British occupation was soon followed by the arrival of the British 
settlers. Although their numbers were limited, these settlers represented the 
first firm introduction of artisans.72 Many of these artisan-settlers were brought 
to South Africa at the expense of private entrepreneurs who in return shared 
in their wages. Since many of them absconded from their assigned masters to 
work for others, Proclamations were passed in 1803 and again in 1818, aimed 
at preventing the desertion of such white indentured servants and apprentices 
as well as preventing third parties from luring these servants away from their 
assigned masters: the former was punishable by imprisonment, the latter by a 
fine.73 These proclamations represent the earliest form of the regulation of 
‘free’ labour at the Cape and introduced a pattern of disparities between the 
position of employees and employers that would dominate the South African 
labour market until at least the repeal of the Master and Servant Laws in 
1974. 
 
A number of important legislative steps were taken by the British that 
had a direct influence on the development of employment relationships and 
provided the stimuli for the Great Trek: By 1806 the slave trade all but came 
to a halt and a general shortage of labour followed at the Cape.74 To address 
this, a Proclamation was passed in 1809 to secure KhoiKhoi labour by means 
of a pass control system and the registration of contracts lasting a month or 
longer. This was the ‘first comprehensive legislation that assumed a master-
servant relationship was to exist between the [KhoiKhoi and Europeans]’.75  
Significantly, Sir John Cradock, who became governor at the Cape soon after 
                                                        
72  See Newton-King, S ‘The Labour Market of the Cape Colony, 1807-28’ in Marks, S and 
Atmore, A (eds) Economy and Society on Pre-Industrial South Africa (1980) 182-188.  
73  Harding, W (ed) The Cape of Good Hope Government Proclamations From 1806 to 1925 (vol 
1) 1838 at 216. 
74  The last auction of slaves at the Cape took place on 12 March 1808. 
75  See Clement Duly, L ‘A Revisit with the Cape’s Hottentot Ordinance of 1828’ in Kooy, M 
(ed) Studies in Economics and Economic History (1972) 26-56, especially at 28. Also see 














the passing of this proclamation, justified its passing because there was a 
need to end the ‘uncontrolled severity of the powerful over the weak . . . the 
nameless tyranny of the strong over the defenceless’.76 
 
 This proclamation was repealed by Ordinance 50 of 1828 which 
endeavoured to introduce full civil rights for all the KhoiKhoi by limiting the 
powers of employers, abolishing the obligation of the KhoiKhoi to carry 
passes and giving them the right to buy and own land on the same basis as 
Europeans.77 On the labour front oral contracts were limited to one month, 
written contracts to one year and children could not be apprenticed without 
the consent of their parents.78 Furthermore, the anticipated abolition of slavery 
was preceded by what was known as ameliorative legislation aimed at 
facilitating the transformation from slavery to labour in a free market. 
Ordinance 19 of 1826 and two further Orders-in-Council in 1830 and 1831 
respectively placed limits on the amount of labour per day that slaves could 
be expected to perform (10 hours in winter and 12 hours in summer), limited 
the amount of physical punishment that could be inflicted on slaves and 
prescribed the provision of sufficient food and clothing. Also, in an effort to 
protect family ties, slaves were also given the right to marry. Transgressing 
masters could be criminally prosecuted.79 This was followed by the final 
abolition of slavery at the Cape with affect from 1 December 183480 and the 
                                                        
76  Quoted by Dooling (n 53) at 65. 
77  Giliomee (n 50) at 146, Hahlo and Kahn (n 49) 577, Fagan (n 49) at 54 and Jordaan (n 51) at 
395-397. Piet Retief, an important Voortrekker leader, (quoted by Fagan at 54) stated the 
‘severe losses which we have been forced to sustain by the emancipation of our slaves and the 
vexatious laws which have been enacted respecting them’ as the reason for the Voortrekker 
migration (Great Trek). Also see Dooling (n 53) at 93-95. Ironically, Ordinance 50 of 1828 
did little to improve the social standing of the KhoiKhoi and very few actually obtained land 
as a result of it. In addition, the poor legal system at the Cape, the lack of resources and the 
lack of political will soon rendered this proclamation a dead letter. See Giliomee (n 50) at 89 
and 108 and Clement Duly (n 75) at 40-46. 
78  Clement Duly (n 75) at 29. Ordinance 50 of 1828 represented an attempt to increase the labour 
supply by removing the KhoiKhoi resistance to the  pass laws of 1809. Ironically it was 
preceded by Ordinance 49 of 1828 which intended to regulate African labour and introduced a 
pass system for Africans. See Newton-King (n 72) at 171-207. 
79  Dooling (n 53) at 84-85. 
80  Under the Slavery Abolition Act 1833 passed by the British Parliament. While slavery was 
abolished in 1834 it was followed by a period of ‘apprenticeship’ which required slaves to 
provide their labour, although they could no longer be punished by their masters. This task 
was given to magistrates appointed for this purpose. At the end of this period, on 1 December 














subsequent introduction of the first Master and Servant Ordinance in 1841.81 
This removed the distinction previously made between the KhoiKhoi (who 
were regarded as freer than the slaves) and the slaves.82 The 1841 Ordinance 
was replaced by the harsher Master and Servant Act of 185683 and similar 
legislation was introduced in the other British territories84 and the Boer 
Republics and Natal.85   
 
Unlike Britain, but similar to the position in, for instance, Australia, the 
Master and Servant laws were repealed in South Africa only in 1974.86 The 
general thrust of these laws was to make the registration of contracts 
compulsory and to make a breach of contract criminally punishable.87 
Breaches, such as failure to commence work, desertion, negligence, 
insolence and refusal to obey commands, were punishable by fines and/or 
imprisonment and, in the case of Natal and Transvaal, by lashing for minor 
offences. The definition of ‘servant’ varied, but the laws were, on the face of it, 
racially neutral. In the 1856 (Cape) Act, for instance, ‘servant’ was defined as 
any person employed for hire, wages, or other remuneration to perform any 
handicraft or other bodily labour in agriculture or manufacture or in domestic 
service, or as a boatman, porter, or occupation of a like nature’.88  
 
Despite the punitive nature of these laws, they show early traces of 
protective legislation. For instance, they provided for a month’s paid sick 
                                                        
81  Ordinance 1 of 1841. 
82  Giliomee (n 50) at 108 further states that: ‘More than in the eighteenth century, Cape society 
was now becoming polarized between whites and an undifferentiated category of people who 
were very poor and brown or black, and who could do little but work for whites.’ 
83  Act 15 of 1856 (Cape) as amended by Acts 18 of 1873, 28 of 1874, 7 of 1875 and 30 of 1889. 
84  Proclamation 14 of 1872 and Act 23 of 1952 in Griqualand West. Proclamation 206 of 1893, 
34 of 1894 and 33 of 1897 and all amended by Proclamation 255 of 1934 in the Transkeian 
Territories. 
85  In Natal: Ordinance 2 of 1850 as amended by Ordinance 13 of 1852, Laws 18 of 1862, 23 of 
1865, 15 of 1871, 17 of 1882, 12 of 1885, 34 of 1887, 3 of 1891, Acts 40 of 1894, 13 of 1896, 
13 of 1898, 35 of 1899, 49 of 1901, 50 of 1901, 3 of 1904, 21 of 1907 and 12 of 1908. 
In Transvaal (Zuid-Afrikaanse Republic): Law 13 of 1880 and Act 27 of 1909. 
In the Orange Free State: Ordinance 7 of 1904 and Act 15 of 1911. 
86  General Law Amendment Act 94 of 1974. 
87  Generally see Bundy, C ‘The Abolition of the Masters and Servants Act’ (1975) 2(1) SALB 
37; Chanock, M ‘South Africa, 1841-1924: Race, Contract, and Coercion’ in Hay, D and 
Craven, P (eds) Masters, Servants and Magistrates in Britain & the Empire (2004) 338-364; 
Chanock, M The Making of South African Legal Culture 1902-1936: Fear, Favour and 
Prejudice (2001) at 424-436 and Spencer v Gostelow 1920 AD 617 at 628-629. 














leave; a month’s notice for all contracts of service for a month or longer; the 
provision of food and lodging where the servant was required to reside on the 
premises of the master; the protection of the wife and children of a servant 
required to reside on the master’s premises against forced labour and the 
limitation of the age at which a child could be apprenticed. In addition, the 
duration of contracts was limited.89 90 Section 3 of the Master and Servant 
Laws of 1880 (Transvaal) even contained crude elements of protection 
against victimisation for what can now be describe as early trade unionism.91  
 
In addition, some judges seem to have had a genuine understanding of 
the reciprocal nature of the master and servant relationship. In October and 
Others v Rowe92 De Villiers CJ summarised his understanding of these laws 
as follows:  
 
The want of mutuality does not raise merely the question of 
consideration, but it goes to the root of the relation between master and 
servant. So long as slavery was legal, no such mutuality was required 
as between master and slave, but since the abolition of slavery the only 
legal relation between master and servant has been that of hiring and 
letting of services. Where a servant has purported to let his services for 
a certain period without a reciprocal hiring of such services for the full 
period, the criminal liability of the servant under the Masters and 
Servants Acts of 1856 and 1873 attaches only so long as the master's 
civil liability to employ the servant continues.93 
                                                        
89  For example, the Cape Act limited a contract to five years in the case of a written contract and 
one year in the case of an oral contract. See ss 3-5 of Act 15 of 1856.  
90  This protection may have been a relic from the of old English poor laws that a master should 
care for a sick servant (which appears to have fallen into disuse by the late eighteenth century 
(Deakin and Wilkenson  (n 2) at 66) or even the Roman law rule stated by Voet that domestic 
servants retained their right to wages if they were prevented from performing their work for a 
short time as a result of illness. Both these authorities are discussed in Boyd v Stutttaford and 
Co 1910 AD 101. Some of these protective elements also resemble the rights given to the 
slaves in the ameliorative legislation (Ordinance 19 of 1826) that preceded the final abolition 
of slavery. See Dooling (n 53) at 85 and the discussion earlier in this paragraph. 
91  Section 3 provided that those meeting for ‘the sole purpose of consulting upon and 
determining the rate of wages or price which the persons present at that meeting . . . shall 
require or demand for his or their services or work . . . ’ would not be liable to any penalty or 
prosecution. 
92  (1898) 15 SC 110.  














Nonetheless, despite these progressive elements of the Master and 
Servant laws and positive remarks from the bench, their general thrust 
rendered them extremely one-sided. Not only could the master rely on the 
might of the criminal justice system to punish breaches by a servant, he could 
also manipulate the process by virtue of a provision that allowed the master to 
order the servant to appear before the magistrate on a date determined by the 
master.94  
 
While a master could be fined for not paying wages when an action for 
non-payment came before a magistrate, unpaid wages had to be recovered 
by the servant via civil action. The courts soon developed a narrow view on 
the non-payment of wages by requiring proof of criminal intent which meant 
that the master’s belief that wages were not due or a bona fide dispute as to 
the amount owed or a lack of funds assisted the master. The master could 
also claim as set-off against wages amounts owing to him by the servant and 
notice pay was not regarded as wages.95  
 
By the twentieth century progressively more (white) workers were 
covered by industrial relations legislation and the Master and Servant laws 
were predominantly used in the agricultural and domestic sectors which, in 
turn, suffered from ‘statutory neglect’96  and which have traditionally been non-
white sectors.97 It has been said that this is one of the reasons for the late 
abolition of these laws in South Africa: 
 
As in Britain, ‘small and backward’ employers were the 
beneficiaries of the law. In contrast to nineteenth century Britain, 
however, the electoral and representative power of agrarian capital 
remained far more powerful. Any suggestion of repealing the Master 
                                                        
94  See s 24 of Act 15 of 1856. Also see Chanock ‘South Africa, 1841-1924: Race, Contract, and 
Coercion’ (n 87) at 346-347. 
95  Lansdown, CWH; Hoal, WG and Lansdown, AV Gardiner and Lansdown South African 
Criminal Law and Procedure (2) 6ed (1957) at 1901. 
96  Haysom, N and Thompson, C ‘Labouring under the Law: South Africa’s Farmworkers (1986) 
7 ILJ 218 at 219. Also see Calitz, K ‘Die Minderwaardige Arbeidsregtelike Posisie van 
Plaaswerkers in Suid-Afrika’ (2000) 21 ILJ 793 at 798. Also generally see Chanock ‘South 
Africa, 1841-1924: Race, Contract, and Coercion’ (n 87). 














and Servants legislation before - say -1960 would have encountered 
stern resistance from a sizeable farming community.98 
 
Whereas in England the Master and Servant Act by 1867 applied to all 
servants and labourers, irrespective of trade, the tendency in South Africa 
was the opposite. In South Africa, as a result of the encroachment of the 
industrial relations legislation, the application of these laws by the twentieth 
century was almost entirely reserved for the agricultural and domestic 
sectors.99 In addition, the courts, on the basis that these laws essentially 
involved the enforcement of a contractual obligation via the criminal courts, 
furthermore adopted a narrow interpretation of the services that were covered 
by these laws,100 and also did not apply them in instances where mental, as 
opposed to manual skills were required,101 or where the services were 
rendered for a very short duration or at indefinite times.102 
 
Thus, while racially neutral, the net effect of this ‘narrowing process’ 
was to exclude many categories of predominantly white workers such as 
printers, salesmen and foremen. Chanock summarises the impact in the 
following terms: 
 
Introduced to bring all labour, including coloureds and ex-slaves, 
under the same law, [the Master and Servant legislation] was to 
develop into one of the cornerstones of a differential labour regime.103 
                                                        
98  Bundy (n 87) at 43. Also see Haysom and Thompson (n 96) at 218. 
99  Bundy (n 87) at 40. 
100  See Chanock The Making of South African Legal Culture (n 87) at 424. Also see R v Clay 
1903 TS 482; R v Sango (1904) 21 SC 35; R v Isaaks (1909) 26 SC 9; Roper v Dormer (1889-
1890) 7 SC 3; The King v Levey (1905) 19 EDC 167; R v Molefe 1948 (3) SA 206 GWLD; R v 
Makoena and Others 1951 (4) SA 322 (O). In Falconer v Juta (1879) 9 Buch 23 at 24 De 
Villiers CJ remarked that: ‘The interpretation clause of that Act clearly shows that it is meant 
to apply to contracts made with persons employed for wages to perform any handicraft or 
bodily labour in agriculture, manufactures or domestic service, and the like, but certainly not 
to a contract with a gentleman who came out from England to serve as a clerk to a stationer.’ 
101  Electric Process Engraving and Stereo Co v Irwin 1940 AD 220. Cf Graham v Harwin  & Co 
1914 NLR 324. 
102  R v Pobane 1908 EDC 230; Icesteen 1907 EDC 100; R v Nel 14 SC 423; R v Andries (1891-
1892) 9 SC 18 and R v Sango (1904) 21 SC 35. 
103  Chanock The Making of South African Legal Culture (n 87) at 424. Chanock ‘South Africa, 
1841-1924: Race, Contract, and Coercion’ (n 87) at 348 (note 35), relying on the Report of 
Economic and Wage Commission (UG14-1926), points out that in 1923, for instance, 883 














Thus, whereas Deakin concluded that the application of the Master and 
Servants laws in England was determined by the class of the workers,104 in 
South Africa its application tended to be determined predominantly by the 
race of the worker.105 However, like in England, there is no indication of a 
binary divide based on independence and dependence.106 The racial division 
was further entrenched by the position the legislature took in respect of labour 
tenants who were predominantly non-white. In 1921 the Transvaal Supreme 
Court ruled that labour tenants were not covered by the Master and Servant 
legislation.107 However, amendments were soon made in order to include 
labour tenants under the definition of ‘servant’.108   
 
The racial divide in South Africa was maintained by complicated 
legislative tools of which the Master and Servant laws, in the context of 
employment, played an important, but by no means the only role. The function 
of pass and influx control laws109 cannot be disregarded.110 From 1809 laws 
                                                                                                                                                              
In fact this commission specifically reported that master and servant ‘proceedings are 
infrequently taken where white employees are concerned.’ However, a work by Norman-
Scoble, C Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956), one of the earliest South African 
publications focusing on the master and servant laws, creates the impression that these laws 
applied more widely across the racial divide and in terms of the type of services.  However, 
sight should not be lost of the fact that this publication focused on reported judgments of the 
Supreme Court and that very few of the thousands of master and servant cases heard in the 
magistrates’ court involving non-whites escalated beyond this court. Bundy (n 87), for 
instance, suggests that there were 43 000 prosecutions under master and servant laws in 1955 
(one year before the Norman-Scoble publication) and most of these would more than likely 
have concerned non-white and agricultural workers. Also see the remarks of Simons and 
Simons (n 97) at 23-24. 
104  See discussion at § 2.2.3. 
105  Chanock The Making of South African Legal Culture (n 87) at 429-430 points out that this 
even worked against the interest of the poor whites since white employers were reluctant to 
employ poor whites on the basis that the pass regulations and the Master and Servant laws 
provided more control over black employees. ‘Poor whites’ is a term associated with a 
predominantly Afrikaner underclass that became a major political issue during the period 
1890-1939. The problem stemmed mainly from the urbanisation of rural and unskilled 
Afrikaners unable to compete with cheap unskilled African labour. Their urbanisation, in turn, 
was caused by poor farming techniques, the ‘scorched earth’ technique employed by the 
British during the Anglo-Boer War and a number of natural disasters. See Giliomee (n 50) at 
320-322. The full extent of the poor white problem was investigated by the Carnegie 
Commission which published a report in 1932. Also see the Second Interim Report of the 
Unemployment Commission 1921 UG 34-21 at par 14 for a list of the causes of the problem. 
106  See Norman-Scoble (n 103) at 13-14 for a list of persons held not to be servants under the 
various Master and Servants laws in South Africa. 
107  Maynard v Chasana 1921 TPD 242. 
108  Native Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936. 
109  For a study on pass laws in South Africa see Hindson, D Pass Controls and the Urban African 
Proletariat (1987). Hindson (at 11) explains the purpose of the pass laws ‘. . . as a complex of 














were in place in the Cape to control the movement of indigenous people in the 
colony.111 Over the next 150 years even more stringent pass and influx control 
laws were introduced in the provinces, and eventually these laws were 
passed by the national government to control the movement of Africans from 
rural to urban areas and to control the movement of migrant mineworkers 
living in compounds on the mines.112 The eventual demise of the Master and 
Servant laws is linked to pass law prosecutions.113 While there was a relative 
decline in the number of Master and Servant law prosecutions from the 1920s 
to the early 1970s, there was a serious rise in influx control prosecutions over 
the same period.114 The Master and Servant laws were cumbersome since 
they required the employer to appear before the magistrate, whereas this was 
not necessary in the case of the pass law prosecutions. It was therefore 
simply more convenient to rely on the pass laws to control the non-white 
workforce.115  Below further reference will be made to the racial divide in 
employment, particularly in the collective bargaining arena.116 
 
How did the courts view and develop the contracts of service not 
covered by the Master and Servant laws?  While there is no doubt that the 
courts applied general contractual principles to the contract of employment 
                                                                                                                                                              
population. After World War Two, three functions can clearly be distinguished. These are 
influx control, labour direction and labour placement. Influx control refers specifically to 
measures aimed at limiting the growth of urban population.’ Also see Savage, M ‘Pass Laws 
and the Disorganization and Reorganization of the African Population in South Africa’ paper 
presented at the Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in Southern Africa, 
Cape Town, South Africa, April 1984 (Carnegie Conference Paper No 281); Chanock The 
Making of South African Legal Culture (n 87) at 410-424 and 433-436; Chanock ‘South 
Africa, 1841-1924: Race, Contract, and Coercion’ (n 87) at 339-346 and Duncan, D The Mills 
of God: The State and African Labour in South Africa 1918-1948 (1995) at 91-120. 
110  Wage legislation (Acts 27 of 1925, 44 of 1937 and 5 of 1957), the Black Labour Regulation 
Act 15 of 1911 (passed to ensure adequate supply of migrant labour for the gold mines and to 
centralise state control over African labour) and even the workmen’s compensation legislation 
(Acts 25 of 1914, 59 of 1934, 30 of 1941), the Miners Phthisis Act 40 of 1919 and the 
Silicosis Act 47 of 1946, which either excluded African workers or applied different scales of 
compensation in the case of African workers either directly or through regulations, all added 
to the marginalisation of African workers. See Duncan (n 109) at 44, 66 and 153. 
111  See Hahlo and Kahn (n 49) at 577. 
112  For example, the Black Labour Regulation Act 15 of 1911; Black (Urban Areas) Act 21 of 
1923; Black Laws Amendment Act 46 of 1937; Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 
1945; Black Laws Amendment Act 54 of 1952 and the Black Laws Amendment Act 42 of 
1964. 
113  Bundy (n 87) at 40. 
114  Generally see Savage (n 109) and Bundy (n 87) at 40. While the respective figures quoted by 
these two authors do not quite correspond, the same pattern emerges from both analyses. 
115  See Bundy (n 87) at 40-41 and 44. Also see Giliomee (n 50) at 510-512. 














and even developed some discrete doctrines,117 it is clear the courts 
distinguished between different levels of wage-dependent labour. For 
instance, in Brown v Sessell118 and Schneier and London Ltd v Bennett119 the 
court made a clear distinction between a labourer and an employee and held 
that isolated absences in the case of the latter would not justify dismissal, but 
suggested that in the case of the former they would. Even the highest court 
(AD) distinguished between different classes of wage-dependent labour as is 
evidenced by the following remark by Innes CJ in Jamieson v Elsworth:120 
 
In terms of the written contract the defendant hired the services 
of the plaintiff "to manage and conduct farming operations" upon 
certain two farms . . . The relationship thus constituted was not one of 
master and servant, using the latter word in its narrow or menial sense; 
but it was certainly one of employer and employed. 
 
This divide is neatly expressed in an early edition of Wille’s Principles 
of South Africa Law: 
 
Two classes of servants are recognized by the law, superior 
servants, and inferior servants. The law relating to superior servants is 
the common law . . . ; the law relating to inferior servants is statute law 
. . . The broad distinction between the two classes is that the services 
of the former class are of a mental nature, whilst those of the latter are 
of a manual nature.121 
                                                        
117  For instance, in Kenrick v Central DM Co (1884) 3 HCG 414 damages were allowed for 
wrongful dismissal (also see Haupt v Diebel Bros (1888-1889) 5 HCG 185; Donaldson v 
Webber (1886-1887) 4 HCG 403; Douglas v L & SA Exploration Co (1886-1887) 4 HCG 275 
Cowie v Ellard & Co (1894-1895) 9 EDC 152 and Spruyt v de Lange 1903 TS 277); in R v 
Eayrs (1894) 11 SC 330 the court held that in the absence of any express stipulation it is an 
implied term of a contract of employment that an employee shall not compete with his master; 
in Isaacson v Walsh and Walsh (1903) 20 SC 569 the court held that even in the case of an 
unlawful breach, employees must still mitigate damages; in Boyd v Stuttaford and Co 1910 
AD 101 it was confirmed that an employee is not entitled to paid sick leave and in Spencer v 
Gostelow 1920 AD 617 the court confirmed that an employee dismissed for misconduct is 
entitled to wages for the period actually worked. 
118  1908 TS 1137. 
119  1927 TPD 346. 
120  1915 AD 115 at 118. 
121  Gibson, JTR Wille’s Principles of South Africa Law 6ed (1970) at 418. Also see Ringrose, HG 














Thus, by the early twentieth century, while some contractual principles 
were applied to employment relationships, there is no convincing evidence 
suggesting that there was a unitary concept of employment in place: The 
application of the Master and Servant laws was reserved predominantly for 
the black agricultural and domestic workforce and the general law of contract 
predominantly for the white upper class workforce.   
 
2.3.2.2  Social welfare legislation 
 
Reverting to the Deakin scheme, the question is whether the English 
pattern identified by him in respect of early national social welfare 
legislation122  was repeated in South Africa. The answer is that, through a 
combination of exclusions in the legislation and the use of the control test,123 it 
was repeated.  
 
The early workmen’s compensation legislation in the Cape, Natal and 
Transvaal defined workmen and the work to which the legislation applied in 
very narrow terms.124 After unionisation in 1910 these acts were replaced by 
the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1914.125 While both the Workmen’s 
Compensation Acts of 1914 and 1934126 defined the workman127 in terms of a 
contract of employment,128 there was no protection for employees earning 
                                                        
122  In other words, excluding both higher and lower status employees from statutory protection. 
See discussion at § 2.2.3 
123  Also see § 2.3.3. 
124  See the Employer’s Liability Act 12 of 1896 (Natal), the Workmen’s Compensation Act 40 of 
1905 (Cape) and the Workmen’s Compensation Act 36 of 1907 (Tvl).  The 1905 Cape Act 
repealed the earlier Employers Liability Act 35 of 1886 (Cape) that did not define workmen at 
all.  See Steyn v Enslin and Others (1910) 27 SC 82 for the narrow application of the 1905 
(Cape) Act where the court held that a labourer working in connection with boring operations 
on a farm was employed in agriculture within the meaning of section 4 of Act 40 of 1905 and 
was thus not covered by the Act. Cf Gadda v Martens 1940 TPD 386 where a labourer 
involved with building operations on a farm was held not to be employed in agriculture under 
the Workmen’s Compensation Act 59 of 1934 Act. The Cape Act, for example, defined a 
workman in terms of ‘work’. ‘Work’, in turn, was defined to mean ‘any employment in any 
trade, business or public undertaking in the Colony . . . but shall not mean or include 
domestic, messenger or errand service or employment in agriculture’.  Those in the naval and 
military service were also excluded. Ss 4-5. 
125  Act 25 of 1914.   
126  Act 59 of 1934. 
127  Section 2 of Act 25 of 1914 and s 2 of Act 59 of 1934. 
128  This is one of the earliest statutory uses of the term ‘contract of employment’ as opposed to 














below or above a certain threshold,129 casual workers,130 outworkers, 
subcontractors, domestic131 and agricultural workers132 and for those of 
certain races. The control test further served to exclude predominantly higher 
status and professional workers from the application of these laws, at least 
initially.133 In Hansen v Cape Town Resident Magistrate,134 a matter that 
concerned the meaning of workmen (where the definition did not limit the 
meaning of workmen on the basis of an income threshold) in terms of the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1905 (Cape)135 it was held that: 
 
It is not every official employed at such [a lunatic asylum] who 
can claim to be a workman, for the definition given by the Act could not 
have been intended to let in persons who have no claim whatever to be 
regarded as workmen. The resident surgeon, for instance, who 
receives a considerable salary, is not a workman, but a warder 
receiving wages at the rate of 3s. 4d. a day has every right to be so 
regarded.136 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
under English legislation. See De Beer v Thompson & Son 1918 TPD 70 at 75-76. Also see 
Lowe v Bruce (1926) 47 NPD 459. The Workmen’s Compensation Act 30 of 1941 reverted to 
the term ‘contract of service’. See s 3. 
129  See South African Railways v Mellett NO 1916 TPD 440; Huntley v Largo Colliery Limited 
1930 PH (2)_ K23 and Hesselman v Northern Motors (Pty) Ltd 1944 TPD 64. 
130  See Lower v Bruce (1926) 47 NPD 45 where a nurse rendering a casual service was not 
regarded as a workman. Also see R v Silber 1938 TPD 561 where it was held with reference to 
the 1934 Act that a single business transaction could constitute employment for purposes of 
the Act and did not necessarily amount to work of a casual nature. 
131  In Van Vuuren v Pienaar NO 1941 TPD 122 an assistant matron was held to be in domestic 
service for purposes of the 1934 Act. She worked in a school hostel where she supervised 
work in the kitchen and pantry, attended to the health and well-being of the children in the 
hostel, slept in the sick-room and cared for the children therein and was subject to the 
supervision of the matron who in turn took her instructions from the principal. For criticism of 
this interpretation see Norman-Scoble (n 103) at 12. Also see Stuttaford v Batty's Estate 1917 
CPD 639 for the difficulty the court had in deciding whether a chauffeur was a domestic 
servant or not. 
132  See Olivier v Goossens 1935 PH (2) K61 where the driver of a plough motor on a farm was 
held not to be employed in agriculture. The Act, however, excluded the operation of a 
mechanically propelled machine from the ambit of employment in agriculture. See s 41. 
133  See § 2.3.3.  
134  (1909) 26 SC 225. 
135  Act 40 of 1905. See s 4 for the definition of ‘workman’.  
136  At 226-227. Cf Lower Umfolosi District War Memorial Hospital v Lowe 1937 NPD 31; Lowe 
v Bruce (1926) 47 NPD 459 and Fisk v London & Lancashire Insurance Co Ltd 1942 WLD 














In 1941137 yet another Workmen’s Compensation Act was passed. This 
Act remained in force until the passing of the Compensation for Occupational 
Injuries and Diseases Act of 1993 (COIDA).138 As will be shown below, it was 
during the 50 year period between the enactments of the 1941 Act and 
COIDA that the dichotomy between an employee and independent contractor 
became more visible in South African law.139 
 
The 1941 Act, in its definition of a workman in section 3, reverted to the 
terminology of ‘contract of service’ and this terminology was maintained in 
COIDA.140 Significantly the 1941 definition of a workman continued to be 
marred by a long list of exclusions at both the lower and higher ends of the 
scale.141 In addition to those who earned above a certain threshold, the 
military, the police, casuals, outworkers, domestic servants,142 seamen, 
airmen, agricultural workers,143 persons who contracted for the carrying out of 
work and themselves engaged others to perform the work, and blacks were 
originally excluded from the definition. While the definition and exclusions 
were amended several times,144 many categories of wage earners continued 
to be excluded from the protection of the Act.  The trend in South Africa thus 
remained consistent with the sentiment expressed in Hansen v Cape Town 
Resident Magistrate in 1909 and with the pattern identified by Deakin 
regarding the pre-Beveridge position in England.145 
 
This is in stark contrast with the position adopted under COIDA, which 
specifically includes casual employees employed for the purpose of the 
                                                        
137  Workmen’s Compensation Act 30 of 1941. 
138  Act 130 of 1993. 
139  See §§ 2.3.4.4 and 2.3.4.6. 
140  Section 1. In the COIDA the term ‘workman’ was replaced with ‘employee’. 
141  Section 3(2). 
142  See R v Dardagan 1944 SR 162 where employees in a restaurant, where the sole business was 
the supply of food and drink, were held to be not ‘workmen, but ‘domestic servants’ within 
the meaning of the Rhodesian Workmen’s Compensation 12 of Act 1941 and thus not covered 
by the Act. This Act followed the same structure as its 1941 counterpart in South Africa. 
143  See Mabaso v Souza 1946 PH (2) K97. 
144  See, for example, the Workmen’s Compensation Amendment Act 27 of 1945, Act 48 of 1947, 
Act 36 of 1949, Act 51 of 1956, Act 7 of 1961 and Act 21 of 1964. 














employer's business,146 has no threshold provisions and lists only a minimum 
of exclusions, namely, the military, the police, a person who contracts for the 
carrying out of work and him or herself engages another person to perform 
such work, and domestic employees employed in a private household, 
although the latter continues to represent a large workforce.147  It is thus only 
with the adoption of COIDA in 1993 that the majority of wage/salary earners 
became subject to a unified approach. 
 
The same pattern is visible with respect to statutory unemployment 
insurance, first introduced in South Africa under the Unemployment Benefit 
Act of 1937.148 This Act defined149 a contributor in terms of a contract of 
service, but it only applied in respect of scheduled industries.150 Persons 
excluded included those earning below and above a certain threshold; 
persons to whom articles or materials were given out by the employers to be 
made up, cleaned, washed, ornamented, finished or repaired or adapted for 
sale on premises not under the control and management of the employer; 
persons employed irregularly and for less than one day in a week; persons 
employed during the same calendar week by more than one employer; the 
husband and wife of an employer; public servants; blacks and persons 
employed in agriculture.151 
 
                                                        
146  Section 1. Other specific inclusions are a director or member of a body corporate who has 
entered into a contract of service or of apprenticeship or learnership with the body corporate, 
in so far as he acts within the scope of his employment in terms of such contract; a person 
provided by a labour broker against payment to a client for the rendering of a service or the 
performance of work, and for which service or work such person is paid by the labour broker; 
in the case of a deceased employee, his dependants; and in the case of an employee who is a 
person under disability, a curator acting on behalf of that employee; 
147  Section 1. In 2006 domestic workers were estimated to total 886 000 out of a total of 12 800 
000 employed in South Africa. See Tables B and K, Statistical release PO210 (Labour Force 
Survey September 2006) accessed via 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/statsdownload.asp?ppn=P0210&SCH=3890 (14 
August 2007). 
148  Act 25 of 1937. Also see the Report of the Select Committee on the Subject of Unemployment 
Benefit Bill 1935 CS7-35 and the Report of the Select Committee on the Unemployment 
Insurance Bill 1936 SC9-36. 
149  Section 2. 
150  This included the building industry, mechanical and electrical engineering industry, motor 
engineering industry, furniture making industry, gold mining industry within certain 
magisterial districts, leather and footwear, printing and newspaper and clothing industry.  
151  Section 2. For an overview of the position of farm workers prior to 1970 see Atkinson, D 














This Act was replaced by the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1946152 
which made no reference to scheduled industries, but nonetheless continued 
to list a number of exclusions; for instance, those earning above a certain 
threshold, casuals, blacks on gold or coal mines, domestic servants and those 
employed in agriculture apart from forestry.153 Similar exclusions were also 
listed in the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1966.154 The long journey to 
unification (albeit still imperfect on account of the exclusion of public servants) 
was finally completed with the passing of the Unemployment Insurance Act of 
2001(UIA)155 in which, apart from public servants, very few exclusions156 
appear and in which, for the first time in social welfare legislation, but 
consistent with current industrial relations legislation,157 an employee is 
defined to exclude an independent contractor: 
 
[An] 'employee' means any natural person who receives 
remuneration or to whom remuneration accrues in respect of services 
rendered or to be rendered by that person, but excludes any 
independent contractor;158 
 
The unification of the contract of employment which, Deakin suggests 
was near completion in England by the mid-twentieth century, clearly took 
much longer in South Africa. While it is difficult to identify all the reasons for 
this, the South African policy of racial segregation during most of the twentieth 
century is certainly the most obvious reason. The process towards a unitary 
concept of employment certainly accelerated after publication of the report of 
the Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legislation in 1979159 in 
which the deracialisation of labour relations legislation was recommended.160 
                                                        
152  Act 53 of 1946. 
153  Section 2. 
154  Act 30 of 1966. See s 2. 
155  Act 63 of 2001. 
156  See s 3. These include employees employed for less than 24 hours per month, employees 
under a contract of employment contemplated in s 18(2) of the Skills Development Act 97 of 
1998 (SDA), public servants, some foreign employees and certain pensioners. 
157  For instance, the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA). 
158  Section 1. 
159  Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legislation (RP 47/1979). (The Wiehahn 
Report). Also see note 301. 














Another possible reason is the absence of any ‘Beveridge-like’ investigation in 
South Africa, covering the entire spectrum of social welfare. The Wiehahn 
Commission, however, did note the ‘strong contention’ that the definition of 
‘workman’ in the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1941 should remove all 
references to income161 and in fact recommended the abolition of a wage 
ceiling in the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1966,162 but it was not until 
1993 and finally in 2001, that a semblance of a unitary concept would be 
achieved. A further possible reason is that the long reign of the control test, 
which tended to exclude predominantly upper class employees, ended only in 
the late 1970s. 
 
2.3.3 The control test 
 
The early case law in South Africa on the existence of an employment 
relationship often concerned vicarious liability and always relied, often with 
reference to English law, on the control test.163 It is clear that the early use of 
the control test was not exclusively, and perhaps not even primarily, aimed at 
distinguishing between an employee and independent contractor or various 
classes of wage earners, but rather at establishing a basis for the employer’s 
vicarious liability or to identify the correct employer (for purposes of vicarious 
liability). As in England, it was therefore not a test of status.164 
 
 For instance, in East London Municipality v Murray165 and Addis v 
Schiller Lighting and Plumbing Co166 the courts applied the control test 
because control determines the difference between an employee and an 
                                                        
161  Par 3.53 (part 3) of the Wiehahn Report (n 159). 
162  Par 3.52.1 (part 3) of the Wiehahn Report (n 1159). 
163  Dreyer v Van Reenen (1828-1849) 3 MENZ 375 at 376 (incompletely reported). Also see 
Kotze v Ohlsson's Breweries (1891-1892) 9 SC 319; Addis v Schiller Lighting and Plumbing 
Co 1906 TH 210; Chatwin v Central South African Railways 1909 TH 33; Moroka v Mcewen 
1910 ORC 32; Phillips v Sipuka 1915 EDL 289; Duigan NO v Angehorn & Piel 1915 TPD 82; 
British South Africa Co v Crickmore 1921 AD 107; Kohlberg v Uitenhage Municipality 1926 
EDL 90; Penrith v Stuttaford 1925 CPD 154 and Mcmillan v Hubert Davies & Co Ltd 1940 
WLD 256.   
164  Deakin and Wilkenson (n 2) at 90. 
165  (1894) 9 EDC 55.  














independent contractor, but in Phillips v Sipuka167 the control test was simply 
used to determine employment on the basis that once there is (no) control, 
(no) employment is established. Therefore, failure of the control test to identify 
a relationship of employment did not imply that the person rendering the 
service was an independent contractor.  
 
In one matter concerning vicarious liability, a labour broker supplied 
labour to a client.168 Since the broker did not actually control and supervise 
the work performed by the labourers, he was held not to be the employer. 
This did not imply that the labourers were independent contractors. Similarly, 
in a matter where a person rented out his wagon with a driver, the control test 
was used to identify the correct employer (the lessor or the lessee) for 
purposes of vicarious liability.169 In another matter where a contractor, of the 
type clearly falling within the realm of independence, had been employed by a 
city resident to install a drainage system under the supervision of the 
municipality, the court implied that the municipality was the appropriate party 
to be held vicariously liable. In Mkize v Martens,170 the AD held that two young 
relatives helping the defendant who ran a transport business, were his 
employees. Once again the court did not use the control test to contrast 
employment with the independent contractor.171 In one matter the court even 
went so far as to find an employment relationship where a person drove a car 
gratuitously but under control of the owner.172 Furthermore, because the 
rendering of a professional service fell beyond the control of an employer, 
persons rendering such services were not regarded as servants or 
employees.173  
                                                        
167  1915 EDL 289.   
168  Eyssen v Calder 1903 20 SC 435. Also see Chatwin v Central South African Railways 1909 
TH 33. 
169  Moroko v McEwan 1910 OPD 32. Also see Duigen NO v Angehorn 1915 TPD; Phillips v 
Sipuka 1915 EDL 289; Penrith v Stuttaford 1925 CPD 154; Kohlberg v Uitenhage 
Municipality 1926 EDL 90. 
170  1914 AD 382. 
171  The use of the control test in this matter is not immediately apparent, but see at 401. 
172  Van Blommenstein v Reynolds 1934 CPD 65. 
173  See Hartl v Pretoria Hospital 1915 TPD 336; Byrne v East London Hospitaal Board 1926 
EDL 128 and Lower Umfolosi District War Memorial Hospital v Lowe 1937 NPD 31.  In the 
latter matter a hospital patient suffered injuries as a result of a hot water bottle placed in his 














By the 1930s the use of the control test in determining vicarious liability 
was uncontentious, but still awaited critical pronouncement from the AD. 
 
In 1931 the AD handed down judgment in Colonial Mutual Life 
Assurance Society Ltd v MacDonald174 in which it was held that an insurance 
agent was not an employee of Colonial Mutual, but an independent contractor 
for whose negligence Colonial Mutual was not vicariously liable. It is often 
overlooked that much of this judgment concerned the extent to which a 
principal can be held vicariously liable for the actions of an agent and that the 
court approached the matter on the basis that for purposes of vicarious 
liability ‘a mandatory can be considered as within the general classification 
“independent contractor”’.175 Relying mostly on English authorities, the court 
confirmed that an employer is not vicariously liable for the negligence of an 
independent contractor. In deciding whether the agent was an employee or 
independent contractor De Villiers CJ held that ‘[t]he test is the existence of a 
right of control over the agent in respect of the manner in which his work is to 
be done’176  and that the ‘relation of master and servant cannot exist where 
there is a total absence of the right of supervising and controlling the workman 
under the contract’.177 Analysing the written contract between the parties, the 
court concluded that the agreement was ‘inconsistent with the relation of 
master and servant’.178 However, since all three appeal judges viewed the 
terms ‘independent contractor’ in such broad terms, it has been argued that 
this judgment is not authority for the distinction between employee and 
independent contractor, but is only ‘authority for the proposition that in delict 
the liability of the master for the acts of his servant is confined to cases where 
the contract is locatio conductio operarum’.179 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
not to be an employee for purposes of vicarious liability. Also see Van Der Walt, JC ‘St 
Augustine’s Hospital Pty Ltd v Le Breton 1975 2 SA 530 (N)’ (1976) 36 THRHR 399. 
174  1931 AD 412. For comment on this judgment see Brassey, M ‘The Nature of Employment’ 
(1990) 11 ILJ 889 at 896. 
175  Kerr, AJ ‘Mandataries and Conductores Operis’ (1979) 96 SALJ  323 at 327. 
176  At 435. 
177  At 435. 
178  At 437. 














Three points need to be noted about this judgment: First, this judgment 
was sometimes understood as authority for the proposition that the employer 
must have actual control over the employee’s work.180 However, a closer 
analysis of Colonial Mutual shows that the court never required more than a 
right to control and even conceded that actual control could be absent: 
 
[The master] is entitled at any time to order the servant to desist, 
and if the matter is sufficiently serious may even dismiss him for 
disobedience. Although the opportunity of supervising and controlling 
which a master is able to exercise over a servant may vary greatly with 
circumstances, it cannot be said to be altogether unreasonable to hold 
him liable for the torts of his servant. But because even in the case of a 
master and servant effective supervision and control is in some case[s] 
difficult if not entirely absent that is no reason for extending the liability 
of the principal to include the torts of a man over whose actions he has 
no say whatever.181 
 
Second, the court’s only reference to Roman-Dutch law is rather brief 
and can at best be regarded as obiter.182 The full extent of the court’s 
reference to the Roman-Dutch distinction is as follows: 
 
[A]n agent is bound to act in the matter of the agency subject to 
the directions and control of the principal, whereas an independent 
contractor merely undertakes to perform certain specified work, or 
produce a certain specified result, the manner and means of 
performance or production being left to his discretion, except as far as 
they are specified by the contract. This is a distinction which in our own 
law cannot be ignored for the contract between master and servant is 
one of letting and hiring of services (locatio conductio operarum) 
whereas the contract between the principal and a contractor is the 
                                                        
180  See Fisk v London & Lancashire Insurance Co Ltd 1942 WLD 63 at 73. Also see Brassey (n 
174) at 909-910. 
181  At 433. Also see Addis v Schiller Lighting and Plumbing Co 1906 TH 210 where it was held 
that the control need not be actually exercised; all that is necessary is that the employer can 
exercise control if he chooses. 














letting and hiring of some definite piece of work (locatio conductio 
operis). In the former case the relation between the two contracting 
parties is much more intimate than in the latter, the servant becoming 
subordinate to the master, whereas in the latter case the contractor 
remains on a footing of equality with the employer. The crucial 
difference between these two cases lies in the fact that where a master 
engages a servant to work for him the master is entitled under the 
contract to supervise and control the work of the servant.183 
 
Third, for the majority of the judgment the court deferred to English 
authorities in support of its conclusion. None of these authorities, however, 
concerned vicarious liability: Queen v Walker184 was a criminal case 
concerning embezzlement which can only be committed by a servant. In 
Yewens v Noakes185 the court considered whether Noakes was entitled to 
exemption from inhabited house duty. Exemption was allowed if a ‘servant or 
other person’ lived in a house (used for trade) for its protection. The person 
living in the house was employed by Noakes as a clerk. When Bramwell B 
used the control test it was to decide whether the clerk was a servant as 
opposed to an employee.186 Performing Right Society Ltd v Mitchell and 
Booker (Palais de Danse) Ltd187 concerned a master’s liability for an 
infringement of copyright by an employee and, in turn, relied on Yewens v 
Noakes. The importance of this is that Colonial Mutual relied on judgments in 
which the English courts were mostly concerned with the distinction between 
different forms of wage dependent labour.188 This is not to suggest that control 
should not be an issue when deciding whether an employment relationship 
exists, but reliance on this test in other contexts inevitably perpetuated the 
exclusion of the higher status employees from the net of employment. This 
                                                        
183  At 433. 
184  27 LJMC 207. At 208 Bramwell, B states that ‘a principal has the right to direct what the 
agent has to do, but a master has not only that right, but also the right to say how it is to be 
done’. 
185  50 QBD 530. 
186  The Solicitor-General, for example, argued that ‘a clerk in the present case is not a “servant or 
other person” within the meaning of the section which is meant to include servants in the 
nature of domestic servants’. See Brooks (n 34) at 56-57 and Deakin and Wilkenson (n 2) at 
91. 
187  [1924] 1KB 762. 














was also the result when this test was reverted to in South Africa in the 
context of social welfare legislation. This is aptly illustrated by the judgment in 
Hansen v Cape Town Resident Magistrate,189 quoted earlier,190 where the 
court, relying on the control test, held that a warder, but not the resident 
surgeon, at a lunatic asylum should be regarded as a workman for the 
purposes of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1905 (Cape). 
 
Nonetheless, Colonial Mutual became one of the most important 
landmarks of employment law and, irrespective of the context, the basis upon 
which an employment relationship would be determined over the following 50 
years.191 Arguably, as a result of this judgment the control test came to be 
associated with the distinction between an employee and independent 
contractor, rather than the basis upon which vicarious liability was founded. 
As such the judgment was responsible for the subsequent sharp division 
between an employee and independent contractor that eventually became so 
deeply entrenched in South African employment law.192  
 
To conclude this section: Deakin argues that while the control test was 
used in the context of vicarious liability in England, it is unlikely that it was 
‘established as a general test of status’.193 He argues that the rediscovery of 
the control test after the enactment of social welfare legislation was a 
‘doctrinal innovation . . . [which] reinforced status distinctions between the 
“labouring” and “professional” classes . . . while excluding casual and 
seasonal workers’.194 After the enactment of the early workmen’s 
compensation legislation in South Africa the control test was relied on to 
establish whether a claimant was a ‘workman’ for purposes of this 
legislation.195 It is, however, doubtful whether it was used in the same 
                                                        
189  (1909) 26 SC 225. 
190  See § 2.3.2.2. 
191  Also see Brassey (n 174) at 906-915. 
192  See §§ 2.3.4.4 and 2.3.4.6. 
193  Deakin and Wilkinson (n 2) at 90. 
194  Deakin and Wilkinson (n 2) at 91-92. 
195  See, for example, Dennis Edwards & Co v Lloyd 1919 TPD 291 and De Beer v Thompson & 
Son 1918 TPD 70. These judgments concerned the application of the Workmen’s 
Compensation Act 25 of 1914. In the former the court found the claimant to be an independent 
contractor, in the latter the court found the claimant to be a ‘co-adventurer’. Also see Frank, 














‘doctrinal’ sense as in England. Even before the Colonial Mutual judgment the 
control test was already well established as the basis for vicarious liability, 
and it is not surprising that the courts simply turned to it when called upon to 
interpret social welfare legislation. Nonetheless, as in England, application of 
the control test had the effect of excluding, in particular, higher status workers 
from the protection of these laws.  
 
2.3.4 The influence of Roman-Dutch law and the binary divide 
 
2.3.4.1  Introduction 
 
It will be recalled that Deakin not only associates the unification of the 
contract of employment with the development of social welfare legislation,196 
but attributes the dichotomy between the employee and the independent 
contractor to it. Before tracing such a link in the context of South African 
welfare legislation, it is necessary first to consider another possibility: 
Freedland, while subscribing to the Deakin argument, acknowledges the 
possibility that the dichotomy is, rather than the ‘product of a particular set of 
social policies’- 
 
 . . .  [a] much more universal and deeply embedded one 
that permeates the jurisprudence, as well as the legislation, of many 
legal systems over very long historical periods of time. The dichotomy 
can, after all, be compared with the distinction made in Roman law 
between locatio conductio operarum and locatio conductio operis, 
literally the hire of services and for services . . . There is no doubt that 
most employment law systems reflect a strong intuition that there is a 
strong and clear distinction between dependent employment and the 
independent working, and moreover that employment law is concerned 
with the former kind of work and not with the latter.197 
 
                                                        
196  See discussion at § 2.2.3. 
197  Freedland (n 3) at 19-20. Deakin acknowledges this possibility and suggest that the question 
can only be resolved by means of a broader comparative analysis. See Deakin, ‘The 














South Africa law, with its undisputed link with Roman-Dutch and 
Roman law, untainted by the Dutch Civil Code, therefore offers an ideal 
opportunity to investigate this link as the likely source of the dichotomy. 
Without exception South African authors on employment law believe that such 
a link exists.198 While acknowledging that work can occasionally be rendered 
through other arrangements such as agency or partnership, they primarily 
contrast the employee with the independent contractor and in doing so rely on 
the Roman law distinction between locatio conductio operarum and locatio 
conductio operis to justify this. 
 
Yet, despite the claims of these authors, there is general acceptance 
that the common law contract of employment in South Africa and the 
concomitant principles are not exclusively rooted in Roman-Dutch law, but 
rather represent a complicated mixture of Roman-Dutch and English law.199 
This, it is suggested, justifies reconsideration of the nature of the influence of 
the Roman-Dutch dichotomy on South African labour law.  
 
                                                        
198  See, for example, Norman-Scoble (n 103) at 1-2; Cheadle, H ‘Law of Employment (Including 
the Law of Master and Servant)’ in Coaker, JF and Zeffertt, DT (eds) Wille and Millin’s 
Mercantile Law of South Africa 8ed (1984) 340-373 at 340; Grogan, J Workplace Law 8ed 
(2004) at 3 and Vettori, S The Employment Contract and the Changed World of Work (2007) 
at 10. Also see the authors referred to by McCall J in Borcherds v C W Pearce & J Sheward 
T/A Lubrite Distributors (1993) 14 ILJ 1262 (LAC) at 1274-1276. 
199  For example: The English doctrine of common employment was only briefly followed in 
South Africa (see Hilpert v Castle Mail Packets Co (1897-1898) 12 EDC 38), but the doctrine 
of vicariously liability is ‘decidedly English in orientation and derivation’. See Jordaan (n 51) 
at 400 and Hahlo and Kahn (n 49) at 585. Under Roman-Dutch law the forfeiture of wages for 
an employee dismissed for misconduct only applied in the case of domestic servants and 
servants who had an intimate relationship with their employers.  See Jordaan (n 51) at 401. In 
Spencer v Gostelow 1920 AD 617, the Roman-Dutch rule was preferred to the English rule 
that generally favoured forfeiture in such cases. In Boyd v Stuttaford  & Co 1910 AD 101 the 
court, preferring the Roman-Dutch rule, held that contrary to English law, an employee 
(except a domestic servant) is not entitled to wages during absences due to sickness. See 
Sutton, CJ ‘Masters and Servants’ (1910) 27 SALJ 581. Specific performance, generally not a 
remedy available in English law is, with reference to Roman-Dutch law, a recognised remedy 
in South African labour law. See Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v Thorpe 1977 (2) SA 943 (A); 
Igesund & Another v Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd (2002) 23 ILJ 2001 (C) and 
National Union of Textile Workers v Stag Packings (Pty) Ltd & Another 1982 (4) SA 151 (T); 
(1982) 3 ILJ 285 (T). Also see Jordaan (n 51) at 407-410 and Brassey, M ‘Specific 
Performance - A New Stage for Labour's Lost Love’ (1981) 2 ILJ 57. The influence of 
English law on employment is probably most visible in respect of the implied terms of the 
contract of employment, such as the duties to obey the employer and to serve the employer in 
good faith and competently. See Jordaan (n 51) at 413-414. In the context of restraint of 
trades, English law was followed until its rejection in Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) 














2.3.4.2  Roman-Dutch law 
 
 In Roman-Dutch law, a distinction was made between the locatio 
conductio rei, the locatio conductio operarum and the locatio conductio operis. 
The locatio conductio rei was a consensual contract involving the letting and 
hiring of a thing such as a slave, animal or land for payment. The locatio 
conductio operarum was a consensual contract between an employee, who 
agreed to place his personal services for a certain period of time at the 
disposal of the employer, and the employer who agreed to pay remuneration 
in return. The locatio conductio operis was a consensual contract in terms of 
which the workman agreed to execute a particular piece of work as a whole 
for the employer in return for a fixed sum of money.200 In the case of the 
former the object of the contract was the services rendered; in the case of the 
latter the object of the contract was a specific result. There is some dispute as 
to the extent to which this trichotomy existed in Roman law. On the one hand, 
Zimmerman claims that it was known in Roman law, but that the locatio 
conductio operarum only applied to a very limited number of services (not 
unlike the position in England and South Africa many centuries later), 
excluding the slaves at the lower end of the social scale and professional 
services at the upper end.201 On the other hand, Schulz regards it as the 
‘product of continental legal scholasticism’202 and suggests that the Romans 
knew only one locatio conductio and applied the same rules to all varieties of 
the contract.203  He claims that ‘[t]he terminological differences were matters 
of linguistic convenience and usage and nothing more’.204 Nonetheless, while 
it is a distinction found in Roman-Dutch law, there is no evidence suggesting 
that Roman-Dutch authorities regarded the employment relationship as an 
autonomous institution, the only exception being domestic service.205 In 
                                                        
200  Schulz, F Classical Roman Law (1951) at 542. Also see Van Warmelo, P An Introduction to 
the Principles of Roman Civil Law (1976) at 181. 
201  Zimmermann, R The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition 
(1990) at 388 and 391. 
202  Schulz (n 200) at 544. 
203  Schulz (n 200) at 543. Also see Beyleveld, A Die Essensiële Vereistes vir die Onstaan van die 
Kontraksvorme Mandatum, Locatio Conductio Operis en Location Conductio Operarum: ‘n 
Prinsipiële Onderskeid, LLD thesis, University of Pretoria, 1978 at 219. 
204  Schulz (n 200) at 543. 
205  See Benjamin, P ‘The Contract of Employment and Domestic Workers’ (1980) 1 ILJ 187.  














addition, Roman-Dutch writers expressed conflicting opinions or were silent206 
on important issues peculiar to the employment relationship, for example, 
vicarious liability.207 This uncertainty is largely responsible for the fact that 
many South African judges often turned to English law for the resolution of 
employment disputes.208  
 
2.3.4.3  The locatio conductio in South Africa 
 
While the application of the control test in respect of both vicarious 
liability and early workmen’s compensation legislation resulted in a lack of an 
unitary approach regarding the contract of employment, it also shows that 
while the courts from time to time acknowledged the existence of a dichotomy 
in Roman-Dutch law, the existence of the dichotomy certainly was not (at 
least initially) entrenched through the application of the control test in early 
South African judgments; until after the judgment in Colonial Mutual it was 
simply the basis of vicarious liability.  
 
In fact, apart from a few judgments concerning delictual liability, there 
is hardly any specific reference to the Roman-Dutch dichotomy in early South 
African case law. It certainly was not cutting through the South African labour 
market like the proverbial hot knife through butter. In many of the early 
judgments concerning contractual disputes, the courts simply referred to or 
relied on authorities dealing with the locatio conductio in general terms, mostly 
to establish the validity or the consequences of a contract. For instance, in 
Brown v Hicks209 the court, considering whether or not a valid contract was 
concluded, held that: 
 
                                                        
206  See, for example, Hilpert v Castle Mail Packets Co (1897-1898) 12 EDC 38 where the 
English doctrine of common employment was followed simply because the Roman-Dutch 
authorities were inconclusive on the issue. Also see Binda v Colonial Government (1887-
1888) 5 SC 284 where it was held that the Government was not liable for the delictual acts of 
its officers within the scope of their employment, and that the Government was thus not liable. 
207  See Mkize v Martens 1914 AD 382.  
208  Jordaan (n 51) at 391. See the opening comments of Lord De Villiers CJ in Boyd v Stuttaford 
and Co 1910 AD 101 at 114 on the usefulness of English cases in cases of doubt. Also see 
note 199. 














 Until the wages were so determined or some definite basis 
fixed, upon which the wages could be calculated, there was no letting - 
no locatio - of the plaintiff's services. If it had been a case of letting a 
house, there would have been no question about it. Until the rent, or 
some definite mode of fixing the rent, is agreed upon, there is no 
contract of letting and hiring of the house. The letting of services stands 
upon the same footing.210  
 
In later judgments the courts at times specifically identified the contract 
as either locatio conductio operarum or operis, but even then it was simply to 
determine the consequences of the contract in question and not to contrast 
the one with the other.211 In 1910 the newly established AD had an 
opportunity to consider the contract of employment and the right to be paid 
sick leave in Boyd v Stuttaford and Co.212 While specific reference was made 
to the locatio conductio operis and locatio conductio operarum (in such terms) 
as two distinct concepts by one of the five judges,213 no guidance at all on the 
actual difference (if at all) is provided and for the rest of the judgment reliance 
is placed on principles that apply to locatio conductio in general terms.214 
 
The above quote from the judgment in Brown v Hicks also illustrates 
that the courts were hardly concerned with the contract of employment when 
applying the control test in the context of vicarious liability. Earlier it was said 
the courts only reverted to the locatio conductio, be it in its simple or 
‘trichotomised’ form, when it wanted to determine the validity or 
consequences of a contract. The quote highlights one of the essentialia of the 
                                                        
210  At 315-316. Cf Ladlow v Crowe 1935 NPD 241. Also see Nixon v Blaine & Company (1879) 
9 Buch 217; R  v Eayrs (1894) 11 SC 330; Maberley v Seale 1902 19 SC 540; Theunissen v 
Burns 1904 21 SC 421 and Tulloch v Marsh 1910 TPD 453. 
211  Hauman v Nortje 1914 AD 293; Breslin v Hichens 1914 AD 312 and Spencer v Gostelow 
1920 AD 617. While the latter case concerned an operarum and the former two an operis, the 
court in Spencer at 631 indicated that in the case of incomplete performance the same 
principles would apply to both locatios. 
212  1910 AD 101 at 116. See Sutton (n 199). 
213  Innes J at 116. 
214  This matter represents one of the few judgments in which the court felt confident about the 
view of Roman-Dutch writers and preferred the Roman-Dutch principle to the (contrary) 
English principle. It held (at 120) that ‘a servant or other employee cannot claim to be paid for 
a period during which he was prevented by ill-health from rendering service to his master’. 














contract of employment: Until wages or remuneration has been agreed upon, 
there is no contract (locatio).215 And yet, in many judgments concerning 
vicarious liability, the courts found an employment relationship by relying on 
the control test, despite the absence of agreement on wages.216 As pointed 
out earlier, sometimes the court even went so far as to find an employment 
relationship where a person drove a car gratuitously but under control of the 
owner.217 This illustrates the fallacy of using a test which developed with 
complete disregard for the contract to determine the existence of the contract 
of employment.218  
 
 While the control test also played an important role in the context of 
workmen’s legislation, deference to contractual requirements when 
determining whether a claimant was a workman as defined was beginning to 
emerge in judgments concerning early workmen’s compensation legislation. 
In one matter, the court was not prepared to regard a person employed as a 
driver as a workman, since the latter was defined in terms of a contract, and 
the driver in question, contrary to a road traffic ordinance that forbade 
employment of a driver without a licence, did not have one. The contract was 
therefore void for an illegality and in the absence of a valid contract there was 
no workman as defined.219  
 
2.3.4.4  Towards a binary divide 
 
By the mid-twentieth century the control test was, but for one exception 
(discussed below),220 universally applied irrespective of the context. It 
continued to be used in the context of vicarious liability,221 but also whenever 
                                                        
215  See Alexander v Perry (1874) 4 Buch 59. Cf Ladlow v Crowe 1935 NPD 241.  
216  Davidson v Johannesburg Turf Club 1904 TH 260. In Mkize v Martens 1914 AD 382 the court 
did not consider payment of remuneration at all. Also see Barlow, TB The South African Law 
of Vicarious Liability and a Comparison of the Principles of Other Legal Systems (1939) at 
103. 
217  Van Blommenstein v Reynolds 1934 CPD 65. Also see the later judgment in Paton v 
Caledonian Ins Co 1962 (2) SA 691 (N) where the same approach was followed. 
218  Also see § 2.2.3. 
219  Havenga v Rabie 1916 TPD 466. Also see Brassey (n 174) at 892. 
220  See § 2.3.4.5. 
221  See Heymans v D MacKay and Norval Limited and Johannesburg City Council 1933 PH (1) 














employment was a prerequisite for the application of legislation, whether it 
concerned the application of war emergency regulations,222 tax legislation,223 
motor vehicle insurance legislation,224 minimum wage legislation225 or 
workmen’s compensation legislation,226 and irrespective of whether the 
legislation defined an employee in terms of contract or not or at all. 
 
This test continued to be the preferred means of establishing 
employment up to the 1970s. However, from the almost indiscriminate use of 
                                                                                                                                                              
1947 (1) SA 100 (W).  Also see Munarin v Peri-Urban Areas Health Board 1965 (1) SA 545 
(W) and in particular at 549 where the court linked the control test to the Roman-Dutch 
dichotomy. The judgment was partially confirmed on appeal: Peri-Urban Areas Health Board 
v Munarin 1965 (3) SA 367 (A). Further see Rodrigues and Others v Alves and Others 1978 
(4) SA 834 (A) and Gibbins v Williams, Muller, Wright & Mostert Ingelyf en Andere 1987 (2) 
SA 82 (T) for the continued emphasis placed on control despite the advent of other tests to 
determine employment. 
222  Fisk v London & Lancashire Insurance Co Ltd 1942 WLD 63. This matter concerned the 
application of s 16 of the War Emergency Regulation in terms of War Measure 43 of 1942 
which required employers to give leave of absence to their employees who had volunteered 
for military service and to re-employ them afterwards. Using the control test, the court found 
that a branch auditor was not an employee for purposes of this regulation. See at 72-73. Also 
see R v Feun 1954 (1) SA 58 (T) which concerned the payment of cost of living allowances to 
employees as provided for in War Measure 43 of 1942. In this measure an employee was not 
defined in terms of a contract. 
223  See ITC 566 13 SATC 332 at 334 and Joffe v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1950 (3) SA 
309 (C) at 315-316. In both these cases the court had to decide whether income was derived 
from trade or employment for purposes of Excess Profits Tax. Since the legislation in 
question,  the Income Tax Act 34 of 1940 and the Income Tax Act 31 of 1941, did not define 
employment, the court reverted to the common law for guidance. While the latter case was 
decided on the basis of onus, the court approved the court a quo’s use of the control test as 
formulated in Colonial Mutual. In Secretary for Inland Revenue v Somers Vine 1968 (2) SA 
138 (A) the court considered the meaning of employment in s 1 of the Income Tax Act of 
1962 and once again (at 159) approved the control test as the appropriate test, also in respect 
of fiscal legislation. The legislation did not provide a definition of employee or employment. 
224  See Singh v Provincial Insurance Co Ltd 1963 (3) SA 712 (N) where the court had to decide 
whether a person who suffered injuries in a motor vehicle collision was acting within the 
course of his employment (undefined) by the owner of the vehicle at the time of the collision 
for purposes of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Act 29 of 1942. At 717 the court once again 
relied on the control test as postulated in Colonial Mutual and held that there was no 
employment.  
225  Section 31 of the Wage Act 44 of 1937 identified those whose relation to a business is fixed 
by a partnership or by ‘some other agreement’ as possibly excluded from the operation of the 
Act that provided for the payment of minimum wages in certain industries. In a judgment 
handed down by the Natal Provincial Division, R v Kamuludin 1954 PH (1) K38, this was 
held to ‘obviously’ relate to independent contractors, which the court distinguished from 
employees by applying the control test. An employee in this Act was not defined in terms of 
contract. See s 1. 
226  Padayachee v Ideal Motor Transport 1974 (2) SA 565 (N) concerned the Workmen's 
Compensation Act 30 of 1941. A passenger injured during a bus accident proceeded to claim 
damages from the bus company. The latter argued that since the person was its employee, his 
claim was against the Compensation Commissioner and not the bus company. At 557-558, the 
court, relying on the control test and Colonial Mutual, held that the person was indeed the 
employee of the bus company and that he was thus entitled to bring an action against his 














the control test by the courts when applying the legislation referred to above, it 
is clear that the significance of the control test as the basis of vicarious liability 
was soon lost227 and that it became ‘the determinant of employment’.228 More 
specifically, it became associated with the distinction between the various 
forms of the locatio conductio,229 slowly but surely establishing a divide 
between an employee and an independent contractor. 
 
Two judgments concerning the distinction between a contract of 
employment and a contract of lease present further evidence that the control 
test lost its significance as the basis of vicarious liability and became the 
hallmark of employment. One judgment concerned the application of the 
Motor Vehicle Insurance Act 1942230 in which the court was required to 
consider whether a taxi driver was a servant, in which case the Act would 
apply, or the lessee of a taxi.231 Without discussing the origin of the control 
test, but proceeding on the basis that control forms the basis of the locatio 
conductio operarum, the AD held that the relationship was not one of locatio 
conductio rei.232 In another matter the AD of Rhodesia233 had to decide for 
purposes of the Sales Tax Act of 1963 (R) whether cranes made available 
with an operator constituted locatio conductio rei or locatio conductio operis. 
This depended on whether the crane operators were in the service of the 
contractor or whether they were leased along with the cranes. Since the 
                                                        
227  Cf Masinda v Tower Typewriter Co 1961 (1) SA 795 (N); Manickum v Lupke 1963 (2) SA 
344 (N); Cassiem v Rohleder 1962 (4) SA 739 (C); Boucher v Du Toit 1978 (3) SA 965 (O) 
and Braamfontein Food Centre v Blake 1982 (3) SA 248 (T) where the courts appeared to re-
establish control as the basis of vicarious liability in cases where a person was asked to drive a 
vehicle on behalf of the owner. However, in Messina Assoc Carriers v Kleinhaus 2001 (3) SA 
868 (SCA) it was held that the true inquiry is whether the relationship between the owner and 
the driver, and the interest of the owner in the driving of the driver is sufficiently analogous to 
the case of an employee driving in the course and scope of her or his employment to justify 
the negligence of the driver being attributed to the owner. 
228  Brassey (n 174) at 891. 
229  However, cf, for example, Rand Tea Rooms Ltd v De Oliveira 1929 PH (2) A78 where the 
court still clearly assumed that control can also be present in the case of an independent 
contracting situation. 
230  Act 29 of 1940. 
231  Auto Protection Insurance Co Ltd v MacDonald (Pty) Ltd 1962 (1) SA 793 (A). 
232  At 797-798. 
233  George Elcombe (PV) Ltd v Commissioner of Taxes 1973 (4) SA 407 (RA). Cf Blismas v 















contractor retained control over the operators, the court was satisfied that the 
contract was not one of lease, but one of locatio conductio operis.234 
  
Apart from vicarious liability, almost all the judgments above concerned 
the application of social welfare legislation in the broad sense (wage 
protection and workmen’s compensation) and tax law. However, there is 
nothing to suggest that the distinction between an employee and an 
independent contractor was based on an understanding (as envisaged by the 
Beveridge scheme in England) that what independent contractors sacrificed in 
terms of social welfare protection, they would gain by means of deductions for 
income tax purposes.235 Rather, the distinction made by the courts (and 
authors)236 seems to be nothing less than a slavish reliance on the judgment 
of the AD in Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v MacDonald,237 
never questioning its tenuous application of English case law and its equally 
tenuous reference to the Roman-Dutch dichotomy.238 
 
This is not to suggest that the control test was applied in unmodified 
form until the 1970s. De Villers CJ’s statement in Colonial Mutual that ‘the 
relation of master and servant cannot exist where there is a total absence of 
the right of supervising and controlling the workman’239 was soon used to 
justify lesser forms of control as compatible with the employment 
relationship.240 The reality is that the modern manifestation of work minimised 
the control of the employer and the continued use of the control test in its 
original form would have excluded even those relationships traditionally 
regarded as falling within the realm of master and servant.241 However, until 
                                                        
234  At 413-415. 
235  Deakin ‘Does the “Personal Employment Contract” Provide a Basis for the Reunification of 
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236  See note 198. 
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238  See § 2.3.3. 
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the late 1970s the courts’ response was not to question the control test, but 
simply to modify it. 
 
2.3.4.5  The exception 
 
The only exception to the slavish observance of the control test 
occurred very briefly in the 1950s and concerned the payment of cost-of-living 
allowances by employers to employees in terms of War Measure 43 of 1942. 
The regulations defined ‘employee’ as any person (excluding certain 
categories such as state employees, domestic and farm servants, mine 
employees provided with rations and quarters and some others) 'employed by 
or working for any other person and receiving or being entitled to receive in 
respect of such employment or work any remuneration' and ‘remuneration' as 
'any money due or paid or payable to any person which arises in any manner 
whatsoever.242  
 
As will be seen below243 this definition of employee very closely 
resembles the definition of ‘employee’ in the industrial relations legislation of 
the time.244 In R v Feun245 the court, satisfied that the evidence revealed ‘a 
considerable degree of control’246 over ice-cream vendors, held that they were 
employees and therefore entitled to cost-of-living allowances. Roper J, 
however, doubted whether the definition of employee in the regulation should 
be understood in the narrow terms expressed in Colonial Mutual, but 
nonetheless proceeded on that basis: 
 
It was assumed in argument by counsel on both sides that the 
question whether the ice-cream vendors were 'employees' of the 
company in terms of the regulations depended upon the same tests as 
were applied in Colonial Mutual  . . . Having in mind the wide terms of 
                                                        
242  Regulation 1(1). 
243  See § 2.3.5.1. 
244  Subject to some exclusion, s 1 of the Industrial Conciliation Act 36 of 1937 defined an 
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entitled to receive, any remuneration, and any other person whatsoever who in any manner 
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the definitions in the regulations, and the objects and scope of the 
legislation, I am not sure that the assumption is correct, and that the 
term 'employee' may not have a wider connotation than that of 'servant' 
under the common law. I will, however, discuss the question whether 
the vendors were employees on the assumption that 'employee' means 
'servant'.247 
 
The application of these regulations again came before the AD in 1959 
in R v AMCA Services Ltd and Another.248  At issue was the status of persons 
who collected payments on behalf of the defendant due to it by members of 
the public in respect of insurance policies or saving accounts. Schreiner JA 
held that there was nothing in the language of the definition that points to a 
master and servant relationship. Conceding that there are some persons who 
are employed by or work for another for remuneration that could not have 
been intended to be covered by the regulations, the judge accepted that a line 
had to be drawn somewhere, but refused to concede that it is the master and 
servant relationship that should represent that line: 
 
But the mere fact that the master and servant relationship would 
provide convenient tests for the application of the regulations would not 
be a good ground for holding that it is impliedly the touchstone of who 
is an employee under the regulations.249 
 
Following a purposive approach and relying on the aim of the 
regulation to supplement the income of lower paid members of a business 
organisation, but not persons who operate outside the organisation, the judge, 
satisfied that the collectors in question were members of the organisation, 
confirmed their status as employees within the meaning of the definition and, 
in the process, stated the South African version of the organisation test: 
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The regulations are, I think, aimed at requiring the payment of a 
cost-of-living allowance for the lower paid members of a business 
organisation but not for payment to persons who are outside the 
organisation. Inside the organisation you may have persons whose 
work is subject to close control, or to slight control or to no control at 
all, as may seem most convenient. Some of the workers in the 
organisation may be paid by time and may be required to work during 
fixed hours at specified places. Others may be paid by results and may 
not be restricted in regard to hours of work or where it is to be done. 
Some may have transport or other equipment provided, others may 
have to provide their own. Some may have no latitude to work for other 
concerns, competing or non-competing, others may have some such 
latitude. Some may work under supervision or subject to inspection, 
others not. Some may be subject to regular leave agreements, others 
not. Though none of these considerations will by itself be decisive they 
will all to a greater or lesser extent throw light on the problem whether 
the persons in question are inside or outside the business organisation 
or not. 250 
 
Significantly, in rejecting the common-law approach to determining the 
meaning of employee in the definition of the regulations, the judge lamented 
the tendency, here and elsewhere, to graft legislative definitions regarding 
employment onto the Roman law dichotomy. More specifically Schreiner JA 
suggested that industrial legislation may require a modification of the 
common-law requirements of the employment contract.251 The court 
                                                        
250  At 213-214. This is not the first time that the organisation test or something akin to it was 
raised in South Africa, but previous judgments referring to it did no more than suggest, rather 
than explain, it. In Imperial Cold Storage v Yeo 1927 CPD 432 vicarious liability (and an 
employment relationship) was founded on the fact that the employee was ‘upon the business’ 
of the employee at the time when the delict occurred. Whether this was a forerunner to the 
organisation test is difficult to say, but it was certainly intended as an alternative to the control 
test since the court held (obiter) that the application of the control test would have led to the 
same finding. Duigen NO v Angehorn 1915 TPD followed a similar approach, but ultimately 
the judge did not venture beyond the control test. 
251  At 211. In this regard the judge quoted from the judgment of Lord Thankerton in Short v 
Henderson Ltd 1946 ScLT 231 who, in considering the status of dockworkers, suggested that 
it ought to be reconsidered whether the requirements of ‘selection, payment and control are 














suggested that the only importance of the dichotomy was in the context of 
vicarious liability.252 Whether by happenstance or design, this judgment 
follows in the wake of the Kahn-Freund note253 on servants and independent 
contractors, published in 1951, in which he advocated the test used in France 
based on the employer’s power to organise254 and the judgments of Lord 
Denning in Stevenson, Jordan and Harrison Ltd v Mac Donald and Evans255 
and Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart NV v Slatford256 where the judge 
asked whether the alleged employee was part and parcel of the 
organisation.257 
 
Unfortunately, this refreshing, but perhaps too brief articulation of the 
distinction between the common-law and legislative meanings of employee 
was short lived. In 1962 the same parties came before the AD again in S v 
AMCA Services (Pty) Ltd.258 The employment status of collectors was once 
again the issue, the only significant difference being that the collectors in 
question were, unlike in the previous case (or perhaps as a result of its 
outcome), allowed to engage others to do the collections on their behalf. This 
time the AD, ignoring the call in the previous judgment to rethink the use of 
the dichotomy in the context of legislation, held that the term ‘working for’ in 
the definition of employee implies personal service, a characteristic of the 
locatio conductio operarum.259 Since the collectors were no longer obliged to 
render the service personally, they were held not to be employees for 
purposes of the regulation.260 
 
The use of the so-called organisation test did not resurface in South 
African employment law until 2002 when, by means of amendments to the 
Labour Relations Act of 1995 (LRA)261 and the Basic Conditions of 
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253  Kahn-Freund (n 241). 
254  At 508. 
255  (1952) 1 TLR 100. 
256  [1953] 1 QB 248. 
257  At 295. 
258  1962 (4) SA 537 (A). 
259  At 542. Cf CIR v Rooth & Wessels 1923 TPD 231 at 234. 
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Employment Act of 1997 (BCEA),262 it became part of a provision on a 
presumption as to who is an employee.263 In the meantime the common-law 
meaning of employee continued to be regarded as the ‘touchstone’ of who is 
an employee under almost all legislation. 
 
2.3.4.6  The end of the control test – the confirmation of the binary divide 
 
By the mid-1970s the courts realised that the control test was totally 
inadequate to explain modern employment, and what became known as the 
‘dominant impression’ test began to take shape.264 The phrase was coined in 
the judgment handed down in Ongevallekommissaris v Onderlinge 
Versekerings Genootskap Avbob265 when the AD, conceding that control is no 
longer decisive, held that when a relationship exhibits characteristics of 
employment as well as of another type of relationship, the court must ask 
itself what dominant impression is created by the contract.266 In this matter the 
court had to consider, for purposes of the 1941 Workmen’s Compensation 
Act, whether the driver of a hearse, injured while so driving, was a workman. 
The court, emphasising that the phrase ‘contract of service’ in the Act must be 
given its common-law meaning, relied exclusively on the written contract 
between the parties to determine the dominant impression. It held that the 
driver was not a workman as defined by the 1941 Act.267 
 
However, it was only after the AD handed down its judgment in Smit v 
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner268 in 1979 that this test gained full 
momentum. The status of an insurance agent in terms of the 1941 Workmen’s 
Compensation Act, injured while procuring policies, was the issue in this 
matter. This judgment signals the final death knell of the control test and, 
approving the approach in Avbob, discounted its role in the following terms: 
                                                        
262  Act 75 of 1997 as amended by the Basic Conditions of Employment Amendment Act 11 of 
2002. 
263  See s 200A of the LRA and s 83A of the BCEA. 
264  Brassey (n 174) at 919-920. 
265  1976 (4) SA 446 (A). Also see Sasverbijl Beleggings & Verdiskonterings Maatskappy Bpk v 
Van Rhynsdorp Town Council and Another 1979 (2) SA 771 (W). 
266  At 457A. 
267  At 450C. 














Notwithstanding its importance the fact remains that the 
presence of such a right of supervision and control is not the sole 
indicium but merely one of the indicia, albeit an important one, and that 
there may also be other important indicia to be considered depending 
upon the provisions of the contract in question as a whole.269  
 
But if this judgment signals the end of the control test, it also 
represents the first firm jurisprudential pronouncement in South Africa on the 
binary divide based on Roman-Dutch origins. Hitherto the courts had rarely 
ventured beyond the judgment in Colonial Mutual to determine employment 
status, and apart from occasional superficial references to the Roman-Dutch 
dichotomy, they had never explored its Roman-Dutch history in any significant 
detail. While the control test came to be associated with the distinction 
between an employee and independent contractor, it acquired this role by 
association rather than the dichotomy imposing itself as a divisive force. The 
judgment in Smit undoubtedly changed this. Investigating the common-law 
meaning of the ‘contract of service’ in the 1941 Act, Joubert JA reverted to the 
Roman and Roman-Dutch law distinction between the locatio conductio 
operarum and locatio conductio operis and contrasted their important legal 
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Contract of service Contract of work 
Object of contract is to 
render personal services. 
Object of contract is to perform a 
specified work or produce a specified 
result. 
Employee must perform 
services personally. 
Contractor may perform 
through others. 
Employer may choose 
when to make use of 
services of an employee. 
Contractor must perform work (or 
produce result) within period fixed by 
contract. 
Employee obliged to 
perform lawful commands 
and instructions of 
employer.  
Contractor is subservient to the 
contract, not under supervision or 
control of employer.  
Contract terminates on 
death of employee. 
Contract does not necessarily terminate 
on death of contractor. 
Contract also terminates on 
expiry of period of service in 
 contract. 
Contract terminates on completion of 
work or production of specified result. 
 
This list came to be the factors around which the dominant impression 
test would evolve for the next twenty years, but as elsewhere271 it has always 
been criticised on the same basis. It provides no guidelines on what weight 
should be attached to the individual factors and what the role of control ought 
to be.272  
 
Nonetheless, this judgment firmly established the binary divide based 
on the Roman-Dutch dichotomy in South Africa and henceforth became the 
reason for employees to be contrasted with independent contractors. The 
effect of Smit, as will be illustrated below,273 soon spilled over to the industrial 
relations legislation which, almost contemporaneously, was transformed to 
include the regulation of individual employment relationships.274 Ironically, 
particularly in view of the resonance it subsequently had, it is often 
overlooked, as alluded to by Kerr, that what was said in Smit about the locatio 
conduction operis was in fact obiter. 
                                                        
271  See Freedland (n 3) at 21. 
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The Court was asked to decide whether S was a workman 
within the meaning of the Act; whether his contract was locatio 
conductio operarum or not. The decision was that it was not. The 
decision would have been the same whether the court thought the 
contract was mandate or locatio conductio operis. Hence it was not 
necessary to decide which it was. It is of interest to note that, so far as 
the report indicates, both counsel confined themselves . . . to the 
question of locatio conductio operarum . . . It has long been recognised 
that one of the dangers of obiter dicta is that the court makes 
pronouncements without having the benefit of argument by counsel . . 
.275 
 
The question can rightfully be asked whether the Roman-Dutch 
dichotomy, in the words of Freedland, was not in reality always ‘deeply 
embedded’ in the South African common law276 and simply waited, like a 
dormant volcano, for an opportunity to erupt.  Or were there other forces at 
work? If the Roman-Dutch dichotomy was such a major divisive force would it 
not have shown itself long before Smit? Would the courts (or at least some of 
them) after Colonial Mutual, instead of making mere occasional references to 
it, not naturally have transplanted the dichotomy that gradually emerged under 
the influence of Colonial Mutual, to the Roman-Dutch model in a much more 
graphic ‘Smit-like’ fashion? In fact, if the dichotomy was such a major 
presence, would the judges in Colonial Mutual not have made much more of 
the dichotomy instead of the brief obiter reference277 to it? While the Roman-
Dutch dichotomy certainly existed, it is far more likely that Smit reflects the 
last remnants of the purist school,278 and that it was an attempt to shift the 
dichotomy that was emerging under the influence of Colonial Mutual (and 
subsequent judgments on predominantly social security and tax legislation) 
and the control test onto Roman-Dutch categorisations.279 Joubert’s JA 
rebuke of previous courts for relying on English law in respect of the control 
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test, and the contempt with which he dismissed the ‘organisation test’ after 
alluding to its English origin, are clear evidence of his purist mindset: 
 
It was, however, unnecessary for this Court to have had 
recourse to English law as authority for the so-called test of supervision 
and control inasmuch as it is indisputably clear from our investigation of 
our common law that the so-called test of supervision and control is 
firmly rooted in Roman-Dutch soil  . . .280  
 
In my view the organisation test is juristically speaking of such a 
vague and nebulous nature that more often than not no useful 
assistance can be derived from it in distinguishing between an 
employee (locator operarum) and an independent contractor 
(conductor operis) in our common law.281 
 
This purist sentiment, it is suggested, is a far more likely explanation for the 
late revival of the Roman-Dutch dichotomy rather than the view that it was 
simply a dormant force.282 
 
2.3.4.7  The binary divide and tax legislation 
 
It is argued above that the binary divide in South Africa is more closely 
linked to the application of the control test as postulated in Colonial Mutual, 
perpetuated by subsequent judgments on social welfare and tax legislation 
                                                        
280  63D. 
281  64G. 
282  This tendency to revert to the Roman law divisions is by no means unique to South Africa. In 
the wake of the Code Civil, the French distinguished between the louage d’’ouvrage 
(employment of workers for a specific job) and the louage de service (domestic servants or 
casual labourers for service). The latter implied submission and the former an undertaking to 
deliver a specific result and can loosely be equated with the locatio conductio operarum and 
locatio conductio operis of Roman law respectively. The contract de travail or contract of 
employment started being used only during the 1880s with the rise of service in the factories 
and was conveniently equated to the louage de service and subordination and, apparently to 
lend the appearance of continuity, it was ‘pretended’ that this type of hiring was a category of 
the Code Civil from the outset and was regarded as a form of subordinated labour. See 
Cottereau, A ‘Industrial Tribunals and the Establishment of a Kind of Common Law of 
Labour in Nineteenth-Century France’ in Steinmetz, W (ed) Private Law and Social 
Inequality in the Industrial Age (2000) 203-226 at 205 and 218-220, especially note 21. Also 
see Deakin D ‘The Comparative Evolution of the Employment Relationship’ (n 2) at 99-100 














and, despite the belated efforts in Smit to affirm the Roman-Dutch model, the 
Roman-Dutch dichotomy was never the powerful force it has sometimes been 
credited to be. The question is whether, apart from these judgments, other 
forces were at work in dividing the labour market. The knock-on effect of Smit 
in the context of industrial relations will be illustrated below,283 but at this 
stage it is fair to state that it was indeed far reaching. However, Freedland 
suggests that the role of the Pay-as-you-earn system (PAYE) introduced by 
the Income Tax (Employment) Act 1943 (UK) in creating the binary divide in 
England should not be disregarded.284 This Act was introduced shortly before 
the National Insurance Act 1946 (UK) that was based on divisions 
recommended by the Beveridge Commission.285 Like the National Insurance 
Act, the PAYE system introduced a distinction between employees and the 
self-employed. It is easy to see how these two pieces of legislation, 
introduced almost contemporaneously and using similar distinctions, could 
divide employment even without the help of a Roman-Dutch-style dichotomy 
looming in the background. 
 
Similar synergies do not exist in respect of comparable South African 
legislation. For instance, similar divisions were not introduced with the 
introduction of unemployment insurance legislation in 1937 and beyond, and it 
is only in 2001 that most wage earners became subject to legislation of this 
nature. Furthermore, the PAYE system was only introduced in South Africa in 
1963.286  
 
Nonetheless, regardless of the absence of such synergies, PAYE was 
arguably as schismatic as the legacy of the control test and the influence of 
Smit, the latter two being forced down from a jurisprudential level, the former 
requiring a decision to be taken by workers at the level of employment. 
Bearing in mind that previously taxes were collected in arrears from all, PAYE 
was introduced as a ‘radical change’ and a ‘far-reaching piece of tax 
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legislation’.287 The PAYE system made a distinction between employees 
earning remuneration (from which the employer was required to deduct tax) 
and the self-employed, the latter paying provisional tax.288 An employee was 
defined as a person who received remuneration289 and the definition of 
remuneration specifically excluded ‘any amount paid or payable to any person 
in respect of services rendered or to be rendered by any person in the course 
of any trade conducted by him independently of the person by whom such 
amount is paid or payable’.290 Significantly the introduction of PAYE in South 
Africa predates Smit by 16 years and until the passing of the LRA in 1995, 
which defined an employee by excluding an independent contractor, it was 
the only legislation vaguely relevant in the context of employment that made a 
distinction between an employee and an independent contractor. While the 
tax courts have always been at pains to stress that the statute takes 
precedence over the common law, the regularity with which these courts 
make an analogy with the Roman-Dutch dichotomy is a clear indication that 
the statutory distinction which had nothing to do with ancient categorisations, 
has nonetheless been grafted onto the common-law divisions.291   
 
The view that PAYE was driving a wedge into the labour market (and 
perhaps still does) and that it almost certainly stimulated the tendency to 
provide services through intermediaries292 is strengthened by the fact that 
several amendments were made to the definition of ‘employee’ in Schedule 4 
to the Income Tax Act of 1962. These amendments sought to counter 
attempts to escape the reaches of the original definition of employee. For 
                                                        
287  See the second reading of the Income Tax Amendment Bill on 28 January 1963 Debates of the 
House of Assembly (1963) 5 299 and Explanatory Memorandum on the Income Tax 
Amendment Bill 1963 WP2-63. 
288  See ITC 1787 67 SATC 142 at par 18. 
289  See s 1(ii) of Schedule 4. 
290  See s1(x)(b)(ii) of Schedule 4. 
291  See ITC 1787 67 SATC 142 at par 62; ITC 1718 64 SATC 43 pars 18-20 and ITC 1695 63 
SATC 133 at 137. Interpretation Note 17 ‘Employees’ Tax: Independent Contractors’ 
published 28 March 2003 is a further indication of the heavy reliance placed on the common 
law and in particular the dominant impression test. See De Koker, A Silke on South African 
Tax SI 32 (2005) at 20.7A. 














instance, in 1990, labour brokers were added to the definition of employee.293  
The need for this addition is explained as follows: 
 
Absent any special provisions, the fees earned by labour 
brokers from their clients would not be subject to PAYE although the 
salaries payable to the individuals by the labour broker would be. The 
above structure was for many years used by individuals or small 
groups of individuals to effectively defer the payment of tax by 
appointing the individuals concerned as directors of the labour broking 
entity. Under the law as it then existed, this would have removed any 
PAYE liability, leaving the individual liable only to provisional tax 
payments twice or three times a year.294 295 
 
For very similar reasons the legislature added personal service 
companies and personal service trusts296 (as well as directors of private 
companies)297 to the definition of an employee in Schedule 4.298 
 
While it is clear that the impact of PAYE on the labour market was 
never a consideration when it was introduced,299 there is no doubt that to a 
lesser or greater extent it would have been a force in the shaping of the labour 
market and that, by the time Smit harked back to the Roman-Dutch 
dichotomy, the employee/independent contractor divide was a reality, but for 




                                                        
293  Section 44(A) of Income Tax Act 101 of 1990. 
294  Clegg, D and Strecth, R Income Tax in South Africa SI 30 (November 2006) at 28.2A.1. Also 
see De Koker (n 291) at 20.22 and Meyerowitz, D Meyerowitz on Income Tax (2005/6) at 
38.7. 
295  See, for example, Housecalls Projects CC and Others v Minister of Finance and Others 1995 
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2.3.5 Industrial relations legislation 
 
2.3.5.1  1914 to 1956 
 
It is generally true that since the individual contract of employment is 
subject to the terms of collective agreements, a study of the evolution of the 
contract of employment and the meaning of employee cannot ignore 
legislation on collective labour relations.300 However, there are at least two 
specific reasons for surveying these statutes in the South African context and, 
in particular, the manner in which they define an employee: First, the 
enactment of these statutes roughly coincided with the passing of major social 
welfare legislation in South Africa in the form of workmen’s compensation 
legislation. Both the industrial relations legislation and the workmen’s 
compensation legislation represented rather radical legislative interventions 
and the legislature could not have been unaware of how employment was 
regarded in the one statute when passing the other. Second, after 1979301 the 
enforcement of individual labour disputes was facilitated via the industrial 
relations legislation, allowing for a definition of an employee that was first 
enacted for purposes of collective industrial relations to apply to individual 
employment relationships. Nonetheless, as will be shown below, it was the 
understanding of individual employment as it developed outside the context of 
industrial relations legislation that came to dominate this legislation from 1979 
until at least the end of the twentieth century.302 
 
                                                        
300  Du Toit, D Capital and Labour in South African Industrial Relations in the 1970s LLD thesis, 
University of Leiden, 1979 at 34. 
301   1979 is generally regarded as a watershed year in South African employment. In 1979 the 
report of the Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legislation (Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legislation (RP 47/1979)) was published. This resulted in 
major amendments to the Industrial Conciliation Act 28 of 1956. These included the removal 
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unfair labour practice regime. See Du Toit, D; Bosch, D; Woolfrey, D; Godfrey, S; Cooper, C; 
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The first attempts to regulate the industrial relations framework resulted 
in the passing of the Industrial Disputes Prevention Act 20 of 1909303 by the 
Transvaal Parliament and only applied to the Transvaal. This Act and the Acts 
subsequently passed by the Union government were the result of a peculiar 
class struggle that was playing itself out, mainly on the mines of the 
Witwatersrand, and involved the mine owners, the white workers, the black 
workers and the government.304 At the heart of the issue was the fear of white 
workers that mine owners would prefer cheaper black labour and the white 
workers’ concomitant demands for job reservation. This led to several intense 
strikes on the mines (that also spread to other industries), which often 
required military intervention by the government. Each of the disruptive 
periods (1907, 1913-1914 and 1922) was followed by legislation aimed at 
addressing the fears of the white workforce: first the 1909 Transvaal Act, 
followed by the Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924.305 While these statutes 
introduced collective bargaining structures that have basically survived until 
today, they marginalised the black labour force. Black workers were excluded 
from the definition of an employee and continued to be excluded until 1979. 
The racial divisions emanating from the application of the (racially neutral) 
Master and Servant laws thus found formal expression in the industrial 
relations legislation.306  
 
                                                        
303  Crude elements of protection against victimisation because of trade union activity are found in 
the Master and Servant Laws 13 of 1880 (Transvaal). See Schaeffer, M ‘The History of 
Industrial Legislation as Applied in South Africa with Special Reference to Black Workers’ 
1977 TSAR 49. The 1909 (Transvaal) Act was broadly based on the Canadian model which 
required compulsory conciliation before strike action could commence. See Hartog, G 
‘Methods of Industrial Peace within the Empire’ (1913) 30 SALJ 442. 
304  For a comprehensive overview of these struggles see Davies, R ‘The Class Struggle of South 
African’s Industrial Conciliation Legislation’ in Webster, E (ed) Essays in Southern African 
Labour History (1978) 69-81; Lever, J ‘Capital and Labour in South Africa: The Passage of 
the Industrial Conciliation Act, 1924’ in Webster, E (ed) Essays in Southern African Labour 
History (1978) 82-107; Davis, D ‘From Contract to Administrative Law: The Changing Face 
of South African Labour Law’ in Visser, D Essays on the History of Law (1989) 79-104 and 
Gitsham, E and Trembath, JF A First Account of Labour Organisation in South Africa (1926) 
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305  Davies, R (n 304) at 73.  The Industrial Disputes and Trade Unions Bill was introduced in 
parliament in April 1914, but mainly because of the advent of World War I, it was not passed. 
Less significant industrial relations legislation was, however, passed, like the first Wage Act 
29 of 1918 and the Factories Act 28 of 1918. See Lever (n 304) at 90. 
306  Initially women were not covered by native pass laws, but the Native Laws Amendment Act 
54 of 1952 extended this form of control to Black women. As a result they were also excluded 














In an effort to address the problems presented by the dual system of 
industrial relations regulation, a new statute was passed in 1937307 and again 
in 1956,308 which, as shall be seen from the definitions quoted below, 
continued to entrench the racial divisions of workers.309  
 
The 1909 Transvaal Act defined an employee as: 
 
any white person engaged by an employer to perform for hire or 
reward, manual, clerical, or supervision work in any undertaking, trade 
or industry to which this Act applies.310 
 
The Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924 defined an employee as: 
 
any person engaged by an employer to perform, for hire or 
reward, manual, clerical or supervision work in any undertaking, 
industry, trade or occupation to which this Act applies, but shall not 
include a person whose contract of service or labour is regulated by 




                                                        
307  Industrial Conciliation Act 36 of 1937. 
308  Industrial Conciliation Act 28 of 1956. 
309  See Du Toit (n 301) at 9. One of the problems presented by the dual system of industrial 
relations regulation was that Black workers could be employed at lower rates. This was 
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1937 and the Wage Act 5 of 1957. These Acts did not apply in as far as industrial agreements 
in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Acts were applicable. These Acts used the same 
definition of employee as the Industrial Conciliation Acts, but were racially neutral and 
because of this achieved the same objective of preventing the undercutting of wages of the 
Black labour force. This anomaly is illustrated in 1927 PH (1) K32 (name of parties not 
provided) where the TPD confirmed that Blacks were excluded from the Industrial 
Conciliation Act of 1924, but covered by the Wage Act of 1925. Since wage determinations 
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benefit from this legislation. Also see Giliomee (n 50) at 336 and 342; Schaeffer (n 303) at 51 
and Duncan (n 109) at 152-181. (The Wage Act 29 of 1918 was rarely used and in any event 
only applied to women and children and did not apply to Black labour).  
310  Section 1. 
311  Section 24. Technically this meant that Black workers were not excluded on racial grounds 
since those Blacks not covered by the pass laws were still employees in terms of the Act. See 














The Industrial Conciliation Act 36 of 1937 defined an employee as: 
 
any person employed by, or working for any employer, and 
receiving, or being entitled to receive, any remuneration, and any other 
person whatsoever who in any manner assists in the carrying on or 
conducting of the business of the employer but does not include a 
person, whose contract of service or labour is regulated by any Native 
Pass Laws  . . .312 (emphasis added) 
 
The Industrial Conciliation Act (later Labour Relations) 28 of 1956 
defined an employee as:- 
 
any person (other than a native) employed by, or working for 
any employer and receiving, or being entitled to receive any 
remuneration, and any other person whatsoever (other than a native) 
who in any manner assists in the carrying on or conducting of the 
business of an employer      . . .313 
 
It should be noted that, in addition to exclusions based on race (and as 
in the case of social welfare legislation), large groups of wage earners, like 
domestic workers, agricultural workers, public servants and university 
lecturers, were also excluded from the application of these laws.314 After 
publication of the report of the Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry into Labour 
Legislation in 1979, the reference to race was removed from the definition,315 
but other than that it remained the same as in the 1937 Act. Today the 1995 
LRA contains the minimum exclusions and consistent with the move towards 
unification identified earlier, the Constitutional Court (CC) in 2008 held that 
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313  Section 1. Contrary to the 1924 Act Blacks were thus explicitly excluded on racial grounds. 
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separate branches for white and coloured members.. Black labour disputes were regulated by 
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Schaeffer (n 301) at 53-54. 
314  See, for example, s 2(2) of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956. 














‘the LRA brings all employees, whether employed in the public sector or 
private sector under it’ and that public sector employees are seriously 
constrained from proceeding against the state as their employer on the basis 
of administrative law principles. 316 
 
Apart from the exclusions based on race, the striking feature of these 
definitions is that, contrary to the contemporaneous workmen’s compensation 
legislation, an employee was not defined in terms of contract. Jurisprudence 
on the definition of employee reflects the same understanding. While 
judgments on the meaning of employee as defined in the early industrial 
relations legislation were preoccupied with the question whether the employee 
was excluded from the operation of the statute either because of race or the 
type of employment in which the worker was engaged,317 the few judgments 
that did consider the substantial meaning of ‘employee’ conceded that a 
contract of employment in the form of a master and servant relationship was 
not necessarily a prerequisite for the application of this legislation. 
 
In R v Chaplin318 a hairdresser was prosecuted for paying four 
assistants less than the minimum provided for in the applicable industrial 
council agreement. The court, relying on the control test, found that the 
relationship was essentially one of master and servant319 and for that reason 
they were held to be employees for purposes of the 1924 Act. But the court 
conceded that a master and servant relationship may not necessarily be a 
prerequisite for the application of the Act:  
 
Now the question may arise in some future case whether this 
right of control, supervision and direction must exist in order to 
                                                        
316  Chirwa v Transnet Ltd & Others (2008) 29 ILJ 73 (CC) at par 102. 
317  See, for example, R v Jackson 1927 EDL 346; R v Port Elizabeth Municipality 1928 EDL; 
49R v Gutner 1934 TPD 278; City of Cape Town v Union Government 1931 CPD 366; R v 
Becker 1940 AD 19 and R v Maal 1940 TPD 395. 
318  1931 OPD 172. 
319  This was despite the fact that their remuneration was not fixed and was based on the income 
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constitute the relation of employer and employee within the meaning of 
the Industrial Conciliation Act.320 
 
The same sentiment is expressed in R v Berman & Others,321 the facts 
of which, although trivial, are worth summarising: Berman was a director of a 
company that was covered by an industrial council agreement relating to the 
printing and newspaper industry. The agreement provided, inter alia, that only 
qualified persons should be employed to operate a guillotine in that industry. 
Berman, unqualified to operate a guillotine, was responsible for the financial 
matters of the company and received remuneration. From time to time, during 
the course of his duties, he operated a guillotine and a prosecution followed 
on the basis that he was not qualified to do so. The court concluded that 
Berman was not an employee as contemplated by the 1924 Act. In coming to 
this conclusion the court remarked that while he was receiving reward for 
fulfilling his obligations and was thus an employee covered by the substantial 
part of the definition, he was not engaged to do the type of work envisaged by 
the industrial council agreement and the prohibition therefore did not apply to 
him. In coming to this conclusion the court remarked that ‘[t]he test is not 
whether the relationship of master and servant exists, but whether in regard to 
the work in question [Berman] is employed.’322  
 
At the time the control test was widely used to determine a master and 
servant relationship and often, because the nature of their employment 
suggested they were not under such control, individuals were not regarded as 
employees.323 Berman was a director of the company and as such the control 
test would ordinarily have ruled him out as an employee. Yet, on the basis 
that he received a reward for rendering a service, the court was prepared to 
regard him as an employee, ultimately excluding him only on the basis of the 
type of work he was doing. This and the reservation expressed in Chaplin are 
clear indications that the court regarded employment under the 1924 Act in 
very broad non-contractual terms. 
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In the 1937 Act the definition of employee was amended to include a 
reference to persons assisting the employer.324 This was in response to the 
judgment in R v Govindasamy,325 decided under the 1924 Act, where the 
court found that children of the employer who worked in his shop as shop 
assistants were not employees unless their work was for hire or reward. The 
amendment, which negates one of the requirements of the common-law 
contract of employment (remuneration), is a further indication, it is suggested, 
of the broad intent of the legislature.  
 
The view that the industrial relations legislation never intended to 
regard employment in terms of the common-law contract of employment finds 
further support in the judgment of the AD in R v AMCA Services Ltd and 
Another326 discussed earlier.327 While this judgment concerned the application 
of a war measure, the definition of an employee328 is remarkably similar to the 
definition in the 1924 Act and the first leg of the definition in the 1937 Act. The 
AD’s reservations in AMCA about reliance on the common-law relationship of 
master and servant to determine the meaning of a definition that is not 
couched in contractual terms is equally relevant and worth repeating in some 
detail: 
 
Since the definition of employee does not mention masters or 
servants the only way that their relationship can be introduced is by 
implication, and that can only arise, I apprehend, if it is clear (a) that 
there are some persons who are employed by or work for another 
against remuneration who cannot have been intended to be included, 
and (b) that the only acceptable way of excluding them, without 
excluding others who were probably intended to be included, is by 
                                                        
324  The Wage Act 44 of 1937 made the same adjustment to the definition of employee. See s 1. 
325  1936 GWLD 15. Cf R v Gregoratos 1919 TPD 13 and R v Kaplan 1928 TPD 466 decided 
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assisting in  shops were employees. Also see Norman-Scoble (n 103) at 23. 
326  1959 (4) SA 207 (A). 
327  See § 2.3.4.5. 
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any remuneration'. The only significant difference when compared to the first part of the 
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treating 'employee' as equivalent to 'servant'. I think that (a) is 
established, since there are many persons (e.g. the doctor, the 
plumber, the builder, the taxidriver) who in the widest sense work for 
another for remuneration but who clearly fall outside the intention of the 
definition. But in my view (b) is not satisfied. No doubt if (a) is accepted 
you have to stop somewhere and a convenient stopping place might 
well seem to be where the master and servant relationship ends. For 
cases on this relationship have developed tests which could afford 
guidance, if applicable. But the mere fact that the master and servant 
relationship would provide convenient tests for the application of the 
regulations would not be a good ground for holding that it is impliedly 
the touchstone of who is an employee under the regulations. To act on 
this view might exclude persons from the operation of the regulations 
who would be included if one regarded the language of the regulations 
alone. If there is any difference at all between the definition of 
'employee' in the regulations and the definition of 'servant' at common 
law it is the former that must be applied, and not the latter. In my view 
there is at least a possibility of difference and, if that is so, the master 
and servant relationship can at most be used as suggesting factors that 
might be relevant in deciding whether particular cases fall outside or 
inside the definition in the regulations.329 
 
Many years later this sentiment was acknowledged by the Labour 
Court in White v Pan Palladium SA (Pty) Ltd330 in the context of the Labour 
Relations Act of 1995331 (which, while still not defining an employee in terms 
of contract, contrasts employment with an independent contractor)332 when it 
concluded (obiter) that:- 
 
 The existence of the employment relationship is therefore not 
dependent solely upon the conclusion of a contract recognized at 
common law as valid and enforceable. Someone who works for 
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330  (2006) 27 ILJ 2721 (LC). 
331  Act 66 of 1995. 














another, assists that other in his business and receives remuneration 
may, under the statutory definition qualify as an employee even if the 
parties inter se have not yet agreed on all the relevant terms of the 
agreement by which they wish to regulate their contractual 
relationship.333  
 
What is important is that, despite the fact that industrial relations 
legislation dominated early twentieth-century employment in South Africa, 
neither the legislation nor the courts’ interpretation thereof suggest that the 
employee/independent contractor dichotomy was enforcing itself via this 
legislation. Further support for this can be found in the manner that these 
statutes regulated the extension of industrial agreements. Section 9 of the 
1924 Act simply refers to the possibility of extending the agreement to ‘other 
employers and employees’ and section 48(4) of the 1937 Act provides for the 
extension of agreements to persons not covered by the definition of employee 
in the Act, but in neither Act were independent contractors specifically 
identified (and thus contrasted with employees) as possible beneficiaries of 
such extensions.  
 
This is also consistent with the view taken on the meaning of 
‘employee’ in labour relations legislation elsewhere. In a 1940 judgment of the 
US Supreme Court, the meaning of ‘employee’ under the National Labor 
Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935 (which did not define the term) was analysed 
with reference to the purpose of the Act: 
 
Congress had in mind a wider field than the narrow technical 
legal relation of ‘master and servant’, as the common law had worked it 
out in all its variations, and at the same time a narrower one than the 
entire area of rendering service to others . . . Yet only partial solutions 
would be provided if large segments of workers about whose technical 
legal position such local differences exist should be wholly excluded 
from coverage by reason of such differences. Enmeshed in such 
                                                        














distinction, the administration of the statute soon might become 
encumbered by the same sort of technical legal refinement as has 
characterized the long evolution of the employee-independent 
contractor dichotomy in the courts for other purposes. The 
consequences would be ultimately to defeat, in part at least, the 
achievement of the statute’s objectives . . .334  
 
Recently it has also been argued that the roots of the ‘worker’ 
concept335 in England which aims to transcend the limitations of contract, can 
be traced back to legislation on trade disputes, such as the Trades Disputes 
Act 1906 which adopted a broad definition of the term ‘workman’.336 
 
2.3.5.2  1956 to 1979 
 
The position began to change under the 1956 Act. While it essentially 
reproduced the definition of employee in the 1937 Act and did not explicitly 
exclude an independent contractor, one of the first commentaries337 on the 
Act assumed that it did. The author of this commentary (Schaeffer) simply 
relied on the control test and authoritatively stated that: 
 
For the purpose of the Act the relationship between employer 
and employee is one of master and servant. In other words the 
employer must have the right to prescribe not merely what work has to 
be done but also the manner in which it has to be done.338 
 
As authority for this statement, the author cites339 the judgment in 
Colonial Mutual340 and a judgment on wage legislation341 as well as section 
24(1)(p) of the 1956 Act. The latter, read with section 48(7) of the Act, 
                                                        
334  National Labor Relations Board v Hearst Publications Inc 322 US 11 (1944). 
335  See § 2.2.4. 
336  Deakin ‘Does the “Personal Employment Contract” Provide a Basis for the Reunification of 
Employment Law?’ (n 2) at 78. 
337  Schaeffer, M Regulation of Employment and Industrial Conciliation in South Africa (1957). 
338  Schaeffer  (n 337) at 3. 
339  Schaeffer  (n 337) at 3. 
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provided that an industrial council agreement may include provisions in 
respect of: 
 
[any work given] out on contract to any person by a principal or 
contractor, whether or not that principal or contractor is himself an 
employer in or is engaged in the undertaking, industry, trade or 
occupation concerned, the rates at which or the basis or the principles 
upon which, payment shall be made to that person for the work. 
 
The slavish adherence to the control test, irrespective of the context, 
has already been alluded to above.342 Furthermore, it is also doubtful whether 
the statutory provision quoted above is enough to suggest that employees 
must be understood in terms of contract and contrasted with independent 
contractors. In this regard Du Toit observed that: 
 
These sections provide in effect that an industrial agreement 
may deal separately with the terms and conditions for handing out work 
on contract. It is not clear that this should circumscribe the meaning of 
“employee” as far as the entire statute is concerned . . . From the fact 
that the definition of “employee” gives no hint of such intention, the 
opposite may rather be concluded.343 
 
Schaeffer, in a 1973 publication, cites exactly the same authority for 
the claim that the definition of employee in the 1956 Act does not include 
independent contractors.344 The lack of jurisprudential authority is explained 
by the fact that the legislation concerned collective labour relations only, and 
judgments on the definition of employee that did come before the courts 
simply did not concern the substantial meaning of ‘employee’ (and for that 
matter the dichotomy). Instead, not unlike the position under the Master and 
Servant laws, the courts were more troubled by the delineation of an industrial 
council agreement in respect of the type of industry in which the employee 
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was engaged.345 While the courts were not engaging with the dichotomy as 
such, there is some evidence that they were now becoming reluctant to 
regard employment in broad terms. For instance, in Playfair Gents 
Hairdressers (Pty) Ltd and Another v S346 the court focused on the first leg of 
the definition only and did not revert to the second leg of the definition at all. In 
this matter two directors of a company were prosecuted on the basis that they 
did not observe certain terms of an industrial council agreement. They 
operated a hairdressing business through a company and were held not to be 
employees for purposes of the 1956 Act, because they shared in the profits of 
the company and were not entitled to remuneration as required by the first leg 
of the definition.347 
 
2.3.5.3 1979 to 2000 
 
Whatever ambivalence there might have been towards the substantial 
meaning of ‘employee’ in the context of industrial legislation, it all changed 
after 1979. As a result of the recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission 
an Industrial Court was introduced with jurisdiction in respect of unfair labour 
practices. Originally, an unfair labour practice was defined as any practice 
which, in the opinion of the Industrial Court, was an unfair labour practice.348 
The concept was amended and refined many times, but was always 
understood to include unfair dismissals.349 More so than before, this resulted 
in individuals litigating under the Act, often requiring the courts to consider the 
employment status of a litigant. The Industrial Court almost always viewed 
this narrowly, and with reference to the dominant impression test and Smit, 
infused the common-law employee/independent contractor dichotomy into 
industrial relations legislation.350 This was despite the fact that earlier 
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348  Section 1 of the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 94 of 1979. 
349  See Le Roux, R ‘The Impact of the 2002 Amendments on Residual Unfair Labour Practices’ 
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jurisprudential pronouncements, albeit few, on the role of the common law in 
this legislation suggested otherwise, and the fact that, but for the removal of 
the reference to race, the definition did not change and still did not refer to the 
contract of employment. 
 
However, there were a few (admittedly receding) voices prepared to 
assign a broader meaning to the definition of employee. For instance, in Oak 
Industries (SA) (Pty) Ltd v John No & Another351 the court held that a 
managing director who also received a salary for working for the company 
was an employee of the company on the basis that he assisted the company: 
 
Now if one looks at the definition of 'employee' and if one has 
regard for the moment to the language used by the legislature in 
defining 'employee', it is clear that the second respondent was a 
person who assisted in the carrying on or conducting of the business of 
the applicant.  In other words, subject to what I shall say in a moment 
as to whether or not the applicant is an 'employer' as defined, the facts 
reveal that the second respondent fell at lowest within the terms of the 
latter portion of the definition of employee, although it seems to me he 
probably fell within the first part of that definition as well.352 
 
However, with the enactment of the Labour Relations Act of 1995 
(LRA),353 an ‘employee’, under the influence of the judgments handed down 
by the Industrial Court, was defined in the following terms:354 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Pearce & J Sheward T/A Lubrite Distributors (1993) 14 ILJ 1262 (LAC); Dempsey v Home & 
Property (1993) 14 ILJ 1547 (IC); Dempsey v Home and Property  (1995) 16 ILJ 378 (LAC); 
Erasmus v Saambou Versekeringsmakelaars (Edms) Bpk  & ’n Ander [1995] 2 BLLR 57 (IC) 
and Board of Executors Ltd v McCafferty (1997) 18 ILJ 949 (LAC). 
351  (1987) 8 ILJ 756 (N). 
352   759G-H. Also see SA Clothing & Textile Workers Union & Others v SA Clothing Industries 
Ltd; Mtambo & Another v SA Clothing Industries Ltd (1993) 14 ILJ 983 (LAC) where McCall 
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(a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, who 
works for another person or for the State and who 
receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration; and 
(b) any other person who in any manner assists in carrying 
on or conducting the business of an employer. (emphasis 
added) 
 
Not only (for the first time in industrial relations legislation) was an 
employee defined by excluding an independent contractor, but in one of the 
first judgments handed down by the newly established Labour Appeal Court, 
SA Broadcasting Corporation v McKenzie,355 (although it actually concerned 
the definition under the 1956 Act), it was accepted that an independent 
contractor is not an employee as defined by the (1956) Act and the court 
relied heavily on Smit in concluding that there was no employment. Through 
the Smit/McKenzie combination and the specific exclusion of independent 
contractors in the 1995 definition, ‘the first part of the definition [was 
henceforth] understood as covering common-law employees’.356 Not 
surprisingly, the dominant impression test came to dominate the 
understanding of employee under the 1995 LRA for the following five years.357 
The second leg of the definition, however, appeared to receive no attention 
from the courts. 
 
It was also during this period that a further statutory twist was added to 
the contract of employment in the form of the relationships between labour 
brokers, the employee and the client where the employee is placed. Labour 
brokers were first formally regulated in South Africa by means of an 
amendment358 to the Labour Relations Act of 1956359 which required the 
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356  Benjamin (n 272) at 789. 
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broker to register with the Department of Labour. In terms of this amendment 
and contrary to practical realities the labour broker was deemed to be the 
employer of the workers supplied by it to the client.360 In terms of the 1995 
LRA the registration of labour brokers (called temporary employment services 
under the 1995 LRA) with the Department is no longer required, but their 
status as deemed employers is reinforced by s 198(2) of the LRA.361 
 
2.3.5.4  2000 and beyond 
 
The new century brought many new, and often conflicting, 
developments on both jurisprudential and legislative levels. The impact of 
these developments on the evolution of the contract of employment is yet to 
be determined. 
 
2.3.5.4.1  The courts 
 
On the one hand, initially at least, is seemed as if the labour courts 
were entrenching the contractual model by insisting that no protection is 
available if the requirements for a valid contract are not met and, to a certain 
extent, that view still holds true. For instance, in a number of judgments the 
labour court denied protection on the basis that the parties did not intend to 
enter into a contract of employment, despite the fact that the realities may 
have pointed to such a relationship.362 In Church of the Province of Southern 
Africa Diocese of Cape Town v CCMA & Others,363 which concerned the 
employment status of a priest Waglay J held that: 
                                                                                                                                                              
359  Act 28 of 1956. 
360  International norms as provided by ILO Private Employment Agencies Convention 181, 1997 
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Since I have found that a contract of employment is necessary 
for purposes of establishing an employment relationship and that there 
was no legally enforceable contract of employment between the 
applicant and the third respondent, the parties are not an employer and 
employee as defined by the LRA and consequently the first respondent 
has no jurisdiction to entertain the alleged dispute referred to it by the 
third respondent.364   
 
On the basis that employment contrary to the Aliens Control Act 96 of 
1991 constitutes an illegality the CCMA has hitherto declined to intervene 
when foreigners, employed contrary to the provisions of this Act, have been 
dismissed, since the LRA cannot be seen to condone unlawful conduct.365 
The CCMA took a similar approach in respect of prostitutes when it stated that 
‘it is trite that the employment contract forms the basis of the employment 
relationship between the parties’ and that an arrangement to provide such 
services cannot constitute a valid contract.366 
 
On the other hand, clearly uncertain on how to deal with the limitations 
of contract of employment367 shown up by the ‘vertical disintegration of the 
enterprise’,368 the courts have turned to an approach that favours substance 
over form. In Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber369 the Labour Appeal Court was faced 
with a contract that was equivalent to an independent contracting 
arrangement. The court, in holding that the respondent was an employee for 
purposes of the LRA, defied the traditional approach that the relationship 
between the parties must be gathered primarily from the contract concluded 
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between the parties and held that ‘the court must have regard not to the labels 
but to the realities of the relationship between the three parties’.370 This was 
followed by a judgment of the Labour Court in White v Pan Palladium SA (Pty) 
Ltd,371 in which the court, almost casually, downplayed the role of the 
common law, stating (obiter) that ‘[t]he existence of the employment 
relationship is therefore not dependent solely upon the conclusion of a 
contract recognised at common law as valid and enforceable’.372 
 
Irrespective of the future of the contract of employment in the context of 
protective legislation, it is clear that it lives on beyond such legislation. It was 
always understood that those specifically excluded from the ambit of the LRA 
are entitled to enforce their rights in the common-law courts,373 but now it has 
been held, unlike the position in England,374 that even those employees who 
are covered by the LRA are not prevented from enforcing the contract of 
employment under the common law.375 An employee is therefore, upon 
termination of the contract of employment, not limited to the unfair dismissal 
regime provided for in the LRA, but may, in the case of an unlawful breach of 
the contract of employment, claim contractual damages in terms of the 
common law. The extent to which an employee may pursue both an unfair 
dismissal claim in terms of the LRA and an unlawful termination claim in terms 
of the LRA remains to be decided, but s 195 of the LRA provides that 
compensation awarded for dismissal is in addition to any other amount to 
which the employee is entitled in terms of any law, collective agreement or the 
contract of employment. It has been suggested by the SCA that since the LRA 
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limits compensation for unfair dismissal, the balance of the contractual 
damages can be recovered in the common law courts.376 377 
 
2.3.5.4.2  Legislation 
 
In 2002 s 200A378 and s 83A379 were inserted into the LRA and the 
Basic Conditions of Employment of 1997380 (BCEA) respectively. These 
sections (that are identical), while not amending the definition of employee, 
create a rebuttable presumption that a worker is an employee when certain 
factors are present.381 The full impact of these amendments will be discussed 
in more detail elsewhere,382 but suffice to say that the nature of the factors 
that would trigger the presumption, such as the integration of a person into an 
organisation and the extent of the person’s economic dependence on the 
other persons and the fact that it applies ‘regardless of the form of the 
contract’, suggests that the legislature envisages employment beyond the 
common-law version.383 
 
2.3.5.4.3  Code of Good Practice: Who is an employee? 
 
Following the ILO Employment Relationship Recommendation 198, 
2006, the Department of Labour published a ‘Code of Good Practice: Who is 
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employment is unfair, the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction to deal with it 
notwithstanding the unlawfulness of the termination and that s 195 of the LRA merely enables 
the Labour Court to award damages in addition to the compensation that can be awarded for 
the unfair dismissal. See par 43. 
377  Section 77(3) of the BCEA conferred concurrent jurisdiction on the Labour Court to hear and 
determine any matter concerning a contract of employment. An aggrieved employee will 
therefore be able to pursue both the claim for unfair dismissal and the common-law claim for 
damages in the Labour Court. 
378  Inserted by s 51 of the Labour Relations Amendment Act 12 of 2002. 
379  Inserted by s 21 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Amendment Act 11 of 2002. 
380  Act 77 of 1997. 
381  See Starke / Financial Expert Marketing CC [2005] 2 BALR 244 (CCMA) and Andreanis / 
Department of Health [2006] 5 BALR 461 (SSSBC) for application of the presumption by 
industrial tribunals.  
382  § 5.3.2. 














an employee?’ in December 2006.384 The Code basically reiterates existing 
techniques such as the dominant impression test and revisits the provision 
dealing with the presumption,385 but provides no new insights into 
understanding employment relationships. While it does stress the importance 
of substance over form386 and alludes to the potential of the second leg of the 
definition of employee in the LRA,387 no hints are provided on how to marry 
these with the common-law dichotomy of employee and independent 





These judgments and legislative interventions clearly suggest that the 
contract of employment is at a crossroads, but other than a few broad, and at 
times, conflicting hints, they provide no guidance on how the contract should 
evolve in the future. Nor is there any indication whether it should indeed 
remain the port of entry to protective legislation, or to what extent a new 
dichotomy with a fault line based on, for instance dependence, ought to be 
devised. It is suggested that understanding the manner in which work is 
performed as well as the limitations of the contract of employment will be 
instructive in plotting the future of the contract of employment or, alternatively, 




Historically the contract of employment was not a unitary concept in 
South Africa. The Master and Servant laws applied to lower status 
                                                        
384   Published in terms of the LRA under General Notice 1774 in GG 29445 of 1 December 2006. 
Cheadle, H ‘Regulated Flexibility: Revisiting the LRA and the BCEA’ (2006) 27 ILJ 663 at 
669 in discussing the concept of regulated flexibility describes the function of Codes (the 
publication of which is authorised by s 203 of the LRA) as not imposing duties but setting 
standards of behaviour. In other words, it does not create substantive rights, but provides 
guidelines in respect of the application of substantive principles. 
385   See Parts 2 and 3 of the Code.  
386  Item 16, Part 2. 
387  Items 24-25, Part 3. 














employees; the common law applied to higher status employees. This divide, 
which also happened to be a racial divide, continued until the latter part of the 
twentieth century. The control test and the exclusions in legislation 
undermined the development of a unitary concept of employment.  
 
While the distinction between an employee and independent contractor 
is often linked to the Roman-Dutch dichotomy of locatio conductio operis and 
locatio conductio operarum this dichotomy only made a very belated entry into 
South African labour law in 1979 and other forces may have been more 
influential in this regard. 
 




The Dutch Civil Code was introduced in the Netherlands in 1838, when 
the Cape was already subject to English rule. Despite this, Roman-Dutch law 
remained the common law at the Cape and subsequently was also adopted 
as the common law of Natal and the Boer Republics. However, as a result of 
codification, developments in Holland had no further influence on the 
development of the law in South Africa. Nonetheless, apart from the pre-
codification ties, the development of labour law in South Africa and the 
development thereof in the Netherlands share an interesting time line. Above 
it was shown that it was not until the abolition of slavery in the 1830s that a 
(crude) culture of employment developed in South Africa, and that it was only 
with the introduction of the first Master and Servant law in 1841 that there was 
a serious attempt to regulate employment.389 This roughly coincided with the 
introduction in 1838 of the Burgelijk Wetboek (BW) in the Netherlands which 
contained rules concerning the letting and hiring of services, work and 
industry, albeit it a few at the time.  
 
                                                        














Another important reason for referring to the Dutch position is that, 
unlike South Africa and England, pre-industrial Holland appears not to have 
had a criminal jurisdiction similar to that of the Master and Servant laws of 
England and South Africa.390 The Netherlands thus provides an opportunity to 
consider the evolution of the contract of employment in a less repressive and 
socially more equal environment. 
 
The BW was broadly based on the Code Civil in France, but in later 
amendments, particularly in respect of employment, it carried, to a certain 
extent, the imprint of the German Burgerlichesgesetzbuch (BGB).391 The 
original BW of 1838 was, in the context of the contract of employment, 
amended many times (most significantly in 1909), but in 1992 a new BW was 
adopted. In the (old) 1909 BW, articles 1637 to 1639 covered the 
arbeidsovereenkomst (contract of employment), but by the time the new BW 
was adopted, art 1637 included subsections up to 1637z, art 1638 included 
subsections up to 1638oo and art 1639 included subsections up to 1639dd. In 
the new BW, articles 610 to 689 of Book 7 originally regulated the 
arbeidsovereenkomst, but with effect from 1 January 1999 articles 690 and 
691 were added to also regulate the uitzendovereenkomst (placement by 
labour broker).392 
 
2.4.2 The general nature of the arbeidsovereenkomst 
 
Initially the break with the Roman-Dutch tradition was not clean and the 
contract of employment was still seen as a form of the locatio conductio and 
subject to the same rules that governed the letting and hiring of goods. The 
                                                        
390  Kuijpers, E ‘Labour Legislation at a Developing Labour Market. Holland 1350-1600’ paper 
submitted to the European Social Sciences History Conference, Lisbon, Portugal, February 
2008. 
391  Generally see Watkin TG An Historical Introduction to Modern Civil Law (1999) at 145. Also 
see Jansen, CJH ‘Rechtshistoriese Beschouwingen over het Moderne 
Arbeidsovereenkomstenrecht’ inaugural lecture 23 January 2003 and Loonstra, CJ and 
Zondag, WA Arbeidsrechtelijke Themata 2ed (2006) at 22-23. For an overview of the 
historical development of labour relations in the Netherlands before the adoption of the 1838 
BW (and elsewhere in Western Europe) see Knegt, R ‘Regulation of Labour Relations and the 
Development of Employment’ in Knegt, R (ed) The Employment Contract as an Exclusionary 
Device (forthcoming). 















original (1838) BW referred to two types of agreement of letting and hiring: the 
letting and hiring of goods, and the letting and hiring of services, work and 
industry.393 In other words, all forms of arbeidskracht (labour power) were 
regarded as things (rei) being rented out; as things with economic value that 
could be exchanged for value.394 This sentiment is illustrated by the fact that 
the employee was often, in writings on the 1838 BW, referred to as the 
dienstverhuurder (literally the lessor of services). The first major amendments 
to the BW came in 1909 with the implementation of the Wet op de 
arbeidsovereenkomst 1907 (Employment Contracts Act of 1907). This 
followed the implementation of social welfare legislation regulating child 
labour (1874), employment in factories (1889), compulsory education to 
counter child labour (1900) and industrial industries (1901).395  
 
One reason for giving the arbeidsovereenkomst separate status in the 
BW appears to be quantitative: 
 
The great number of people concluding such agreements on a 
daily basis and the known disputes associated with such agreements 
are the reasons for the separate regulation of the arbeidsovereenkomst 
by the legislature.396 
 
Another compelling reason for giving separate status to the 
arbeidsovereenkomst and imposing certain conditions of employment on both 
parties to such an agreement was the need to remedy the inequality of 
                                                        
393  Jansen (n 391) at note 14. Also see Aerts, MCM De Zelfstandige in het Sociaal Recht LLD 
thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2007 at 103. 
394  See Jansen (n 391) at 9. Also see the comments of Deakin ‘The Comparative Evolution of the 
Employment Relationship’ (n 2) at 98-99. 
395  More specifically, these included the Child Labour Act of 1874, the Factories Act of 1898, the 
Steam Act of 1896, the Compulsory Education Act of 1900 and the Industrial Injuries Act of 
1901. See Verhulp, E ‘The Employment Contract as a Source of Concern’ in Knegt, R (ed) 
The Employment Contract as an Exclusionary Device (forthcoming). 
396  ‘Het grote aantal mensen dat deze overeenkomst (dagelijks) sluit en de vele (bekende) 
conflicten die daaruit mogelijkerwijs kunnen voortvloeien, zijn redenen voor die wetgever 
geweest deze overeenkomst afzondelijk te regelen.’ Loonstra and Zondag (n 391) at 21. It is 
estimated that while only 20 per cent of the working population in the Netherlands worked for 
medium and large scale enterprises in 1859, this percentage increased to 45,5 per cent by 














bargaining power between employers and employees.397 In fact, this 
motivation was the source of one of the objections to the inclusion of the 
arbeidsovereenkomst in the old BW: The equality of the contracting parties 
was regarded as one of the main principles of the civil law and the inclusion of 
the arbeidsovereenkomst in the BW on the basis that it would provide 
protection to the weaker employee party, militated against this principle.398 
 
The 1907 Act was largely drafted by HL Drucker and acknowledged the 
weaker position of the worker. Apart from the arbeidsovereenkomst acquiring 
separate status, Roman law categorisations were also abandoned and 
expression was given to the view that work should not be regarded as the 
object of a contract of sale. Also, it was during this time that the view 
developed that arbeid (labour) cannot be separated from the person of the 
worker.399  
 
Jansen argues that when Drucker drafted the 1907 Act, he faced many 
problems brought about by the Industrial Revolution for which the local and 
Roman law sources did not provide obvious solutions. Hence many of the 
provisions drafted by Drucker were either original or were borrowed from the 
German BGB. This does not imply that the Roman law traditions were 
completely disregarded. Drucker still relied on the general principles of the 
Roman law of contract and, through his reliance on the German Code, 
maintained a connection with the Roman law tradition.400 
                                                        
397  Verhulp, E ‘Een Arbeidsovereenkomst? Dat Maak Ik Zelf Wel Uit’ (2005) 3 Maandblad voor 
Sociaal Recht 87 at 88. 
398  See summary of parliamentary discussions in Bles, AE De Wet op de Arbeidsovereenkomst 
vol 1 (1907) at 120. 
399  See generally Meijers, EM De Arbeidsovereenkomst 3ed (1924) at 1-4. Also see Jansen (n 
391) at 9 and Verhulp ‘The Employment Contract as a Source of Concern’ (n 395) and Aerts 
(n 393) at 110-111. 
400  Jansen (n 391) at 7-8. Jansen further argues (at 9) that the Dutch view that ‘elements of the 
law of persons are apparent in the contract of employment’ (‘personenrechtelijke elementen 
kleuren altijd mede de inhoud van de arbeidsovereenkoms’) was strongly influenced by the 
views of the German philosopher Otto von Gierke. Von Gierke argued that the German 
equivalent of the arbeidsovereenkomst, the Treudiensvertrag, originated not from the Roman 
law locatio conductio operarum, but from a contract prevalent during the middle ages and in 
which rights and obligations were regulated by Treue (good faith). This contract, in contrast 
with the Roman law version, was imbued with elements of the law of persons. Dorssemont, F 
in ‘Die Onderneming: Arbeidsgemeenschap of Rechtsorde’ (2003) 40(4) Tijdschrift voor 
Privaatrecht 1313 at 1334-1338 further explains that the Treudiensvertrag was seen as an 














 However, it is generally accepted that the 1907 Act intended to 
maintain a contractual approach to the employment relationship. However, the 
view that the employment relationship in the Netherlands essentially remains 
a matter of contract today is by no means universal. The opposing view is 
known as the institutionele theorie.401 Proponents of this view regard the 
arbeidsovereenkomst as merely a link in the bigger labour organisation; the 
arbeidsovereenkomst is not seen as an individual matter, but as the port of 
entry to a greater institution whose interests are preferred to those of the 
individual employee: 
 
In sharp contrast to [the contractual approach] is the institutional 
approach, in which not the contract per se, but participation in a labour 
organisation constitutes the core of the employment relationship. By 
signing an employment contract, the employee gains entry into a 
labour community. He or she knows beforehand that conditions often 
change within such a community and, in view of this, he or she must be 
ready to adapt.402  
                                                                                                                                                              
an exchange of work and remuneration. Acting in good faith, mutual respect and providing 
protection to the worker (all implied terms associated with the modern contract of 
employment) were common characteristics of the Treudienstvertrag. Von Gierke’s views, so 
Jansen argues, had far-reaching mplications for the manner in which Dutch jurists viewed the 
nature of the arbeidsovereenkomst. In particular, it meant a move away from Roman law with 
its inclination to focus on the individual in favour of the more socially inclined German law 
principles. However, th re appears to be no general endorsement that Von Gierke’s influence 
was as far-reaching in the Netherlands as implied by Jansen. Indeed, a study of the 
Explanatory Memorandum prepared by Drucker and the Parliamentary debates that preceded 
the passing of the 1907 Act, suggest nothing of Von Gierke’s influence. Generally see Bles (n 
398). 
401  See Van der Heijden, PF ‘Kroniek van het Sociaal Rrecht’ 1999 NJB 446. 
402  Van der Heijden, PF ‘The Flexibilisation of Working Life in the Netherlands’ in Van der 
Heijden, PJ and De Gier, E European Employment and Industrial Relations Glossary: The 
Netherlands (1996) at 325-326. It appears that this theory is primarily based on work of the 
French philosopher Maurice Hauriou who believed that, in addition to the legislative function 
of the state and the contractual activities of individuals, individuals also formed part of an 
institution established over time and the wellbeing of which is more important than observing 
individual arrangements. Zondag, WA ‘Institutioneel Arbeidsrecht?’ (2002) 1 RM Themis 3 at 
6. From the 1920s to the early 1970s many labour law academics in the Netherlands 
incorporated this theory into their writings. After the 1970s the theory faded until it 
reappeared in 1999. See Zondag at 6-8. The reason for its reappearance is linked to two 
judgments of the Hoge Raad handed down in 1998 and in 2000 respectively. In the first 
judgment, Van der Lely/Taxi Hofman BV NJ 1998 767, the Hoge Raad held that not only does 
the employer have a duty to accommodate the employee as a result of the incapacity of the 
employee or when the employee requests an adjustment to working hours, but the employee 
too has a similar duty to accept reasonable alternatives offered by the employer brought about 
by changed circumstances, irrespective of the contractual arrangement between the parties. 














The proponents of the contractual theory claim that the application of 
the institutionele theorie will cause great uncertainty,403 and they are 
concerned about its impact on one of the major elements of the 
arbeidsovereenkomst, namely, the gezag (authority or control) of the 
employer. While they agree that the courts are continuously adjusting the 
meaning of the gezagselement, it still remains one of the elements of the 
arbeidsovereenkomst as described in art 7.610 BW and there has never been 
a conscious effort to change the provision in that regard.404 Zondag further 
observes that if the institutionele theorie is correct, it would imply that ‘not the 
relationship of power but the rendering of work/labour in the undertaking 
would be of crucial importance’.405 
 
2.4.3 The arbeidsovereenkomst compared to other specific agreements 
 in the BW 
 
In the old BW the arbeidsovereenkomst was distinguished from the 
aanneming van werk (contracting). The former was defined in terms of an 
arbeider (labourer) agreeing to be in dienst (in the service of) of a werkgever 
                                                                                                                                                              
employment relationship does not justify refusing a reasonable alternative offer from the 
employer. In coming to this conclusion, the court relied heavily on the provision of art 7.611 
BW which provides that ‘de werkgever en de werknemer zijn verplicht zich als een goed 
werkgever en een goed werknemer te gedragen’ which basically suggests that both contractual 
parties must act in good faith. This judgment must further be seen against the backdrop of art 
7.613 BW which provides that where the employer has a right to amend the contract, that 
contractual right may only be used once. In the second judgment, Midnet Tax BV JAR 2002 
120 (C98/251 HR), a similar view was expressed by the Hoge Raad. Subsequent to the Taxi 
Hofman judgment the origins of the institutional theory was revisited by Dorssemont, F in 
‘Die Onderneming: Arbeidsgemeenschap of Rechtsorde’ (n 400) and ‘”Interne 
Flexibilisering” Een Variatie op het Thema van de Instititionele Leer?’ (2005) 60(3) SMA 117. 
In both these articles he pursues the views of Hauriou and also Georges Renard as later 
developed by Paul Durand, J Brèthe de la Gressaye, Hugo Sinzheimer and others. In particular 
he rejects the efforts of Durand and De La Gressaye to link their version of the institutional 
theory to the views of Von Gierke on the Treudiensvertrag (see n 400). He also laments the 
failure of the modern Dutch proponents of the institutional theory to consider the work of the 
Italian, Santi Romano, whose institutional theory saw both the organisation and the contract as 
aspects of a greater legal order. Finally, Dorssemont argues that since work is ‘anomatically’ 
link to the person of the worker, the institutional theory based on Hauriou should be rejected.  
403  Jansen (n 391) at 21. 
404  Zondag (n 402) at 8. 
405  ‘[n]iet de gezagsverhouding, maar het verrichten van arbeid in de onderneming zou van 
doorslaggevende betekenis moeten zijn.’ Zondag (n 402) at 8. Ironically, the element of in 
dienst (which suggests gezag or control by the employer) was not part of Drucker’s original 
draft which merely envisaged the provision of labour power in exchange for remuneration. 















(employer) for a certain period against payment of remuneration.406 
Aanneming van werk was defined to include parties contracting for work of a 
corporeal nature to be done against payment of a certain price.407 The term in 
dienst did not appear in this definition of aanneming van werk. Apart from 
changing arbeider to werknemer (employee), the definition of the 
arbeidsovereenkomst basically remained the same under the new BW.408 
Aanneming van werk is also defined in the original terms except that a phrase 
(buiten dienstbetrekking) was added to make it clear that an arrangement 
beyond the arbeidsovereenkomst is envisaged. 
 
The old BW also referred to the contract for single services in very brief 
terms. It is now more comprehensively regulated as an overeenkomst van 
opdracht (instruction) in the new BW.409 It is defined as an agreement, other 
than an arbeidsovereenkomst, to do work, but not of a corporeal nature and 
not subject to any control. In other words it excludes an arrangement that 
would be covered by the aanneming van werk.410 
 
A peculiar variation of the arbeidsovereenkomst is the 
uitzendovereenkomst which was only added to the BW in 1999, apparently to 
regulate an increasing phenomenon in the Dutch labour market and to provide 
for some regulated flexibility.411 This agreement envisages a situation where 
the employer, in the course its occupation or trade provides an employee to a 
third party to complete an instruction given by the third party to the employer, 
but under the supervision and direction of that third party.412 It is therefore not 
unlike the South African temporary employment service as defined in the 
LRA.413 Importantly, it is possible for the employer and the employee to agree 
in writing that the uitzendovereenkomst will terminate if, within the first 26 
                                                        
406  Article 1637a (old) BW.  
407  Article 1637b (old) BW. 
408  Article 7.610 BW. 
409  Article 7.400 BW. 
410  Verhulp, E ‘De Overeenkomst van Opdracht’ in Verhulp, E (ed) Flexibele Arbeidsrelaties 
(2002) at 13-43 
411  Verhulp Flexibiliteit en Zekerheid (n 392) at 234. 
412  Verhulp ‘De Overeenkomst van Opdracht’ (n 410) at 13 observes that it is clear that the 
relationship between the labour broker and his client is covered by the provisions concerning 
the overeenkomst van opdracht. 














weeks of the placement, the third party requests the placement to be 
terminated. In other words, dismissal law will not apply during this period and 
during this period the employee may also terminate the uitzendovereenkomst 
without notice.414 
 
Control or authority of the employer is regarded as the essential 
element of the arbeidsovereenkomst.415 However, identification of the type of 
control which is indicative of an arbeidsovereenkomst has always been 
problematic. Nonetheless, after the judgment of the Hoge Raad in 
Groen/Schoevers416 it is clear that control is no longer regarded as the sole 
gauge of an employment relationship. The court in this matter emphasised 
that the point of departure must be the intention of the parties. The intention of 
the parties must be gathered from a range of factors, including control. The 
manner of payment, working hours, leave arrangements, payments during 
illness and the possibility of accepting other instructions are some of the other 
factors to consider. These factors collectively point towards the extent to 
which the individual is embedded in the organisation of the employers. If the 
conclusion, based on this analysis, is that the parties did not intend an 
arbeidsovereenkomst it is not the end of the investigation. Bearing in mind 
that the overeenkomst van opdracht also involves a degree of control, the 
court must consider whether the relationship does not in reality amount to an 
arbeidsovereenkomst.417 In making this judgment the court must consider the 
social position of the employee. While this test has been criticised, it appears 
to be the prevailing approach in the Netherlands.418 
                                                        
414  See art 691.2 and art 691.3 BW. Also see Verhulp Flexibiliteit en Zekerheid (n 392) at 253-
260. Further flexibility is provided by art 681.1 which provides that the normal rule that fixed-
term contracts will become an open-ended contract after a certain number of renewals (see art 
668a BW) will, in the case of an uitzendovereenkomst, only apply after 26 weeks. 
415  Aerts (393) at 126-128. It is clear that in the Netherlands too the emphasis on control is seen 
as an exchange: Workers agree to a form of subordination to ensure access to some form of 
social security. See Aerts (n 393) at 113 and 131-132. Also see Verhulp ‘De Overeenkomst 
van Opdracht’ (n 410) at 25-26 and also at 32-36 where the various approaches to these 
criteria are discussed. Also see the comments of Jansen (n 391) at 11-12. 
416  14 November 1997 (JAR 1997/263). 
417  For views on this judgment see Loonstra, CJ and Zondag, WA ‘Het Begrip ‘Werknemer’ in 
Nationaal, Rechtsvergelijkend en Communautair Perspectief’ (2001) 1 ARA 4 at 5-10; 
Loonstra, CJ ‘De Gezagsverhouding ex art 7:610BW’ (2005) 3 Sociaal Recht 96 at 96-97 and 
Aerts (n 393) at 146-155. 
418  Generally see Loonstra (n 417). Also see Schoenmaker/ANWM 15 September 2006 (JAR 














However, despite this judgment, it is clear that it is still very difficult to 
distinguish between the arbeidsovereenkomst and other forms of work,419 
particularly where the factual circumstances are similar: Verhulp, in comparing 
the arbeidsovereenkomst and the overeenkomst van opdracht, laments in the 
following terms: 
 
The difference between those working under an 
arbeidsovereenkomst and those working in terms of an overeenkomst 
van opdracht is sometimes so small that there is no justification for 
subjecting them to different contractual regimes. It often happens that 
both type of workers work shoulder to shoulder for the same person . . . 
Van der Heijden refers in this regard to a growing number of people 
who are in the ‘grey zone’. They are economically dependent and in a 
very similar position to an employee, but do not have that status in 
juridical terms. This results in an erosion of labour law.420 
 
It is perhaps for this reason that the Dutch legislature responded by 
including a presumption in favour of the arbeidsovereenkomst when there is 
uncertainty about the nature of the contract,421 and a further presumption of 
employment if a person had worked for another for at least 20 hours per 
month for three consecutive months.422 
                                                                                                                                                              
Amsterdam/Lammes NJ 2007/448 and the accompanying with HR 13 September 2007 NJ 
2007/448 by Verhulp, E. 
419  See Meijers (n 399) at 34 and Zondag (n 402) at 8. Also see Verhulp ‘The Employment 
Contract as a Source of Concern’ (n 395), ‘Een Arbeidsovereenkomst? Dat Maak Ik Zelf Wel 
Uit’ (n 397) at 90-91 and ‘De Overeenkomst van Opdracht’ (n 410) at 26-28. 
420  ‘Het verschil tussen dergelijke opdrachtnemers en werknemers in dienst van de opdrachtgever 
is soms so gering of zelfs afwesig, dat het aannemen van een verschillende contractuele 
grondslag voor het verrichten van der werkzaamheid niet eenvoudig te rechtvaardigen lijkt. 
Het gebeur regelmatig dat opdrachtnemers en werknemers in dienst van de opdrachtgever 
schouder aan schouder aan hetzelfde project staan te werken . . . Van der Heijden spreekt in 
dit verband van een ‘grijze zone’, van een groiende groep mensen die economisch gezien 
vergelijkbaar is met werknemers, maar juridisch gesproken die status niet heft. Dit leidt in 
zijn visie tot erosie van het arbeidsrecht.’ Verhulp ‘De Overeenkomst van Opdracht’ (n 410) 
at 14. 
421  Article 7.610 BW. For the difficulties associated with this presumption see 
Schoenmaker/ANWB 15 September 2006 (JAR 2006/244).   
422  Article 7.610a BW. The Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen 1945 (Extraordinary 
Resolution on Labour Relations 1945) (BBA) which enables dependent contractors (working 
for less than two persons for an unlimited period and in turn employing less than two persons) 
to claim the benefit of employment dismissal laws, is an example of early efforts to extend 














While terms and their translations can be confusing it is clear that the 
divisions in Dutch employment law are primarily based on personal 
subordination (much like the German system), personal service and, to a 
certain extent, on the duration of the arrangement.423 The self-employed or 
the independent contractor may, depending on the nature of control and the 
duration of the arrangement, find themselves covered by any one of at least 
three specific agreements.424 The ancient divisions of the locatio conductio 
therefore have no clear replication in either the old or the new BW.425  
 
Earlier in this chapter it was shown that both in England and South 
Africa there is evidence supporting the view that the development of the 
contract of employment as a unitary concept was closely linked to the 
development of social welfare legislation, and the development of the unitary 
concept can simultaneously be contrasted with the systematic dichotomising 
of employment.426 When the arbeidsovereenkomst was first introduced in 
1907 it was introduced as a unitary concept: 
 
In the Netherlands there is only one law regulating the 
arbeidsovereenkomst. This was a deliberate choice. Consequently the 
same labour law regulations apply equally to all, whether it is a soccer 
millionaire, an advocate or a cleaner. . .427 
 
Whereas the unitary concept of employment in England and South 
Africa was the result of a long process, the unitary concept of the 
arbeidsovereenkomst was achieved comparatively swiftly. It followed 
                                                        
423  Aerts (n 393) at 130. 
424  These are the most likely contracts that could cover an employment relationship in the broad 
sense. However, the BW also has provisions regulating agencies, travel agencies and the 
rendering of medical services which also fall in the broader category of services. See Book 7 
of BW. 
425  In this regard, Jansen (n 391) at 14 comments that the nature of subordination envisaged in the 
modern arbeidsovereenkomst is far more comprehensive than under Roman law. In Smit v 
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) SA 51 (A) at 60 Joubert JA alludes to the 
fact that the concept of control developed only in Roman-Dutch law and was not part of 
Roman law. 
426  See §§  2.2.3 and 2.3.4.4 and Freedland (n 3) at 14. 
427  ‘Er is in Nederland dus maar ‘één’ arbeidsovereenkomstenrecht, en dat is een bewuste keuze 
geweest. Het gevolg daarvan is dat voor een voetbalmiljonair geen andere arbeidsrechtelijke 
regel kan gelden dan voor een advocaatstagiaire of een schoonmaker . . .’ See Verhulp ‘Een 














relatively soon in the wake of important social welfare legislation. It is 
therefore unlikely that developments in social welfare legislation in the 
Netherlands played the same role in the development of the unitary concept 
of the arbeidsovereenkomst that it played elsewhere. What is clearer is that 
the introduction of such a unitary concept, like elsewhere, facilitated the 
dichotomising of employment in the Netherlands.  
 
Ironically, at the time of its introduction, the ‘doodende uniformiteit’ 
(murderous uniformity)428  of the arbeidsovereenkomst was raised by some as 
a concern. This concern basically evolved around the belief that the nature 
and character of different forms of work, the size of the employer’s business, 
the levels of experience and the needs of individual workers vary to such and 
extent that uniform regulation would not be feasible.429 Two reasons for such 
uniform regulation were advanced by Drucker in his Explanatory 
Memorandum: First a perception that articles 1637 to 1639 of the 1838 BW 
did not apply equally to higher and lower class workers and the concomitant 
need to confirm equality for all before the law. Second, the practical problems 
associated with the categorising of different groups of workers.430  
 
Regarding the first reason, Drucker refers431 to the sentiment 
expressed by many judges in the Netherlands that it did not apply to all 
workers. Also, regarding the first reason (in what appears to be Dutch 
recognition of the lack of a unitary concept in England), reference is also 
made to the difficulties experienced in England (and in Switzerland and 
Germany) at the time distinguishing between the various categories of 
workers provided for in the Employers and Workmen Act 1875.432 In an earlier 
article by Drucker,433 he analysed the tendency of the Dutch courts, including 
the Hoge Raad, to apply the provisions in the BW to lower status employees 
                                                        
428  Bles (n 398) at 151. 
429  Bles (n 398) at 151-152. Also see the comments of Canes, SG Critische Systematische 
Commentaar op de Wet het Arbeidscontract (1908) at 21-26. 
430  Bles (n 398) at 132-133.  
431  Bles (n 398) at 132. 
432  Bles (n 398) at 133. 
433  Drucker, HL ‘Bouwstoffen voor eene Burgerrechtelijke Regeling der Arbeidsoovereenkomst’ 
(1894) Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn 499, particularly at 506. Also see the cases cited in note 1, 














only; apparently reserving general principles of contract for higher status 
employees. Subordination and the nature of the work clearly played important 
roles in deciding whether work was rendered as contemplated by the BW.434 
However, more often than not, these considerations were no more than 
longhand for status, as is illustrated by some of the examples quoted by 
Drucker where, for instance, the fact that a housekeeper occasionally sat 
down with her master for meals was advanced to escape application of the 
provisions of the original 1838 BW concerning the arbeidsovereenkomst.435 
 
Ultimately different provisions were adopted for public servants, 
minors, seamen, trade representatives, live-in employees and more recently 
for those placed by labour brokers (uitzendkracht).436 Furthermore, variation is 
also possible through collective bargaining and variation of hours of work and 
also through dismissal laws (the BBA) that apply differently to temporary 
employees;437 or perhaps not at all, as illustrated above, to some workers 
working in terms of an uitzendovereenkomst.438 Nonetheless, the limitations 
brought about by this uniformity, in the view of Verhulp, encouraged many to 
regulate their employment relationships in different terms: 
 
To escape from the pressures of subordination, many workers 
choose to render their services on the basis of an 
opdrachtovereenkomst.439 
 
This has resulted in the dichotomising of the beroepsbevolking (labour 
population) in the Netherlands into the zelfstandige and onzelfstandige 
workers, roughly corresponding with the divide between the self-
employed/independent contractor and employee in England and South Africa.  
Furthermore, consistent with the pattern in England and South Africa referred 
                                                        
434  Drucker (n 433) at 513. 
435  See the examples cited by Drucker (n 433) at 521. 
436  Also see Canes (n 429) at 26-39. 
437  See Verhulp ‘The Employment Contract as a Source of Concern’ (n 395). 
438  Article 691.2 of the BW. 
439  ‘Om aan de druk van het werken in ondergeschiktheid te ontkomen, kiezen werknemers er 
soms voor werkzaamheden te verrichten op grond van een opdrachtovereenkomst.’ Verhulp 














to earlier in this chapter,440 Verhulp has identified the taxation system as one 
of the major forces entrenching this dichotomy: 
 
The reason for choosing the opdrachtovereenkomst instead of 
the arbeidsovereenkomst is not necessarily noble. One important 
explanation for the existence of self-employed persons without 
employees (ZZPs) is the financial advantages that the 
opdrachtovereenkomst offers compared to the arbeidsovereenkomst. 
An employee is generally 30% more expensive than a ZZP as a result 
of lower premiums and taxation.441 
 
Finally, one more aspect of the arbeidsovereenkomst should be 
mentioned. The Wet op de arbeidsovereenkomst 1907 primarily rearranged 
the then existing obligations of the employer and introduced few new 
obligations. For instance, the employer’s right to terminate the contract, 
provided that sufficient notice was given, remained unaltered. Since the 
employer was not required to give a reasonable reason for terminating a 
contract, employees preferred fixed-term contracts since it was more difficult 
for an employer to terminate such contracts. 
 
 The position only changed much later after the enactment of the 
Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen 1945 (BBA)442 which required 
government’s permission prior to termination of the open-ended 
arbeidsovereenkomst, and the amendments to the BW in 1953 which 
introduced the requirement of reasonableness before an employer may 
terminate the arbeidsovereenkomst.443  
                                                        
440  See § §2.2.3 and 2.3.4.7.  
441  ‘De motieven om te kiezen voor een opdrachtovereenkomst in plaats van een 
arbeidsovereenkomst zijn overigens niet allemaal even nobel. Een belangrijk deel van het 
bestaansrecht van de ZZP’er kan worden verklaard door de grote financiële voordelen die de 
opdrachtovereenkomst heeft boven de arbeidsovereenkomst. Een werknemer is gemiddeld 
30% duurder dan een ZZP’er, hetgeen samenhangt met een mindere premiedruk en 
belastingafdracht.’ Verhulp ‘Een Arbeidsovereenkomst? Dat Maak Ik Zelf Wel Uit’ (n 397) at 
90. 
442  See note 422. 
443  See Verhulp ‘The Employment Contract as a Source of Concern’ (n 395). Currently only 














2.4.4 Conclusion (The Netherlands) 
 
What can be concluded from this very brief consideration of the 
arbeidsovereenkomst in the Netherlands? 
 
It is clear that the original BW as passed in 1838 contained very few 
provisions, if any, which resemble the modern arbeidsovereenkomst in the 
Netherlands. The modern arbeidsovereenkomst originates from the work of 
Drucker and his contribution to the Wet op de arbeidsovereenkomst 1907 
which contained many innovations. Consistent with the pattern identified in 
England and South Africa, the arbeidsovereenkomst as a unitary concept is 
thus also a new concept, but arrived in the Netherlands at least 50 years 
earlier. A possible reason for this is the absence of oppressive laws similar to 
the Master and Servant laws in England and South Africa. 
 
While the employment relationship is generally still viewed in 
contractual terms, the arbeidsovereenkomst is seen as embodying many 
aspects of the law of persons and for that reason represents a break with the 
Roman law locatio conductio. However, the contractual model (and the 
continued relevance of control) in the Netherlands is, not unlike elsewhere, 
experiencing major pressure. While control in the Netherlands was initially 
regarded as the test for employment, as in South Africa and England, control 
is now, consistent with the pattern in these two countries, merely an indication 
of employment and greater emphasis is now placed on the realities of 
employment. 
 
As an alternative to the contractual model and, more specifically, 
because of the limitations imposed by the requirement of control, the 
institutionele theorie, which regards the parties to the arbeidsovereenkomst in 
more equal terms, has been advanced by some. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
enables dependent contractors to claim the benefit of some dismissal laws. See Verhulp ‘De 














Finally, it is unclear whether the same forces were at work in creating, 
on the one hand, the unitary concept of the contract of employment in 
England and South Africa and, on the other, the unitary concept of the 
arbeidsovereenkomst in the Netherlands. On the face of it, it certainly appears 
as if Drucker’s concern about the practicalities of distinguishing between 
various workers was an overriding motivation.  
 
However, once the unitary concept was in place, it, like elsewhere, 
facilitated the modern binary divide between the employed and the self-
employed in the Netherlands.444 This divide is not simply a replication of 
ancient divisions. Rather, it is the product of prevailing circumstances at the 
end of nineteenth century Netherlands, perpetuated by the need to escape 
the gezag of the employer and possibly also influenced by tax legislation. 
 
 Importantly, the limitations associated with the uniform regulation of 
employment relationships continue to encourage both employers and 
employees to find ways to structure their relationships so that they are beyond 
the reach of labour laws. The diverse approach in the Netherlands regarding 
the application of dismissal laws to open-ended and temporary employment 




The Dutch legislature was well aware of status considerations imbuing 
the application of the articles in the BW concerning the arbeidsovereenkomst 
before 1909, and also of the practical difficulties of distinguishing between 
various groups of workers. The legislature thus introduced a unitary concept 
                                                        
444  Loonstra and Zondag (n 391) at 21-22 estimate that the beroepsbevolking (labour population) 
in the Netherlands is about 7, 3 million people. These include the zelfstandige (self-employed) 
and onzelfstandige (employed). Of the approximately 750 000 zelfstandige beroepsbevolking 
about 100 000 zelfstandige zonder personeel (self-employed without employees) (ZZPs) are 
dependent on either one or a few employers. On the basis that Loonstra and Zondag estimate 
that about 5, 3 million people work in terms of an arbeidsovereenkomst, the grey zone (see 
note 407) apparently represents a relatively small, but growing, section of the total 
beroepsbevolking in the Netherlands. A further 900 000 people work in the public sector. The 















of the contract of employment in 1909, albeit not without resistance. The 
unitary concept therefore arrived earlier in the Netherlands than it did in 
England and South Africa. The Dutch development was not unlike the 
developments in other European countries that followed the codification route, 
such as those in France and Germany. However, even in the Netherlands, it 
was always an imperfect unification. In England and South Africa, where the 
influence of the master and servant laws was far greater and, in the case of 
South Africa, lingered well into the late twentieth century, the role of status 
(class considerations in England and race considerations in South Africa) 
undermined the unitary concept which developed only, on the one hand, as 
the shadow of the master and servant laws faded and, on the other, as social 
welfare legislation extended its reach. 
 
While the existence and influence of the Roman and Roman-Dutch law 
concept of the locatio conductio operarum is certainly not denied, serious 
reservations can be expressed as to whether the modern contract of 
employment has been shaped by the concept to the extent that that it is often 
claimed, particularly in South Africa. In the Netherlands, with its now almost-
severed ties with Roman and Roman-Dutch law, it certainly does not appear 
to be the case. It is suggested that, even in South Africa, with its much firmer 
Roman-Dutch foundations, the link with the locatio conductio operarum was 
artificially maintained. Other, more dominant forces may well have been at 
work in shaping the modern South African contract of employment. 
Furthermore, the role of the Treudienstvertrag in Germany, may, as 
suggested by Von Gierke, be far greater than generally believed, although this 
approach is not actively pursued in this thesis. 
 
Reflecting on the position of the contract of employment in modern 
England, South Africa and the Netherlands, it is fair to say that the contract of 
employment is currently in a relative state of unification in all three countries, 
with a slightly higher state of diversification evident in the Netherlands. 
However, while this state of unification may appeal to many on the basis of 
equality and other human rights considerations, it may also carry the seeds of 














labour and social welfare legislation. This possibility will be discussed in 
























The aim of this thesis is to consider whether the contract of 
employment is suitable for regulating the different forms of labour market 
participation by individual workers. In Chapter 2 it was shown that as a result 
of legislative fall-out and jurisprudential interpretation, rather than by design, 
the contract of employment became the central regulatory regime of labour 
law. However, the future role of the contract of employment can only be 
contemplated once it is understood what labour law aims to achieve. The aim 
of this chapter, however, is not to present a comprehensive analysis of the 
purpose of labour law, but to develop a broad understanding of what labour 
law is expected to facilitate in the new century. This chapter will therefore by 
necessity be general and sweeping rather than analytical and specific, and 
aims to provide the nexus between the discussion about the evolution of the 
contract of employment (Chapter 2) and the discussion about its future role.  
 
The chapter will commence by reflecting, first, on the traditional view 
that labour law should serve to moderate the superior bargaining power of 
employers and by showing how, in the early years of South African industrial 
relations, this view was ’tweaked’ to serve a completely different purpose. 
Secondly, the chapter will consider the emerging views that labour law also 
needs to focus on issues such as social welfare, economic growth and 
efficiency to cure market failures. These views and the role of the South Africa 
Constitution will also be reflected on below.  
 
3.2 The traditional and related views 
 
The traditional view on the purpose of labour law is generally credited 
to Kahn-Freund. In his view ‘[t]he main object of labour law has always been, 
and we venture to say will always be, to be a countervailing force to 













inherent in the employment relationship’.1 These sentiments were repeated by 
Hepple in 1995 when he stated that ‘[t]he’ starting point of any ideology of 
labour law, other than one of the market, is the inequality of the supplier and 
the purchaser of labour power.’2 These sentiments echo the justification for 
the introduction of the first legislation in the Cape (the Proclamation of 1809) 
aimed at regulating labour relations (more particularly the relationship 
between masters and the KhoiKhoi), namely, that it would control the ‘severity 
of the powerful over the weak [and] the nameless tyranny of the strong over 
the defenceless’.3 
 
 Implicit in this approach is the view that if labour law performs its 
balancing act successfully, workplace justice and industrial peace should 
follow. Langille has translated the essence of this ‘countervailing force’ into a 
procedural and a substantive element.4 The procedural element concerns 
collective bargaining which he sees as a ‘procedural device of turning up the 
bargaining power on the side of the employee’.5 This device, however, 
guarantees no substantial results. Substantial results are guaranteed by 
rewriting the bargain on behalf of the employees. This is achieved by means 
of protective legislation such as human rights, employment standards and 
occupational health and safety legislation.6  
 
The regulation of collective bargaining, however, can also be used to 
achieve the opposite to what the Kahn-Freund paradigm envisaged and can 
thus strengthen the hand of the employers. For instance, some commentators 
doubt whether the early South African regulation of collective bargaining 
intended to achieve the objective identified by Kahn-Freund.7 It will be 
                                                        
1  Davies, P and Freedland, M Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law 3ed (1983) at 18. 
2  Hepple, B ‘The Future of Labour Law’ (1995) 24 ILJ (UK) 303 at 313. 
3  Sir John Cradock, governor of the Cape, as quoted by Dooling, W Slavery, Emancipation and 
Colonial Rule (2007) at 65. Also see § 2.3.2.1. 
4  Langille, B ‘Labour Law’s Back Pages’ in Davidov, G and Langille, B (eds) Boundaries and 
Frontiers of Labour Law (2006) 13-36 at 24-26. Also see Deakin, S and Wilkenson, F ‘Rights 
vs Efficiency? The Economic Case for Transnational Labour Standards’ (1994) 23 ILJ (UK) 
289 at 290-291. 
5  Langille (n 4) at 24. 
6  Langille (n 4) at 25. 
7  See Davis, D ‘The Functions of Labour Law’ (1980) 13 CILSA 212 and Davies, R ‘The Class 













recalled that the Industrial Conciliation Act of 19248 and its predecessor, the 
Industrial Disputes Prevention Act of 19099 (which applied in the Transvaal 
only), were passed in the wake of widespread strikes, particularly on the 
mines, in 1907, 1913 and during the Rand Revolt of 1922; the latter ultimately 
suppressed by military force. These strikes involved white workers who 
wished to secure certain guarantees from the mine owners against the use of 
cheap Black labour.10 The legislation that followed excluded Black workers. 
While concessions were obviously made to the white workers, it had been 
argued that the aim of the legislation was no more than a underhand 
‘instrument of the classes of property owners dominant in the society’11 and 
that the 1924 Act aimed to do no more than preserve (as opposed to promote) 
industrial peace: 
 
[The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924] involves the regulation 
and institutionalisation of power won by wage earners in struggle. It 
thus represents a practical compromise, but one in which the owners of 
the means of production are dominant, and which, indeed, enables 
their interest to remain dominant.12 
 
The exclusion of Black workers, at the time also suppressed by pass 
laws, helped to protect white workers against cheap black labour, but the 
control of white workers through the collective bargaining system ultimately 
served only the interests of employers since it prevented the development of 
‘a common interest amongst workers of all races’ and thus actually 
perpetuated the power imbalance.13 This dual labour market eventually 
culminated in major strike action by Black (unregistered) unions in the 1970s. 
The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legislation14 (the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Southern African Labour History (1978) at 69-81. Schaeffer, M ‘The History of Industrial 
Legislation as Applied in South Africa with Special Reference to Black Workers’1977 TSAR 
49 at 51 attributes the exclusion of Black workers to fears that their sheer numbers would 
undermine the interest of white members. 
8  Act 11 of 1924. 
9  Act 20 of 1909. 
10  § 2.3.5.1. 
11  Davies, R (n 7) at 78. 
12  Davies, R (n 7) at 79. 
13  Davis, D (n 7) at 216.  













Wiehahn Report) that followed in the wake of these strikes attempted (at least 
formally) to correct the incorrect premise of the 1924 Act (which was 
perpetuated by subsequent industrial relations legislation) when it identified 
the preservation and promotion of industrial peace as the cornerstone of its 
recommendations.15 Indeed, the White Paper issued in response to the 
publication of the Wiehahn Report echoed these sentiments: 
 
After all, the principle that gave rise to the entire concept of 
industrial relations is that where a power imbalance exists which 
permits of unfair actions to the detriment of a particular party, the 
position of the weaker party vis-a-vis the stronger party must be 
strengthened; hence the emergence of trade unions . . .16 
 
Despite these sentiments, Van Niekerk claims, with reference to the 
parliamentary debates, that the unfair labour practice regime that was 
introduced in the wake of the Wiehahn Report was not intended as a 
‘countervailing force’ as such, but was rather aimed at protecting white 
workers whose right to job reservation had been removed as a result of the 
implementation of the recommendations of the Wiehahn Report: 
 
The most apparent justification to be discerned for the 
introduction of the statutory protection of employment security in 1979 
is a racist one – the interest being served was the protection of white 
workers who stood to lose the statutory bulwark of job reservation, and 





Kahn-Freund, in his famous statement on the purpose of labour law 
(quoted earlier) certainly did not doubt that the countervailing force of labour 
                                                        
15  § 2.3.5.3.  
16  Quoted by Van Niekerk, A ‘In Search of Justification: The Origins of the Statutory Protection 
of Security of Employment in South Africa’ (2004) 25 ILJ 853 at 857. 













law would always be its enduring function. Cheadle, in his 2006 seminal 
article on regulated flexibility in South Africa, confirmed that this traditional 
view is still valid by stating that ‘the main purpose of labour laws [is] the 
protection of workers, particularly the most vulnerable workers’.18 This also 
seems to be the view of the courts. In a very recent judgment that concerned 
the constitutionality of a provision in the LRA that provides protection against 
unfair labour practices to employees only (and not to employers too) the LAC 
considered the relationship between employers and employees in generic 
terms and held that given the generally strong bargaining and economic 
position of employers, they need not be given the same protection as 
employees:19 
 
 In my view the employer remains very economically strong 
compared to an individual worker and the fact that this protection is 
afforded the employee but no similar protection is afforded the 
employer does not come anywhere near to diminishing the power that 
the employer has. If legislation were enacted which would give 
employers such protection, the weak position of the individual worker 
would be weakened further and that of the employer would be even 
stronger. Indeed such legislation . . . would be a step backwards in the 
field of labour relations and employment law in our country.20 
 
The causes of the inequality of bargaining power vary, but strong 
arguments, by, for instance, Kaufman, have been made that it relates to 
generalised unemployment, monopsony conditions and discrimination.21 
                                                        
18  Cheadle, H ‘Regulated Flexibility: Revisiting the LRA and the BCEA’ (2006) 27 ILJ 663 at 
663. 
19  National Entitled Worker’s Union v CCMA & Others (2007) 28 ILJ 1223 (LAC). Also see Ex 
parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1996) 17 ILJ 821 (CC) at par 66. 
20  At par 22. However, cf Martin v Murray (1995) 16 ILJ 589 (C) at 600-603 where Marais J 
expressed reservations about the accurateness of this assumption and was not prepared to alter 
the common-law consequences of the contract of employment on the basis of the inequality of 
bargaining power. Also see Roffey v Catterall, Edwards Gaudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 
(N) at 499E-H. 
21  Kaufman, BE ‘Labor’s Inequality of Bargaining Power: Changes over Time and Implications 
for Public Policy’ (1989) 10 Journal of Labor Research 285 at 287. In this article Kaufman 
explores whether the premise of the New Deal is still valid. While he concedes that conditions 













While it is perhaps more correct to regard Kaufman as a proponent of the 
‘market-failure’ model, referred to below, his identification of the reasons for 
the inequality in bargaining power is equally valid in the context of the pure 
‘countervailing’ model: 
 
There are two fundamental factors that give employers market 
power to lower wages and working conditions. The first is any 
impediment to labor or capital mobility. Examples include few buyers of 
labor (monopsony), collusive agreements among employers, firm-
specific training, pension rights, discriminatory hiring policies, and 
institutional barriers that prevent the entrance of new firms into a local 
labor market. The second factor is generalized unemployment, for 
although there may be costless and unobstructed mobility, the 
shortage of available jobs forces workers into a situation of either 
accepting reduced wages and working conditions or forfeiting their 
jobs.22 
 
The aim of levelling the playing field is by no means limited to the 
common-law systems. As was shown in the discussion of the evolution of the 
contract of employment in the Netherlands,23 the inequality of the parties was 
uppermost in the mind of the Dutch legislature when it introduced the first 
comprehensive regulation of the labour relationship in 1907.24 
 
Reflecting on the purpose of labour law and its countervailing aims, 
however, would be incomplete without at least acknowledging the views of 
those who justify labour law on the basis that it is a device that addresses 
                                                                                                                                                              
continue to be workers who suffer from an inequality of bargaining power in the labor 
market’. Kaufman’s views were severely criticised by Reynolds, MO ‘The Myth of Labor’s 
Inequality of Bargaining Power’ (1991) 12 Journal for Labor Research 168 on the basis that 
‘it ignores how the profit-and-loss motive continually moves resources in a free, 
interdependent economy to correct mispricing of inputs’ (at 180). Also see Kaufman, BE 
‘Labor’s Inequality of Bargaining Power: Myth or Reality’ (1991) 12 Journal for Labor 
Research 151. 
22  Kaufman ‘Labor’s Inequality of Bargaining Power: Myth or Reality’ (n 21) at 153. 
23  See § 2.4. 
24  Generally see Verhulp, E ‘The Employment Contract As a Source of Concern’ in Knegt, R 














market failures25 or those who see it as a (re)distributive tool aimed at, on the 
one hand, vertical distribution (mostly from employers to employees and 
generally achieved via collective bargaining) and, on the other hand, 
horizontal distribution which seeks to achieve equality between groupings of 
employees and aims to break down barriers for potential new entrants by 
providing education, training and family care.26  
 
Market failures include, but are not limited to the inability to regulate or 
withdraw labour supply in accordance with the dictates of demand.27 They 
occur when ‘there is a significant deviation between the ideal outcomes which 
would result from perfect competition and the actual operation of the labour 
market’.28 Hepple describes this more fully in the following terms: 
 
. . . workers come into the labour market with different levels of 
education and training, as well as differences in gender, class and 
race, and markets tend to generate differentials in wages and 
conditions which bear no relationship to the value added by individual 
workers. The labour of some is over-valued. Under-valued labour leads 
to productive inefficiency, hampers innovation and lead to short-term 
strategies and destructive competition. Only regulation (eg a minimum 
wage, equal pay for women and men etc) can correct this market 
failure.29 
 
                                                        
25  See Hyde, A ‘What is Labour Law?’ in Davidov, G and Langille, B Boundaries and Frontiers 
of Labour Law (2006) 37-61, particularly at 54-61. Also see the discussion in Collins, H 
‘Justifications and Techniques of Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation’ in Collins, 
H; Davies, P and Rideout, R (eds) Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation (2000) 3-27 
at 7-11 and the views of Kaufman ‘Labor’s Inequality of Bargaining Power: Changes over 
Time and Implications for Public Policy’ and ‘Labor’s Inequality of Bargaining Power: Myth 
or Reality’ (n 21). 
26  Generally see Klare. K ‘Countervailing Workers’ Power as a Regulatory Strategy’ in Collins, 
H; Davies, P and Rideout, R (eds) Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation (2000) 63-82 
at 69-73. 
27  Hyde (n 25) at 54-57. 
28  Hepple, B Labour Law and Global Trade (2005) at 263. Also see Botero, JC; Djankov, S; La 
Porta, R; Lopez-de-Silanes, F and Shleifer, A ‘The Regulation of Labor’ (2004) 119 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 1340. 













The proponents of this view are generally ‘unimpressed’ by the 
traditional rationale for the need of a countervailing force.30 In fact, to them the 
ability of parties to force wages and conditions of employment down is 
indicative of a competitive market and, while they do not discount the need for 
collective bargaining tools and protective legislation, they merely regard them 
as devices to address market failures.31  
 
While one may concede that there is substance in these views, it is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, not to regard the need for a moderating 
force in the South African workplace as a purpose in itself and emphasis on it 
by South African judges and writers should not be dismissed as mere 
‘rhetoric’32 or a failure to understand market forces: It is based on an 
appreciation of the extreme vulnerability of a great proportion of the 
workforce, which is not founded only in failures of the market, but also in the 
general legacy of the previous political system of racial exclusion. For that 
reason it is perhaps easier for the traditionalists to reconcile their views with 
those who emphasise the (re)distributive function of labour law. 
 
While doubt has been expressed in, for instance, the Netherlands as to 
whether there is still the same pressing need to provide legislative means to 
equal the labour playing fields,33 others have argued that those workers who 
are not covered by collective bargaining work under substantially less 
beneficial conditions of employment.34 There is no doubt, as suggested 
above, that the Kahn-Freund paradigm (that is, the inequality of bargaining 
power) is still regarded as valid in South Africa. Not only has it been confirmed 
                                                        
30  Collins (n 25) at 10. 
31  As explained by Davidov, G ‘The Reports of My Death are Greatly Exaggerated: “Employee” 
as a Viable (Though Over-used) Legal Concept’ in Davidov, G and Langille, B Boundaries 
and Frontiers of Labour Law (2006) 133-152 at 139, the inequality of bargaining power is 
regarded as ‘simply a shorthand for a number of market failures’ Also see Collins (n 25) at 11. 
Also see the comment of Klare (n 26) at note 13 and Hyde (n 25) at 53-54. 
32  See Klare (n 26) at 70.  
33  See discussion by Verhulp, E ‘Een Arbeidsovereenkomst? Dat Maak Ik Zelf Wel Uit’ (2005) 
3 Maandblad voor Sociaal Recht 87 at 90. Also see the comments by Didcott J in Roffey v 
Catterall, Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N) at 499E-H where it is doubted 
whether the power imbalance is a ‘universal truism’ and the criticism of Klare (n 26) at 63-82. 
Despite his criticism, Klare concedes (at 82) that the countervailing power of workers is still 
the best tool to address ‘the particular challenge of redistributing wealth and power between 
employer and employee’. 













by the courts, but a brief reflection on the high unemployment figures in South 
Africa and the high level of poverty amongst those who are employed 
confirms the validity of this basic premise: Recent statistics (using the narrow 
definition of unemployment) suggest that 4 391 000 people out of an 
economically active population 17 191 000 are unemployed and that 
6 881 000 of the employed earn less than R2 500, 00 per month.35 
 
3.3 The new world of work 
 
Langille has argued that the contract of employment was chosen as the 
means of delivery simply because it was ‘available’ as a ‘platform’ for 
intervention, but, so he argues, it need not necessarily be the platform.36 
Using the contract of employment as the platform for intervention was closely 
linked to the view that employment consisted of two parties at both ends of a 
long-term contract and that this constituting regime of labour relations simply 
needed some moderation in order to level the playing fields. Hence the 
development of two further regimes: collective bargaining and protective 
legislation.37 Perhaps, initially at least, the contract of employment was 
capable of being both the reason for intervention and the medium for 
intervention. However, since the ‘real world of the labour market has moved 
on’,38 we need to consider whether this is still true and whether there is not 
more for labour law to achieve and whether there are not platforms, other than 
the contract of employment, through which this can be achieved. In this 
regard Quinlan remarks that: 
 
                                                        
35  See Table B and Table 3.7.1 of Statistical release PO210 (Labour Force Survey September 
2006) accessed via 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/statsdownload.asp?ppn=P0210&SCH=3890 (14 
August 2007). Also see Benjamin, B ‘Workers’ Protection in an Increasingly Informalised 
Labour Market: the South Africa Case’, paper presented at a workshop ‘A Decent Work 
Research Agenda for South Africa’, Cape Town, South Africa, April 2007. Bhorat, H ‘Labour 
Market Challenges in the Post-Apartheid South Africa’ paper presented at the 17th Annual 
Labour Law Conference, Johannesburg, South Africa, July 2004 points out that, in 1999, 3.7 
million households out of an estimated 11.4 million households were below the poverty line. 
36  Langille, B ‘Labour Policy in Canada – New Platform, New Paradigm’ (2002) 28 Canadian 
Public Policy 132 at 137-139. 
37  Generally see Langille (n 36). 













Changing contexts can provoke debates amongst policy makers 
about the fundamental objectives of particular pieces of legislation 
while changes to legislation can also facilitate or restrain changes to 
context. Looking at recent changes to the world of work, the former 
effect seems more important . . . 39 
 
What are the ‘changed contexts’ or the new ‘real world’ of the labour 
market? Without debating what came first, these new contexts include the fact 
that service delivery can easily be shifted to developing countries with lower 
labour standards (globalisation and the race to the bottom);40 the replacement 
of long-term or standard employment by precarious, non-standard 
employment (the reasons for this vary, but include globalisation, new 
technologies and strategic moves by employers).41 It also includes the 
collapse of the family structure and the entry of more women into the labour 
market42 as well as falling trade union membership. Other contexts which are 
also relevant elsewhere, but which are particularly evident in South Africa, 
include the HIV/Aids pandemic, which accounts for loss of skills, decreased 
productivity and a high turnover of workers;43 the continued existence of non-
wage (often gendered) employment;44 ever-increasing poverty;45 large-scale 
labour migration;46 unemployment, including a growing graduate 
                                                        
39  Quinlan, M ‘Contextual Factors Shaping the Purpose of Labour Law: A Comparative 
Historical Perspecti e’ in Arup, C; Gahan, P; Howe, J; Johnstone, R; Mitchell, R and 
O’Donnell, A (eds) Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation (2006) 21-42 at 40. 
40  Quinlan (n 39) at 40. Also see Langille, B ‘Labour is not a Commodity’ (1998) ILJ 1002. 
41  Quinlan (n 39) at 33.  
42  Fredman, S ‘Precarious Norms for Precarious Workers’ in Fudge, J and Owens, R (eds) 
Precarious Work, Women and the New Economy: The Challenges to Legal Norms (2006) 177-
200. Also see Klare, K ‘Labor Law for the 21st Century: Stalled Reform in the United States’ 
(1997) 1 Law, Democracy & Development 103 at 108. 
43  Benjamin (n 35) at 4. It is estimated that, in 2005, 1000 people died every day as a result of 
the disease. 
44  See Rittich, K ‘Feminization and Contingency: Regulating the Stakes of Work for Women’ in 
Conaghan, J; Fischl, RM and Klare, K (eds) Labour Law in an Era of Globalization: The 
Transformative Practices and Possibilities (2000) 117-136 at 122 and Kalula, E ‘Beyond 
Borrowing and Bending: Labour Market Regulation and the Future of Labour Law In 
Southern Africa’ in Barnard, C; Deakin, S and Morris, G (eds) The Future of Labour Law 
(2004) 275-287 at 286. 
45  Bhorat (n 35). Also see Frye, I ‘Poverty and Unemployment in South Africa’ NALEDI 
Publication (2006) accessed via http://www.naledi.org.za/ (22 August 2007). 
46  Fakier, K ‘The Internationalization of South African Labour Markets: The Need for a 
Comparative Research Agenda’, paper presented to an International Institute for Labour 
Stdies workshop ‘A Decent Work Research Agenda for South Africa’, Cape Town, South 













unemployment problem;47 and the increasing informalisation of the labour 
market.48 A further context, perhaps peculiar to South Africa, is the challenge 
of absorbing previously excluded ethnic groups into the mainstream South 
African labour market.49 
 
Is the contract of employment capable of meeting all these challenges? 
This will be fully considered in Chapters 4 and 5. However, a few comments 
on unemployment, non-standard work, the feminisation of work and the 
informal labour market will begin to suggest the answer: 
 
 3.3.1 Unemployment 
 
Currently unemployment benefits are available in South Africa to those 
who become unemployed for a number of reasons. However, in order to 
qualify for benefits the claimant must first be in employment as envisaged by 
the Unemployment Insurance Act of 2001 (UIA),50 which is modelled on a 
contractual regime. Bhorat, however, has found that between 1995 and 2002 
3.4 million individuals, many of whom were first-time entrants, remained 
jobless51 and were thus unable to obtain statutory unemployment benefits. 
 
3.3.2 Non-standard employment  
 
It is now an accepted fact that the decrease of standard employment 
has eroded the quality of the labour protection and that those workers become 
                                                                                                                                                              
see Dupper, O ‘Migrant Workers and the Right to Social Security: An International 
Perspective’ (2007) 18(2) Stell LR 219. 
47  See note 24, especially Bhorat (n 35) at 15. 
48  ‘The Informal Plague Goes Global’ (2005) 29(1) SALB 44. Also see Trebilcock, A ‘Using 
Development Approaches to Address the Challenge of the Informal Economy for Labour 
Law’ in Davidov, G and Langille, B Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law (2006) 63-86 
and Sankaran, K ‘Protecting the Worker in the Informal Economy: The Role of Labour Law’ 
in Davidov, G and Langille, B Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law (2006) 205-220. 
49  For a view of some of the above issues in respect of Southern Africa see Fenwick, C; Kalula, 
E and Landau, I ‘Labour Law: A Southern African Perspective’ Discussion Paper 
International Institute for Labour Studies DP/180/2007, in particular part 2. Also see 
Kanyenze, G; Kondo, T and Martens, J (eds) The Search for Sustainable Human Development 
in Southern Africa (2006) at 151-166. For a European perspective see Blanpain, R ‘Work in 
the 21st Century’ (1997) 18 ILJ 185. 
50  Act 66 of 1995. 













‘invisible for recruitment into trade unions or for the protection through law 
enforcement’52 even though most of these employment relationships are still 
driven, nominally at least, by a contract of employment: 
 
[T] here is a growing body of international evidence that some of 
the changes, notably the growth of precarious or insecure employment, 
have profound implications for worker attitudes and commitment as 
well as minimum labour standards and working conditions, especially 
the health, safety and well-being of workers. In particular, the growth of 
elaborate supply chains and flexible arrangements (along with changes 
to regulatory regimes) has been linked to the emergence or expansion 
of low-wage sectors/working poor (with substantial hidden costs to the 
community) and more intensive work regimes.53 
 
3.3.3 Feminisation of work 
 
It is accepted that women constitute the majority of non-standard 
employees and informal workers and or that reason suffer from the same 
malaise alluded to in the above quote.54 While this trend has done much to 
correct the gender imbalances of the labour market, it has not lessened the 
caring responsibilities of women and they continue ‘to enter the paid 
workforce on vastly unequal terms’.55 
 
3.3.4 Informal labour market56 
 
The informal labour market, often portrayed as being the peripheral 
zone on the edges of the formal labour market,57 is one of the significant 
                                                        
52  Cheadle (n 18) at 698. 
53  Quinlan (n 39) at 33. 
54  See Rittich (n 44) at 117-119. 
55   Fredman (n 42) at 200. This is further illustrated by the fact 45 per cent of female-headed 
households in South Africa live in poverty. Bhorat (n 35) at 5.  
56  The informal labour market in South Africa is also considered in § 4.8. Also see §§ 3.5 and 
5.8. 
57  Von Holdt, K and Webster, E ‘Work Restructuring and the Crisis of Social Reproduction: A 
Southern Perspective’ in Webster, E and Von Holdt, K (eds) Beyond The Apartheid 













features of the post-apartheid South Africa labour market. While it remains a 
difficult concept to define58 and to capture, it is now estimated to represent 
about 18,7 per cent of total employment in South Africa.59 The workers in the 
informal labour market generally work under very poor conditions and their 
wages and income do not compare well with similar work in the formal labour 
market.60 These workers are often not covered by protected labour legislation. 
There are at least two reasons for this. First, in instances where an 
employment relationship can be said to exist, it is only nominal and not visible 
to labour law and in any event often controlled by a remote party. Second, 
self-employed persons represent a large number of those workers in the 
informal labour market and because of their legal status as independent 
contractors are excluded from protection.61 The reality is that in the absence 
of legislative protection, the impact of, for instance, loss of work and/or injury 
of these workers devolves onto their families and communities and causes 
further strain.62 
 
3.4 The future: a social welfare agenda? 
 
Perhaps a re-conceptualisation of the contract of employment can 
meet some of the challenges brought about by the new world of work, but in 
some cases it may be that means other than collective bargaining must be 
found to ensure basic rights to employees such as the sectoral determinations 
provided for in the BCEA. The point is that many of these challenges, other 
than their potential threat to the balance of power, are brought about by 
                                                        
58  Trebilcock (n 48) at 72-74. 
59  See Table K, Statistical release PO210 (Labour Force Survey September 2006) accessed via 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/statsdownload.asp?ppn=P0210&SCH=3890 (14 
August 2007). This estimate excludes domestic workers. The informal sector proper is 
calculated on the basis of those who work for an employer (or business, institution or private 
individual) who is not registered for that activity. Also see Horn, P ‘Decent Work and the 
Informal Economy in Africa: Policy and Organizational Challenges’ paper presented at the 
5th African Regional Congress of the IIRA, Cape Town, March 2008 for a number of 
practical measures that can be taken to address the problems associated with informality. Also 
see Benjamin, P ‘Informal Work and Labour Rights in South Africa’ paper presented at the 
5th African Regional Congress of the IIRA. 
60  ‘The Informal Plague Goes Global’ (n 48). 
61  See Benjamin, B ‘Beyond the Boundaries: Prospects for Expanding Labour Market 
Regulation in South Africa’ in Davidov, G and Langille, B (eds) Boundaries and Frontiers of 
Labour Law (2006) 181-204 at 188-189 and Sankaran (n 48) at 209. 













realities which are quite far removed from the realities on which Kahn-Freund 
based his purpose of labour law. But are there any other reasons why the 
challenges of the new world of work should be the concern of labour law? 
 
In a very insightful piece on the interface between legal origin and 
labour legislation Ahlering and Deakin, using the Human Development Index 
(HDI) (developed under the influence of Sen and measuring life expectancy, 
education and standard of living, not merely income), concluded that there is 
strong evidence that modes of labour law regulation, in particular those linked 
to social security systems, play a supportive role in the promotion of labour 
markets and hence in economic development.63 This view is also supported 
by Langille who argues, also relying on Sen, that labour is about the ‘creation 
of human capital, ie education, and then the productive use of that human 
capital’ and that, in turn, will lead to economic growth.64 It is suggested that 
this is closely linked to what Hepple envisaged when, considering means to 
modernise labour law, he identified what he called the ‘integrative function’ of 
law as one of the new functions of labour law: 
 
 . . . we need to add a ne “integrative function”, that is innovative 
“positive welfare” measures, which would help to combat . . . the “social 
exclusion” of a growing underclass of unemployed or partially 
employed people. These might include the right to acquire vocational 
skills and further education, financial inducements to employers to 
engage the long-term unemployed, protection against age 
                                                        
63  Ahlering, B and Deakin, S ‘Labour Regulation, Corporate Governance and Legal Origin: A 
Case of Institutional Complimentarity?’ Working Paper No 312 (2005) Centre for Business 
Research, University of Cambridge at 30. Also see Deakin, S ‘Labour Law and Economic 
Development’ paper presented at the 19th Annual Labour Law Conference, Johannesburg, 
South Africa, July 2006. Also see Deakin and Wilkenson (n 4). On the 2006 HDI published by 
the United Nations Development programme South Africa ranks 121st out of 177 countries. 
Index accessed via http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/ (6 August 2007). 
64  Langille (n 4) at 33-34. It is to be noted that the Dutch legislature, when it introduced the 1909 
amendments to the Dutch Civil Code, regarded ‘social elevation’ as implicitly part of the aim 
of protective legislation. Although the exact content of the envisaged ‘social elevation’ was 
never clearly expressed, it illustrates an early understanding of the broader function of labour 













discrimination, and child care and parental rights which would make it 
easier to combine work with family responsibilities.65 
 
This does not mean that the traditional view on the purpose of labour 
law has become obsolete.66 It simply means that there is a need to: 
 
. . . move beyond the formal labour market and address the 
increasing fluid boundaries between work and family, employment and 
unemployment and different types of worker. It cannot continue to 
assume autonomy from other branches of the law, and in particular, 
from welfare and family law.67 
 
Collins, not doubting that orderly industrial relations remain a priority, 
nevertheless questions the ‘connection between higher labour standards and 
higher levels of investment’.68 He argues that the dominant purpose of labour 
law ought to be the regulation of the employment relationship for 
competitiveness by the promotion of more flexible employment relations.69 
Flexibility in this context must be understood as an extremely fluid 
employment arrangement in a knowledge-driven economy where skills date 
quickly and the focus is on the individual’s re-skilling and employability rather 
than on the security of her or his employment.70 While global developments 
                                                        
65  Hepple (n 2) at 322. 
66  Kalula (n 44) at 286. Also see Benjamin (n 61) at 200-202. 
67  Fredman, S ‘The Ideology of New Labour Law’ in Barnard, C; Deakin, S and Morris, G (eds) 
The Future of Labour Law (2004) 9-39 at 19. Also see Arup, C ‘Labour Law as Regulation: 
Promise and Pitfalls’ (2001) 14 AJLL 229 and Carney, T; Ramia, G and Chapman, A ‘Which 
Law is Laggard? Regulation and the Gaps Between Labour Law and Social Security Law’ in 
Arup, C; Gahan, P; Howe, J; Johnstone, R; Mitchell, R and O’Donnell, A (eds) Labour Law 
and Labour Market Regulation (2006) at 383-409. 
68  Collins, H ‘Regulating the Employment Relation for Competitiveness’ (2001) 30 ILJ (UK) 17 
at 35. Cf Deakin and Wilkenson (n 4). Also see the views of Arup (n 67) at 231-233 regarding 
the aforementioned article by Collins. 
69  Collins (n 68). In South Africa the concept of flexibility manifested in what is known as 
‘regulated flexibility’ and it informed the LRA and the BCEA, but the failure of the 
bargaining councils to, inter alia, set framework agreements and to allow for the refinement of 
standards at enterprise level to a large extent undermined the envisaged model of regulated 
flexibility. However, as emphasised by Cheadle, this does not necessarily imply a failure of 
the model; it is rather a failure of the means and institutions of implementation. See Cheadle 
(n 18) at 668-670 and 693-697. 
70  Stone, KVW ‘Rethinking Labour Law: Employment Protection for Boundaryless Workers’ in 
Davidov, G and Langille, B Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law (2006) 155-179 at 161 













certainly encourage labour market reforms that would facilitate this model,71 
there is the danger that investments attracted by this model would serve the 
formal labour market only72 and would not address the entirety of the new 
world of work as alluded to above.  
 
How to achieve the linkages between labour law and the social welfare 
agenda is still a vexed question (and falls beyond the purpose of this chapter), 
but a reconsideration of the manner in which work is done may reveal some 
answers, in particular the extent to which the contract of employment can still 
be the medium of delivery. To the extent that the contract of employment fails, 
more emphasis on promotional standards such as improving skills and 
providing public services to promote employment may assist in advancing the 
social agenda. In this regard moving the focus from employer-employee 
relations to the labour market generally, by promoting improved synergies 
between the different forms of protective legislation, such as between 
unemployment and skills development legislation, may also advance labour 
law’s social welfare agenda. 73  
 
3.5  The limitations of labour law 
 
In exploring the purpose of labour law one should acknowledge its 
limitations. One limitation relates to its inherent inability to cover all 
workplaces and another limitation concerns institutional inadequacies.  
 
Both enforcement and collective bargaining, despite some successes 
in, for instance, India, are extremely challenging in the informal sector. While 
progress has been made to advance organisation, similar to trade union 
                                                        
71  See Morris, M ‘The Rapid Increase of Chinese Imports: How Do We Assess the Industrial, 
Labour and Socio-economic Implications?’ paper presented at the 20th Annual Labour Law 
Conference, Johannesburg, South Africa, July 2007 for a discussion about the impact of 
Chinese clothing imports on the South African clothing industry. 
72  Kalula (n 44) at 286. 
73  Sengenberger, W ‘Protection – Participation – Promotion: The Systemic Nature and Effects of 
Labour Standards’ in Sengenberger, W and Campbell, D (eds) Creating Economic 
Opportunities: The Role of Labour Standards in Industrial Restructuring (1994) 45-60 at 50-
51. Also see generally D’Antona, M ‘Labour Law at the Century’s End: An Identity Crisis’ in 
Conoghan, J; Fischl, RM and Klare, K (eds) Labour Law in an Era of Globalization (2000) 













organisation, in the informal sector, the lack of identifiable workplaces and a 
counterpart to bargain with have presented great challenges.74 Consideration 
should be given to the fact that structures and tools beyond labour law may be 
better suited to accommodate (some of) the needs of the informal labour 
markets. For instance, the co-operative model may be a better structure to 
advance the collective interest of street traders with a local municipality than a 
trade union model. This is not to suggest that informal workers, when it comes 
to social security schemes such as unemployment insurance or workmen’s 
compensation, should be excluded. In fact, since there is evidence that 
workers migrate between the formal and informal labour market and assuming 
that it would be prudent for the same scheme to cover them, these schemes 
ought to be adjusted to allow for participation while the worker is in the 
informal labour market.75 The point is, as suggested by Sankaran, that those 
working in the informal market have a claim to ‘universal entitlements’ 
guaranteed by human rights legislation and sentiments, but there may be a 
need to complement labour law in order to ensure proper delivery of these 
entitlements.76  
 
The purpose of labour law can obviously only be fulfilled with the help 
of sound institutional structures. Quinlan77 warns that ‘unless the purpose of 
labour law is to be seen in purely symbolic terms it is only meaningfully 
assessed in the light of the mechanisms employed to implement it (and the 
complex battles often associated with it)’. In a similar vein Cheadle78 has 
observed that South African labour legislation is crippled by the failure of the 
institutions of labour law to understand the framework-setting role of collective 
bargaining, the failure of the labour courts and tribunals to regard codes of 
good practice as guidelines, their encouragement of a formalistic and 
                                                        
74  Horn, P ‘Protecting the Unprotected. Can It Be Done?’ (2004) 28(1) SALB 28 and ‘Informal 
Sector Union Faces Crunch Time’ (2004) 28(4) SALB 49. 
75  Also see Sankaran (n 48); Benjamin (n 61) at 200-202 and Olivier, M ‘Extending 
Employment Injury and Disease Protection to Non-traditional and Informal Economy 
Workers: The Quest for a Principled Framework and Innovative Approaches’ paper presented 
at the 7th International Work Congress, Hong Kong, June 2006. 
76  (n 48) at 216. 
77  (n 39) at 37. Kalula (n 44) at 281 makes the same point. 
78  (n 18) at 670 and 693-697. Also see the observations of Fenwick et al (n 49), part 2 regarding 













legalistic approach to workplace discipline, and the general lack of structural 
support from the Department of Labour. In respect of the latter Cheadle 
highlights the failure of the Department to address the fragmented coverage 
of bargaining councils, to channel subsidies to bargaining councils to perform 
dispute-resolution functions, to demarcate sectors adequately and to promote 
the regulatory functions of bargaining councils. To this list should also be 
added the apparent failure of the Department’s inspectorate to monitor and 
enforce the BCEA at workplaces, thus facilitating what Godfrey and Clarke 
refer to as ‘absolute flexibility’79 and unwittingly creating an informal labour 
market within (and not on the edges of) the formal labour market. In view of 
this institutional inability to monitor the formal labour market, the ability to 
monitor legislation extended to the informal sector must be questioned. 
Although much can be done to improve the performance of the above 
institutions, this should not be seen in the first place as criticism of them, but 
serves merely to suggest that legislation aimed at regulating the informal 
sector should take account of the fact that these institutions, at best, have 
limitations. 
 
3.6  Précis 
 
From the above it can be concluded that, despite the limitations of 
labour law, it is clear that the purpose of labour law has at least (whether from 
a traditional, an efficiency or distributive perspective) ‘countervailing’ and 
social flavours to it. These aspirations of labour law, as will be illustrated 
below, are also consistent with the South African Constitution.  
 
3.7 The Constitution 
 
Labour market regulation in South Africa must be considered against 
the backdrop of the Constitution and more specifically the Bill of Rights in 
Chapter 2 of the Constitution. It can therefore rightfully be asked to what 
                                                        
79  Godfrey, S and Clarke, M ‘The Basic Conditions of Employment Act Amendments: More 













extent the general purposes of labour law identified above are constitutional 
imperatives. 
 
Generally the Constitution regulates law and not conduct: 
 
This is the South African Constitution’s special genius: a right 
may bind a private person but the constitutional regulation of the 
person’s conduct in terms of the right takes place through a law that 
gives effect to the right.80 
 
The bundle of socio-economic rights in the Constitution includes the 
right to property, housing, health care, food water and social security81 as well 
as a right to fair labour practices in s 23 which is comprehensively considered 
in Chapter 5. The latter is apparently a unique constitutional right (only the 
Malawian Constitution has a similar provision)82 and not only provides that 
everyone has a right to fair labour practices, but also guarantees the 
structures counteracting the employer’s power: trade unionism and collective 
bargaining. Section 23 reads as follows:  
 
 (1) Everyone has the right to fair labour practices. 
 (2) Every worker has the right- 
  (a) to form and join a trade union; 
 (b) to participate in the activities and programmes of a 
 trade union; and 
  (c) to strike. 
 (3) Every employer has the right- 
  (a) to form and join an employers' organisation; and 
 (b) to participate in the activities and programmes of 
 an employers' organisation. 
(4) Every trade union and every employers' organisation has the 
right- 
  (a) to determine its own administration, programmes 
   and activities; 
  (b) to organise; and 
  (c) to form and join a federation. 
                                                        
80  Cheadle, H ‘Application’ in Cheadle, H; Davis, D and Haysom, N (eds) South African 
Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 2ed (2005) at 3-1 – 3-26, especially at 3-11 – 3-14. 
Also see Chapter 5. 
81  Sections 25, 26 and 27. 
82  Section 32(1) of the Republic of Malawi (Constitution) Act, 1994 provides that every person 













(5) Every trade union, employers' organisation and employer 
 has the right to engage in  collective bargaining. National 
 legislation may be enacted to regulate collective bargaining.  To 
 the extent that the legislation may limit a right in this Chapter, 
 the limitation must comply  with section 36 (1). 
 (6) National legislation may recognise union security 
 arrangements contained in collective  agreements. To the 
 extent that the legislation may limit a right in this Chapter the 
 limitation must comply with section 36 (1). 
 
Consistent with other modern constitutions, the Bill of Rights does not 
only concern itself with public power (for example, state-individual 
relationships), but in certain instances it also applies to the exercise of private 
power (such as power exercised by a natural or juristic person).83 In some 
instances, guidance as to whether rights may be applied to private conduct is 
provided by the Bill of Rights itself.84 Where no such guidance is provided, the 
court must consider the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed 
by it.85 While certain rights will more easily bind natural or juristic persons, the 
extent to which a fundamental right is applicable can only be determined with 
reference to the facts of each case. However, the right to fair labour practices 
in s 23 of the Constitution is one of the rights that undoubtedly applies to 
private relationships. In this regard Cheadle comments: 
 
 The provisions of [s 23] refer to workers, employers and 
employer organisations and it would be an extraordinary reading of the 
text to limit the ambit of this section to state action only.86  
 
Cheadle further argues that labour practices should be understood ‘as 
practices that arise from the relationship between workers, employers and 
their respective organisations’87 and that ‘[i]t is hard to visualise how this right 
operates in respect of its application to laws’.88 However, Cooper argues that 
                                                        
83  See Cheadle, H and Davis, D ‘Structure of the Bill of Rights’ in Cheadle, H; Davis, DM  and 
Haysom, NRL South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 2ed (2002) 1-1 – 1-10 at 
1-2. 
84  See s 9(4) of the Constitution. 
85  Section 8(2) of the Constitution. 
86  Cheadle, H ‘Labour Relations’ in Cheadle, H; Davis, D and Haysom, N (eds) South African 
Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 2ed (2005) at 18-1 – 18-38 at 18-7. 
87  Cheadle, (n 86) at 18-3. 













since one of the BCEA’s objectives is to give effect and regulate the 
constitutional right to fair labour practices, s 23 of the Constitution also 
underwrites the minimum legislative standards provided for in the BCEA. 
Nonetheless, Cooper concedes that it is debatable, despite the absence of an 
obvious reason, whether s 23 of the Constitution should encompass rights 
regulated in other labour legislation such as health and safety rights at work.89 
In other words, should legislation be open to constitutional attack because it 
violates s 23(1) of the Constitution? The history of unfair labour practices, the 
typical interpretation of such practices in South Africa90 and their application 
elsewhere probably militate against such an interpretation and it is therefore 
more realistic to seek constitutional confirmation of labour law’s social welfare 
agenda through the provisions of s 27(1)(c) of the Constitution which provides 
that: 
 
Everyone has the right to have access to social security, 
including, if they are unable to support themselves and their 
dependants, appropriate social assistance. 
 
Social security and social assistance are not defined in the 
Constitution. Section 39 of the Constitution, however, provides that a court, 
when interpreting the Bill of Rights, must also consider international law. This 
means that the provisions of the ILO Social Security (Minimum Standards) 
Convention 102, 1952 (not yet ratified by South Africa) should be considered 
when giving content to these two terms. The Convention suggests that those 
persons who do not receive any earnings or can only receive reduced 
earnings because of, for instance, unemployment when a person is capable of 
and available to work and incapacity or loss of support as a result of an 
employment injury, should in principle be regarded as contingencies covered 
by social security.91  
                                                        
89  Cooper, C ‘Labour Relations’ in Woolman, S; Roux, T; Bishop, M and Stein, A (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 3 2ed (2005) at 53-1 – 53-59, especially at 53-13 -53-
14. 
90  § 2.3.5.3. 
91  See articles 20, 31 and 32 of ILO Convention 102, 1952. Generally see Strydom, EML (ed) 













It should further be noted that s 27(1)(c) of the Constitution does not 
guarantee an absolute right to social security, but only a right to have access 
to social security. Furthermore, s 27(2) of the Constitution requires the state to 
take reasonable legislative measures, within its available resources, to 
achieve the progressive realisation of the rights listed in s 27(1). Also, even if 
it is found that any of the rights in the Bill of Rights is infringed, s 36 of the 
Constitution provides very specific conditions under which such a right may 
justifiably be limited.92  
 
In a 2000 publication,93 Davis, MacKlem and Mundlak lament the 
tendency of courts generally, and more specifically the South African 
Constitutional Court, to interpret social rights narrowly as well as their failure 
to use such rights to advance social citizenship. This view was largely based 
on the judgment handed down by the Constitutional Court in Soobramoney v 
Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal)94 which concerned the right to emergency 
medical treatment entrenched in s 27(3) of the Constitution. The authors, 
rejecting the court’s atomistic approach to social rights and heavy reliance on 
concerns about resources, called for an interpretation of social rights that 
would advance such rights in a programmatic and integrative fashion.95 Since 
then the Constitutional Court has adopted a broader approach to social rights 
                                                                                                                                                              
Relations’ in Woolman, S; Roux, T; Bishop, M and Stein, A (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa vol 3 2ed (2005) at 56D-i – 56D-22. 
92  Section 36(1) of the Constitution reads as follows: 
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to 
the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, 
including- 
  (a) the nature of the right; 
  (b) the importance of the purpose of the    
   limitation; 
  (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
  (d) the relation between the limitation and its    
   purpose; and 
  (e) less restrictive means to achieve the    
   purpose. 
On the limitation of s 27 of the Constitution see generally Cheadle, H ‘Limitation of Rights’ in 
Cheadle, H; Davis, D and Haysom, N (eds) South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of 
Rights 2ed (2005) at 30-1 – 30-18 and Olivier, MP; Smit, N and Kalula, ER Social Security: A 
Legal Analysis (2003) at 69-76. 
93  Davis, D; MacKlem, P and Mundlak, G ‘Social Rights, Social Citizenship, and 
Transformative Constitutionalism: A Comparative Assessment’ in Conoghan, J; Fischl, RM 
and Klare, K (eds) Labour Law in an Era of Globalization (2000) 511-534. 
94  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 













that emphasises the duty of the state to take positive steps to advance social 
rights in an integrated fashion. The leading judgment in this regard is 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and 
Others96 which concerned the right to access to housing in s 26 of the 
Constitution. Since s 26 has a structure similar to s 27 of the Constitution, this 
judgment is extremely relevant in the context of social security.97 The matter 
concerned the forcible removal of squatters without making alternative 
accommodation available to them. The Constitutional Court, finding that the 
state housing programme was inadequate, ordered the government to take 
positive steps to devise and implement a comprehensive and co-ordinated 
programme, bearing in mind available resources, to progressively realise the 
right to access to housing, but declined individual relief.  
 
This judgment is seen as confirmation of the positive duty of the state 
to act reasonably (in terms of measures and time frames) to fulfil its 
constitutional duties regarding social rights in a systematic manner that 
recognises the interrelationship between the various fundamental rights and 
prioritises the more vulnerable groups of society.98 This judgment has been 
hailed as a flag bearer for transformative constitutionalism in that it confirms 
the role of the Constitution in the ’transformation of society into a more just an 
equitable place where people would better be able to realise their full potential 
as human beings’.99 The significance of this judgment in the context of the 
informal labour market has not been fully explored, but it has been suggested 
that it provides the basis on which to argue that those in the informal labour 
market should be given access to, for instance, workmen’s compensation 
                                                        
96  2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). For a discussion of this judgment see Van Bueren, G ‘Housing’ in 
Cheadle, H; Davis, D and Haysom, N (eds) South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of 
Rights 2ed (2005) at 21-1 – 21-17, especially at 21-2 – 21-6 and Olivier et al (n 92) at 90-91.  
97  Olivier et al (n 92) at 90. 
98  See De Vos, P ‘Grootboom, the Right of Access to Housing and Substantive Equality as 
Contextual Fairness’ (2001) 17 SAJHR 258. Also see Liebenberg, S ‘The Right to Social 
Security Assistance: Implications of Grootboom for Policy Reform in South Africa’ (2001) 17 
SAJHR 232. Also see Olivier et al (n 92) at 90. Since Grootboom the Constitutional Court has 
confirmed the broader approach to social rights in Minister of Health and Others v Treatment 
Action Campaign and Others 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) and Khosa and Others v Minister of 
Social Development and Others; Mahlaule and Others v Minister of Social Development and 
Others 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC). 













schemes and insurance schemes similar to those available in the formal 
labour market.100  
 
In as much as labour policies can help to reduce the need for social 
security and employment continues to provide access to social security, the 
link between labour law and social security becomes clear. In fact, historically 
employment has always been the gateway to social security in the form of 
workmen’s compensation and unemployment benefits. However, these 
measures primarily (still) target the formal labour market and do very little to 
ensure the (re)integration of persons into the (formal) labour market.101 Based 
on the judgment in Grootboom, s 27(1)(c) of the Constitution now requires the 
state to take, for instance, an active approach to structural unemployment.102 
In other words, instead of employment being a gateway to social security 
programmes as has been the case historically, social security programmes 
should also provide a gateway to employment. This new approach will 
furthermore require the state and other stakeholders, when implementing new 
policies, to view the ‘informal labour market and the formal labour market from 
an integrated perspective’.103  
 
Olivier argues that the interaction between social security and the 
labour market operates at three different levels: first, the long-term 
unemployed and the informally employed who do not have access to social 
security; second, those workers who are active in the formal labour market, 
but who are excluded from social security structures such as domestic 
workers who are not covered by workmen’s compensation legislation; and 
third, those who have been forced to leave the labour market due to injury or 
retrenchment and who do not yet fall within the first  category.104 To the latter 
may be added those workers who leave the labour market voluntarily because 
of, for instance, family responsibilities or further studies. 
 
                                                        
100  See Olivier (n 75). 
101  Olivier et al (n 92) at 47. 
102  Davis et al (n 93) at 534. 
103  Olivier et al (n 92) at 46. 













This, it is suggested, covers what Hepple envisaged in 1995 when he 
identified the ’integrative function’ of labour law aimed at addressing the 
‘social exclusion’ of the ‘growing underclass of unemployed or partially 
employed people’ as the new function of labour law.105 However, in South 
Africa’s case, this function is now a constitutional imperative. 
 
 This may in part be achieved by extending the pool of beneficiaries 
under unemployment and workmen’s compensation legislation by broadening 
the definition of employee, but will also require functional programmes aimed 
at skills development and (re)integration into the labour market.106 This will in 
turn, as briefly suggested earlier, require the existence of sound institutional 
structures. But it may also require employers to assume a more direct welfare 
responsibility. A graphic example of this relates to the Extension of Security of 
Tenure Act of 1997107 which regulates the circumstances under which an 
employer (usually a farmer) may evict an employee or former employee who 
occupied a residence provided by the employer. 
 
Finally, it is suggested that the Constitution and the emphasis on 
transformative constitutionalism add one more purpose to labour law. Section 
9(1) of the Constitution provides that everyone is equal before the law and 
has the right to the equal protection and benefit of the law. In many ways this 
provision is the cornerstone of the South African Constitution and is a 
reflection of the country’s history. Section 9(2) provides that equality includes 
the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms and that legislative and 
other measures must be taken to promote the achievement of equality and to 
promote and advance persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. Two 
pieces of legislation had been passed to give effect to this: the Employment 
Equity Act of 1998 (EEA)108 and the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act of 2000.109 The former is specifically aimed at equity 
in the workplace whereas the latter has a more general application. The fact 
                                                        
105  Hepple (n 2) at 322. 
106  Benjamin (n 61) at 200-204. 
107  Act 62 of 1997. 
108  Act 55 of 1998. 













that dedicated legislation has been passed to address equity in the workplace 
is evidence that the employment relationship is regarded as an important site 
for transformation and that one of the purposes of labour law is to be a tool of 
social engineering. In other words, transforming a racially skewed workforce 
may help to transform the community at large. 
 
While, in the case of South Africa, this purpose of labour law may be 
rooted in the country’s particular history, the general sentiment is not unique 
to South Africa. Internationally, the role of labour law in promoting human 
rights, and particularly equality, is given greater prominence and, as Davies 
and Freedland have argued, it may be one of the forms of regulation that can 





For a long time, views on the purpose of labour law were preoccupied 
with the need to moderate or countervail the generally more powerful position 
of employers. Collective bargaining and protective legislation were regarded 
as the appropriate means to achieve this purpose. Over the years different 
and perhaps more sophisticated theories developed as to why these forms of 
regulation are required, but there is nothing to suggest that the traditional view 
has become completely obsolete. In any event, most of the modern theories 
concede that collective bargaining and protective legislation must, to some 
degree, play a part in the regulation of labour relations. However, irrespective 
of which theory is preferred, it is indisputable that changing contexts are 
presenting peculiar challenges to collective bargaining and protective 
legislation as well as to the contract of employment, which is the key that 
unlocks these countervailing forces.  
 
                                                        
110  Davies, P and Freedland, M ‘Employees, Workers, and the Autonomy of Labour Law’ in 
Collins, H; Davies, P and Rideout, R (eds) Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation 













In more recent times scholars have also come to recognise the need 
for labour law to engage more visibly in the delivery of social security in the 
broad sense and with strategies aimed at empowerment of the vulnerable, 
particularly since there appears to be a link between economic development 
(which is needed for growth) and social security. In the context of South Africa 
and the country’s emphasis on transformative constitutionalism, the social 
welfare agenda of labour law is not merely an astute insight; it is a 
constitutional imperative. This, in particular, will require labour law to shift its 
focus from labour relations alone to the labour market broadly, and to think 
innovatively about regulating the expanding informal labour market. In the 
same vein, it is now generally accepted that labour law has a prominent role 
to play in the advancement of human rights, a role that, in the case of South 
Africa, can assist in transforming a society still imbued with prejudices. 
 
This does not imply that labour regulation is almighty. It has limitations 
and, ultimately, mechanisms beyond labour law may be more effective in 
protecting workers.  
 
In the following chapter, the interface between the different forms of 
work and the contract of employment will be more closely examined, having 














THE WORLD OF WORK: 




It is now generally accepted that remunerated work is not only engaged 
through employment contracts and that not all work is remunerated; 
consequently, there are many workers who fall beyond the reach of labour 
laws.1 This is not necessarily because of their status as independent 
contractors, but simply because they are, for a number of reasons, either 
invisible to or beyond the reach of labour laws. Some of these forms of work 
have historically never been the concern of labour law, but other forms of 
work are a relatively modern and growing phenomenon to the extent that a 
commentator in 2000 remarked, with reference to the position in Europe, that 
‘the labour with which labour law has until now been concerned seems to be 
found less and less’.2 Whether workers are excluded from the operation of 
labour laws for historical or modern reasons, we can nevertheless ask to what 
extent labour laws ought to be revised to include all or some of these 
workers.3  
 
The aim of this chapter is to consider the ways in which work is 
performed and to identify the differences between different workers;4 the 
extent to which the contract of employment is the paradigm within which the 
different forms of work are performed; the extent to which these forms of work 
are covered by labour and social security laws; and, to the extent that they are 
                                                        
1  Supiot, A Beyond Employment: Changes in Work and the Future of Labour Law in Europe 
(2001) at 1-21. Also see Taylor, RF ‘Extending Conceptual Boundaries: Work, Voluntary 
Work and Employment’ (2004) 18 (1) Work, Employment and Society 1 at 3. 
2  D’ Antona, M ‘Labour Law at the Century’s End: An Identity Crisis’ in Conaghan, J; Fischl, 
RM and Klare, K (eds) Labour Law in an Era of Globalization (2000) 31-49 at 32. 
3  See Davidov, G ‘The Reports of My Death are Greatly Exaggerated: “Employee” as a Viable 
(Though Over-used) Legal Concept’ in Davidov, G and Langille, B Boundaries and Frontiers 
of Labour Law (2006) 133-152 and Stone, KVW ‘Rethinking Labour Law: Employment 
Protection for Boundaryless Workers’ in Davidov, G and Langille, B Boundaries and 
Frontiers of Labour Law (2006) 155-179 at 155-162 for insights on the realities of the modern 
workplace. 













not, to consider whether there is a need for them to become the object of 
labour laws. This chapter is therefore an attempt to establish the shape of the 
world of work by discarding both the fixation with work as a contractual 
commitment to subordinated work only and the ‘other’ dichotomy of paid and 
unpaid work.5 In establishing the shape of the world of work, the focus will 
primarily be on the forms of engagement, but the status of workers and the 
processes of engagement will also be explored in order to ensure a complete 
picture. This is not to suggest that all these forms of work ought to be the 
subject of labour law, but labour law’s boundaries can only be redrawn once 
the full range of work is surveyed. Furthermore, this chapter will consider, as a 
sub-theme, the nexus between the unitary concept of the contract of 
employment and the rise of non-standard forms of employment. 
 
Much of this chapter will therefore depend on what is understood by 
the concept ‘work’. In the widest sense ‘work’, as suggested by The Concise 
Oxford Dictionary involves ‘any expenditure of energy, striving, application of 
effort or exertion to a purpose’,6 but using this as the baseline will result in an 
endless list of activities that could be regarded as work. Clearly what is 
required is a description of work that goes beyond the traditional 
understanding of employment, but falls short of including all activities. This 
chapter will be premised on the following approach suggested by Supiot:  
 
The only concept which extends beyond employment without 
encompassing life in its entirety is the concept of work, which is 
therefore the only concept that can provide the basis for occupational 
status. The distinction between work and activity should not be made 
by the nature of the action accomplished (the same mountain walk is a 
leisure activity for the tourist but work for the guide accompanying him). 
Work is distinguished from activity in that it results from an obligation, 
whether voluntarily undertaken or compulsorily imposed. This 
obligation may result from a contract (employed person, self-employed 
                                                        
5  Supiot (n 1) at 53 and Taylor (n 1) at 2. 













person) or from legal condition (civil servant,7 monk). It may be 
assumed against payment (employment) or without payment 
(voluntarily work, traineeship). But work always falls within a legal 
relationship.8  
 
The only reservation in respect of this approach relates to the 
requirement of a legal relationship. As will be shown later in this chapter, the 
position of illegal immigrants and sex workers presents great difficulty in the 
context of employment since, for the reason of illegality, no valid (or at least 
enforceable) contract of employment can be concluded by these persons.9 If 
too much emphasis is placed on this requirement (legal relationship) in the 
context of work, these persons will also fall beyond the parameters of work. 
For this reason it is preferred from the outset rather to emphasise the 
existence of an obligation, even if it is in common-law terms void or perhaps 
unenforceable, and to downplay the role of a legal relationship. The impact of 
illegality will be considered in more detail in the discussion of these forms of 
work.10 
 
With this as the point of departure, it is clear the range will be broad 
and go beyond, for instance, the ‘worker’ concept that developed in England 
from the 1970s onwards.11 Second, while it is conceded that the concept of 
work is universal, the focus of this chapter will be on work in South Africa, 
taking cognisance of the peculiarities of the South African world of work. In 
this regard great reliance is placed on the empirical work of Jan Theron, 
Shane Godfrey and Marlea Clarke.12 Comparative materials will be 
considered only for emphasis and clarification. 
                                                        
7  This example is not relevant in South Africa since most civil servants are regarded as 
employees and are covered by the LRA, for instance. See Chirwa v Transnet Ltd & Others 
(2008) 29 ILJ 73 (CC). 
8  Supiot (n 1) at 54. 
9  For more on the consequences of illegal contracts generally in South African law see Van Der 
Merwe, S; Van Huyssteen, LF; Reinecke, MFB and Lubbe, GF Contract General Principles 
2ed (2003) at 183-193. 
10  § 4.5.3. 
11  See § 2.2.4. 
12  The most important of these include Theron, J and Godfrey, S Protecting Workers on the 
Periphery (2000) Institute of Development and Labour Law Monographs, University of Cape 













This investigation of work will commence with an analysis of standard 
employment and the benefits associated with such employment. On the basis 
that this type of employment is the core and represents the area where 
current labour and concomitant social security laws have maximum coverage, 
the investigation will then proceed towards the (‘invisible’) outer sphere of the 
world of work, escalating towards forms of work that resemble standard 
employment less and less. Conceding that the categories are extremely fluid 
and building on the typology of work suggested by Davies and Freedland,13 
the following broad categories or spheres are envisaged: standard 
employment; non-standard employment; work without a valid contract; 
contractors for personal work and non-personal work (independent 
contractors); and idiosyncratic forms of work. These spheres should not be 
seen as consistently moving further and further away from the core, but rather 
as retrograding: in others words, waxing and waning in their distance from the 
core and always having characteristics in common with other spheres (forms 
of work). 
 
 The typology of work suggested by Davies and Freedland consists of 
moving from left to right on a horizontal axis: employees, employee-like, 
personal work and non-personal work. The scheme proposed in this chapter 
                                                                                                                                                              
in the Retail Sector’ unpublished paper presented at the TIPS Annual Conference, 
Johannesburg, South Africa, September 2000; Clarke, M; Godfrey, S and Theron, J ‘Workers’ 
Protection: An Update on the Situation in South Africa’ (2002) report commissioned by the 
ILO accessed via 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/downloads/wpnr/sa2002.pdf (13 September 
2007); Theron, J ‘Employment is Not What it Used to Be’ (2003) 24 ILJ 1247; Theron, J; 
Godfrey, S and Lewis, P The Rise of Labour Broking and its Policy Implications Institute of 
Development and Labour Law Monographs, University of Cape Town 1/2005; Godfrey, S; 
Clarke, M; Theron, J and Greenburg, J On the Outskirts But Still in Fashion: Homeworking in 
the South African Clothing Industry: The Challenge to Organisation and Regulation Institute 
of Development and Labour Law Monographs, University of Cape Town 2/2005; Theron, J 
‘Intermediary or Employer? Labour Brokers and the Triangular Employment Relationship’ 
(2005) 26 ILJ 618; Theron, J; Godfrey, S and Visser, M ‘Gobalization, the Impact of Trade 
Liberalization, and Labour Law: the Case of South Africa’ Discussion Paper International 
Institute for Labour Studies DP/178/2007 and Theron, J ‘The Shift to Services and Triangular 
Employment: Implications for Labour Market Reform’ (2008) 29 ILJ 1. The same authors 
were also responsible for the Synthesis Report published by the Department of Labour in 2004 
and published as ‘Changing Nature of Work and “Atypical” Forms of Employment in South 
Africa’ in Cheadle, H; Thompson, C; Le Roux, PAK and Van Niekerk, A Current Labour 
Law 2004 (2004) 135. 
13  Davies, P and Freedland, M ‘Employees, Workers, and the Autonomy of Labour Law’ in 
Collins, H; Davies, P and Rideout, R (eds) Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation 













therefore differs because the category of employees is divided into two 
categories (standard and non-standard employment) and work without a valid 
contract is also treated separately. This is done because there are different, 
but specific consequences (as will be illustrated below) associated with 
standard and non-standard employment respectively. Contractors for personal 
and non-personal work are discussed under the heading of independent 
contractors. Further, in view of the high prevalence of (illegal) migrant 
labour,14 it is suggested that work without a valid contract is deserving of 
separate treatment (although other forms of work without a valid contract will 
also be explored in this category). Finally, idiosyncratic forms of work should 
not be seen as a sphere furthest removed from the core. In fact, some of 
these idiosyncratic forms of work may well be a form of, for instance, standard 
employment, but because of their novel nature or because they have simply 
never been regarded as subjects of labour law, they, for the moment, should 
be seen as itinerants in search of categorisation. Visually, the world of work 




                                                        













The structure of this chapter will therefore be as follows: First, the 
implications of the latest statistical data on the South African labour force will 
be considered briefly. Second, the various categories/spheres of work 
identified above will be analysed. Third, the relationship between these 
spheres of work and the informal labour market will be considered. This will 
be followed by a conclusion on the characteristics of the various spheres of 
work. 
  
4.2 The size of the workforce  
 
No attempt will be made to quantify the number of workers involved in 
the different forms of work. The most complete statistical data available on the 
national labour force is the Labour Force Survey (LFS) prepared by Statistics 
South Africa. The LFS,15 published in September 2006, estimates that the 
South African labour force (which includes the employed and the 
unemployed) is 17 191 000 persons, the unemployed being 4 391 000 
persons and the employed representing 12 800 000 persons.16 On closer 
scrutiny it appears that the ‘employed’ category is not defined in the same 
way that an employee is defined for purposes of labour legislation. The 
‘employed’ category is defined as ‘[p]ersons aged 15-65 who did any work or 
who did not work but had a job or business in the seven days prior to the 
survey interview’.17 Elsewhere in the LFS the ‘employed’ category is defined 
as ‘those who performed work for pay, profit or family gain in the seven days 
prior to the survey interview for at least one hour or who were absent from 
work during these seven days, but did have some form of work to which to 
return’.18  
 
Based on this it is suggested that, for instance, the genuinely self-
employed person or the illegal foreigner working in South Africa (who would 
not be an employee for purposes of labour legislation) is regarded as 
                                                        
15  Statistical release PO210 (Labour Force Survey September 2006) accessed via 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/statsdownload.asp?ppn=P0210&SCH=3890 (14 
August 2007).  
16  See Statistical release PO210 (n 15) Table B. 
17  See Statistical release PO210 (n 15) Table B note 1. 













employed for purposes of the LFS. The number of 12 800 000 is therefore 
more likely to represent those who work in the broadest sense of the word; in 
other words, those who are engaged in the forms of work that this chapter 
intends to capture and who are not employees in the (labour) legislative sense 
of the word.19 This is confirmed by comparing the tables provided on workers 
and employees respectively.20 ‘Workers’ are defined to ‘include the self-
employed, employers and employees’ and the total given is 12 800 000 which 
corresponds with the total given for the employed. The category ‘employees’ 
is not defined, but based on the definitions provided for the ‘employed’ 
category, it clearly excludes employers, but it is not obvious that it excludes 
the self-employed and other forms of work not covered by labour legislation.  
 
Regardless of this ‘disjuncture between the legal and statistical 
definition of employment’,21 a few general trends can nonetheless be 
extracted from these tables. 
 
It is estimated that 5 971 000 of the 12 800 000 workers do not make 
contributions in terms the Unemployment Insurance Act.22 Of the 10 195 000 
employees, it is estimated that 7 199 000 persons are permanently employed 
(standard employment) and that 2 977 000 persons are employed on either 
fixed-term contracts or as temporary, casual or seasonal employees.23 Only 
3 895 000 employees are entitled to paid leave,24 which implies that even 
some of those in standard employment do not get the benefit of paid leave. It 
is further estimated that 7 076 000 employees are not members of trade 
unions – that is, 70 per cent of those who are regarded as employees.25 
 
                                                        
19  See Theron ‘Employment is Not What it Used to Be’ (n 12) at 1262. 
20  See Tables 3.1-3.15 and Tables 4.1-4.1.5, Statistical release PO210 (n 15) at 12-39. 
21  See Theron ‘Employment is Not What it Used to Be’ (n 12). For more on the shortcomings of 
the LFS methodology see Clarke et al ‘Workers’ Protection: An Update on the Situation in 
South Africa’ (n 12). The collection of employment data is notoriously difficult. See, for 
instance, Burchell, B; Deakin, S and Honey, S The Employment Status of Individuals in Non-
Standard Employment EMAR Research Series No 6 1999 at 24 for the shortcomings of the 
LFS data collection in Britain. Also see O’Donnell, A ‘“Non-Standard” Workers in Australia: 
Counts and Controversies’ (2004) 17 AJLL 89 for the difficulties experienced in Australia.    
22  Act 63 of 2001. See Table 3.15, Statistical release PO210 (n 15) at 34. 
23  Table 4.1.2, Statistical release PO210 (n 15) at 36. 
24  Table 4.1.3, Statistical release PO210 (n 15) at 37. 













From these selected statistics26 it is clear that most of the workforce is 
still in standard employment, but few can claim the benefit of collective 
bargaining and trade union membership. Also, a basic social security tool 
such as unemployment insurance is unavailable to almost 50 per cent of 
those who are regarded as workers and paid leave is not available to almost 
40 per cent of those who are regarded as employees. Significantly, while 
there has been an increase in the number of persons permanently employed 
since the February 2001 LFS, the percentage of employees in standard 
employment has decreased from 77.27 per cent in February 2001 to 70, 6 per 
cent in September 2006.27 While it is difficult to calculate the precise extent of 
the trend, it is nonetheless consistent with the pattern in, for instance, the 
EU.28 It is, however, slightly at odds with the observation of Allan et al, 
published in 2001, that by the mid-1990s there was a trend towards standard 
employment in South Africa.29 
 
While the aforementioned statistics tell us very little about the different 
forms of work, they do, however, suggest, first, that many workers are 
invisible to labour law and concomitant social security laws and, second, that 




                                                        
26  Statistics reflecting conditions of employment, trade union membership and UIF contributions 
were given preference, focusing on overall totals and ignoring industry-specific totals. 
27  Cf Table 3.12.2, Statistical release P0210 (Labour Force Survey February 2001) accessed via 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0210/P0210February2001.pdf (16 August 2007) and 
Table 4.1.2 Statistical release PO210 (n 15) at 36. This is also consistent with the pattern 
observed by Clarke in 2000 relying on statistics in respect of the retail sector. See Clarke 
‘Checking Out and Cashing Up: The Rise of Precarious Employment in the Retail Sector’ (n 
12). Also see ‘Labour’s Casualisation Cancer Spreads’ (2005) 29(2) SALB 27 for a summary 
of the Department of Labour’s report on non-standard employment. 
28  The number of employees not in standard employment in the EU has increased from 36 per 
cent of the working population in 2001 to 40 per cent in 2005. See Verhulp, E ‘The 
Employment Contract as a Source of Concern’ in in Knegt, R (ed) The Employment Contract 
as an Exclusionary Device (forthcoming). 
29  See the introductory comments in Allan, C; Brosnan, P; Horwitz, F and Walsh, P ‘From 
Standard to Non-standard Employment: Labour Force Change in Australia, New Zealand and 
South Africa’ (2001) 22(8) International Journal of Manpower 748 at 748-750. It is doubtful 
whether this trend is still the case in South Africa. The survey was based on a questionnaire 
that was distributed in 1995 and it is doubtful whether it reflects current trends. Furthermore, 
the authors (at 762) concede that the results of the survey underestimate the size of the 













4.3 Standard employment 
 
Standard employment is premised on an open-ended and relatively 
secure (and long-term) employment relationship.30 While the above statistics 
suggest that there is a slow decline in standard employment, the latter still 
remains the most populated sphere in the world of work and is still the 
benchmark with which other forms of work are compared. Standard 
employment is typically full-time, the employee only has one employer, the 
work is generally performed at a single workplace subject to the control of the 
employer and it is characterised by the existence of a contract of 
employment.31 
 
Further, as a minimum, the employee’s conditions of employment are 
regulated;32 protection is provided against unfair dismissal and unfair 
discrimination;33 retrenchments are regulated;34 the safety and health 
standards at the workplace are monitored;35 freedom of association, trade 
union organisation and channels for collective bargaining are relatively 
unimpeded;36 and insurance is provided against unemployment37 and the 
effects of occupational diseases and injuries.38  
 
On the face of it, if the world of work consisted only of standard 
employment as described above, labour and social security laws in their 
current forms would generally be delivering on the purposes that were 
identified in Chapter 3. Through the combined efforts of collective bargaining 
and protective legislation the sharpest edges of the employers’ superior 
bargaining power are blunted and access to social security is ensured. 
However, while standard employment has been the model for certain core 
sectors, it has often not reflected the employment situation of the majority of 
                                                        
30  See Stone (n 3) at 155-157.  
31  See Theron ‘Employment is Not What it Used to Be’ (n 12) at 1249. 
32  By the BCEA. 
33  By the LRA and EEA. 
34  By the LRA and BCEA. 
35  By the Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 (OHSA). 
36  By the LRA. 
37  By the UIA. 













employees. In Chapter 2 it was illustrated how the contract of employment 
only became a unitary concept in South Africa fairly late in the twentieth 
century. The considerable exclusion that prevailed in respect of, for instance, 
industrial relations and social security laws denied the many workers forced to 
remain in non-standard employment the benefits associated with standard 
employment and denied them the opportunity to enter standard employment. 
It was only for a brief period of about two decades starting in the early 1970s 
that standard employment was truly the norm. As Clarke has indicated, the 
inclusion of black trade unions into the collective bargaining system under the 
Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 (a statute premised on standard 
employment), the breakdown of the labour migrant system, a rise of full-time 
employment in agriculture and the prohibition or limiting of outwork and the 
use of casual labour through Wage Determinations and Industrial Council 
agreements (to protect those who are covered by these determinations or 
agreements), are some of the reasons for the advent of standard employment 
in the 1970s and 1980s.39 Prior to this period it would be wrong to assume 
‘the ubiquity of “permanent” labour and . . . as novel any deviations from the 
standard’.40 Efforts to deregulate and the advent of globalisation spurred the 
decline of standard employment and a return to employment patterns that 
prevailed during the early part of the twentieth century. However, this does not 
necessary imply a return to the same lack of (formal) protection that prevailed 
for these workers during the early twentieth century. 
 
 The following paragraphs will focus on the structure of work that 
cannot be regarded as standard employment.  
 
4.4  Non-standard employment 
 
Non-standard employment can be examined by focusing on the two 
broad processes associated with it, namely casualisation and 
                                                        
39  Clarke ‘Checking Out and Cashing Up: The Rise of Precarious Employment in the Retail 
Sector’ (n 12) at 4-11.  
40  Klerck, G ‘Industrial Restructuring and the Casualisation of Labour: A Case Study of 
Subcontracted Labour in the Process Industries’ (1994) 7 SA Sociological Review 32 at 32. 
Also see Kenny, B and Webster, E ‘Eroding the Core: Flexibility and the Re-segmentation of 













externalisation.41 The former is regarded as a diluted version of standard 
employment and the latter involves workers providing goods and services to 
the end-user via a commercial arrangement, often, but not always, involving a 
satellite enterprise or an intermediary.42 
 
While a detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is 
important to understand the reasons for the growth of non-standard 
employment. In summary, the two most important reasons distilled by 
scholars appear to be, first, the need to have greater temporal and numerical 
flexibility to cope with varying demands43 and, second, to reduce human 
resource management responsibilities and cost. In the latter regard, while not 
the only cause, the costs or risk associated with termination of employment is 
seen as an important consideration.44 While the second reason presents 
moral difficulties (at least to some), one must accept that the first reason is an 
inevitable consequence of the ‘changed contexts’ of the new world of work 
referred to in Chapter 3.45 
 
                                                        
41  For the impact of these processes on the mining sector generally see Kenny and Webster (n 
40). However, the research on which this article is based predates the implementation of the 
1997 BCEA. For the impact of these processes on the mining, construction, household 
appliances and retail sectors in South Africa see Bezuidenhout, A; Theron, J and Godfrey, S 
‘Casualisation: Can We Meet It and Beat It?’ (2005) 29(1) SALB 39. Although these terms  
are not used, see Quinlan, M ‘The Global Expansion of Precarious Employment: Meeting the 
Regulatory Challenge’ paper presented to the Australian Council of Trade Unions, 2003 
accessed via http://actu.asn.au/public/ohs/reactivecampaign/1064473735_24238.html (11 
October 2007) for a reflection on the impact of these processes on occupational health and 
safety and workmen’s compensation globally. 
42  Generally see Theron and Godfrey Protecting Workers on the Periphery (n 12); Theron 
‘Employment is Not What it Used to Be’ (n 12); Synthesis Report (n 12) and Mills, SW ‘The 
Situation of the Elusive Independent Contractor and Other Forms of Atypical Employment in 
South Africa: Balancing Equity and Flexibility?’ (2004) 25 ILJ 1203. The nomenclature of 
‘casualisation’ and ‘externalisation’ was not always understood in these terms. For instance, 
subcontracting, which is now seen as a manifestation of externalisation, was in earlier writings 
often described as a form of casualisation. See, for instance, Klerck (n 40). It is also true that 
until relatively recently the term ‘atypical’ was preferred by some to describe both 
casualisation and externalisation and that no obvious distinction was made between the 
different policy considerations that casualisation and externalisation demand. In this regard 
see Mhone, G ‘Atypical Forms of Work and Employment and Their Policy Implications’ 
(1999) 19 ILJ 197.  
43  Theron and Godfrey Protecting Workers on the Periphery (n 12) at 17-18. 
44  See Theron et al ‘Gobalization, the Impact of Trade Liberalization, and Labour Law: the Case 
of South Africa’ (n 12) at 8; Cheadle, H and Clarke, M ‘Study on Worker’s Protection in 
South Africa’, unpublished country study commissioned by the ILO 2000 at 23-27, and 
Theron and Godfrey Protecting Workers on the Periphery (n 12) at 18-19. 













4.4.1  Casualisation 
 
Casualisation primarily concerns those workers who are in an 
employment relationship in the strict sense, but who are not in standard 
employment. In other words, not unlike those in standard employment, they 
generally only have one employer, work on the premises of the employer and 
their employment is regulated by a contract of employment.46 The most 
important distinguishing factor is that they either do not work full time or, if 
they do work full time, they work on a fixed-term contract. 
 
Typically, workers falling in this category consist of casuals (working 
less than 24 hours per month), part-time workers (working only a percentage 
of the time worked by the permanent employees and sometimes selected 
using a pool system), temporary workers (working a fixed term) and seasonal 
workers. The significance of the 24-hour requirement relates to the BCEA, in 
terms of which the provisions dealing with working time (including payment for 
overtime),47 all forms of leave,48 particulars of employment49 and notice50 do 
not apply to those employees who work less than 24 hours per month for an 
employer. The UIA51 also excludes employees employed for less than 24 
hours per month by a particular employer from the application of the Act.52 No 
similar exclusion is found in the workmen’s compensation legislation. 
However, these employees are covered by the OHSA.53 While the option of 
employing a casual for less than 24 hours per month is simply not practicable 
in many sectors and industries, anecdotal evidence suggests that it is a 
                                                        
46  See Theron ‘Employment is Not What it Used to Be’ (n 12) at 1250-1251. Generally see 
Clarke ‘Checking Out and Cashing Up: The Rise of Precarious Employment in the Retail 
Sector’ (n 12); Kenny, B ‘The Casualisation of the Retail Sector in South Africa’ (1998) 15 
Indicator SA 25 and Du Toit, A and Ally, F The Externalization and Casualization of Farm 
Labour in the Western Cape Horticulture (2001) unpublished research report compiled for the 
Centre for Rural Legal Studies, Cape Town, South Africa.  
47  Section 6. 
48  Section 19. 
49  Section 28. 
50  Section 36. 
51  Act 63 of 2001. 
52  Section 3(1). 













common in, for instance, domestic services.54 These workers labour 
completely unprotected by the law.55  
 
Apart from those working less than 24 hours per month, there is in 
theory no reason why all casual workers should not be entitled to the same 
legislative benefits as those in standard employment, at least on a pro rata 
basis.56 The BCEA, for instance, provides for proportionate (but similar) 
benefits for those who are not in standard employment and the LRA’s 
dismissal provisions do not discriminate between temporary, part-time and 
permanent employees.57 It is this ‘sameness’ that, so Theron and Godfrey 
argue, is more than likely the incentive for externalisation, the impact of which,  
they argue, is far worse for workers than the impact of casualisation.58 
 
                                                        
54  This refers to the so-called charlady or ‘char-job’ which is a term used for a domestic servant 
(including gardeners) who work no more than a few hours per week, mostly in domestic 
households (or gardens) and is a common phenomenon in South Africa. For more on the 
profile of domestic workers see Mills, SW ‘How Low Can You Go? A Critique of Proposed 
Recommendations on Minimum Wages for Domestic Workers (2002) 23 ILJ 1210. Also see 
Fish, JN ‘Engendering Democracy: Domestic Labour and Coalition-Building in South Africa’ 
(2006) 32(1) Journal of Southern African Studies 107 at 116. 
55  For instance, a domestic employee employed as such in a private household is excluded from 
the application of COIDA (see s 1) and those domestic servants who work less than 24 hours 
per month for an employer are subject only to the provisions regulating wages and wage 
increases in Sectoral Determination 7: Domestic Worker Sector, published under GN R1068 
in GG 23732 of 15 August 2002. They are not subject to the BCEA and unemployment 
insurance legislation does not apply to them either. 
56  See Olivier, M ‘Extending Labour Law and Social Security Protection: The Predicament of 
the Atypically Employed’ (1998) 19 ILJ 669 at 680. In practice, it is clear that ‘true’ casuals 
(those who work less than 24 hours per month) and temporary workers working for very short 
periods will find it very difficult to claim some of the benefits provided for in the BCEA. For 
instance, s 22 of the BCEA, which regulates sick leave, clearly assumes continuous 
employment and affords protection only while the employee is in employment. Those working 
from time to time on single self-standing contracts will find it difficult to claim sick leave 
benefits. Section 22(3) of the BCEA, for instance, provides that during the first six months of 
employment an employee is entitled to one day’s paid sick leave for every 26 days worked, 
but for many it may take more than six months to work 26 days for the same employer. They 
are thus deprived of paid sick leave during this period. See Cheadle and Clarke (n 44) at 22. 
Furthermore, s 27 of the BCEA, regulating family responsibility leave, does not apply to those 
who have worked less than four months for the same employer and who work less than four 
days a week for that employer. This, however, can be blamed on the regulation style and not  
on the contract of employment. See Olivier at 681. Also see the comments of Waglay J in 
NUCCAWU v Transnet Ltd t/a Portnet (2000) 21 ILJ 2288 (LC) at par 7. 
57  See Olivier (n 56) at 681. In fact the LAC has held that fixed-term employees may not be 
retrenched. See Buthelezi v Municipal Demarcation Board (2004) 25 ILJ 2317 (LAC).  
58  Theron and Godfrey Protecting Workers on the Periphery (n 12) at 36-37. Cf the position of 
casuals in Australia, where they are excluded from annual leave, public holidays and sick 













Their argument can be summarised as follows: The previous BCEA 
(the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1983)59 specifically defined a 
casual as a person employed for not more than three days (27 hours) per 
week.60 In respect of these workers no unemployment insurance contribution 
was made and this resulted in payments being recorded differently. Also, 
unlike the casuals under the new BCEA, their daily maximum hours were 
limited to the same number of hours that applied to other employees, they 
were entitled to overtime, they had to be paid no less than the rate that 
applied to other employees, and the employer was obliged to keep a record of 
time worked and remuneration paid, but they were not entitled to benefits 
such as paid sick and annual leave.61 Thus casuals under the old BCEA had 
less protection than other employees, but they were not completely without 
protection either. The point is that they were regulated differently.62 The 
inability of employers to treat certain employees differently under the new 
BCEA and the obvious limitations of using employees who are regarded as 
casuals under the new BCEA is more than likely a stimulus for employers to 
seek alternatives which provide them with the flexibility similar to what the old 
BCEA provided (in respect of casuals as therein defined).63 The alternatives 
include the many manifestations of externalisation. Thus, to revert to the point 
made in Chapter 2, while the new BCEA is instrumental in confirming the 
contract of employment as a unitary concept, this unification is also 
responsible for the erosion of worker rights. In the words of Theron et al: 
 
. . . [this] exposes the fallacy of supposing that because labour 
legislation acknowledges no distinction between workers in standard 
and non-standard employment, workers in non-standard employment 
enjoy the same rights. In truth, both the growth of non-standard work, 
                                                        
59  Act 3 of 1983. 
60  Section 1(1). 
61  Theron and Godfrey Protecting Workers on the Periphery (n 12) at 13-15. See in particular 
note 20. 
62  See Kenny and Webster (n 40) at 228-235 for a description of casual labour under the 
previous BCEA. 













and the particular form it has taken in South Africa are exacerbating 
inequality.64 
 
Whether it was by happenstance or design is not clear, but the 
reintroduction of the ’27 hour per week casual’, albeit in a more sophisticated 
form, by Sectoral Determination 9, which established conditions of 
employment and minimum wages for employees in the Wholesale and Retail 
Sector and which came into effect from 1 February 2003, is an example of 
how this trend can perhaps be reversed by a process of diversification.65 This 
determination provides that employees may by agreement be employed for 27 
hours per week or less at an increased rate of pay, but the paid annual leave 
entitlement is reduced and the employer is not required to pay an allowance 
for night work or to pay paid sick leave or family responsibility leave.66 
 
 There is also no reason, in theory, why casual workers should not 
benefit from collective bargaining and trade union membership. In practice, 
however, trade union recruitment is problematic, but this is caused by the 
nature of casualisation and not by casual workers’ status as employees. The 
need for the publication of a sectoral determination in the wholesale and retail 
sector is testimony to this. A sectoral determination67 is the means to provide 
basic conditions and minimum wages appropriate for a particular sector not 
regulated by collective bargaining, where the nature of the industry negates 
collective bargaining or where workers are extremely vulnerable.68 Unions 
once had a strong foothold in the wholesale and retail sector, but the sector, 
                                                        
64  ‘Globalization, the Impact of Trade Liberalization, and Labour Law: the Case of South Africa’ 
(n 12) at 9. 
65  GN R.68 published in GG No 28424 25 January 2006. Item 1(4) provides the rates of pay for 
those who work for 24 hours per month, but apart from the rate of pay the rest of 
Determination 9 does not apply to these workers. 
66  Item 11 of Sectoral Determination 9. 
67  Sectoral determinations are regulated by s 51 of the BCEA. 
68  Du Toit, D; Bosch, D; Woolfrey, D; Godfrey, S; Cooper, C; Giles, G; Bosch, C and Rossouw, 
J Labour Relations Law 5ed (2006) at 555. A good example of a sector where such a 
determination is appropriate is the agricultural sector. In Chapter 2 it was illustrated how the 
combination of racial policies, the legacy of the master and servant laws, and the traditional 
exclusion of farm workers from many protective labour laws marginalised farm worker in 
particular. This, as well as the fact that the often isolated location of farms in South Africa 
complicates trade union organisation, are the reasons why a sectoral determination is 
appropriate in this sector. The latest sectoral determination in this sector is Sectoral 
Determination 13: Farm Worker Sector, published under GN R.149 in GG 28518 of 17 













now notorious for casualisation, currently has very weak union representation, 
to the extent that the main union in this sector is no longer recognised by 
some retail chains.69  
 
Casualised employees, since they are still employees, also have the 
protection offered by the LRA’s unfair dismissal provisions. However, since 
casualised employees often work on relatively short fixed-term contracts, 
many employers, instead of following pre-dismissal procedures, simply opt not 
to renew the contract when it expires since termination of a contract of 
employment as a result of the effluxion of time is not defined as a dismissal in 
the LRA.70 This practice is only partly addressed by the definition of dismissal 
in the LRA which provides that a dismissal also includes the failure to renew a 
fixed-term contract when an employee reasonably expected the employer to 
renew it on the same or similar terms, but the employer offered to renew it on 
less favourable terms, or did not renew it at all.71 In any event, casual 
employment is often so transient that dismissal claims simply do not arise 
most of the time.  
 
In conclusion, it is difficult to blame the limitations associated with 
casualised labour on the contract of employment as such, even in the case of, 
for example, domestic workers. The contract of employment does not 
obfuscate the status of casual workers as employees. They are clearly 
employees and it is relatively easy to identify them as such.72 If anything is to 
blame, it is perhaps the unitary nature of the contract of employment and the 
sameness of regulation that applies to casualised labour (and the complete 
lack of regulation in the case of those who work for less than 24 hours per 
month for a specific employer). In this regard the diversification allowed for in 
Sectoral Determination 9 in respect of the Wholesale and Retail sector may 
be a useful tool to prevent externalisation. 
 
 
                                                        
69  See Bezuidenhout et al (n 41) at 42. 
70  Section 186(1). 
71  Section 186(1)(b). 















Externalisation is a process that escapes precise definition, but it 
essentially involves the provision of services or goods in terms of a 
commercial contract instead of an employment relationship, thus placing a 
legal distance between the user of the services and the risk associated with 
the employment relationship. Externalisation can be divided into two broad 
categories. The first is the provision of goods and services to a core business 
via an intermediary, often at a workplace removed from the intermediary’s 
premises. While the intermediary becomes the nominal employer of the 
workers, the terms and conditions of their employment are wholly determined 
by the terms of the commercial contract between the intermediary and the 
core business. The second category involves the substitution of the contract 
of employment between the employer and the worker with a commercial 
contract which attempts to convert the legal status of the worker to that of an 
independent contractor. Importantly, while casualisation merely dilutes the 
standard employment relationship, externalisation camouflages the 
employment relationship.73 In other words, while the worker may have a 
clearly identifiable employer (or may even, on the face it, be an independent 
contractor), the terms and conditions of employment (or work) are determined 
by the terms of the commercial contract to which the worker is often not a 
party.  
 
One of the consequences of externalisation via an intermediary is that 
unskilled workers, in particular, are transferred from productive sectors to the 
services sector, where continuously increased competition places downward 
pressure on wages.74 
 
                                                        
73  Theron ‘Employment is Not What it Used to Be’ (n 12) at 1257. 
74  Theron et al ‘Gobalization, the Impact of Trade Liberalization, and Labour Law: the Case of 













The finer manifestation of these two broad categories will be discussed 
below.75  
 
4.4.2.1  Intermediaries76 
 
4.4.2.1.1  Subcontracting, outsourcing and homeworking 
 
Subcontracting, whereby a contractor is engaged to provide certain 
services, is a very popular method for the provision of cleaning and security 
services in South Africa. It is often achieved by outsourcing, involving former 
(retrenched) employees, but it is not uncommon for businesses to be 
established on this basis from the outset.77 The significant feature of 
subcontracting is that the workers generally do not work on the premises of 
the nominal employer.78 
 
A peculiar form of subcontracting, which is prevalent in the South 
African clothing sector, is homework.79 Homeworking has been described as 
                                                        
75  Generally see ‘Employment is Not What it Used to Be’ (n 12) and Theron and Godfrey 
Protecting Workers on the Periphery (n 12) and Clarke et al ‘Workers’ Protection: An Update 
on the Situation in South Africa’ (n 12) at 30. 
76  In this regard some commentators refer to a triangular employment relationship. Because 
externalisation via intermediaries may involve an interconnected chain of several parties, such 
a nomenclature may be open to misinterpretation and is avoided in this paragraph. Also see 
Theron ‘Employment is Not What it Used to Be’ (n 12) at 1253. 
77  See Mills (n 42) at 1216. 
78  Ironically, the government’s flagship public works programme, Working for Water, operates 
on the basis of externalised labour. While the programme claims to have employed 20 000 
people at one stage, this is not a correct reflection of the legal position. The programme has 
identified ‘emergent contractors’ who in turn employ their own teams to work on the 
programme. The Working for Water programme prescribes a minimum wage that must be 
paid by the contractor to the team of workers, but other than that the contractor carries the risk 
of employment. See Theron, J ‘Unions and the Co-operative Alternative (2)’ (2005) 29(2) 
SALB 60 at 63. 
79  The most complete South African study on this phenomenon is Godfrey et al On the Outskirts 
But Still in Fashion (n 12) and Van der Westhuizen, C ‘Women and Work Restructuring in the 
Cape Town Clothing Industry’ in Webster, E and Von Holdt, K (eds) Beyond The Apartheid 
Workplace: Studies in Transition (2005) 335-386. For earlier research on homeworking see 
Budlender, D and Theron, J ‘Working from Home: The Plight of Home-Based Workers’ 
(1995) 19(3) SALB 14 and Theron, J ‘On Homeworkers’ Occasional Paper, Institute of 
Development and Labour Law, University of Cape Town, 1996. Homeworking is by no 
means a unique South African form of engagement. At the international level it has received 
recognition in the form of ILO Homework Convention 177, 1996, but this convention has 
been ratified by only five countries, not including South Africa. On some Canadian 
homeworking estimates see Godfrey et al On the Outskirts But Still in Fashion at 31. On the 
position in Australia see Nossar, I; Johnstone, R and Quinlan, M ‘Regulating Supply Chains to 













‘involving a chain of numerous . . . contracting parties that constitute a 
pyramid of interlocking contractual arrangements [which] permits the effective 
business controllers to profit from the use of cheap labour without any need to 
deal directly with those performing the labour’.80 Van der Westhuizen explains 
in more detail: 
 
[T]he development of informal, unprotected clothing 
manufacturers has provided virtually limitless flexibilisation of labour at 
no extra cost to the retailer or the intermediary. Neither the retailer nor 
the design house absorbs the costs created by the seasonal nature of 
the clothing industry. Rather, it is passed on to the worker-owner, who 
simply earns less or no money when demand has decreased. Social 
costs to the retailer and design house are non-existent as no social 
benefits are provided to the informal workers in home-based industries. 
The cost of overheads is also passed on. This includes needles, 
thread, electricity and the hiring and repair of machines.81 
 
Homework is obviously home-based82 and either involves a nominal 
employment relationship or ‘relationship of economic dependence on a 
supplier or intermediary that is akin to an employment relationship’.83 
Importantly, there is ‘legal distance’ between the workers and the end-users.84 
It is suggested that the following is a useful description of the graphic aspects 
of homeworking: 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Employment: The Case of Home-Based Clothing Workers in Australia’ (2004) 17 AJLL 137 
and Rawling, M ‘A Generic Model of Regulating Supply Chain Outsourcing’ in Arup, C; 
Gahan, P; Howe, J; Johnstone, R; Mitchell, R and O’Donnell, A (eds) Labour Law and 
Labour Market Regulation (2006) 520-541. Rawling (at 526-527) concedes that while 
homeworking is most prevalent in the Australian clothing, textile and footwear industry, it is 
by no means limited to this industry. In South Africa no formal research is available that 
suggests it is significant in any other industry. 
80  Rawling (n 79) at 523 and Van der Westhuizen (n 79) at 345-346. 
81  Van der Westhuizen (n 79) at 349. 
82  Home-based workers include workers carrying out work independently from their homes as 
well as dependent workers in an employment relationship (albeit nominal), but working from 
their own homes or that of the nominal employer. It should not be confused with unpaid 
housework or caring duties. See Carr, M; Chen MA and Tate, J ‘Globalization and Home-
based Workers’ (2000) 6(3) Feminist Economics 123 at 127. 
83  Godfrey et al On the Outskirts But Still in Fashion (n 12) at 7. 













This “invisible industry” involves a chain of interlocking 
contracting arrangements for the production of clothing goods offsite. 
Typically, at the apex of this integrated system are major retailers that 
enter into arrangements with principal manufacturers for the latter to 
supply the retailers with clothing products. The principal manufacturer, 
with a substantial workforce, will give out orders for the production of 
clothing goods to a smaller manufacturer or offsite contractor or 
subcontractor. In some instances a fashion house, with a very small 
onsite workforce, will give out orders directly to the small manufacturer 
or offsite contractor. The orders for production from the principal 
manufacturer or the fashion house will then be successively handed 
down through a sequence of intervening parties, or “middlemen”, until 
the goods are finally produced by a small factory sweatshop, which 
usually passes the order for the actual production of the clothing 
product to an outworker working at home. The finished goods are then 
delivered back up the chain of contractual arrangements until they 
arrive back at the original principal manufacturers or the fashion 
houses.85 
 
In South Africa homeworking typically has three forms:86 a CMT (cut, 
make and trim) operation with a workforce of as many as 20 or more workers 
and with a clear distinction between the owner of the operation and the 
workers; a M&T (make and trim) operation, normally with a smaller work force 
than that of CMT operations, with the owner of the business often working 
alongside the other workers; and the ‘survivalist’ operations, which are very 
small operations, normally without cutting facilities, and with the homeowner 
working alongside a very small number of workers, who tend to take collective 
responsibility for expenses. However, generally, the conditions of employment 
are poor and job security is minimal.87 The following observation on job 
security is quoted at length since it illustrates the extent to which the workers 
bear the risk in the homeworking environment: 
                                                        
85  See Nossar et al (n 79) at 145. 
86  Godfrey et al On the Outskirts But Still in Fashion (n 12) at 15-16 and Van der Westhuizen (n 
79) at 342-343. 













Most workers reported that their working hours were determined 
by the contracts with suppliers: when there was work, they worked; 
when there wasn’t enough work, they were told not to come in. In all 
but one enterprise, workers were only paid for the days they actually 
worked. Many, however, reported working regular hours. Most also 
indicated that they worked overtime (generally without overtime pay) 
and weekends, to meet contract deadlines. Workers nevertheless 
expressed high levels of anxiety about the duration of the contracts, 
with some complaining about the tight turn-around time to complete 
orders.  
 
The pressure on the homeworkers was often intense. If the 
contract deadline was not met, payment from the retailer or design 
house was not made. Without payment, workers’ wages would not be 
paid. As a result, hours of work were often dictated by the size of the 
order and the time required to complete the contract. Thus, in 
enterprises where there was a clearer distinction between the owner of 
the enterprise and homeworkers, the pressure and risks of the 
business were effectively placed upon workers.  
 
In the M&Ts and survivalist operations, where the owner of the 
operation was often also a homeworker, the pressure was even more 
intense but was felt equally by everyone. During an interview with one 
homeworker, fellow workers scrambled to put together enough money 
to buy more electricity to keep the sewing machines running. The 
interviewee explained that they had not been able to buy groceries or 
electricity that month because payment from the design house for their 
last contract had not been received. Another homeworker reported that 
she sometimes had to borrow money from family members to purchase 
electricity to keep the sewing machines going in order to finish a 
contract and get paid.88  
                                                        
88  Godfrey et al On the Outskirts But Still in Fashion (n 12) 19-20. Also see Morris, M ‘The 













A few more observations about homeworking are necessary. As in 
Australia, for example, homeworking in South Africa is primarily performed by 
female workers.89 While there may be more than one intermediary, it is not 
uncommon for day-to-day supervision to be done by the end-user and/or one 
or more of the intermediaries90 and, certainly in the case of South Africa, 
homeworking ‘displays the structural interrelationship of the formal and the 
informal economies’.91 Furthermore, the homeworkers tend to be invisible to 
the structures and processes of collective bargaining.92 Importantly, inasmuch 
as the contract of employment remains central to the employment 
relationship, it obscures the true nature of the relationship between the end-
user and/or many of the intermediaries, on the one hand, and the worker on 
the other. 
 
It is noteworthy is that although many homeworkers were forced into 
homeworking by retrenchment, they are not necessarily averse to it, because 
it is convenient in terms of the work/life cycle.93 Also, because many 
homeworkers received training in the formal sector and tend to be older than 
35, skills development and training in this sphere may eventually become a 
problem.94 If one assumes that there is a place for homeworking – because  it 
is still preferable to imports (in the sense that it provides employment)95 – it is 
clear that it will require closer (and perhaps different) regulation and 
organisation that will recognise its peculiar nature. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
economic Implications?’ paper presented at the 20th Annual Labour Law Conference, 
Johannesburg South Africa, July 2007 at 11-12. 
89  See Godfrey et al On the Outskirts But Still in Fashion (n 12) at 23-24 and Rawling (n 79) at 
522. Generally see Carr et al (n 82). 
90  Rawling (n 79) at 523. Also see Godfrey et al On the Outskirts But Still in Fashion (n 12) at 
12. 
91  Godfrey et al On the Outskirts But Still in Fashion (n 12) at 1. 
92  Van der Westhuizen (n 79) at 352-353. 
93  Van der Westhuizen (n 79) at 342 and Godfrey et al On the Outskirts But Still in Fashion (n 
12) at 26. 
94  Godfrey et al On the Outskirts But Still in Fashion (n 12) at 40. 
95  In this regard Morris (n 88) at 11 estimates that as a result of Chinese imports, employment 
levels in the formal clothing sector have decreased by 16 per cent (representing approximately 
20 000 jobs). However, while he concedes that it is difficult to measure their numbers, he 
claims that all evidence suggests that informal CMT enterprises are ‘mushrooming and 
proliferating’ and that because of their rise the decrease in employment in the clothing sector 













4.4.2.1.2  Labour broking96 
 
Since engagement with the help of a labour broker often results in 
temporary employment, this form of engagement clearly intersects with 
casualisation on many levels. However, since it also involves engagement via 
an intermediary and on the basis that the statutory regulation of labour 
brokers creates ‘legal distance’ between the worker and the user of the 
service, it is suggested, although nothing turns on it, that it is more 
appropriate for purposes of this chapter to view it as a form of externalisation. 
 
Essentially labour broking involves the supply by brokers of labour 
contracted to them to clients who pay an all-inclusive fee for the service to the 
broker who, in turn, pays the worker.97 It was first formally regulated in South 
Africa by means of an amendment98 to the Labour Relations Act of 1956.99 
The essential features of this amendment required the broker to register with 
the Department of Labour and deemed the labour broker to be the employer 
of the workers supplied by it to the client.100 In terms of the 1995 LRA the 
registration of labour brokers (now called temporary employment services 
(TES)) with the Department is no longer required, but their status as deemed 
employers is reinforced by s 198(2) which provides that: 
 
For the purposes of this Act, a person whose services have 
been procured for or provided to a client by a temporary employment 
                                                        
96  This must be distinguished from labour recruitment where an agency on payment of a fee 
recruits an employee for the employer, but then severs ties with the recruited employee. 
Labour recruitment is not considered in this chapter. 
97  Research on labour broking in South Africa is limited. The most considered research available 
on the topic is Theron et al The Rise of Labour Broking and its Policy Implications (n 12) and 
Theron ‘Intermediary or Employer? Labour Brokers and the Triangular Employment 
Relationship’ (n 12). 
98  Labour Relations Amendment Act 2 of 1983. Also see Brassey, M and Cheadle, H ‘Labour 
Relations Amendment Act 2 of 1983’ (1983) 4 ILJ 34. 
99  Act 28 of 1956. 
100  International norms – as provided by ILO Private Employment Agencies Convention 181, 
1997 (not ratified by South Africa) – follow the same structure. This is also the structure 
adopted by Germany and Australia. See Waas, B ‘Temporary Agency Work in Germany: 
Reflections on Recent Developments’ (2003) 19 International Journal of Comparative 
Labour Law and Industrial Relations 387 at 389 and Underhill, E ‘The Role of Employment 
Agencies in Structuring and Regulating Labour Markets’ in Arup, C; Gahan, P; Howe, J; 
Johnstone, R; Mitchell, R and O’Donnell, A (eds) Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation 













service is the employee of that temporary employment service, and the 
temporary employment service is that person's employer. 
 
This peculiar situation (‘one would be hard pressed to say in what 
respects a TES is the employer, other than that the TES remunerates the 
employee’)101 is complicated by a further provision that the TES and the client 
are jointly and severally liable if the TES contravenes a collective agreement 
concluded in a bargaining council that regulates terms and conditions of 
employment,102 a binding arbitration award that regulates terms and 
conditions of employment, or the BCEA.103 Based on the definition of the TES 
in the LRA it is clear that the workers must be provided to the client for 
reward; hence non-profit organisations providing such workers are not 
covered.104 The definition further requires that the worker must be 
remunerated by the TES. The BCEA defines a TES in the same terms as the 
LRA does, and the TES must therefore observe the BCEA. COIDA, which 
defines an employer to include a labour broker,105 requires the labour broker, 
as employer, to register in terms of the Act, and it is obliged to report an 
accident to the Compensation Commissioner. The client therefore has no 
liability in terms of COIDA, but remains delictually liable to the employee 
placed with it by the TES.106 A case in point is the judgment of the SCA in 
Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Rieck.107 An employee 
placed with Crown Chickens by a TES was injured due to the negligence of 
employees of Crown Chickens. The injured employee proceeded with a 
                                                        
101  Theron et al The Rise of Labour Broking and its Policy Implications (n 12) at 5. 
102  See Bargaining Council for the Contract Cleaning Industry and Gedeza Cleaning Services & 
Another (2003) 24 ILJ 2019 (BCA). 
103  Section 198(4) of the LRA. 
104  Theron et al The Rise of Labour Broking and its Policy Implications (n 12) at 7. 
105  Section 1. 
106  The following legislation is also relevant in relation to TESs: The Skills Development Act 97 
of 1998 (SDA) does not refer to TESs as such, but requires that any person who wishes to 
provide employment services for gain must apply for registration. The broadness of the 
requirement, however, makes it clear that registration is not aimed only at TESs. Section 57(1) 
of the EEA provides that a person whose services have been procured by a TES will be 
deemed to be an employee of the client if the person is used by the client for longer than three 
months. The client will thus be liable if unfair discrimination against such worker is 
established, but if the TES commits an act of unfair discrimination against the employee on 
the instruction of the client, it will be jointly and severally liable. However, the OHSA 
specifically excludes labour brokers. For more on the legislation covering TESs see Theron et 
al The Rise of Labour Broking and its Policy Implications (n 12) at 7-8. 













delictual claim against Crown Chickens who claimed that it was shielded 
against such action by the provisions of s 35 of COIDA. This section provides 
that no action by an employee injured during the course and scope of 
employment shall lie against the employer. Relying on the definition of an 
employer in COIDA, which includes labour brokers,108 the SCA confirmed the 
client (Crown Chickens) remains delictually liable to the employee. 
 
While those employed by TESs on the face of it seem to be well 
protected by legislation, the protection is more apparent than real. Despite 
being at least structurally part of the client’s enterprise, the following conspire 
to create what Theron calls ‘an underclass in the formal workplace’:109 the fact 
that an employee’s terms and conditions (in particular wages, duration and 
notice) are wholly dependent on the terms of the commercial contract 
between the TES and the client, the fact that there is no obligation that 
workers placed by TESs are remunerated on the same basis as the client’s 
employees110 and the difficulties which the temporary nature of the 
placements present for trade union participation and collective bargaining. 
The following illustrates some of the predicament of workers placed by TESs: 
 
The notion that wages and minimum standards are amenable to 
a process of collective bargaining between an employer and its 
workers has no practical application, unless the TES is able to prevail 
upon the client to vary its contract with the TES. It will obviously not be 
easy to do so. On the contrary, it is more likely that one TES will 
displace another by offering the same service at a lower price, and will 
take over the workforce employed by the former TES.111 
                                                        
108  Section 1. 
109  Theron ‘Intermediary or Employer? Labour Brokers and the Triangular Employment 
Relationship’ (n 12) at 626. Also see Synthesis Report (n 12) at 160-164 for an overview of 
the erosion of rights in the context of non-standard work generally and more specifically in the 
case of TESs. 
110  This is unlike the position in Germany where, since 2002, employees placed by a labour 
broker must be remunerated on the same basis as the client’s employees. See Waas (n 100) at 
394-395. In Australia the position is similar to the position in South Africa. See Underhill (n 
100) at 292. 
111  Theron ‘Intermediary or Employer? Labour Brokers and the Triangular Employment 
Relationship’ (n 12) at 629. See Colven Associates Border CC / Kei Brick & Tile Co (Pty) Ltd 













The client, apart from delictual liability for injuries negligently caused by 
its employees, is legally removed from most of the risks associated with 
employment. However, on the basis that occupational injuries and diseases 
are taken care of by the Compensation Commissioner in terms of COIDA, the 
only real risk for the TES is unfair dismissal. While still awaiting critical 
pronouncement by the Labour Courts, no clear message is emanating from 
CCMA awards on the responsibility of the TES once a client terminates the 
placement of the employee. One view is that TES has no further 
responsibility.112 Another view suggests that the TES has a duty to find 
alternative employment or to retrench the redundant employee.113 While the 
latter appears to be consistent with what one would expect from an employer 
in terms of the LRA, the former view appears to be on firm common-law 
ground. The complication is the result of s 186(1)(a) of the LRA which defines 
a dismissal to mean termination of the contract of employment by the 
employer with or without notice. Termination because the term of placement 
has ended will thus not constitute a dismissal. Normally the duration of fixed- 
term contracts is expressed in terms of time, but at common law it is possible 
to link the duration to the wish of the parties and the term of employment will 
simply end when the party so decrees.114 115 
                                                        
112  See Dick v Cozens Recruitment Services (2001) 22 ILJ 276 (CCMA); April and Workforce 
Group Holdings (Pty) Ltd t/a The Workforce Group (2005) 26 ILJ 2224 (CCMA); Smith / 
Staffing Logistics [2005] 10 BALR 1078 (MEIBC); NUMSA obo Daki / Colven Associates 
Border CC [2006] 9 BALR 877 (MEIBC) and National Union of Metalworkers of SA & 
Others v SA Five Engineering (Pty) Ltd & Others (2007) 28 ILJ 1290 (LC). Also see 
Hutchinson, W ‘Are the Provisions of Section 198 of the LRA Applicable to Temporary 
Employment Services?’ (2007) 28 ILJ 90. 
113  See Buthelezi & Others v Labour for Africa (Pty) Ltd (1991) 12 ILJ 588 (IC), decided under 
the 1956 Act; LAD Brokers (Pty) Ltd v Mandla [2001] 9 BLLR 993 (LAC); Fourie & JD 
Bester Labour Brokers CC (2003) 24 ILJ 1625 (BCA) and Jonas / Quest Staffing Solutions 
[2003] 7 BALR 811 (CCMA). This predicament was initially taken to heart by the Namibian 
legislature in the draft of the new Labour Bill. Article 128 of the Bill provided that the 
‘employment hire service’ is the employer of an employee placed with a client, but both the 
employment hire service and the client would be jointly and severally liable if the 
employment hire service contravenes a number of provisions, including the dismissal 
provisions of the Bill. However, the legislature has now opted to forbid labour hire. See 
Jauch, H ‘Namibia’s Ban on Labour Hire in Perspective’ The Namibian 3 August 2007.  
114  Christie, RH The Law of Contract 4ed (2001) at 164-166. 
115  Further practical problems concerning dismissals are the TES’s difficulty to maintain 
discipline and to take action against the employee for disciplinary problems that occur at the 
workplace (see National Union of Metalworkers of SA on behalf of Fortuin & Others and 
Laborie Arbeidsburo (2003) 24 ILJ 1438 (BCA) and Labuschagne v WP Construction [1997] 
9 BLLR 1251 (CCMA)); the role of the TES when the employee becomes medically 
incapacitated (National Union of Metalworkers of SA on behalf of Swanepoel and Oxyon 













There can be no doubt that the combination of casualisation and labour 
broking is one of the forces destabilising standard employment in South Africa 
and it has been called ‘the motor for the development of externalisation’.116 
Not only does it promote job insecurity and erode basic standards, but it 
marginalises the potential balancing power of trade unions and collective 
bargaining. The solution may well be, as suggested by Theron et al, to 
address the lack of differentiation between the different forms of employment 
which appears to be an incentive to externalise.117 Furthermore, there seems 
to be nothing temporary about the placements made by TESs, and reinforcing 
the notion of temporary by limiting the duration of placements may also help 




Remarkably little has been written in South Africa on franchising.119 
Franchising is an opportunity to trade on a pre-packaged recipe and has been 
described in the following terms: 
 
[A]t the heart of a franchise relationship is an agreement which 
allows the franchisee to provide a service which has been pre-
packaged by the franchisor with the proviso that the franchisee 
operates within the boundaries as established by the franchisor.120 
 
Usually the franchisee will be expected to pay an initial amount and to 
pay royalties on an ongoing basis. One of the distinguishing features of 
                                                                                                                                                              
experience in citing the correct employer. See Theron ‘Intermediary or Employer? Labour 
Brokers and the Triangular Employment Relationship’ (n 12) at 635-636 and 639-641. 
116  Benjamin, P ‘Beyond the Boundaries: Prospects for Expanding Labour Market Regulation in 
South Africa’ in Guy Davidov and Brian Langille (eds) Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour 
Law (2006) 181-204 at 189. 
117  The Rise of Labour Broking and its Policy Implications (n 12) at 45. 
118  Benjamin (n 116) at 195. For instance, in the Netherlands once a fixed-term contract is 
renewed more than three times over a period of 36 months, it becomes an open ended 
contract. See art 688a of the BW. The same applies to a worker employed by a labour broker 
except that the provisions of art 668a do not apply to labour broking during the first 26 weeks 
of employment by the labour broker. See art 691 of the BW. 
119  For a superficial overview of franchising in South Africa see Havenga, P; Garbers, C; 
Havenga, M; Schulze, WG; Van der Linde, K and Van der Merwe, T General Principles of 
Commercial Law 4ed (2000) at 233-239. 













franchising is the extent of control that the franchisor retains over the running 
of the business, including pricing, sources of supply, ingredients, make-up, 
marketing, promotion, employment policy and uniforms. This enables the 
franchisor to protect the goodwill associated with the package that is the 
subject of the franchise agreement.121 The control by the franchisor and the 
economic dependence of the franchisee is not dissimilar to the standard 
employment relationship, but importantly all the risks are with the 
franchisee.122 Externalisation of labour thus occurs by either converting the 
employee to a franchisee (or by engaging him on this basis from the outset) or 
by creating a franchise that becomes the nominal employer of employees 
whilst the control remains with the franchisor. There is, however, some 
evidence suggesting that franchising is used internationally to achieve 
externalisation of the labour force.123 No empirical evidence is available on the 
extent to which franchising as a form of externalisation is prevalent in South 
Africa, but there is some case law and anecdotal evidence suggesting that it 
is occurring.  
 
In Rodgers and Assist-U-Drive124 the CCMA commissioner considered 
whether the termination of a franchising agreement constituted a dismissal. 
The franchisor operated a driving school and the franchisee obtained a 
franchising licence to operate under its name. The arbitrator, cognisant of the 
LAC judgment in Denel125 that substance should trump form was, however, 
not satisfied that the control exercised by the franchisor and the economic 
dependence of the franchisee were of such a nature that the relationship 
constituted one of employment, and held that the franchisee was in fact an 
                                                        
121  Havenga et al (n 119) at 234. 
122  Riley, J ‘Regulating Unequal Work Relationships for Fairness and Efficiency: A Study of 
Business Format Franchising’ in Arup, C; Gahan, P; Howe, J; Johnstone, R; Mitchell, R and 
O’Donnell, A (eds) Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation (2006) 561-578 at 565 and 
Veenis, J ‘Franchising: “Window-dressing” van de Dienstbetrekking’ (2000) 55(3) SMA 93 at 
93. However, cf Longhorn Group (Pty) Ltd v The Fedics Group (Pty) Ltd and Another 1995 
(3) SA 836 (W) where the court was not prepared to acknowledge these similarities. 
Admittedly, the franchisee in this matter was an established company and not a vulnerable 
individual. Also see Theron, J ‘The Shift to Services and Triangular Employment: 
Implications for Labour Market Reform’ (n 12) at 9. 
123  See Riley (n 122) for the Australian experience and Veenis (n 122) for the position in the 
Netherlands. 
124  (2006) 27 ILJ 847 (CCMA). 













independent contractor. On the other side of the spectrum, Theron and 
Godfrey refer to the example of a hotel chain that obtained a franchise and, 
with a manager-owner in place, outsourced the rest of its operation, creating a 
business with no labour force.126  
 
While franchising is perhaps not yet as common as other forms of 
externalisation it is easy to see how, if unchecked, it can become yet another 
serious manifestation of externalisation, marginalising the social protection of 
individuals styled as franchisees and marginalising trade union recruitment. 
 
4.4.2.2 Commodification of the individual employment relationship 
 
This essentially involves an attempt to convert employees into 
independent contractors by presenting the relationship between the employer 
and the worker as a pure commercial arrangement. As will be explained in 
more detail below, independent contractors are generally not regarded as 
beneficiaries of the protection offered by labour legislation;127 hence the 
desire by employers to convert the worker who would normally be an 
employee into an independent contractor. 
 
The most graphic example of this is the retrenchment of (mostly 
unskilled and therefore vulnerable) employees and their immediate re-
engagement (or even engagement from the outset) as independent 
contractors despite the fact that they continue to work under the same 
circumstances as before their retrenchment.128 These sham practices, which 
enable employers to bypass protective legislation and collective agreements, 
have now been curtailed by the combination of the courts’ insistence that 
                                                        
126  Protecting Workers on the Periphery (n 42) at 21. 
127  § 4.6. 
128  Clarke et al ‘Workers’ Protection: An Update on the Situation in South Africa’ (n 12) at 31 
refers to the example of Confederation of Employers South Africa (COFESA) who in 2002 
claimed that they have already converted 2 million employees into independent contractors. 
Also see Mills (n 42) at 1215 and Benjamin, P ‘An Accident of History: Who Is (and Who 
Should Be) an Employee under South African Labour Law?’ (2004) 25 ILJ 787 at 795-796. 
Also see Building Bargaining Council (Southern & Eastern Cape) v Melmons Cabinets CC & 













substance should trump form,129 and the presumption as to who is an 
employee.130 Even prior to the judgment in Denel, in which the LAC 
emphasised substance over form (even if the contract did not amount to a 
sham), the court intervened to negate such contracts ‘designed to strip the 
workers of the protection to which they are entitled according to law and fair 
labour practice’131 and held the workers in question to be employees. Another 
example is the practice of portraying workers as agents and thus independent 
contractors. In a recent judgment132 concerning an estate agent characterised 
as an independent contractor in her contract, the court, following the ratio in 
Denel, held that the realities of the relationship suggested that she was in fact 
an employee despite the method of payment and the non-deduction of UIF 
and PAYE as provided for in the contract.133 Disturbingly, the evidence in this 
matter revealed that 50 agents were employed on the same basis,134 and 
presumably similarly deprived of access to, for instance, UIF.135 
 
More difficult to curtail is the emergence of arrangements in the nature 
of owner-driver schemes. These schemes usually enable the former 
employee to own the tools of the trade (for instance, a vehicle) and to render 
his or her service to the former employer in terms of a commercial contract.136 
These workers are therefore no longer employees and not able to claim the 
benefits of protective labour legislation or collective agreements.137 On the 
other hand, because of the incentives offered by productivity-based payments 
and because labour standards are no longer relevant, drivers work much 
longer hours than they did prior to the conversion to the scheme. However, 
they are not necessarily less dependent than before since the vehicle is either 
                                                        
129  See Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber (2005) 26 ILJ 1256 (LAC) and discussion at § 2.3.5.4.1. 
130  See discussion at §§ 2.3.5.4.2 , 2.3.5.4.3 and 5.3.2. 
131  See Naidu J Motor Industry Bargaining Council v Mac-Rites Panelbeaters & Spraypainters 
(Pty) Ltd (2001) 22 ILJ 1077 (N) at 1091J. 
132  Linda Erasmus Properties Enterprise (Pty) Ltd v Mhlongo & Others (2007) 28 ILJ 1100 (LC). 
133  Pars 17-26. 
134  Par 4. 
135  It is possible that this type of externalisation can occur by portraying the relationship as a 
lease agreement. Labour tenancy on farms is regulated by the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) 
Act 3 of 1996 and no case was found where employees (not on farm land) were portrayed as 
tenants. 
136  Generally see Cheadle and Clarke (n 44) at 35-37; Theron and Godfrey Protecting Workers on 
the Periphery (n 12) at 21-22 and Mills (n 42) at 1214. 
137  Attempts have been made to negotiate these schemes with unions. See Cheadle and Clarke (n 













acquired from the former employer or financed with its help.138 The former 
employer not only benefits from the increased productivity, but also from the 
reduced costs of not having to maintain the vehicle and the reduced labour 
costs. The owner-driver, however, in reality no less dependent than before 
and with only some prospect of earning more, is saddled with the financial 
responsibility of ownership and is deprived of the protection offered by labour 
legislation.  
 
4.4.2.3  Précis 
 
In the context of externalisation via intermediaries it is still possible to 
identify an employer that is theoretically responsible for the risks of 
employment. However, the reality is that another party, by remote control from 
behind the façade of a commercial arrangement, dictates the employment 
relationship between that employer and the worker. This camouflaged 
employment relationship and the fact that this form of externalisation often 
occurs in association with casualisation139 result in a workforce that is 
deprived of protective labour legislation and collective bargaining. 
Externalisation via the commodification of the individual employment 
relationship simply involves an attempt to change the status of the individual 
employee by restructuring the employment relationship with the help of 
commercial taxonomy. However, whether externalisation occurs through the 
use of intermediaries or by commodification of the individual relationship, for 






                                                        
138  It is not inconceivable that these schemes may also be operated through the use of 
intermediaries. Cheadle and Clarke (n 44) at 36 explain: ‘[M]anagement companies have been 
formed to administer owner-drive schemes. These companies approach large customers with a 
proposal on how to convert their employees (truck drivers) into owner-operators. A contract is 
then signed between the management company and the customer, and between drivers 
(usually the drivers who were employees of the company, although new drivers may also be 
recruited) and the management company.’ 













4.5 Work without a valid contract 
 
4.5.1  Introduction 
 
In chapter 2 it was illustrated that the employment relationship for 
purposes of labour legislation is premised on the existence of a common-law 
contract of employment.140 In this paragraph, instances where work is 
performed in the absence of a valid contract will be considered. Lack of the 
required intent and illegality have emerged as two of the most common 
reasons for the absence of a valid contract, despite the obvious existence of 
an arrangement to work. Work without a valid contract will be considered 
under the following headings: absence of required intent and illegality arising 
from a legislative prohibition. 
 
4.5.2 Absence of required intent 
 
Apart from all the other legal requirements for the creation of a valid 
contract, an agreement will only be regarded as a contract if the parties 




This requirement has been the reason for the Labour Court refusing to 
provide protection to, for instance, clergy. In Church of the Province of 
Southern Africa Diocese of Cape Town v CCMA & Others142 a priest’s licence 
to practice was revoked for five years after he was found guilty of misconduct, 
effectively depriving him from any financial benefits attached to this office. The 
priest referred an unfair dismissal claim to the CCMA. The commissioner 
rejected the argument that the priest was not an employee and this finding 
was taken on review. The Labour Court found that the agreement between 
the church and the priest was a spiritual agreement aimed at regulating the 
                                                        
140  § 2.3.5.3. 
141  See Van der Merwe et al (n 9) at 8. 
142  (2001) 22 ILJ 2274 (LC). For a discussion of this judgment see Grogan, J ‘Workers of the 













priest’s divine obligations and there was no intention on the part of the church 
or the priest to enter into a legally enforceable employment contract. Since 
Waglay J held that a contract of employment is necessary for purposes of 
establishing an employment relationship,143 the priest could not be regarded 
as an employee for purposes of the LRA.144 Salvation Army (South African 
Territory) v Minister of Labour 145 concerned a declaratory order sought by the 
Salvation Army to establish whether their officers – clergy who are ordained 
and commissioned ministers of religion – are employees for purposes of a 
range of labour legislation. Maya AJ, for the same reasons advanced by 
Waglay J in Diocese of Cape Town, held that they are not employees for the 
purposes of this legislation. The implication of these judgments is clearly that 
where there is no intention to create an employment contract in the common-
law sense, an employment relationship is not possible for purposes of labour 
legislation.146  
 
Some commentators147 have questioned the continued validity of these 
judgments after the LAC’s emphasis on substance rather than form in Denel 
(Pty) Ltd v Gerber,148 but whether the language of this judgment goes far 
enough to suggest employment exists where there is no contract at all as 
                                                        
143  See pars 30 and 40. 
144  Also see the finding of the Industrial Court in Paxton v The Church of the Province of 
Southern Africa, Diocese of Port Elizabeth (unreported case no NH11/2/1985 (PE)) referred to 
by Waglay, J at par 38. Also see Mankatshu v Old Apostolic Church of Africa & Others 1994 
(2) SA 458 (TkA) and Ndarha & Another and The Salvation Army (unreported case no 
KN64726) referred to in Salvation Army (South African Territory) v Minister of Labour 
(2005) 26 ILJ 126 (LC) at par 5. In Schreuder v Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, Wilgespruit 
& Others (1999) 20 ILJ 1936 (LC) the court, however, was apparently satisfied that there was 
an intention to create a legally enforceable contract. Also see Sajid v The Juma Musjid Trust 
(1999) 20 ILJ 1975 (CCMA) and Sajid v Mahomed NO & Others (2000) 21 ILJ 1204 (LC) 
which concerned the position of an Imam. Neither the CCMA nor the Labour Court 
apparently doubted that he was an employee. 
145  (2005) 26 ILJ 126 (LC). 
146  For instance, in Salvation Army at par 16 it was declared that the officers of the Salvation 
Army are not employees as defined in the LRA, the BCEA, the EEA, the Unemployment 
Insurance Act 30 of 1966, the SDA, COIDA, and that the said Acts are not applicable to such 
officers. 
147  Van Niekerk, A ‘Personal Service Companies and the Definition of “Employee” – Some 
Thoughts on Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber (2005) 26 ILJ 1256 (LAC)’ (2005) 26 ILJ 1904 at 
1909. In England the question regarding clergy now seems to be whether a contract existed 
and, if so, whether it was a contract of employment. If the relationship has many 
characteristics of employment – rights and obligations – these cannot be ignored simply 
because the duties are of a religious or pastoral nature. See Percy v Church of Scotland [2006] 
IRLR 195 and The New Testament Church of God v Reverend S Stewart [2007] IRLR 178.  













opposed to concluding that employment exists where there is a valid contract, 
albeit not in the form of an employment contract, is doubtful.  
 
For the moment the question is not whether the outcome of these 
judgments is correct and whether their ratio still stands. The point is that there 
can be no doubt that the clergy in question, relying on the view of work 
adopted earlier, were in fact working. What distinguishes their position from 
those in standard employment and most other forms of work is the absence of 
a contract in any form. However, while they may ultimately serve a divine 
employer, the manner in which they render their earthly labours, as emerged 
particularly from Diocese of Cape Town, hardly differs from any other 
standard secular employment.  
 
4.5.2.2  Genuine volunteer workers 
 
The position of clergy is also not dissimilar to that of volunteer workers. 
Only genuine volunteer workers,149 who undertake work freely and without 
remuneration and who are not undergoing vocational training, are considered 
in this paragraph. Students undergoing vocational training, although their 
positions are not substantially different, will be discussed below under the 
heading of idiosyncratic forms of work.  
 
Genuine volunteer workers include those who offer their services to 
religious, charitable, benevolent or sporting organisations. It may be one-off 
volunteer work or it may be an ongoing commitment. The actual numbers of 
volunteer workers in South Africa are difficult to estimate but the 2006 LFS 
suggests a number of 1 052 000 persons.150 Following drives from national 
government,151 particularly since 2002 that was declared the Year of the 
                                                        
149  The phrase ‘genuine volunteer worker’ is borrowed from Murray, J ‘The Legal Regulation of 
Volunteer Work’ in Arup, C; Gahan, P; Howe, J; Johnstone, R; Mitchell, R and O’Donnell, A 
(eds) Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation (2006) 696-713 at 697-699. She contrasts 
genuine volunteer work with precarious volunteer work. In this chapter it is contrasted with 
vocational work which is discussed in § 4.7.3. Generally also see Taylor (n 1). 
150  See Table 7.2 Statistical release PO210 (n 15). 
151  See, for instance,  Mbeki, T President’s Freedom Day address, 27 April 2002 accessed via 
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches (5 October 2007) and the President’s New Year’s Message, 













Volunteer, to promote a spirit of voluntarism, anecdotal evidence suggests 
that it is on the rise.  
 
While genuine volunteer work may not require all the regulation 
associated with genuine employment, it has been suggested that at least 
those laws that regulate the workplace per se, such as anti-discrimination and 
occupational health and safety laws, ought to apply in the case of 
volunteers.152 
 
This is not the position in South Africa. On the basis of the Labour 
Court’s judgment in Diocese of Cape Town, it would be difficult to classify 
volunteers as employees for purposes of most labour legislation,153 because 
there is no intention to create a binding contract of employment. Moreover, 
the judgment of the SCA in ER24 Holdings v Smith NO154 also militates 
against this. While this matter concerned an injury to a volunteer worker 
undergoing vocational training, the ratio applies equally to genuine volunteers. 
The volunteer in this matter, acting through a curator ad litem, sued ER24 on 
the basis that she sustained very serious injuries in a motor vehicle collision 
which occurred while she was accompanying an employee of ER24 in an 
ambulance to the scene of another collision. The negligence of the employee 
in causing the collision was not disputed. However, ER24 claimed that since 
the volunteer was an employee, and by virtue of the provisions of s 35 of 
COIDA,155 the volunteer’s claim ought to be against the Compensation 
Commissioner.  
 
The SCA considered the definition of an employee in s 1 of COIDA, 
which provides that an employee is a person who works under a contract of 
services and who receives remuneration in cash or in kind. The volunteer in 
this matter was not paid and since the court was not prepared to regard the 
opportunity to travel in the ambulance and to acquire experience and 
                                                        
152  Murray (n 149) at 709. 
153  See note 146.  
154  [2007] SCA 55 (RSA). 
155  This section provides that damages for occupational injuries shall not lie against the employer, 













guidance at an accident scene as remuneration in kind,156 the volunteer was 
held not to be an employee for purposes of COIDA. ER24 was thus delictually 
liable for the volunteer’s claim. The claim in this matter was substantial 
(R7 million) and while it was probably in the interests of the injured volunteer 
to allow the common-law claim against a ‘deep-pocket’ defendant such as 
ER24 rather than a notoriously limited claim against the Compensation 
Commissioner, the outcome is not necessarily in the interest of the broader 
volunteer community. More often than not they make their services freely 
available to organisations precisely because these organisations are cash-
strapped and would otherwise be unable to offer their worthy services. In such 
cases an injured volunteer would be deprived of a claim in terms of COIDA 
and left with a hollow common-law claim against the organisation. 
 
In addition to the limited reach of COIDA in respect of genuine 
volunteer workers, s 3(1)(b) of the BCEA provides that the Act does not apply 
to unpaid volunteers working for an organisation serving a charitable purpose. 
 
Returning to the central focus of this chapter, the question can be 
asked whether genuine volunteer work is really work. In Diocese of Cape 
Town it was easy to see how the clergy’s position, but for its divine nature, 
resembles that of any other secular employee. But can it be claimed that the 
genuine volunteer worker who responds to a sense of communitarianism is 
working? Supiot, in his description of work quoted earlier,157 had no doubt that 
voluntary work, on the basis that it creates obligations, is a form of work. But 
can it be said that it is work deserving of (some) labour market regulation? 
Borrowing from feminist scholarship on unpaid work (such as domestic duties 
and child-caring responsibilities),158 the claim can be made that at least in 
some cases volunteers have a place in the labour market because they 
provide a service that must normally be paid for, they often work in the same 
workplace as those in paid employment, and their participation often impacts 
                                                        
156  The court (at pars 7 and 8) argued that since compensation is calculated on the basis of the 
injured employee’s remuneration, some monetary value had to be placed on remuneration in 
kind. The court held that this task was impossible in respect of the remuneration in kind in this 
matter suggested by ER24. 
157  Note 8. 













of the duties of those in paid employment.159 In this regard Rittich comments 
as follows: 
 
On reflection, it is not obvious why only certain types of work 
should be of interest, while others – domestic work, volunteer work, 
subsistence work, or community work, for example – remain largely 
neglected. As non-controversial and deeply normalized as it seems, 
this state of affairs was rendered possible in part because mainstream 
labour agenda became consolidated around the concerns of workers 
for whom work simply meant paid work.160 
 
Thus, unpaid work is not necessarily without value and it often impacts 
on paid work. On this basis there can be no doubt that volunteer work is at 
times a dynamic force in the labour market. The court in ER24 was perhaps 
limited by the wording of COIDA, but the judgment does not even hint at this 
possible labour market significance of volunteer work.  
 
4.5.3 Illegality arising from a legislative prohibition 
 
At common law an agreement must be legal to constitute a contract. In 
some circumstances an illegal agreement will still constitute a contract, but 
will not be legally enforceable. In instances where the illegality is due to a 
conflict with legislation, the validity of the agreement must be sought from the 
wording of the legislation.161 Unless the agreement is declared invalid by the 
legislation, a mere prohibition does not necessarily render it invalid.162 While 
the imposition of only a penalty suggests that the contract is probably only 
unenforceable as opposed to invalid, the broader public purpose of the 
legislation may still render it invalid.163 In this paragraph the focus will mainly 
be on foreigners working in South Africa without work permits (illegal foreign 
                                                        
159  Rittich, K ‘Feminization and Contingency: Regulating the Stakes of Work for Women’ in 
Conaghan, J; Fischl, RM and Klare, K (eds) Labour Law in an Era of Globalization: The 
Transformative Practices and Possibilities (2000) 117-136 at 124-125. 
160  Rittich (n 159) at 125. 
161  Van der Merwe et al (n 9) at 175 and 185. 
162  Metro Western Cape (Pty) Ltd v Ross 1986 (3) SA 181 (A). 













workers) and sex workers. In the former case the work performed is not the 
cause of the illegality, but rather the status of the worker. In the latter case it is 
the work performed that is illegal. Brief reference will also be made to child 
labour. 
 
4.5.3.1  Illegal foreign workers 
 
In Chapter 3 large-scale labour migration was identified as one of the 
challenges of the ‘new world of work’, particularly in South Africa.164 While 
precise data is not available, it has been estimated by the Human Sciences 
Research Council that undocumented migration to South Africa involves 
between 2,5 and 12 million foreigners. Department of Home Affairs estimates 
vary between 2,5 and 7 million.165 Even when relying on the most 
conservative of the available data and based on anecdotal evidence,166 it 
must be assumed that many illegal foreigners are active in the South African 
labour market,167 168 but are beyond the reach of protective laws. In this 
regard the provisions of the Immigration Act of 2002169 are significant.  
 
Section 38 of the Act provides that no person shall employ an illegal 
foreigner or a foreigner whose status does no authorise employment or 
                                                        
164  § 3.3. 
165  Waller, L ‘Irregular Migration to South Africa During the First Ten Years of Democracy’ 
Migration Policy Brief No 19 published by the Southern African Migration Project 2006 and 
accessed via http://www.queensu.ca/samp/sampresources/samppublications/ (28 November 
2007). Also see Fakier, K ‘The Internationalization of South African Labour Markets: The 
Need for a Comparative Research Agenda’, paper presented at a workshop ‘A Decent Work 
Research Agenda for South Africa’, Cape Town, South Africa, April 2007 at 18-19. Others, 
although conceding that it is impossible to determine, suggest that these numbers are 
overestimated. Peberby, S ‘Nature and Modalities of Migration and their Impact on Social 
Security Needs and Labour Markets in SADC’ presentation at the conference on Migration 
and Social Security in the SADC Region: Prospects and Challenges, Johannesburg, South 
Africa, October 2007.  
166  See Honey, P ‘Immigrants and Refugees. Deal with It’ 16 February 2007 Financial Mail 
accessed via http://fm.co.za/cgi-bin/pp-print.pl (21 August 2007). 
167  As in Australia, for instance, this assumption is based on the fact that these foreigners are 
unlikely to have resources of their own and are unable to access social welfare lawfully. See 
Orr, G ‘ Unauthorised Workers: Labouring Underneath the Law’ in Arup, C; Gahan, P; Howe, 
J; Johnstone, R; Mitchell, R and O’Donnell, A (eds) Labour Law and Labour Market 
Regulation (2006) 677-695 at 680. 
168  It is also likely that illegal foreign workers consist mainly of semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers. Generally only skilled workers qualify for permanent and temporary residence (the 
only exception being, in the case of temporary residence, contract mine and agricultural 
workers). Section 10 read with s 19 of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002. 













employ such foreigner on terms and conditions or contrary to his or her 
status.170 Section 49 of the same Act provides that it is an offence to 
knowingly employ an illegal foreigner in contravention of the Act. There is no 
indication, either expressly or by implication, in this Act, that employment 
contracts contrary to the prohibition in s 38 are invalid. However, Bosch has 
persuasively concluded that ‘while there are cogent arguments to the 
contrary, there are stronger arguments for accepting that the effect of the 
Immigration Act, properly interpreted, is that the contracts of employment 
concluded contrary to the Act are null and void’.171 These arguments include 
the peremptory nature of the prohibition coupled with a criminal sanction, as 
well as the broader public purpose of the Act.172 Furthermore, on the basis of 
the broader public purpose of the Aliens Control Act 1991173 (predecessor of 
the Immigration Act of 2002), the labour courts and tribunals declined to 
intervene when foreigners, employed contrary to the provisions of that Act, 
had been dismissed, because the LRA cannot be seen to condone unlawful 
conduct. 174  
 
This is consistent with the general approach followed by the common-
law and industrial courts in respect of other prohibitive legislative 
provisions.175 
                                                        
170  Cf the position in Australia where there is no specific offence of unauthorised hiring and the 
illegal foreign worker alone bears the risk of criminal prosecution. See Orr (n 167) at 686. 
171  Bosch, C ‘Can Unauthorized Workers be Regarded as Employees for the Purposes of the 
Labour Relations Act?’ (2006) 27 ILJ 1342 at 1352-1353.  
172  See Bosch (n 171) at 1346-1352. A further argument would be art 3 of ILO Migrant Workers 
Convention 143, 1975 which requires states to suppress illegal employment of immigrants in 
effort to avoid their exploitation. Although South Africa has not ratified this Convention, 
s 39(1)(b) read with s 233 of the Constitution requires a tribunal when interpreting legislation 
to prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international 
law. 
173  Act 96 of 1991. 
174  Dube v Classique Panelbeaters [1997] 7 BLLR 868 (IC); Mthethwa v Vorna Valley Spar 
(1996) 7 (11) SALLR 83 (CCMA); Moses v Safika Holdings (Pty) Ltd (2001) 22 ILJ 1261 
(CCMA). Also see Georgieva – Deyanova / Craighall Spar [2004] 9 BALR 1143 (CCMA). 
175  See Havenga v Rabie 1916 TPD 466 which concerned the employment of a driver without a 
licence as required by a road traffic ordinance; Lende v Goldberg (1983) 4 ILJ 271 which 
concerned employment contrary to influx control legislation in the form of the Black (Urban 
Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945 and Norval v Vision Centre Optometrists (1995) 16 ILJ 
481 (IC) which concerned employment of an optometrist contrary to the Medical, Dental and 
Supplementary Health Service Professions Act 56 of 1974. Also see Kaganas, FR ‘Exploiting 
Illegality: Influx Control and Contracts of Service’ (1983) 4 ILJ 254 and Jordaan, B ‘Influx 
Control and Contracts of Employment: A Different View (1984) 5 ILJ 61. For an English 













While it is possible that a number of civil (non-contractual) remedies 
may be available to the worker party to such an illegal contract, access to 
labour protective legislation is limited.176 Bosch has argued that there is room 
for an argument to nonetheless regard illegal foreign workers as employees 
for purposes of the LRA. His argument is based on the LAC’s177 recent 
emphasis on substance rather than form; the apparent disregard by the LAC 
in the same matter of the possibility that the relationship in question was 
tainted by tax fraud,178 as well as the absence of any mention of contract in 
the definition of employee in the LRA.179 While the LAC’s judgment is certainly 
authority for the proposition that the form of engagement is less important in 
determining a worker’s status, it is still not authority for a proposition that 
something that is illegal should be given effect to. In fact, the LAC specifically 
instructed the employee to correct any possible misrepresentation to the 
Revenue Services and not to pursue her claim on the merits in the Labour 
Court with dirty hands.  
 
Assuming, however, that Bosch is correct, the matter is still 
complicated by the definition of dismissal in the LRA, which is primarily 
premised on the termination of a contract of employment. Unless, as 
suggested by Bosch,180 the courts are prepared (relying on s 23 of the 
Constitution which guarantees a right to fair labour practices to everyone) to 
‘read into’ the definition of dismissal words to the effect that it also includes 
                                                                                                                                                              
(1981) 10 ILJ (UK) 23. This article also alludes to contracts which are illegal because they 
constitute efforts to defraud the taxation authorities. No South African judgment or arbitration 
award could be traced where an employment contract was held to be void for this reason. In 
Hunt v ICC Car Importers Services Co (Pty) Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 364 (LC) the court was 
prepared to find an unfair dismissal and order compensation despite the obvious effort to 
defraud the Receiver of Revenue by using an invoice scheme intended to give the impression 
that the employee was an independent contractor. This did not deter the court from finding an 
employment relationship. The court, however, directed that the Receiver be notified of its 
judgment. In Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber (2005) 26 ILJ 1256 (LAC), the court was prepared, 
relying on substance rather than form, to find that there was an employment relationship. The 
matter was referred back to the Labour Court for adjudication on the facts, but the possibility 
that the employee in this matter defrauded the Revenue Services once again did not deter the 
LAC from finding that there was an employment relationship and it merely instructed the 
employee to correct any possible misrepresentation to the Revenue Services. See par 204. 
176  See Beck, AC ‘Illegal Employment and the Par Delictum Rule’ (1984) 101 SALJ 62. Also see 
Kaganas (n 175) and Jordaan (n 175). 
177  Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber (2005) 26 ILJ 1256 (LAC). Also see § 2.3.5.4.1. 
178  Bosch, C and Christie, S ‘Are Sex Workers “Employees”?’ (2007) 28 ILJ 804 at 810. 
179  Bosch (n 171) at 1354-1360. 













the termination of an employment relationship (and not only an employment 
contract), illegal foreign workers will remain unprotected against unfair 
dismissals. However, even if ‘reading in’ does take place, the remedies of 
reinstatement or re-employment will still not be available and the most prudent 
remedy will be compensation.181  
 
Moving beyond the LRA, the position of the illegal foreign worker with 
respect to basic conditions of employment, unemployment benefits, protection 
against unfair discrimination and workmen’s compensation is equally doubtful. 
The BCEA and the EEA define an employee in similar terms as the LRA does 
and, unless Bosch’s argument is followed, illegal foreign workers will not be 
able to claim the protection of these Acts. While an employee is not defined in 
terms of a contract for purposes of the UIA, it is extremely unlikely that illegal 
foreign workers will either register in terms of this Act or approach the 
enforcement structures provided for in these statutes for fear of their true 
status being discovered.182 Furthermore, available evidence suggests that 
most illegal foreigners are absorbed into informal employment where these 
statutes are simply not applied. An employee is defined in terms of a contract 
of service for purposes of COIDA and it is very unlikely that the courts will give 
effect to a contractual arrangement that is not valid at common law, 
particularly in view of the SCA’s recent narrow interpretation of this definition 
in the case of a volunteer worker.183 
 
Not only are these illegal foreign workers almost certainly beyond the 
reach of protective legislation, but they are also unlikely to benefit from 
collective bargaining. It seems as if many of the foreign workers work in 
                                                        
181  Bosch (n 171) at 1362-1364. See § 5.4. 
182  In any event, the definition of employee in this Act excludes persons who enter the Republic 
for the purpose of carrying out a contract of service, apprenticeship or learnership within the 
Republic if, upon the termination thereof, the employer is required by law or by the contract 
of service, apprenticeship or learnership, as the case may be, or by any other agreement or 
undertaking, to repatriate that person, or that person is so required to leave the Republic, and 
their employers. See s 3(1)(d). 
183  ER 24 Holdings v Smith NO [2007] SCA 55 (RSA). This matter is more fully discussed in 
§ 4.5.2.2. See the discussion by Orr (n 167) at 688-691 on the different approaches in 
Australia to the payment of workmen’s compensation. Some courts see illegality as a 
complete bar, but in some states the courts have discretion to award compensation even if the 













sectors where subcontracting is prevalent: that is in the mining, agricultural 
and construction sectors, and workers in subcontracted positions in, for 
instance, the mining industry, fall outside trade union wage negotiations.184 
 
For the moment, the question is not whether this situation is correct or 
not, but it is clear that the need for a valid contract has a devastating effect in 
the context of illegal foreign workers. Ironically, those illegal foreign workers 
who do find formal employment appear to be beyond the protection that 
formal employment normally offers and, on the other hand, because they are 
not in a position to conclude valid contracts of employment, they are generally 
forced to take up informal employment which exposes them to exploitation 
and once again takes them beyond the reach of protective laws.  
 
The issue of appropriate regulation will be more fully pursued in 
Chapter 5, but as a prelude one may well ask, first, whether subjecting illegal 
foreign workers to labour regulation will eliminate the aspects that encourage 
employers to exploit these workers. Second, can the answer to this particular 
illegality be found in a different interface between labour and immigration 
laws? Finally, why should the employer escape the wrath of labour law in the 
case of, for instance, unfair dismissal simply because of the status of the 
illegal foreign worker?185 
 
4.5.3.3   Child labour 
 
Analogous to the position of illegal foreigner workers (in the sense that 
the illegality concerns the status of the worker and not the work performed) is 
the position of child labourers. Section 43(3) of the BCEA provides that it is an 
offence to employ a child who is under the age of 15 years. The only available 
data on child labour in South Africa, albeit dated and perhaps unreliable 
                                                        
184  See Fakier (n 167) at 19. 
185  See generally O’Donnell, A and Mitchell, R ‘Immigrant Labour in Australia: The Regulatory 
Framework (2001) 14 AJLL 269. This should also be seen against the backdrop of the CCMA 
directive issued on 27 February 2008 in which it instructed its commissioners that in the case 
of disputes involving illegal foreigners, the CCMA should accept all referrals for illegal 
foreigners; accept jurisdiction; order compensation only in successful disputes and should 














because of the subject area, suggests that in 1999 approximately 1 million 
children between the ages of 5 and 14 years were involved in an economic 
activity of three hours or more in duration.186 While it is clear that this type of 
labour is illegal and that the court will be reluctant to give effect to any such 
arrangement for the policy reasons underpinning the prohibition of child 
labour, it is not clear how the courts will approach, for instance, a claim 
brought by a child (less than 15 years) in terms of COIDA. The point is that, 
quite apart from the worst forms of child labour such as prostitution and 
involvement with criminal activity, it is known that many children perform work 
in contravention of s 43 of the BCEA.  
 
4.5.3.3 Sex workers 
 
Hitherto the discussion has concerned an illegality relating to the status 
of the person working. It appears, however, that the labour tribunals will 
observe the same principles where the illegality concerns the actual work 
performed. On the basis that prostitution still constitutes a criminal offence, 
the commissioner in 'Kylie' and Van Zyl t/a Brigittes187 proceeded on the basis 
that the contract was illegal because the work performed constitutes an 
offence in terms of the Sexual Offences Act of 1957.188 On the basis that it is 
‘trite that the employment contract forms the basis of the employment 
relationship’189 and the common-rule law that illegal contracts are not 
enforceable, and further relying on a complete absence of any indication in 
                                                        
186  See ‘An Overview of Child Labour in South Africa’ accessed via http://www.child-
labour.org.za/south-africa/documents-and-laws/research-reports/survey-on-work-activities-of-
children/ (12 September 2007). Also see Budlender, D and Bosch, D ‘Investigation the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour No. 39 South Africa Child Domestic Workers: A National Report’ 









1&selectedSortById=4 (12 September 2007). Also see ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour 
Convention 182, 1999. 
187  (2007) 28 ILJ 470 (CCMA). For a discussion of this award see Bosch and Christie (n 178). 
188  Act 23 of 1957. 













the LRA that the legislature nonetheless intended the LRA to apply to illegal 
work, the commissioner declined jurisdiction. Bosch and Christie have raised 
similar arguments as those raised in the context of illegal foreigners regarding 
why sex workers should be regarded as employees for the purpose of the 
LRA and related legislation.190 For the moment, however, it appears that while 
labour courts and tribunals are prepared to give effect to something that in 
substance resembles a contract of employment, they are not yet prepared to 
do so when either the work or the status of the worker is tainted by an 
illegality. 
 
Although the nature of the sex worker’s work is extremely personal, 
conceptually there is no difference between a sex worker and, for example, a 
hairdresser in standard employment. As in the case of clergy, the only 
tangible difference is the absence of a contract of employment. 
 
4.6  Independent contractors and the self-employed 
 
Section 213 of the LRA, in the definition of employee, specifically 
excludes independent contractors from the definition of employee. This, as 
was illustrated in Chapter 2, was not always the case. In this chapter it was 
illustrated that industrial relations legislation in South Africa historically viewed 
and defined the meaning of employee in broad terms and it was only fairly late 
in the twentieth century that an employee was contrasted with an independent 
contractor.191 Ever since, like elsewhere, the search has been on to find the 
decisive defining element of employment.192 For the moment the concern is 
not with identifying that defining element, but rather to acknowledge that there 
are people who work, but who are not employees as traditionally understood. 
Since the decisive element of employment has always been elusive, it is of 
course very difficult to describe this form of engagement. However, 
acknowledging that there is a grey area, independent contractors would 
typically include those who contract to produce a result (the plumber or the 
                                                        
190  Bosch and Christie (n 178). 
191  See § 2.3.5. 













mechanic) and those who contract to render a personal service, but have an 
identifiable business of their own such as an attorney in private practice, a 
consultant193 or an agent.194 The latter is often referred to as the ‘genuinely 
self-employed’.195 In both cases, the client base would be diverse and there 
would be no exclusive economic dependence on one client.196 In other words, 
cancellation by one client, although perhaps not without financial implications, 
would not result in them not working at all.  
 
This is not to suggest that an independent contractor may not be 
extremely vulnerable. De Jongh refers to pockets of the so-called ‘Karretjie 
[donkey wagons] People of the Karoo’ (a semi-arid region in South Africa). 
Their numbers are unknown, but they have no fixed abode and move from 
farm to farm in the Karoo by donkey cart, performing shearing duties on farms 
where they are sometimes allowed to camp for the duration of the shearing. 
While their labour law status has never been researched, they are by all 
accounts, in labour terms, independent contractors. They provide their own 
shearing tools, are paid by the number of sheep sheared, determine their own 
working hours and although they tend to work in teams, individuals are 
basically free to leave before the shearing has been completed. Their 
bargaining power is limited and the rate of payment is almost exclusively 
determined by the farmer. However, they are not dependent on a single 
farmer and will simply move to another destination if rates cannot be 
negotiated or will simply camp next to roads and literally live off the land until 
another shearing assignment is found.197  
 
Easier to identify as the genuinely self-employed are those who work 
for themselves in the sense that they create a product which is delivered to 
                                                        
193  See Felstein v Coléo Beauty Products International CC (1991) 12 ILJ 399 (IC). 
194  SA Broadcasting Corporation v McKenzie (1999) 20 ILJ 585 (LAC). 
195  Davies and Freedland (n 13) at 273. 
196  Unlike, for instance, the position of the estate agent in Linda Erasmus Properties Enterprise 
(Pty) Ltd v Mhlongo & Others (2007) 28 ILJ 1100 (LC) who was allowed to work for only 
one company. Cf Bezer v Cruises International CC (2003) 24 ILJ 1372 (LC); Taljaard and 
Basil Real Estate (2006) 27 ILJ 861 (CCMA) and Borcherds v C W Pearce & F Sheward t/a 
Lubrite Distributors (1991) 12 ILJ 383 (IC). 
197  See De Jongh, M ‘Itinerant and Sedentary: Karretjie People, Agency and “Karoo Culture”’ 
(2000) 23(1) S Afr J Ethnol 1 and ‘No Fixed Abode: The Poorest of the Poor and Elusive 













one or more clients. In its most rudimentary form it would include the person 
making or producing something such as confectionery which he or she then 
sells once a week at the market. In other words there is no suggestion or 
sense of ‘working for another’, but the person clearly works on the basis of an 
obligation to him- or herself. 
 
Once a worker is in fact an independent contractor or is genuinely self-
employed, contrary to the position of the employee, he or she has no claim to 
the protection offered by labour and concomitant social welfare legislation, is 
excluded from the collective bargaining process, becomes a provisional 
taxpayer, and assumes the risks such as those associated with non-
performance or with his or her negligence in performing the service or 
producing the result. The question, further pursued in Chapter 5, is at what 
point this exclusion becomes untenable. 
 
4.7  Idiosyncratic forms of work 
 
4.7.1 Worker co-operatives 
 
The worker co-operative option is a form of self-help that resembles 
aspects of both self-employment and a partnership, without being either.198 
The worker co-operative is an entity created by the Co-operative Act of 
2005,199 which commenced on 2 May 2007. The Act allows a number of 
individuals to register a range of co-operatives, including worker co-
operatives, which have juristic personality.200 The members contribute the 
capital of the co-operative, which must have a constitution and must meet a 
number of co-operative principles,201 including mandatory establishment of 
                                                        
198  For more on co-operatives see Theron, J ‘Unions and the Co-operative Alternative (1)’ (2004) 
28(4) SALB 33 and Theron (n 78). Also see the report ‘Worker Co-operatives in the Western 
Cape’ prepared by the Labour and Enterprise Project, Institute of Development and Sociology 
Department, University of Cape Town, September 2003 for the Department of Labour; Philip, 
K ‘A Reality Check: Worker Co-ops in South Africa’ (2007) 31(1) SALB 45 and Theron, J 
‘“Remember Me, When it Goes Well for You”: What Role can South African Worker Co-ops 
Play?’ (2007) 31(4) SALB 13.  
199  Act 14 of 2005. 
200  Section 2(1)(c). Other forms of co-operatives include financial services co-operatives and 
agricultural co-operatives. 













reserves.202 The essential object of the worker co-operative is to enable the 
co-operative to employ its members and to share its profits amongst its 
members. Importantly, the Act provides that in the case of a worker co-
operative, a member is not an employee as defined by the LRA and the 
BCEA. However, for purposes of unemployment insurance, health and safety 
legislation and skills development, the worker co-operative is deemed to be 
the employer.203 This ensures that the member has access to various forms of 
social security upon termination of his or her membership. Since the member 
is in effect working for him- or herself, protection is presumably not necessary 
in the areas of typical exploitation by employers, namely, conditions of 
employment and dismissal.204 Furthermore, since the member will be 
productivity-driven, there are concerns that this (productivity-driven) 
environment may, as in the case of owner-driver schemes, prompt members 
to work longer and to take no leave, or during lean times may result in lower 
than minimum wages. The difference, however, is that in the case of owner-
driver schemes, control is still located elsewhere, whereas worker co-
operatives are democratic worker-owned entities.205 In other words the co-
operative is not an intermediary in the sense discussed above.206 However, 
the following arbitration award, albeit decided under the now repealed Co-
operative Act of 1981207 illustrates that there is potential for abuse. 
 
In National Bargaining Council of the Leather Industry of SA and 
Ballucci Footwear CC & Others208 the bargaining council questioned the 
withdrawal of an employer from the council on the basis that it no longer had 
any employees. The (original) employer incorporated two co-operatives under 
the Co-operatives Act of 1981 and outsourced its entire production to one of 
the co-operatives, which, in turn engaged the second co-operative to execute 
                                                        
202  Section 3(1)(e). 
203  See item 6 of Part 2 of Schedule 1 of Act 14 of 2005. 
204  Worker co-operatives may employ non-members in which case the full suite of labour 
legislation will apply. However, item 3(1)(c) of Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the Co-operative Act 
14 of 2005 limits the number of employees that a worker co-operative may employ to 25 per 
cent of its membership. These employees are subject to all labour legislation. 
205  Theron (n 78) at 63. 
206  § 4.4.2.2. 
207  Act 91 of 1981. 













the work. The employer basically forced all its previous employees to become 
members of the second co-operative or be dismissed. It appeared that 
unemployment insurance payments were still made but, despite promises that 
terms and conditions would not change, the employer showed very little 
regard for dismissal procedures and basically changed conditions of 
employment at will under the guise of its commercial arrangement with the 
two co-operatives. The arbitrator found that the arrangement was a sham and 
ordered the employer to re-register as a member of the council and to 
observe the provisions of the relevant collective agreement. 
 
Members of worker co-operatives are clearly workers in the ‘Supiot 
sense’ of the word, but their formal status can be located somewhere in the 
gap between what are traditionally regarded as employees and independent 
contractors or self-employed workers. While it is simply too early to assess 
the new model, the access that it provides to post-employment social security 
for those who would otherwise (as self-employed workers) be deprived of 
such access certainly provides a strategy that could be usefully considered in 




A partnership is a legal contractual relationship between at least two 
and not more than 20 persons in which the parties agree to carry on a lawful 
enterprise in common, to which each, with the object of making and sharing 
profits, contributes something of commercial value.209  
 
It is easy to see how this commercial form can be abused to disguise 
an employment relationship, particularly since the contribution by a partner 
make take the form of labour, although the joint and several liability of the 
partners for partnership debts militates against such abuse (at least from the 
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point of view of the worker). 210 Nonetheless, even in the case of a bona fide 
partnership, it would be fair to say that services rendered by partners to the 
partnership are work as contemplated by Supiot, the origin of the obligation to 
work being the partnership agreement. 
 
4.7.3 Students undergoing vocational work 
 
Reference was made above to the position of genuine volunteer 
workers.211 They were distinguished from students undergoing vocational 
training on the basis that the former has an element of communitarianism, 
whereas the latter primarily serves an educational purpose and is often part of 
the requirements for a formal educational qualification. Another reason for 
making the distinction is that legislative attention is given to students 
undergoing vocational training and to contracts of learnership, albeit limited, 
as opposed to the position in respect of genuine volunteer workers.  
 
Landman explains the need for protecting students in this context as 
follows: 
 
Students are particularly vulnerable when confronted with the 
requirement that they perform practical work. The requirement is 
invariably non-negotiable. Students, when performing this work, may 
be disadvantaged by long hours, inadequate spreadovers, 
unreasonable overtime, and other unfavourable working conditions. 
The student may be reluctant to complain about these deficiencies. 
Like the conventional employee, they occupy a subordinate position in 
the workplace. Moreover students have an overarching desire to obtain 
the important certificate, diploma or degree. The possibility of 
victimization is an ever present insidious fear (if only in the mind of the 
student).212 
 
                                                        
210  See Purdon v Muller 1961 (2) SA 211 (A) at 220C-E. Also see Oosthuizen v C A N Mining & 
Engineering Supplies CC (1999) 20 ILJ 910 (LC) at par 8. 
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In the following paragraphs the legislation protecting those undergoing 
vocational training and learners will briefly be considered: 
 
While the BCEA does not include students in its definition of 
employee,213 the Act does apply to persons undergoing vocational training, 
except to the extent that any term or condition of their employment is 
regulated by the provisions of any other law.214 In other words, the Act does 
not view them as employees, but still regards them as worthy of protection 
similar to that offered to employees. However, no similar provision is found in 
the LRA, the UIA or the EEA. ‘Vocational training’ is not defined in the BCEA 
and it is not at all certain whether someone outside formal educational 
structures, offering his or her services for the sake of gaining experience, will 
be covered by these provisions.215 In one bargaining council arbitration216 the 
arbitrator did not specifically consider the meaning of vocational training in the 
BCEA in his award, but held that a student undergoing vocational training in 
terms of a sponsorship agreement was not an employee for purposes of the 
BCEA. The student in this matter was sponsored by the ‘employer’ to undergo 
training at its training centre. It was a term of the agreement that on the 
successful completion of his training the employer would have the first option 
of offering the student employment. The sponsorship agreement required the 
student to render services in the laboratory and to perform other functions 
while undergoing training. He received a monthly allowance on which he paid 
PAYE. The student approached the tribunal on the basis that the employer’s 
failure to offer him the same conditions of employment (such as hours of work 
and paid leave) as the other employees constituted an unfair labour practice 
in terms of the LRA. No reference is made in the award to the provisions in 
the BCEA dealing with vocational training. The commissioner’s approach is, 
however, problematic since the student approached the tribunal in terms of 
the LRA, but the commissioner dealt with the issue in terms of the BCEA. 
Furthermore, the commissioner did not consider the presumption as to who is 
                                                        
213  Section 1. 
214  Section 3(2). 
215  Murray (n 149) refers to this person as the precarious volunteer worker. It can perhaps be 
argued that his or her position more closely resembles the position of the genuine volunteer 
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an employee at all. Reliance on the presumption may have been beneficial to 
the student’s case.  
 
The OHSA makes no specific reference to students and one can only 
speculate whether the definition of employee in s 1 as somebody ‘who works 
under the supervision of an employer or any other person’ may be regarded 
as broad enough to include students. Section 1(2), however, makes provision 
for the Minister of Labour to declare persons belonging to a specific category 
of persons to be deemed employees and thus the person supervising them 
would be deemed to be the employer. Landman has suggested that this 
provision be used to bring students within the ambit of this Act.217  
 
The SDA provides for a learnership agreement, which is a tripartite 
agreement between a learner, an employer or group of employers, and an 
accredited training provider, offering the learner the combined benefit of 
working experience and training opportunities.218 The terms and conditions of 
learners under a learnership agreement who were not in the employment of 
the employer party at the time of the learnership agreement are regulated by 
Sectoral Determination 5 issued in terms of the BCEA. These learners are 
excluded from the application of the UIA.219 
 
COIDA does not refer to students undergoing vocational training, but 
the definition of employee in s 1 of COIDA includes ‘a person who has 
entered into or works under a contract of service or of apprenticeship or 
learnership’. Learnership is not defined in the Act, and again one can 
speculate whether it is broad enough to include a student undergoing 
vocational training. In ER24 Holdings v Smith NO,220 however, the SCA was 
not prepared to regard a student who was not a learner, but who was 
undergoing vocational training, as covered by COIDA.221 
 
                                                        
217  Landman (n 212). 
218  Section 17. 
219  Section 4(1)(b). The sectoral determination is published under GN 519 in GG 22370 of 15 
June 2001. 
220  [2007] SCA 55 (RSA). 













On balance, both learners registered under contracts of learnership 
and students undergoing vocational training appear to be protected in respect 
of conditions of work. Students undergoing vocational training are, however, 
not covered in respect of employment equity, unemployment insurance and 
workplace injuries and diseases.222 Learners are covered by COIDA. 
 
The above illustrates two things. First, there is need for the BCEA (and 
other legislation) to define more clearly what is meant by vocational training. 
Second, there is a danger that if employers are forced to observe the full suite 
of labour laws in respect of students it may discourage them from offering 
such training. This suggests that a more considered and, at the same time, a 
more diverse approach (such as has been suggested in the case of casual 
labour) via a sectoral determination is perhaps required in respect of students 
undergoing vocational training. 
 
4.7.4 Students (as students) 
 
Can it be said students are working when they do what they are 
supposed to do, namely, study? Relying on the Supiot definition of work 
quoted at the start of this chapter, one may well argue that students are 
working when they are attending lectures, preparing for examinations or 
writing dissertations. Whether it can be claimed that this process of acquiring 
knowledge and skills and general self-promotion is a form of work that 
protective labour law should regulate is doubtful. However, in a recent 
judgment of the Hoge Raad in the Netherlands,223 the court was prepared to 
accept that a bursary holder at a university, by doing research, advances the 
core objective of the university and the bursary holder’s activities therefore 
amounted to arbeid for purposes of the arbeidsovereenkomst as defined in 
the BW. There is South African case law that suggests that a school would be 
vicariously liable for damages arising out of unlawful assaults by duly 
                                                        
222  Landman (n 212) at 1306 suggests that s 83(1)(a) and (b) which enables the Minister of 
Labour to extend the provisions of the EEA, the OHSA, COIDA and the UIA to categories of 
persons such as students may not pass constitutional muster on the basis that it empowers the 
Minister to alter the BCEA which is the basis of many other statutes. 
223  Universiteit van Amsterdam/Lemmes NJ 2007 447. Also see Verhulp, E note with HR 13 













appointed prefects as it would be for assaults by a teacher employed by the 
school, but it is doubtful whether these sentiments can be extended to 
protective labour legislation where the student or learner is not given any form 
of authority (like a prefect).224 
 
4.7.5 Exclusions in the LRA and BCEA and other legislation 
 
The LRA and the BCEA do not apply to the National Intelligence 
Agency and the South African Secret Service. The LRA also does not apply to 
the National Defence Force, but the BCEA does.225 COIDA does not apply to 
some members of the Defence Force and the Police Force.  
 
It has, however, been held that although dedicated legislation fails to 
give effect to it, those who work for these services are still entitled to rely on 
the constitutional right to fair labour practices in s 23. In South African 
National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and Another226 the 
Constitutional Court held that the position of enlisted soldiers is akin to an 
employment relationship and for that reason they are still workers for the 
purpose of s 23 of the Constitution and entitled to form and join trade unions, 
but they are not entitled to strike. In addition, despite being specifically 
excluded from the processes and structures provided for in the LRA and 
BCEA, soldiers are still entitled to enforce their contracts of employment in the 
common-law courts.227 
 
Due to the nature of these services and the constitutional imperative ‘to 
defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in 
accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law 
                                                        
224  Hiltonian Society v Crofton 1952 (3) SA 130 (A) and Dowling v Diocesan College and Others 
1999 (3) SA 847 (C). 
225  It is to be noted that the National Defence Force is not excluded from the application of the 
BCEA. See s 3 of the BCEA (as amended by s 40(1) of the Intelligence Services Act 65 of 
2002). In Bongo v Minister of Defence & Others (2006) 27 ILJ 799 (LC) it was held that while 
the National Defence Force is excluded from the application of the LRA, the labour court, by 
virtue of s 77(3) of the BCEA, still has jurisdiction to adjudicate any matter concerning a 
contract of employment to which the National Defence Force is a party. 
226  1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC) at par 24. Also see § 5.2.2.3. 













regulating the use of force’228 and to do so dispassionately,229 there may be 
good reasons to exclude them from mainstream labour legislation.230 The 
point is that, despite the special nature of the services, it is still work that is 
being performed. 
 
4.7.6 Presidential appointments, parliamentarians and ministerial 
appointments 
 
The Constitution provides for a number of appointments by the 
President such as the appointment of cabinet ministers,231 the commissioner 
of police232 and the head of the national intelligence services.233 While some 
of these appointees may find themselves covered by at least some labour 
legislation, it appears that the termination of their services is basically the 
prerogative of the President, provided that he or she does not act in bad faith, 
arbitrarily or irrationally. However, where such appointments are linked to a 
term and the dismissed person was not in breach, early termination still 
entitles that person to payment in respect of the remainder of the term.234 
 
                                                        
228  Section 200(2) of the Constitution. 
229  See s 199(7) of the Constitution. Also see National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and 
Another 1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC) at par 12 and SA National Defence Union v Minister of 
Defence & Others (2007) 28 ILJ 1909 (CC) at pars 86 and 98. 
230  This is also consistent with ILO Conventions. In National Defence Union v Minister of 
Defence and Another 1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC) O’Regan J at par 26 commented as follows in 
this regard: ‘Article 2 of ILP Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention 87, 1948, the first major Convention of the ILO concerning freedom of 
association, which South Africa ratified in 1995, provides that: “Workers and employers, 
without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules 
of the organisation concerned, to join organisations of their own choosing without previous 
authorisation.” Article 9(1) of the same Convention provides: “The extent to which the 
guarantees provided for in this Convention shall apply to the armed forces and the police shall 
be determined by national laws and regulations.” It is clear from these provisions, therefore, 
that the Convention does include “armed forces and the police” within its scope, but that the 
extent to which the provisions of the Convention shall be held to apply to such services is a 
matter for national law and is not governed directly by the Convention. This approach has also 
been adopted in the ILO Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 98, 1949 
which South Africa ratified in 1995. The ILO therefore considers members of the armed 
forces and the police to be workers for the purposes of these Conventions, but considers that 
their position is special, to the extent that it leaves it open to member states to determine the 
extent to which the provisions of the Conventions should apply to members of the armed 
forces and the police.’ 
231  Section 91. 
232  Section 205. 
233  Section 209. 













The position of parliamentarians concerns at least two work 
relationships: one with the political party that they represent and one with 
Parliament where they enjoy certain constitutional benefits. There can be no 
doubt that they are working when they serve either of these relationships, but 
their constitutional position and the nature of elected politics probably render 
these work relationships inappropriate for regulation by mainstream labour 
legislation. This was the argument before the Labour Court when the status of 
parliamentarians was considered in Charlton v Parliament of the Republic of 
South Africa.235 This matter concerned the Protected Disclosures Act of 2000 
(PDA).236 The chief financial officer of Parliament was dismissed after making 
certain disclosures to the secretary of parliament concerning certain members 
of parliament. He claimed that his disclosure was a protected disclosure as 
defined in s 1 of the PDA. The essence of a protected disclosure is that the 
disclosure made to the employer will only be protected if it concerns the 
conduct of the employer or employees of the employer. Parliament argued 
that since the disclosure concerned members of parliament who are not 
employees, the PDA did not apply. The PDA does not have a presumption in 
favour of employees similar to the one in the LRA and the BCEA but, 
nevertheless, defines employee in the same terms as do the LRA and the 
BCEA. The Labour Court, in finding that parliamentarians are employees, 
made it clear that this finding related to the PDA only and was therefore not 
authority for the broader application of labour legislation to parliamentarians:  
 
I am satisfied that Parliament does have business, which is to 
legislate for the Republic of South Africa. I accordingly reject the 
submission that Parliament has no business. 
 
The MPs fit into the definition of ‘employee’. They perform duties 
for Parliament being an organ of the State. They are entitled to and do 
receive remuneration. . . They are not paid by the parties who elected 
them into Parliament. It is not a requirement that remuneration is only 
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payable in terms of the employment contract. The payment to MPs is a 
reward for services rendered to Parliament.  
 
The MPs assist in the legislation which is the business of 
Parliament. The second part of the definition of the ‘employee’ does not 
require that payment to be made to a person for him or her to qualify as 
an employee. What is required is that that person must be assisting in 
carrying on or conducting the business of an employer. I have 
mentioned that the business of the Legislature is the legislation. That is 
what the MPs are doing. That places them within the definition of 
employees. My conclusion is that the MPs are employees in terms of 
the PDA 26 of 2000.237 
 
Despite this judgment, it is still suggested that it is inappropriate to 
regard parliamentarians as employees for purposes of mainstream legislation 
despite the fact that they are undoubtedly working. It is in any event doubtful 
whether it was necessary to approach the matter as the court in Charlton 
did.238 However, what is important is that in its consideration of the definition 
of employee, the court expressed views on the meaning of the common-law 
contract of employment consistent with those expressed in recent Labour 
Court judgments239 on the definition of employee in the LRA (which is exactly 
the same as the definition in the PDA). 
 
Members of statutory boards, it has been held, are not employees, 
particularly when the board is required by statute to exercise its powers and 
functions independently and free from governmental, political or other outside 
influence.240 
 
                                                        
237  At pars 21-23. 
238  The court further found that parliamentarians are also employers in terms of the PDA and for 
that reason the disclosure would also have been protected. This finding, in isolation, is perhaps 
correct, but the finding that they are simultaneously employees and employers is less 
palatable. 
239  Most notably White v Pan Palladium SA (Pty) Ltd (2006) 27 ILJ 2721 (LC). Also see 
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The status of judges in terms of employment law was considered by 
the Namibian Labour Court.241 In this matter a judge of the High Court of 
Namibia made urgent application to the Namibian Labour Court for an order 
directing the government to desist from unilaterally altering his terms and 
conditions of employment by depriving him of his entitlement to the provision 
of water, electricity and refuse removal at no charge to himself. It held, 
correctly it is suggested, that a judge is not an employee of the state since it 
would compromise the independence of the judiciary. This does not negate 
the fact that judges are still working when they perform their judicial duties. 
 
4.7.8 Unpaid work and caring responsibilities 
 
The interface between market and non-market work, or the work/life 
cycle as it is commonly referred to, has received much attention, particularly 
from feminist scholars.242 While it is generally conceded that it does not 
exclusively concern women workers, the increasing feminisation of the labour 
market highlights the need for labour regulation to recognise the 
vulnerabilities of those workers who enter the labour market with caring 
responsibilities of children, the infirm or the aged – responsibilities which, in 
South Africa, are expected to increase in view of the HIV/Aids pandemic.  
 
The claim that that the labour market should address the work/life 
conflict is not pursued here, but the significance of this scholarship is the fact 
that it has highlighted the reality that these caring responsibilities also amount 
to work, albeit non-paid and more often than not arising from a family 
relationship. 
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Whether, in isolation, unpaid work of this nature should be regulated by 
labour law is doubtful, but the fact is that it is now generally accepted that it is 
a form of work. 
 
4.8 The informal labour market 
 
In Chapter 3 brief reference was made to the informal labour market 
and the limitations of labour law in this regard,243 and in the above discussion 
reference was made only in passing to work performed in the informal labour 
market (for example, by homeworkers and illegal immigrants). This chapter 
would, however, be incomplete and misleading without again emphasising the 
existence and extent of the informal labour market which is a growing 
phenomenon here and elsewhere,244 despite, in the case of South Africa, it 
being almost non-existent in the apartheid labour market.245  
 
There is strong evidence to suggest that both casualisation and 
externalisation promote informalisation. However, since informalisation is not 
only the result of these processes, it is more appropriate to address it 
separately. 
 
The absence of a generally accepted definition appears to be one of 
the reasons for the difficulty in measuring the informal labour market.246 
However, the September 2006 LFS247 estimates informal sector employment 
to be 18,7 per cent or 2 379 000 jobs.248 For purposes of the LFS domestic 
                                                        
243  § 3.3.4. Also see § 5.8. 
244  ‘The Informal Plague Goes Global’ (2005) 29(1) SALB 44.  
245  Spaza shops, tuck shops, hawker tables, craft markets, informal markets and traffic vendors 
are all places of trade associated with the informal retail sector and have increased 
significantly in post-apartheid South Africa. See Atkinson, D ‘Spaza, Hawkers and Policy 
Challenges’ 2006, unpublished paper. For case studies on the informal labour market see 
Philip, K ‘Rural Enterprise: Work on the Margins’ in Webster, E and Von Holdt, K (eds) 
Beyond The Apartheid Workplace: Studies in Transition (2005) 361-386. For a case study on 
informal urban street traders and their attempts at organisation see Webster, E ‘New Forms of 
Work and the Representational Gap: A Durban Case Study’ in Webster, E and Von Holdt, K 
(eds) Beyond The Apartheid Workplace: Studies in Transition (2005) 387-405. 
246  See Theron ‘Employment is Not What it Used to Be’ (n 12) at 1263 and Atkinson (n 245). 
247  Statistical release PO210 (n 15). In the context of the informal measurements the LFS is 
subject to the same criticism expressed in § 4.2. 
248  For more on the size of the informal labour market see Clarke et al ‘Workers’ Protection: An 













workers and agricultural workers are measured separately. The informal 
sector proper therefore includes those who work for an employer (or business, 
institution or private individual) who is not registered for that activity. The 
domestic sector was estimated to represent 886 000 jobs and agriculture to 
represent 1 088 000 jobs.249 The LFS also suggests that workers with the 
lowest income are found in the informal sector,250 clearly illustrating the 
vulnerability of those in this sector.251 
 
Much has been written about the need to find ways to extend 
mainstream labour regulation to the informal sector in South Africa and 
elsewhere.252 The point is that, but for the progress made in the domestic 
sector,253 those working in the informal South African labour market still find 
themselves beyond the reach of most protective labour laws.254 Importantly, 
as suggested above, the processes of casualisation and externalisation 
facilitate informalisation and the concomitant erosion of worker rights: 
 
Labour-only subcontracting [in the construction sector] therefore 
provides a very clear example of externalisation, casualisation and 
informalisation working in tandem, with externalisation being the main 
driving force and informalisation being the outcome . . . the 
externalisation results in non-compliance by the labour-only 
subcontractors, which means that the workers become part of the 
growing informal component of the construction sector.255 
 
                                                        
249  See Statistical release PO210 (n 15) Table K.  
250  See Statistical release PO210 (n 15) Table 3.5. 
251  See the example of the Karretjie people in note 197. 
252  See, for instance, Atkinson (n 245); Quinlan (n 41) and Olivier, M ‘Extending Employment 
Injury and Disease Protection to Non-traditional and Informal Economy Workers: The Quest 
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The answer to this dilemma is probably twofold. First, protective 
legislation needs to be extended to at least some of those working in the 
informal labour market by either formalising these workers or by providing 
access to social security. The latter, as was shown in Chapter 3, is in any 
event a constitutional imperative by virtue of s 27 of the Constitution, which 
not only provides that everyone has a right of access to social security, but 
also to appropriate social assistance if they are unable to support 
themselves.256 Second, some of the processes facilitating infomalisation must 
be stopped. These include casualisation and externalisation, but the exclusion 
of, for instance, illegal foreign workers from protective labour legislation and 
lack of available jobs in the formal labour market are all contributory factors.257 
The fact is that these workers are excluded from protective labour legislation 
and the difficulty of organising in this market deprives them of a collective 
voice.258 
 
4.9  Conclusion 
 
From the above exploration of the world of work it is clear that work is 
not limited to engagement through a contract of employment. It is equally 
clear that all these forms of work are not suitable for regulation – at least not 
labour regulation. The reason for this is that the nature of the work is 
sometimes such that labour regulation will negate the fundamental essence of 
that work since its performance goes to the heart of a principle such as the 
separation of powers, for example, the work performed by a judge. In other 
instances the elements of control and discipline, which are not as such foreign 
to the employment relationship, are taken to such extremes that it is simply 
not compatible with an employment relationship, for example, the work done 
by soldiers.  
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Between these extremes, on the one hand, and the relationships which 
are traditionally covered by labour regulation, on the other hand, are many 
forms of engagement that are not regulated by the contract of employment, 
but nonetheless involve the performance of work that calls for labour 
regulation. This is not only because of their interrelationship with the broader 
labour market, but because labour law will fail in its purpose, as identified in 
Chapter 3, if regulation is not extended to these forms of work, particularly 
since more often than not these forms of work are performed by vulnerable 
workers who are not in a position to command protection without legislative 
support.  
 
In reflecting on the role of the contract of employment in marginalising 
these workers, a distinction must be made between (A) those workers who 
lack protection because no discernible or valid contract of employment can be 
identified, and (B) those workers who actuallly work in terms of a contract of 
employment and for that reason are deprived of protection. 
 
The former category (A), in turn, can be divided into two further sub-
categories. First, there are those who work for another in terms of 
arrangements which are judged not to be contracts of employment (which 
represents what one may term the traditional problem). In other words the 
self-employed worker and independent contractor. This has become even 
more problematic in the context of externalisation through the 
commodification of the employment relationship by using commercial 
structures such as agency or franchising. As has always been the case, the 
challenge that remains is where to draw the line of protection and, more 
particularly, to find the point at which the legislature ought to desist from 
interfering with a truly entrepreneurial spirit prepared to take the associated 
risks. The second sub-category is those who work in the absence of a 
contract of employment. This category includes workers who concluded an 
arrangement to work, but not an arrangement to be employed (for example, 
the clergy, those undergoing vocational training and volunteers) and those 
who work under a contract that is invalid under common law (for example, 













of employment is equated to a common-law contract, will present 
insurmountable problems and may require legislative intervention to serve 
policy considerations. 
 
 The latter category (B) (those workers who work in terms of a contract 
of employment and for that reason are deprived of protection) primarily 
concerns externalisation through an intermediary. In such cases it is relatively 
easy to identify a contract of employment and a nominal employer. However, 
because the relationship is subjugated to a commercial arrangement between 
the nominal employer and a third party (or a number of third parties) and 
because of the weakness of the nominal employer, the employment 
relationship is hollow. The challenge is therefore to find ways to make the 
commercial entity (the third party) more directly accountable. This may require 
either a further evolution of the contract of employment or a development of 
the common law, or both. While, because of the way they have been dealt 
with by the legislature, the problems presented by TESs may admittedly 
require a slightly different approach, TESs are structurally consistent with 
other forms of externalisation and should, it is suggested, conceptually be 
approached on the same basis. Ultimately, in the case of this form of 
externalisation, the issue may well be reduced to the question of who the 
employer is. 
 
It is difficult to blame the marginalisation of workers in the case of 
casualisation on the contract of employment (as the means delivering 
protection). However, its unitary nature and the consequent ‘sameness’ of the 
protections available to various forms of casualised labour may be the 
incentive for externalisation, primarily through labour broking. In other words, 
if labour broking is the engine that drives externalisation, the unitary concept 
of the contract of employment is, it is suggested, the key that starts the 
engine. Accepting that there is a need for casualised labour, restructuring the 
various forms of casual labour by allowing for greater variation, as was done 
in Sectoral Determination 9 in respect of the wholesale and retail sector, may 














By bringing some of the above forms of work into the protective net of 
labour legislation and by limiting casualisation, the growth of the informal 
labour market may be slowed down. However, it appears to be a trend that is 
here to stay and it may require innovative legislative steps, unrelated to the 
contract of employment and, as was suggested in Chapter 3, perhaps even 
beyond labour laws, to ensure that at least some protection is available to 
those working in this part of the world of work. 
 
While there is a clearly a need to extend the coverage of labour 
legislation to more forms of work, in the case of some forms of work there 
may be merit in a diverse approach similar to the one followed in the case of 
worker co-operatives, where only some labour legislation is extended to the 
workers in question, particularly in the areas where they are most vulnerable. 
 
Finally, the contract of employment is clearly responsible for the lack of 
protection in certain areas. In other areas it is difficult to blame the contract of 
employment for the predicament of the workers. The challenge is to find ways 
of making the contract of employment more efficient in delivering basic 
protection to the workers in the areas where it can. This will require the 
contract of employment to transform (once more) into a form that can 
accommodate the modern world of work, a process made so much easier by 
the evolutionary nature of the contract of employment and an understanding 





                                                        
259  See Merritt, AS ‘The Historical Role in the Regulation of Employment – Abstentionist or 














WHITHER THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT? 




Having reflected upon the world of work and having established the 
relatively unitary nature of the contract of employment in South Africa, the 
following question remains: How should the contract of employment and the 
broad notion of employment be transformed to meet the challenges of the 
new world of work and, more particularly, to ensure that the purposes of 
labour law, as identified in Chapter 3, are fulfilled? 
 
It is suggested that the future landscape of employment and thus the 
future evolution of the contract of employment will be determined by 
answering a number of fundamental questions: Should the contract of 
employment be equated with the common-law contract? How can the 
traditional problem (the difference between an employee and an independent 
contractor) be resolved? How can the tide of externalisation be stemmed? If a 
diverse approach is followed in respect of the contract of employment, would 
it be justifiable in view of the constitutional imperative of equality? Put 
differently, what is to be done about the two most prominent guards patrolling 
the binary divide: the contract of employment still seen as a common-law 
device and the preoccupation with direct employment? 
 
The focus of this chapter will be the contract of employment and its link 
with the common law. This chapter will attempt to show that the Constitution 
allows for employment to be understood in much broader terms than hitherto 
thought possible.  
 
 The chapter will commence with a brief review of the legislative regime 
in South Africa and, in particular, the Constitution. In this regard the focus will 
be on s 23 of the Constitution. This will be followed by an examination of the 













employment. In doing so, matters such as illegality, economic dependence 
and the potential for diversification will be (re)visited. In assessing the value of 
the constitutional model, developed in the course of the chapter, comparisons 
will made with other models and techniques that have been developed to 
address the limitations of the contract of employment. These include deeming 
provisions, the ‘worker category’ used in Britain and the personal employment 
contract/personal work nexus model. While not the central focus of this 
chapter, the future of the second of the guards patrolling the binary divide – 
the fixation with direct employment – will be speculated upon in the final 
section. 
 
5.2 The statutory regime1 
 
5.2.1 The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) 
 
The central South African statute governing employment is the LRA. But for 
soldiers and spies,2 the LRA applies to all employees. Section 213 of the LRA 
defines an employee as ‘any person, excluding an independent contractor, 
who works for another person or the State and who receives, or is entitled to 
receive any remuneration; and any other person who in any manner assists in 
carrying out or conducting the business of the employer’. This must be read in 
conjunction with the presumption about who is an employee in s 200A of the 
LRA.3  
 
As was illustrated in Chapter 2, the courts were very seldom called 
upon to interpret the substantive meaning of the definition of employee in 
industrial relations legislation prior to 1979. It was further highlighted that the 
few pre-1979 judgments available on the issue suggest that the definition of 
employee was regarded as broader than the one created under the common-
                                                        
1  The chapter draws extensively from conclusions made in Chapter 2, in particular § 2.3.5, as 
well as a note published by the author: Le Roux, R ‘The Worker: Towards Labour Law’s New 
Vocabulary’ (2007) 124 SALJ 469. 
2  Section 2 of the LRA. 
3  The presumption applies only to persons who earn less than R115 572, 00 per annum: Section 














law contract of employment.4 It was only after the introduction of the unfair 
labour practice doctrine into industrial relations legislation in 1979 that the 
industrial court transplanted the contractual model that developed under 
judgments on vicarious liability5 and workmen’s compensation legislation6 to 
industrial relations legislation.7 
 
Independent contractors were formally excluded only from the 1995 
definition of an employee. The courts and labour tribunals interpreted this 
exclusion as the final endorsement of the contractual model.8 Consequently, 
because no such contract has been concluded for want of, for instance, 
legality9 or the required intent10 or on the basis that the person rendering the 
service is an independent contractor, the courts and labour tribunals have 
often declined to find an employment relationship for the purposes of the LRA. 
 
However, as is illustrated by more recent judgments, the modern 
manifestation of work is forcing the courts to reinterpret the meaning of 
employee. Judgments such as Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber11 (which emphasised 
substance over form) and White v Pan Palladium SA (Pty) Ltd12 (where the 
court, albeit obiter, questioned the traditional wisdom of viewing employment 
in terms of a contract recognised at common law) are clear signals that the 
courts have come to realise that the traditional understanding of an employee 
                                                        
4  See R v Chaplin 1931 OPD 172 and R v Berman & Others 1932 CPD 133 both decided under 
the Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924. 
5  Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v MacDonald 1931 AD 412. 
6  Smit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) SA 51 (A). 
7  Tuck v SA Broadcasting Corporation (1985) 6 ILJ 570 (IC); SA Master Dental Technicians 
Association v Dental Association of SA & Others 1970 (3) SA 733 (A); Borcherds v C W 
Pearce & J Sheward T/A Lubrite Distributors (1993) 14 ILJ 1262 (LAC); Dempsey v Home & 
Property (1993) 14 ILJ 1547 (IC); Dempsey v Home and Property (1995) 16 ILJ 378 (LAC); 
Erasmus v Saambou Versekeringsmakelaars (Edms) Bpk & ’n Ander [1995] 2 BLLR 57 (IC); 
Board of Executors Ltd v McCafferty (1997) 18 ILJ 949 (LAC) and Liberty Life Association of 
Africa Ltd v Niselow (1996) 17 ILJ 673 (LAC). 
8  Also see Benjamin, P ‘An Accident of History: Who is (and Who Should Be) an Employee 
under South African Labour Law’ (2004) 25 ILJ 787 at 789.  
9  ‘Kylie’ and Michelle van Zyl t/a Brigettes (2007) 28 ILJ 470 (CCMA); Mthethwa v Vorna 
Valley Spar (1996) 7 (11) SALLR 83 (CCMA); Moses v Safika Holdings (Pty) Ltd (2001) 22 
ILJ 1261 (CCMA) par 16 and Georgieva – Deyanova / Craighall Spar [2004] 9 BALR 1143 
(CCMA). 
10  Church of the Province of Southern Africa Diocese of Cape Town v CCMA & Others (2001) 
22 ILJ 2274 (LC) and Salvation Army (South African Territory) v Minister of Labour (2001) 
22 ILJ 2274 (LC). 
11  (2005) 26 ILJ 1256 (LAC). 













and the independent contractor – hitherto regarded as no man’s land – is real 
and in need of regulation. Clearly sensing that the courts were straining at a 
gnat, the Department of Labour in December 2006 published the ‘Code of 
Good Practice: Who is an employee?’ (the Code).13  
 
However, one may reasonably ask whether these judgments provide 
meaningful guidance on how to understand employment in the future. The 
same applies to the Code. It reiterates existing techniques such as the 
dominant impression test, revisits s 200A of the LRA,14 stresses the 
importance of substance over form15 and alludes to the potential of the 
second leg of the definition in s 213 of the LRA. But does it provide new 
insights into understanding employment relationships and what to make of the 
common-law dichotomy between an employee and an independent 
contractor?  
 
While this legislative regime and the above jurisprudential 
developments, as will be illustrated below, collectively and in tandem with the 
Constitution provide a means of addressing the new world of work, these 
judicial pronouncements also signal discontent with one of the guards 
patrolling the binary divide: the notion that the contract of employment must 
be viewed in common-law terms.  
 







                                                        
13  Published under GN 1774 in GG 29445 of 1 December 2006. This Code was published partly 
to give effect to the ILO Employment Relationship Recommendation 198, 2006 and also as 
the result of s 200(4) of the LRA, relating to the presumption as to who is an employee, which 
provides that a Code of Good Practice must be prepared that sets out guidelines for 
determining whether persons are employees. Also see § 2.3.5.4.3. 
14  See Parts 2 and 3 of the Code. 

















Some aspects of the Constitution have already been discussed in the 
context of the purpose of labour law in Chapter 3. In Chapter 3 it was shown 
that the fundamental right in the Bill of Rights most closely associated with 
employment is the right to fair labour practices in s 23 of the Constitution.16 
Nonetheless, although the constitutional rights to equality, dignity, privacy and 
social security are of more universal application than the right to fair labour 
practices, these rights remain immensely important in the context of 
employment.17 It was further shown that s 23 is one of the unusual 
constitutional rights which concern themselves primarily with the exercise of 
private rather than public power.18 
 
Once a court is satisfied that a provision of the Bill of Rights applies to 
private relationships, it must determine whether there is legislation giving 
effect to that right. If there is such legislation, it must be applied.19 If the 
legislation fails to give effect to the relevant constitutional right, the litigant 
must challenge the constitutionality of the legislation and is not allowed to rely 
directly on the Constitution.20 If the legislation fails to give effect to the 
constitutional right, ‘the court must determine whether the restricted legislative 
expression of the right constitutes a lacuna or a limitation.’21 In the case of a 
lacuna, the court must apply or develop the common law to give effect to the 
                                                        
16  Section 23 of the Constitution is reproduced in § 3.7. 
17  See in this regard Du Toit, D and Potgieter, M ‘Labour in the Bill of Rights’ in Bill of Rights 
Compendium Service Issue 21 (2007) 4B-1 – 4B-60 at 4B-43 – 4B-60. 
18  See § 3.7. Also see Cheadle, M and Davis, D ‘Structure of the Bill of Rights’ in Cheadle, 
MH; Davis, DM and Haysom, NRL South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 2ed  
issue 1 (2005) 1-1 – 1-10 at 1-2; Davis, D ‘Interpretation of the Bill of Rights’ in Cheadle et 
al 33-1 – 33-13 at 33-5 – 33-7 and Cheadle, M ‘Labour Relations’ in Cheadle et al 18-1 – 18-
38 at 18-7. 
19  Hoffman v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) at 14E-G; NAPTOSA and Others v 
Minister of Education, Western Cape and Others (2001) 22 ILJ 889 (C) at 896D-G and 
AMPOFO and Others v MEC, Arts, Culture, Sports and Recreation: Northern Province and 
Another (2001) 22 ILJ 1975 (T) at 1989G-1992H. 
20  SA National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and Another 1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC) at 
par 51. 













right. If, however, the legislation limits the constitutional right, the court must 
assess whether the limitation may be justified under s 36 of the Constitution. 
 
If there is no legislation at all giving effect to the fundamental right, s 
8(3) of the Constitution provides that the court must consider whether the 
common law gives effect to the right. If so, the court must apply the common-
law rule. If the common law does not give effect to the right, the court must 
develop the common law to give effect to that right.22 In other words, the 
development of the common law is not arbitrary – it can only happen in the 
context of legislation failing to give effect to the relevant fundamental right. 
  
Fundamental rights, however, are not absolute. Section 36 of the 
Constitution provides that these rights may be limited. A right may, however, 
only be limited by a law of general application. This would include the 
common law, legislation and subordinated legislation, but not an executive act 
or policy.23 The limitation is only permitted to the extent that it is reasonable 
and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom. This must be determined by taking into account factors 
that include:24 
 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
 
In order to establish whether a law of general application meets the 
standard of justification under s 36(1) of the Constitution, Cheadle proposes 
the following scheme: 
 
                                                        
22  For a discussion on how to interpret s 8 of the Constitution, see Currie, I and De Waal, J The 
Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2005) at 52-55. 
23  Cheadle, H ‘Limitation of Rights’ in Cheadle et al (n 18) at 30-1 – 30-18 at 30-8 – 30-9. 













[T]he law [of general application] must, first, have a purpose 
sufficiently serious to justify the limitation of a right. It must, thereafter, 
be determined whether there is any rational connection between the 
limitation and its purpose. It is only after these two enquiries that 
proportionality is applied: the importance of the purpose weighed 
against the extent of the infringement. The doctrine of proportionality 
will normally involve a consideration of the nature of the right and 
whether the same purpose cannot be achieved by employing less 
restrictive means.25 
 
All of this leads to the question whether the current interpretation of the 
definition of the employee in the LRA is consistent with the Constitution and, if 
not, whether the definition read with the presumption in s 200A of the LRA 
provides scope for an interpretation consistent with the Constitution. One of 
the stated purposes of the LRA (as well as the BCEA))26 is, after all, to give 
effect to s 23 of the Constitution.27 28 This requires, first of all, an 
understanding of the meaning of ‘worker’ and ‘labour practice’ as used in s 23 
of the Constitution and, second, a reflection on the nature of the right. 
However, before turning to these questions it is necessary to consider the 




Determining the scope and meaning of a fundamental right is not 
always easy. While the text ought to be the starting point, the complexities of 
the Constitution have led the Constitutional Court to develop further 
techniques for the interpretation of fundamental rights.29 One method adopted 
by the Constitutional Court is a generous interpretation which holds that 
‘where the text reasonably permits, a broad interpretation should be preferred 
                                                        
25  Cheadle ‘Limitation of Rights’ (n 23) at 30-12. 
26  Section 2(a) of the BCEA. 
27  Section 1(a) of the LRA. This section refers to s 27 of the interim Constitution. The LRA was 
passed under the interim Constitution and this should now be read as a reference to s 23 of the 
Constitution. 
28  Also see the comments of Ngcobo J in National Education Health & Allied Workers Union v 
University of Cape Town (2003) 24 ILJ 95 (CC) at par 34. 













over a narrow interpretation, if the results of the latter would be to deny 
persons the benefits of the Bill of Rights.’30 However since the purpose of a 
fundamental right may in fact be narrow, the Constitutional Court has 
indicated that the purpose of a particular provision may justify a narrower 
meaning.31 Currie and De Waal summarise the position as follows: 
 
. . . the generous approach dictates that, when confronted with 
difficult value judgments about the scope of a right, the court should . . . 
be prepared to assume that there has been a violation and call on the 
government [or employer] to justify its laws and actions. However, 
there are indications that the Constitutional Court is not following this 
approach. The court has been unwilling to extend the protection 
afforded by the rights to an indefinite and unforeseeable number of 
activities. It seems as if the court will always choose to demarcate the 
right in terms of its purpose when confronted with a conflict between 
generous and purposive interpretation.32 
 
What is the purpose of s 23? Subject to what is said below on the 
meaning of worker and labour practices (since purpose cannot be divorced 
from text) and in view of the history of the unfair labour practice doctrine,33 it is 
suggested that the purpose of s 23 is at least twofold: first, the regulation of 
the exercise of employer power and, second, the regulation and promotion of 
broader labour market activities (for example, employment, job creation, skills 
development, trade unionism, collective bargaining and strike action). Further 
support for this can be found in the Wiehahn Report, the original South 
African source of the unfair labour doctrine, where it was referred to in terms 
of: 
 
                                                        
30  See Currie and De Waal (n 22) at 151. Also see S v Zuma & Others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) at 
par 18 and S v Mhlungu 1995(3) SA 391 (CC) at par 9. Also see SA National Defence Union v 
Minister of Defence & Another (1999) 20 ILJ 2265 (CC) at par 28. 
31  S v Makwayane & Another 1995 (3) 391 (CC) at par 325 and Soobramoney v Minsiter of 
Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at par 17. 
32  Currie and De Waal (n 22) at 152. 













irregular and undesirable labour practices such as unjustified 
changes in the established labour pattern of an employer or other 
actions which threaten industrial peace or lead to dissatisfaction; . . . 
alleged cases of unfair discrimination, inequitable changes in 
conditions of employment, underpayment of wages, unfair treatment 
and other cases of grievance; [and] . . . strikes, lock-outs, picketing, 
intimidation, boycotts or other instances of similar action . . . 34 
 
 Bearing in mind that a constitution is an organic document which must 
react to the challenges of the time,35 the interpretation of s 23 cannot be 
divorced from the distorting impact on the labour market of trends such as 
globalisation, externalisation and informalisation. It also cannot be denied, as 
was shown in Chapter 4, that people participate in the labour market in 
diverse and unpredictable forms, but often without protection. A narrow 
interpretation of s 23 will continue to marginalise many labour market 
participants and will thus undermine the purpose of s 23. The purpose of s 23 
requires that a generous interpretation be followed in as much as it is 
permitted by the text. With this as a roadmap, the meaning of ’worker’ and 
‘labour practice’ as well as the nature of s 23(1) will now be considered. 
 
5.2.2.3 The worker 
 
Section 23(1) of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to 
fair labour practices. Subsections (2) to (4) of s 23, however, refine the right 
and identify four beneficiaries of the more nuanced aspects of the right: 
workers, employers, trade unions and employer organisations.36 This, 
together with the fact that s 23(1) refers to labour practices, limits the focus of 
                                                        
34  Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legislation (RP 47/1979) (the Wiehahn 
Report) at pars 4.28.5.2-4. 
35  See the reference to Lord Wilberforce in S v Mhlungu 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at par 8. 
36  Cooper, C ‘Labour Relations’ in Woolman, S; Roux, T; Bishop, M and Stein, A (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 3 2ed (2005) 53-1 – 53-59 at 53-14 argues that the 
structure of s 23 suggests that the right to fair labour practices in subsection (1) should be seen 
as distinct from the rights dealt with in subsections (2) to (4). This was, however, not the view 
of the High Court in South African National Defence Force Union & Another v Minister of 
Defence & Others 2004 (4) SA 10 (T) and in the judgment of Sachs J in SA National Defence 













s 23(1) to the ‘relationship between the worker and the employer and the 
continuation of that relationship on terms that are fair to both’37 and the 
reference to ‘everyone’ in s 23(1) should not be taken to imply those beyond 
the employment relationship.38 
 
The meaning of the term ‘worker’ in s 23 is not defined and the leading 
judgment providing guidance on its meaning remains South African National 
Defence Union v Minister of Defence and Another,39 already referred to in 
Chapter 4.40 Soldiers are excluded from the application of the LRA. This 
matter concerned a prohibition on soldiers joining trade unions. Not being able 
to proceed in terms of the LRA, the Defence Force union relied directly on s 
23(2) of the Constitution which provides that every worker has the right to 
form and join trade unions. In holding that the term ‘worker’ in s 23 should be 
interpreted to include soldiers, the court held that: 
 
It is clear from reading s 23 that it uses the term 'worker' in the 
context of employers and employment. It seems therefore from the 
context of s 23 that the term 'worker' refers to those who are working 
for an employer which would, primarily, be those who have entered into 
a contract of employment to provide services to such employer.41 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
 Clearly, members of the armed forces render service for which 
they receive a range of benefits. On the other hand, their enrolment in 
the permanent force imposes upon them an obligation to comply with 
the rules of the Military Discipline Code. A breach of that obligation of 
compliance constitutes a criminal offence. In many respects, therefore, 
the relationship between members of the permanent force and the 
                                                        
37  National Education Health & Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town (2003) 24 ILJ 
95 (CC) at par 40. 
38  Cf, for instance, the concurring judgment of Sachs J in South African National Defence Union 
v Minister of Defence and Another 1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC) where he did not consider 
whether soldiers are workers, but (at par 48) relied on the fact that the right to fair labour 
practices in s 23(1) is available to everyone, thus including soldiers. 
39  1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC) at par 24. 
40  § 4.7.5. 













defence force is akin to an employment relationship. In relation to 
punishment for misconduct, at least, however, it is not.42 
 
It is clear that the court did not envisage a contract of employment as 
the only determinant of a worker, but also as something analogous to an 
employment relationship.43 The problem with this approach is that the 
employment relationship still eludes definition. Cheadle argues that the 
decisive elements in this regard (whether something mirrors an employment 
relationship) should be the personal and dependent nature of the service.44 In 
Chapter 4 the numerous types of work – almost all of which were personal in 
nature – were illustrated. While relying on the element of personal service 
alone may perhaps cast the net too wide, the requirement of dependence may 
be unduly limiting. One may further ask whether it is possible to measure the 
extent of the economic dependence that is envisaged.45 While labour law will 
clearly fail its purpose if it does not provide protection to the vulnerable and 
dependent, not only the vulnerable and dependent are parties to employment 
relationships. In this regard Cheadle concedes that there are many 
employees in terms of the common-law contract of employment, for example, 
employees with special skills and professional employees, who are in reality 
neither dependent nor vulnerable. In these cases, he argues, the element of 
dependence presents itself as a legal consequence of the contract of 
employment.46 Cheadle further argues that for these employees a limitation of 
some of the protection provided for in, for instance, the BCEA may be justified 
                                                        
42  Par 24. 
43  Cheadle ‘Labour Relations’ (n 18) at 18-4. 
44  Cheadle ‘Labour Relations’ (n 18) at 18-5 – 18-6. This view is supported by Du Toit and 
Potgieter (n 17) at 4B -21 – 4B-22. 
45  In this regard it has been said that: ‘Tests of employee status that focus on economic 
dependence fail to provide a principled or coherent distinction between independent 
contractors and employees and in arguing this approach, advocates may simply be replacing 
one narrow test with another.’ See Cobble, DS and Vosko, LF ‘Historical Perspectives on 
Representing Nonstandard Workers’ in Carré, F; Ferber, MA; Golden, L and Herzenberg, SA 
(eds) Nonstandard Work (2000) 291-312 at 306. It is also useful to refer to Davies, P and 
Freedland. M ‘Employees, Workers, and the Autonomy of Labour Law’ in Collins, H; Davies, 
P and Rideout, R (eds) Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation (2000) 267-286 who 
argue (at 279-281) that some functions of labour law not related to economic dependence, 
namely human rights law and health and safety law, justify extending at least some parts of 
labour law to workers who are not economically dependent. Also see Davidov, G ‘Who is a 
Worker?’ (2005) 34 ILJ (UK) 57 at 60-61 for further views on this. 













in terms of s 36 of the Constitution.47 The problem is that this approach 
continues to exclude from the meaning of ‘worker’ in s 23 of the Constitution 
some of the workers identified in Chapter 4 who may be vulnerable in the 
present legislative landscape, but who are not necessarily dependent. The 
group described as genuine volunteer workers is an example of this.  
 
It is suggested that the mandate for a broader approach as far as s 23 
is concerned should be taken from the use by the Constitutional Court of the 
words ‘employment relationship’. While the definition of the common-law 
contract of employment has presented enormous difficulties and it is equally 
difficult to define an employment relationship, the essential traits of an 
employment relationship, although seldom consistently present in the same 
combinations, are known and have been reproduced in the form of the factors 
that would trigger the presumption in s 200A of the LRA.48 Subject to what is 
said about personal service below,49 it is suggested that one of these factors 
be used in combination with personal service and not only the factor of 
dependence. These factors include:50 the manner in which the person is 
subject to the control or direction of another person; whether the person’s 
hours of work are subject to the control or direction of another person; 
whether the person works for an organisation, whether the person forms part 
of that organisation; whether the person has worked for the alleged employer 
for an average of at least 40 hours per month over the last three months; 
whether the person is economically dependent on the other person for whom 
he or she works or renders the services; whether the person is provided with 
tools of trade or work equipment; and whether the person only works for or 
renders services to one person.  
 
Using personal service in combination with one of these factors will of 
course result in a very wide entitlement to the constitutional right to fair labour 
                                                        
47  Cheadle ‘Labour Relations’ (n 18) at 18-6. 
48  Also see § 2.3.5.4.2. It is not suggested that the court’s inquiry at this stage should turn to s 
200A of the LRA. What is intended is that the court should establish whether, in addition to 
personal service, one of the known elements of the employment relationship is present. 
Section 200A of the LRA merely represents a useful codification of these elements. 
49  See § 5.3.2. 













practices and will probably, it is suggested, cover almost all of the workers 
identified in Chapter 4, even some independent contractors.51 Such a 
generous interpretation, as explained above,52 is not only consistent with the 
purpose of s 23 of the Constitution, but also consistent with the text: the 
deviation in s 23 of the Constitution from the standard terminology in 
protective legislation by using ‘worker’ (which in a literal sense has a very 
broad import) instead of ‘employee’ is undoubtedly code for a generous 
interpretation. 
 
However, it is not suggested that all these workers should necessarily 
be entitled to the protection of all protective labour legislation. The nature and 
purpose of such legislation will often justify selected and diverse limitations. 
For instance, if a broad interpretation is given to the meaning of ‘worker’ in s 
23 and genuine volunteer workers are included, it may be justifiable (and 
appropriate) in terms of s 36 of the Constitution to exclude them from the 
LRA’s dismissal provisions, but not from workmen’s compensation and 
occupational health and safety legislation.  This is, for instance, currently done 
in the case of worker co-operatives.53 
  
This, however, begs the question whether s 23(1) encompasses all 
labour legislation. This depends, it is suggested, on the meaning of labour 
practice in s 23(1) of the Constitution. Does it refer to all incidences of labour 
regulated by legislation or is its import much narrower?54  
 
5.2.2.4  Labour practice 
 
The Constitutional Court has stated that ‘the concept of fair labour 
practice is incapable of precise definition’ and that it is not ‘necessary nor 
desirable to define the concept’, and further that it should ‘gather meaning . . . 
                                                        
51  Du Toit and Potgieter (n 17) at 4B-21 suggests that such a broad interpretation is consistent 
with the unqualified language of s 23(1). 
52  § 5.2.2.2. 
53  § 4.7.1. 













from the decisions of the specialist tribunals’.55 Nonetheless, it has been 
argued by Cheadle that the concept was taken from a specific legislative and 
jurisprudential background and that the term in s 23(1) should be understood 
against that background.56 This means that it ‘should be determined with 
reference to the employment axis – the practices that flow from the 
employment relationship.’57 In other words, issues in connection with ‘the 
establishment of a statutory system of unemployment insurance or workmen’s 
compensation or skills development’58 are excluded. This interpretation is 
supported by the definition of unfair labour practices in s 186(2) of the LRA as 
conduct ‘that arises between an employer and employee . . .’59  
 
Cooper identifies conduct relating to workers’ security (dismissal and 
suspension), unfair treatment in relation to work opportunities (promotion, 
demotion, probation training and benefits) and disciplinary action as typical 
examples of labour practices in the context of individual employment.60 In the 
context of collective labour law, labour practices will include trade union 
organisation and membership and collective bargaining. Viewed thus, it is 
clear that s 23 of the Constitution encompasses at least the LRA, the BCEA 
and, to a lesser extent, the EEA.61 This is so because, in the case of the LRA 
and the BCEA, it is the stated purpose of these Acts to give effect to s 23 of 
the Constitution. However, even in the absence of such a stated purpose, it is 
                                                        
55  National Education Health & Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town (2003) 24 ILJ 
95 (CC) at pars 33 and 34. 
56  See § 2.3.5.3. The unfair labour practice concept was introduced into South African law in 
1979. Although its definition was amended many times, the unfair labour practice 
jurisprudence nonetheless developed a body of rules aimed at regulating the employment 
relationship. It was this body of rules that was intended to be constitutionalised in both the 
interim and final Constitutions. See Cheadle ‘Labour Relations’ (n 18) at 18-9. Also see quote 
from Wiehahn report above (note 34). 
57  Cheadle ‘Labour Relations’ (n 18) at 18-11. 
58  Cheadle ‘Labour Relations’ (n 18) at 18-11 (fn 52). 
59  While s 186(2) was added to the LRA only in 2002 (by s 41(a) of the Labour Relations Act 
Amendment Act 12 of 2002) this definition of unfair labour practices predates the 
Constitution since unfair labour practices were originally defined in a schedule to the LRA. 
60  Cooper (n 36) at 53-13. 
61  Before the passing of the EEA in 1998, unfair discrimination in the workplace was one of the 
‘residual unfair labour practices’ regulated by Schedule 7, item 2 (1)(a) to the LRA. The other 
‘residual unfair labour practices’ were later moved to the main text of the LRA (s 185(2)). 
This is mentioned to illustrate that unfair discrimination in the workplace has historically been 
regarded as an (unfair) labour practice. However, the constitutional right to equality is now 














apparent from the text of these Acts that the regulation of the employment 
relationship is their essence. However, while a broader interpretation was 
urged in an earlier edition,62 Cooper now concedes that although there is no 
obvious reason militating against it, it is debatable ‘[w]hether rights regulated 
in other labour legislation, such as health and safety rights at work’63 are 
underwritten by s 23 of the Constitution. Bearing in mind that the purpose of s 
23, as explained above,64 cannot be divorced from text and context, it is 
probably correct that labour practices should not be understood as referring to 
all incidences of employment. 
 
Given its open-ended meaning, it is quite possible that a court may in 
future find a labour practice beyond that which has hitherto been regulated by 
the trilogy of the LRA, the BCEA and the EEA. This is illustrated by the 
judgment of the Labour Court in Piliso v Old Mutual Life Assurance Co (SA) 
Ltd & Others.65 In this matter the employee was sexually harassed by an 
unidentified perpetrator who left obscene photographs at her desk. As a result 
of this and the failure of the employer to take any reasonable steps to address 
her fears and general security at the workplace, she suffered from post 
traumatic stress disorder. The employer was held not vicariously liable or 
liable in terms of s 60 of the EEA66 since there was no evidence that the 
perpetrator was another employee. However, the court did find that the 
employer was liable for constitutional damages since the employee’s 
constitutional right to fair labour practices was infringed. Whether the court 
approached the matter of constitutional damages correctly is debatable,67 but 
the judge’s view that the manner in which the employer manages its duty to 
avoid unfair discrimination against its employees is an aspect of the duty to 
                                                        
62  Cheadle ‘Labour Relations’ (n 18) at 18-11 (fn 52). 
63  Cooper (n 36) at 53-14. 
64  § 5.2.2.2. 
65  (2007) 28 ILJ 897 (LC). 
66  Section 60(3) of the EEA renders the employer liable if one of its employees contravenes a 
provision of the EEA in respect of another employee while at work. 
67  Following the scheme proposed in § 5.2.2.1 the court, after finding that legislation does not 
give effect to the employee’s constitutional right to fair labour practices, should have applied 
or developed the common law. It is suggested that the employer’s common-law duty to 
provide a safe working environment was the basis on which the employer should have been 
held liable. The court also did not explore the possible application of COIDA. Also see Currie 













provide a safe working environment illustrates the evolving nature of the unfair 
labour concept.68  
 
While the judge’s equating of labour practices to the management of 
unfair discrimination is perhaps less contentious, the view that the manner in 
which the employer manages its duty to provide a safe working environment 
may constitute a labour practice is novel and suggests that there is potential 
relevance for s 23(1) of the Constitution beyond the LRA, the BCEA and the 
EEA. Furthermore, it is quite possible that a generous interpretation of the 
term ‘worker’ may also extend the meaning of labour practices. 
 
 However, for the moment the focus will remain on the two statutes for 
which 23(1) of the Constitution is the stated lodestar: the LRA and the BCEA.  
 
5.2.2.5  The nature of section 23(1) of the Constitution 
 
The imprecise and peculiar nature of this right has been noted earlier. 
Since the nature of a right is relevant when considering any limitation of that 
right in terms of s 36 of the Constitution, it is necessary to highlight the 
strange bipolar nature of the right to fair labour practices. The right is available 
to workers, employers, trade unions and employers’ organisations. When a 
worker (or trade union) relies on the right to fair labour practices, the right can 
only extend to the point where it does not impact on the employer’s right to 
fair labour practices. In this regard the Constitutional Court has remarked that 
the right is about the ‘relationship between the worker and the employer and 
the continuation of that relationship on terms that are fair to both.’69 In this 
regard Brassey many years ago argued that the ‘unfair labour jurisdiction is 
not meant to restrict the proper pursuit of pecuniary gain.’70 However, there 
are more interests at stake. Fairness ‘should also take account of societal 
interests such as health and safety, the environment, the community and the 
                                                        
68  At par 80.  
69  National Education Health & Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town (2003) 24 ILJ 
95 (CC) at par 40. 













economy.’71 In other words, the employer’s right to fair labour practices and 
societal interests may limit the practices that a worker is entitled to dispute as 
unfair. For instance, if unpaid volunteer workers are regarded as workers, the 
employer’s right to fair labour practices and societal values may justifiably limit 
the volunteer’s right to rely on dismissal procedures of the LRA on the basis 
that the volunteer’s right places an undue burden on the employer which in 
turn may discourage employers from investing in voluntarism. On the other 
hand, these considerations may not justify a limitation in the case of practices 
impacting on the volunteer’s right relating to, for instance, the provision of 
training or the making of a protected disclosure. 
 
However, based on the purpose of labour law and bearing in mind the 
greater social and economic power that employers have, the right to fair 
labour practices will generally favour workers.72 This is evidenced by a LAC 
judgment where it was held that the failure of the LRA to provide remedies to 
employers for the unfair termination of employment by employees does not 
render the LRA unconstitutional.73 Both the common law and the BCEA, so 
the court held, provide sufficient protection to the employer.74  
 
5.3 The potential of the current legislative regime 
 
The view that the definition of employee in these statutes presupposes 
a common-law contract is, as was illustrated in Chapter 2, entirely judge-
made, and prior to 1979 some judges, interpreting the definition of employee 
in industrial relations and other statutes, conceded that employment may well 
exist beyond a contract of employment.75  
 
Below it will be illustrated that the combination of the plain language of 
the definition of employee in the LRA and the BCEA; the meaning of worker in 
                                                        
71  Cheadle, H ‘Regulated Flexibility: Revisiting the LRA and the BCEA’ (2006) 27 ILJ 663 at 
par 33. 
72  Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1996) 17 ILJ 821 (CC) at par 66. 
73  National Entitled Workers Union v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, Arbitration & 
Others (2007) 28 ILJ 1223 (LAC). Also see § 3.2. 
74  At par 16. 













s 23 in the Constitution; the fact that the LRA and the BCEA must be 
interpreted in compliance with the Constitution; and the presumption as to 
who is an employee in s 200A of the LRA and section 83A of the BCEA can 
accommodate a meaning of an employee free from the limitations associated 
with the common-law contract of employment. It is not suggested that the 
interpretation below is the only possible one that can be given to the definition 
of an employee. However, it is suggested that nothing militates against what 
is proposed below. Much depends on the extent to which the courts and 
policy-makers have come to realise that employment has moved beyond the 
work-wage bargain and on the will to undo judge-made rules. 
 
5.3.1 The definition in the LRA and the BCEA 
 
For ease of reference the definition of an employee in these two 
statutes is reproduced: 
 
'employee' means- 
  (a) any person, excluding an independent  
    contractor, who works for another person or 
    for the State and who receives, or is entitled 
    to receive, any remuneration; and 
  (b) any other person who in any manner assists 
    in carrying on or conducting the business of 
    an employer.76 
 
The statutory definition consists of two parts. The first part has three 
requirements: (1) a person who works for another person; (2) that person 
must not be an independent contractor; and (3) that person receives or is 
entitled to receive remuneration. While the courts have taken the exclusion of 
independent contractors as an approval of the contractual model for 
employment, it is actually at odds with the plain language of the definition 
which does not refer to a contract at all. Furthermore, this definition must be 
                                                        













interpreted in compliance with the Constitution. An interpretation that this part 
of the definition presupposes a contract of employment, as well as the 
exclusion of an independent contractor, possibly amounts to a limitation of the 
constitutional right in s 23. The rationale for this contention is that such an 
interpretation reduces the number of workers, as contemplated in s 23 of the 
Constitution, who may claim the benefit of the right. 
 
Above it was argued that the term ‘worker’ in s 23 of the Constitution 
should be given a broad meaning. Using the model that was suggested above 
(personal service together with one of the factors listed in s 200A of the LRA), 
it is quite possible that an independent contractor rendering a personal 
service could fall within the meaning of worker in s 23. Since the independent 
contracting arrangement could quite easily cover at least some of these 
factors (also those other than the one relating to dependence), at least some 
independent contractors may be regarded as workers in terms if s 23 of the 
Constitution. The question is whether the exclusion of the independent 
contractor from the definition of an employee amounts to a justifiable limitation 
of s 23. It is suggested that, bearing in mind the general purpose of labour law 
and its relation to the vulnerable, as well as the rationale for making a 
distinction between employers and independent contractors in the PAYE 
system (that is the ability of independent contractors to discount their risks 
through the taxation system),77 the exclusion of genuine independent 
contractors from the LRA can be justified in terms of s 36 of the Constitution.78  
 
However, it is suggested that the reliance placed on the contractual 
model in respect of the first part of the definition does constitute a limitation of 
the s 23 constitutional right. Bearing in mind the proposed reach of the term 
‘worker’, the limitation presented by the contractual model is simply too 
sweeping and, in any event, not consistent with the plain language of the 
definition.  
 
                                                        
77  This statement relies on the claim made in § 2.3.4.7 that the PAYE system was influential in 
the establishment of the employee/independent contractor dichotomy. 
78  Furthermore, protection to independent contractors is also available in the form of s 22 of the 













Similarly, it may be asked whether the requirement of remuneration 
constitutes a justifiable limitation. In this regard it is necessary to deconstruct 
the second part of the definition and to consider the relation between the first 
part and the second part of the definition. The second part of the definition 
relates to a person who in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the 
business of an employee. This has caused some commentators to claim that 
the second part of the definition is wide enough to include independent 
contractors.79  
 
The second part of the definition is introduced by the words ‘and any 
other person’. The ‘other person’ in the second part of the definition therefore 
relates to a person other than the one referred to in the first part of the 
definition. The person referred to in the first part of the definition is ‘any 
person, excluding an independent contractor’ who does a number of things 
(that is, works for another and receives a salary). In other words, the 
independent contractor is also excluded from the second part of the definition. 
It is only by the most circular of arguments that it can be said that the 
independent contractor who has been excluded from the first part of the 
definition is nonetheless covered by the second part of the definition. If that 
was the intention, there was no need to exclude the independent contractor at 
all. The second part of the definition therefore covers a person (excluding the 
independent contractor) who does certain things (assists the employer), but 
the definition does not include receiving remuneration. The implication is that 
a person who does not receive remuneration is not excluded from the 
definition of employee and there is no limitation to consider. Thus, the only 
absolute exclusion from the definition is an independent contractor.80 
 
                                                        
79  Du Toit, D; Bosch, D; Woolfrey, D; Godfrey, S; Cooper, C; Giles, G; Bosch, C and Rossouw, 
J Labour Relations Law 5ed (2006) at 73. 
80  One may ask whether it is necessary to divide the definition of employee into two parts. It can 
possibly be explained with reference to the history of this definition. The Industrial 
Conciliation Act 11 of 1924 defined an employee in terms of the work-wage bargain only. 
However, what now constitutes the second part of the definition was added in the Industrial 
Conciliation Act 36 of 1937, apparently to negate the effect of the judgment in R v 
Govindasamy 1936 GWLD 15 where it was held that the children of a shopkeeper helping him 













It therefore becomes much easier to assign a meaning to the definition 
of an employee which is consistent with s 23 of the Constitution and not at all 
constrained by the limitations of contract. Based on this analysis and returning 
to some of the workers identified in Chapter 4, those working in terms of an 
illegal contract (the sex worker and the illegal foreign worker) and those 
working for remuneration, but without a contract (the priest), would be covered 
by the first part of the definition and unpaid volunteer workers by the second 
part of the definition. Support for this view is found in the BCEA: section 
3(1)(b) provides that the ‘Act applies to all employees and employers except 
unpaid volunteers working for an organisation serving a charitable purpose.’ 
Such an exclusion is only possible if unpaid volunteers were in the first place 
intended to be covered by the definition of an employee. Furthermore, it is 
also consistent with the original motivation for adding this part to the definition 
of an employee in the Industrial Conciliation Act 36 of 1937, namely, to 
overcome the impact of the judgment in R v Govindasamy81 where it was held 
that the children of a shopkeeper who worked in his shop without 
remuneration were not employees.82 
 
Although this chapter has emphasised throughout the requirement of 
personal service, it is suggested that there is scope to view this requirement in 
less absolute terms. This will be discussed below.83  
 
5.3.2 The presumption in the LRA and the BCEA 
 
In 2002 the legislature added a presumption as to who is an employee 
to both the LRA84 and the BCEA85 and it is suggested that the presumption 
does not detract from the above interpretation of the definition of employee. 
Section 200A(1) provides that: 
 
                                                        
81  1936 GWLD 15. 
82  Also see note 80. 
83  See § 5.3.2. 
84  Section 200A of the LRA. 













 Until the contrary is proved, a person who works for, or renders 
services to, any other person is presumed, regardless of the form of 
the contract, to be an employee, if any one or more of the following 
factors are present:  
 
  (a) the manner in which the person works is subject to 
   the control or direction of another person;  
  (b) the person's hours of work are subject to the  
   control or direction of another person;  
  (c) in the case of a person who works for an  
   organisation, the person forms part of that  
   organisation;  
  (d) the person has worked for that other person for an 
   average of at least 40 hours per month over the 
   last three months;  
  (e) the person is economically dependent on the other 
   person for whom he or she works or renders  
   services;  
  (f) the person is provided with tools of trade or work 
   equipment by the other person; or  
  (g) the person only works for or renders services to 
    one person. 
 
While it is open to rebuttal and only applies to persons who earn less 
than a certain threshold (indicating a tendency to favour the vulnerable),86 the 
presumption nonetheless informs the nature of the employment relationship, 
irrespective of whether the person seeking protection earns more or less than 
the threshold.87  
 
The presumption applies ‘regardless of the form of the contract’. At the 
very least this confirms that a common-law contract of employment is not 
                                                        
86  See note 3. 













required to establish an employment relationship.88 The disregard of the form 
of the contract further implies that the express wishes of the parties not to 
create an employment relationship are secondary to the factors that would 
trigger the presumption. This interpretation is consistent with the judgment of 
the LAC in Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber89 where the view was held that the status 
of an employee should be determined objectively and the court should not 
defer to the choice of the parties since such an approach would prejudice ‘the 
state in that it may lose taxes which it otherwise may have been entitled to 
collect if the court determined the issue objectively and found that there was 
an employment relationship.’90  
 
However, on the face of it, the reference to ‘co tract’ in the 
presumption appears to negate the claim made above that the definition of an 
employee (in the LRA and the BCEA) does not assume a contract. It is 
suggested that the use of ‘contract’ does not envisage a contract in the 
common-law sense, but a work arrangement to which the parties have 
agreed. This is endorsed by s 200A(3) of the LRA (and s 83A(3) of the 
BCEA.) The presumption applies if a person earns less than the threshold 
amount. Section 200A(3) of the LRA provides that ‘if a proposed or existing 
work arrangement involves persons who earns equal to or below’ the 
threshold amount, the ‘contracting parties’ may ask the CCMA for an advisory 
award on their employm nt status. The use of the word ‘work arrangement’ in 
the same context as ‘contract’ clearly indicates that the word ‘contract’ in s 
200A should not be viewed within the common-law paradigm, but in less 
restricted terms. This is consistent with the judgment of the Labour Court in 
White v Pan Palladium SA (Pty) Ltd,91 in which the court said (obiter) that 
‘[t]he existence of the employment relationship is therefore not dependent 
                                                        
88  Benjamin (n 8) at 802. 
89  (2005) 26 ILJ 1256 (LAC). 
90  Par 95. This view is also consistent with the overriding view in Britain that public policy 
demands that the parties not be given this leeway to avoid social and labour legislation. See 
Deakin, S and Morris, GS Labour Law (2005) 4ed at 142-143. Only in finely balanced cases, 
the authors argue, should the parties’ view of the contract prevail. 













solely upon the conclusion of a contract recognised at common law as valid 
and enforceable.’92 
 
The presence of only one of the factors is sufficient to trigger the 
presumption. Almost all of the factors listed seem to imply personal service. Is 
there perhaps scope to argue that the presumption leaves room for an 
interpretation that does not require personal service? Section 200A(1) applies 
to ‘a person who works for, or renders services to, any other person’. One of 
the factors that would trigger the presumption is if ‘the person is economically 
dependent on the other person for whom she works or renders services’.93 
The use of the words ‘renders services’ is inconsistent with the definition of 
employee which refers to a person ‘who works for another person’ (in the first 
part of the definition) or ‘who in any manner assists in carrying on or 
conducting the business of an employer’ (the second part of the definition). 
While the words ‘works for another person’ imply something personal,94 it is 
quite conceivable that a person can render a service or assist in the carrying 
on or conducting of a business without doing so personally. It is therefore 
suggested that the combination of the words used in the definition and the 
presumption arguably does exclude a situation where the service is not 
rendered personally all the time.95  
 
                                                        
92  2727J-2728A. While a comparative analysis falls beyond the scope of this section, it should 
be noted that the French courts have acknowledged that ‘the existence of an employment 
relationship does not depend on the will of the parties however they have expressed it, nor on 
the label which they give their agreement, but on the factual matrix within which the relevant 
labour services are carried out’. Quoted by Barnard, C and Deakin, S ‘Redefining the 
Employment Relationship to Counter Employer “Evasion”: the UK Experience in A 
Comparative Perspective’ paper presented at the LSA Conference, Berlin, Germany, July 
2007 at 5. Barnard and Deakin (at 6) explain this approach with reference to ‘the strong 
tradition of mandatory social or “ordre public social” in French tradition – that is to say, a 
conception of labour law as laying down fundamental terms of the protection of the employee 
in order to counterbalance the inherent power of the employer within the enterprise which, in 
other respect, the law strongly validated.’ As was shown in Chapter 3, these sentiments are 
consistent with the purpose of labour law in a South African context. 
93  Section 200A(1)(e) of the LRA and s 83A(1)(e) of the BCEA. 
94  S v AMCA Services (Pty) Ltd 1962 (4) SA 537 (A) at 542. 
95  Brassey, M Employment and Labour Law Service Issue vol 1 (2006) at B1:19 argues that 
personal service has never been a requirement, provided that the employer is entitled to 













A good illustration of the envisaged situation is the judgment of the AD 
in S v AMCA Services (Pty) Ltd,96 discussed in Chapter 2.97 The employment 
status of collectors of insurance premiums for purposes of cost-of-living 
allowances was at issue. In a previous AD judgment involving the same 
parties, R v AMCA Services Ltd and Another,98 the collectors were held to be 
employees, but after the passing of that judgment their conditions of 
employment were altered and the collectors were allowed to engage others to 
do the work on their behalf. In the later judgment the AD held99 that personal 
service is a characteristic of the locatio conductio operarum and, since the 
collectors were no longer obliged to render the service personally, they were 
held not to be employees for purposes of the regulation. The facts of the case 
do not suggest the extent to which the collectors continued to render their 
services in person, but assuming that the services were predominantly carried 
out by them, it is suggested that the reach of the current definition ought to be 
such that they are covered by the definition.100 
 
5.3.3 The Code  
 
While the Code provides useful guidelines on how to implement current 
wisdom on employment and gives credence to South Africa’s obligations 
arising under the ILO Employment Relationship Recommendation 198, 2006 it 
provides no guidance on the future evolution of the contract of employment 
and, in particular, it fails to explore the potential collective implication of s 23 
of the Constitution, the definition of employee and the presumption as to who 
is an employee. If anything, the title of the Recommendation and the general 
language and emphasis of both the Code and the Recommendation seem to 
                                                        
96  1962 (4) SA 537 (A). 
97  See § 2.3.4.5. 
98  1959 (4) SA 207 (A). 
99  At 542-543. 
100  Also see Davies and Freedland (n 45) at 283 where the authors express doubt about the 
wisdom of excluding labour law from situations where personal service is not required. They 
refer to British case law where the court, in the case of sex discrimination legislation, was 
prepared to extend protection where personal work was the dominant, but not the exclusive, 
purpose of the contract. This also goes to the heart of one of the foundations of the personal 
employment contract as conceived by Freedland, MR The Personal Employment Contract 
(2003), referring to the paperback edition published in 2006, which is discussed in more detail 













shift the focus from a contract of employment to an employment relationship. 
However, it is suggested that much of the argument postulated here is not 
dependent on the Code. 
 
5.3.4 Economic dependence and the independent contractor 
 
One of the factors that would trigger the presumption is economic 
dependence. Economic dependence should, however, not be seen as 
excluding an independent contractor. While the genuine independent 
contractor may sometimes have difficulty negotiating the barriers presented 
by the presumption, it is also true that many independent contractors are 
economically dependent on the other person in the relationship in the sense 
that they often depend solely or largely on a single person to provide work. As 
explained earlier,101 using this factor (or even the other factors listed in the 
presumption) it would be quite easy for many independent contractors to be 
presumed to be employees. If, however, the other person to the work 
arrangement can discharge the onus and show that the person is a genuine 
independent contractor, he or she will be excluded from the definition of an 
employee. This, of course, represents the quintessential issue in labour law, 
namely the distinction between employee and independent contractor. 
However, it is proposed that a very narrow and limited meaning be given to an 
independent contractor. 
 
In Chapter 2 it was argued that the introduction of the PAYE system in 
South Africa had a schismatic influence on the South African labour market 
and became a major consideration in structuring work arrangements.102 This 
system basically distinguishes between employees who pay PAYE and 
provisional taxpayers who conduct a trade independently (independent 
contractors) and who, while not able to benefit from the social security 
available to employees, are able to set off work-related expenses for income 
tax purposes. It is suggested that, together with the normal requirements 
associated with the independent contractor (the production of a result free 
                                                        
101  See note 45. 













from the control of the person giving the instruction), the original rationale for 
distinguishing between employees and provisional taxpayers should be used 
to determine whether a person is an independent contractor. Independence in 
this sense therefore relates rather to the ability to discount the risks 
associated with working and the ability to operate independently outside the 
organisation of the employer. Independence therefore relates to the ability ‘to 
spread . . . risks among a number of relationships.’103 This will, as intimated 
above, result in a very narrow view of an independent contractor and will 
ensure that a person working for another is not excluded from the definition of 
employee because there is no contract of employment, but only because he 
or she is truly an independent contractor.  
 
In this regard it is useful to return to the example of the estate agent in 
Linda Erasmus Properties Enterprise (Pty) Ltd v Mhlongo & Others104 referred 
to in Chapter 4. The court, following the ratio in Denel, held that the realities of 
the relationship suggested that the agent was in fact an employee despite the 
method of payment and the non-deduction of UIF and PAYE as provided for 
in the contract.105 Based on the available evidence it is doubtful whether the 
agent would have been able to operate as an estate agent outside the 
security offered by the organisation and structure of the employer, and for that 




One matter that requires further contemplation is the impact of an 
illegality on the employment relationship. At the heart of this inquiry are the 
common-law maxims ex turpi vel inuista causa non oritur actio (illegal 
contracts cannot be enforced) and in pari delicto potior est condition 
defendentis (a court will not assist with the recovery of a performance made 
under an illegal contract). The latter rule was relaxed in Jajbhay v Cassim, a 
1939 judgment of the AD, where the court, not without criticism, held that 
                                                        
103  Davidov (n 45) at 63. 
104  (2007) 28 ILJ 1100 (LC). Also see Hydraulic Engineering Repair Services v Ntshona & 
Others [2007] JOL 20527. 













public policy and ‘simple justice between man and man’ may justify a 
relaxation of the rule.106 
 
 In Chapter 4, the employment of illegal foreigners, prostitution and 
child labour were identified as the typical illegalities in the context of 
employment.107 While it is doubted whether the LAC’s judgment in Denel, as 
advanced by some,108 can be taken as authority that something that  is illegal 
should be given effect to, it is suggested that a definition of employee, 
liberated of the trappings of the common-law contract of employment, can 
accommodate an illegality:109  
 
A claim in terms of the LRA is not a claim to enforce contractual 
rights. It is a claim to enforce constitutional rights . . . . Whether the 
bearer of the right has a valid contract of employment is not decisive.110 
 
This is not implying that the illegality should be disregarded at the 
remedy stage. A court clearly cannot order an illegality to continue.111  
 
Some support for this sentiment is found in the judgment of the 
Zimbabwe Appellate Division in Zuvaradoka v Franck112 which has since been 
                                                        
106  See Jajbhay v Cassim 1939 AD 537. For more on these maxims and the criticism of Jajbhay 
see Christie, RH The Law of Contract 4ed (2001) at 460-465 and Van der Merwe, S; Van 
Huyssteen, LF; Reinecke, MFB and Lubbe, GF Contract: General Principles 2ed (2003) at 
189-191. Also see Trakman, LE ‘The Effect of Illegality in South African Law: A Doctrinal 
and Comparative Study’ (1977) 94 SALJ 327, especially at 330-331 for a discussion of the 
competing interests at stake. 
107  § 4.5.3. It should, however, be noted that the CCMA issued a directive on 27 February 2008 in 
which it instructed its commissioners that in the case of disputes involving illegal foreigners, 
the CCMA should: accept all referrals for illegal foreigners, accept jurisdiction, order 
compensation only in successful disputes, and oppose any review application challenging this 
approach right up to the Constitutional Court. 
108  Bosch, C ‘Can Unauthorized Workers be Regarded as Employees for the Purposes of the 
Labour Relations Act?’ (2006) 27 ILJ 1342 at 1357. Also see Bosch, C and Christie, S ‘Are 
Sex Workers “Employees”?’ (2007) 28 ILJ 804. 
109  The difference between Bosch’s view and the one advanced here is subtle. Bosch suggests that 
since Denel focused on substance rather than form an illegality should be disregarded. 
However, the court, it is suggested, did not go so far as to say that a valid contract is not 
required. The view advanced in this paragraph is based on an interpretation of the definition 
that does not assume a contract at all. 
110  Bosch and Christie (n 108) at 811. 
111  Bosch ‘Can Unauthorized Workers be Regarded as Employees for the Purposes of the Labour 
Relations Act?’ (n 108) at 1362-1364. Also see S v Nkambula 1980 (1) SA 189 (T). 













quoted with approval by the Cape High Court.113 In this matter the contract 
between the buyer and the seller of property was void because of an illegality. 
The purchaser, however, paid a deposit to the seller’s agent. The court held 
that it was entitled to consider the illegal contract to determine the nature of 
the relationship between the third party and the seller, namely, whether the 
third party was the seller’s agent. Similarly, the illegality of a contract should 
not impact on the question whether an employment relationship exists or 
existed. This should only be an issue when a party attempts to enforce the 
contract in a common-law court.  
 
In this regard it is useful to return to Jajbhay v Cassim114 and to 
consider the following passage: 
 
And when the delict falls within the category of crimes, a civil 
court can reasonably suppose that the criminal law has provided an 
adequate deterring punishment and therefore, ordinarily speaking, 
should not by its order increase the punishment of the one delinquent 
and lessen it of the other by enriching one to the detriment of the other. 
And it follows from what I have said above, in cases where public 
policy is not foreseeably affected by a grant or a refusal of the relief 
claimed, that a Court of law might well decide in favour of doing justice 
between the individuals concerned and so prevent unjust 
enrichment.115 
 
 While employment that is illegal for whatever reason is unlikely to 
constitute a delict, it is suggested that the sentiments expressed above are 
equally applicable to illegal employment. Providing employment protection in 
terms of the LRA does not prevent the appropriate authorities from taking 
                                                        
113  Peterson and Another NNO v Claassen and Others 2006 (5) SA 191 (C) at 198B. 
114  1939 AD 537. 
115  At 544-545. Also see Rousseau & Ors NNO v Visser 1989 (2) SA 289 (C) at 305-306 where 
the court held that participants in an illegal lottery were allowed to reclaim contributions to the 
scheme, otherwise they would be punished both in civil and criminal law and the organiser of 
the scheme would be enriched at their expense. This was also confirmed on appeal. See Visser 













criminal action against offenders.116 Refusing such protection would in effect 
mean the increase of the punishment of the (usually) more vulnerable party to 
the employment relationship and would lessen any harm caused to the 
employer. 
 
This is a pragmatic interpretation that might offend the purists, but it will 
discourage employers from exploiting individuals who are normally extremely 
vulnerable and thus, in the long term, it will serve the public interest. While it is 
possible to draw a distinction between an illegality that relates to the status of 
the worker (for example, the illegal foreign worker) and an illegality that 
relates to the type of work (for example, prostitution), it is suggested that, in 
both situations, not recognising an employment relationship will invite 
exploitation.117 Some may say this will open the door to all criminals to pursue 
‘employment’ disputes in the labour courts with, for instance, crime syndicate 
lords who fail to honour their promise to share the bounty. The answer to this 
is twofold. First, it is unlikely that this policy (ignoring the illegalities associated 
with an employment relationship) will lead to a ‘parade of the horribles’118 (that 
is, encourage criminals to turn to the labour courts en masse to resolve these 
disputes), but second, and more importantly, the underlying motive for a more 
relaxed attitude in this regard remains the quest for ‘simple justice between 
man and man’. In each case the courts must still decide, with reference to 
public policy, whether the resolution of ‘employment disputes’ outweighs the 
par delictum rule. It is unlikely that public policy will generally favour criminals 
in this regard.119 
                                                        
116  Although the illegalities were of a minor nature, some support for this can be found in Pick 'n 
Pay Stores v Trek Petroleum (Pty) Ltd 1976 (2) SA 302 (W) at 306A-306C. 
117  This is said with the full knowledge of the judgment of the Constitutional Court in S v Jordan 
2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) in which it was held that s 20(1)(aA) of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 
1957, which criminalises sexual intercourse for reward, is not unconstitutional. The above 
proposal is not a suggestion that prostitution should be decriminalised or that the 
Constitutional Court came to the wrong conclusion in Jordan; it is simply suggested that this 
is an area, despite the illegality involved, where ‘simple justice between man and man’ calls 
for a relaxation of the par delictum maxim. 
118  This is an expression used by Langa CJ in MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal and Others v 
Pillay and Others CCT 51/06 at par 136 in considering whether making dress code 
concessions to school children on the basis of religion will lead to a general abuse of the 
concession. 
119  This is confirmed by case law subsequent to the 1937 AD judgment in Jajbhay. See in this 
regard the discussion by Christie (n 106) at 461-462. However, on the basis that ‘ordinary 













5.4 Towards diversification and a metamorphosis 
 
The argument postulated above (the ‘constitutional argument or 
model’) can be summarised as follows: The right to fair labour practices in s 
23(1) of the Constitution underwrites at least the LRA, the BCEA and the 
EEA. The right in s 23(1) can be claimed by a worker. A worker should be 
understood in very broad terms, which terms may even include an 
independent contractor. This legislation and its definition of employee should 
be interpreted in compliance with s 23 of the Constitution; in other words, a 
limitation on the meaning of worker is only permitted if it can be justified in 
terms of s 36 of the Constitution. The plain language of the definition of an 
employee (in the LRA, for instance) suggests that only an independent 
contractor is excluded from the application of this legislation. If a narrow 
meaning is given to an independent contractor, it is a limitation that can be 
justified. However, an interpretation that emphasises a contractual model 
restricts the meaning of worker to an extent which is not justifiable in terms of 
s 36 of the Constitution. Further, the nature of labour practices is such that the 
number of workers entitled to rely on them may justifiably be limited in the 
legislation regulating those practices. It is in this regard that a diverse 
approach, allowing different workers the benefit of different labour practices, is 
advocated. 
 
It is conceded, as will be illustrated below, that while there is scope to 
accommodate the above argument in the present legislative regime, it is not 
necessarily compatible with all the provisions in the current legislative scheme 
which still assumes the contractual model of employment. Dismissal is one 
example. The definition of dismissal in the LRA is drafted primarily on the 
premise that it involves the termination of a contract of employment.120 This 
                                                                                                                                                              
for which no value was given, the courts have been prepared to assist even criminals. The best 
example of this is Padayachey v Lebese 1942 TPD 10 where the court was satisfied that all the 
parties knew that the subject of a sale was stolen property. The stolen goods were paid for, but 
no proper delivery was made. The court assisted the criminal with the recovery of the 
purchase price by relaxing the par delictum rule. 
120  Section 186(1) of the LRA. In this regard also see Bosch, C ‘What’s in the Word? Giving 
Definition to “Dismissal”’ paper delivered at the 18th Annual Labour Law Conference, 













means that only some workers would be able to rely on the LRA’s dismissal 
procedures. Volunteers, for instance, are covered by the second part of the 
definition of employee, but still have no legislative peg on which to hang a 
claim of unfair dismissal. One can use the techniques of ‘reading down’ or 
‘reading in’121 to enable references to the termination of the ‘contract of 
employment’ in the definition of dismissal to be read as the termination of 
‘employment’ (or perhaps even ‘work arrangement’).122 As for ‘reading down’, 
a court may argue that the meaning of the word ‘contract’ has a clear meaning 
and that it would be inappropriate to use this technique. On the other hand, 
the impact of ‘reading in’ on the rest of the statute and other labour legislation 
may discourage a court from resorting to this remedy. Furthermore, a court 
may even feel that not all workers should be able to rely on dismissal 
provisions, but that it is not possible to identify the workers who ought to 
benefit from these provisions by either ‘reading down’ or ‘reading in’. This 
aspect goes to the heart of the argument for diversification. Earlier123 
reference was made to the example of the volunteer worker who may 
justifiably be excluded from the LRA’s dismissal provisions because of the 
‘bipolar’ nature of the right to fair labour practices which also requires fairness 
to the employer (and society) and because it would discourage employers 
from supporting voluntarism. Similarly, it may be justified to exclude senior 
management employees from the LRA’s dismissal provisions.124 Currently it is 
not possible to read such a limitation into these provisions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Slippery Interface Between the Contact of Employment and Statutory Labour Law’, paper 
delivered at the 19th Annual Labour Law Conference, Johannesburg, South Africa, July 2006. 
121  Generally see Currie and De Waal (n 22) at 66 and 204-206. ‘Reading down’ is a method of 
interpretation used when interpreting a statute in light of the Constitution in order to preserve 
the statute’s constitutionality. This method of interpretation is limited to what the words are 
reasonably capable of meaning. In other words this method cannot be used to change the clear 
meaning of the words. See National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality & Others v 
Minister of Home Affairs & Others 2000 (1) BCLR 39 (CC) at par 24 and Mateis v Ngwathe 
Plaaslike Munisipaliteit 2003 (4) SA 361 (SCA) at par 9 (although this matter did not concern 
the constitutionality of a statute). ‘Reading in’ is a remedy used to cure the unconstitutionality 
by adding words once the court decides that a statute is unconstitutional. See National 
Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality & others v Minister of Home Affairs & Others at par 
73. 
122  Bosch ‘Can Unauthorized Workers be Regarded as Employees for the Purposes of the Labour 
Relations Act?’ (n 108) at 1361 and Du Toit ‘Oil on Troubled Waters’ (n 120). 
123  § 5.2.2.5. 













Incidentally, it is suggested that diversification in the context of 
dismissals can best be achieved by the use of the words ‘work arrangement’ 
instead of ‘contract of employment’ and by making the dismissal procedures 
available only to those earning below125 a certain threshold.126 This approach 
will ensure that vulnerable workers are prioritised for protection and that the 
employer is not burdened by the dismissal of ‘peripheral’ workers who do not 
receive remuneration. It will also protect workers who are remunerated, but 
who do not have a contract.  
 
Returning to the compatibility of the above argument with current 
legislative provisions, it is suggested that giving broader meaning to an 
employee may quite easily be accommodated in, for instance, the LRA’s 
provisions on unfair labour practices, although once again the exclusion of 
senior management employees may be justified.127 Unfair labour practices in 
the LRA are given a very specific and limited meaning and are essentially 
aimed at regulating employer power.128 Some of these practices may simply 
never arise in the context of certain workers because of their nature (for 
instance, it is unlikely, but not impossible, that volunteer workers will 
experience unfair conduct by the employer relating to promotion). However, 
since these practices are not defined on the assumption of a contract, the 
problems that present themselves in the context of unfair dismissals would not 
arise even if a worker is understood in broader terms. Furthermore, some of 
the prohibited conduct listed can easily impact on workers in the broadest 
sense and when it comes to considering diversification, it would be neither 
necessary nor appropriate to limit the workers who may rely on this 
protection.129 
                                                        
125  This is suggested because provisions aimed at eliminating the power imbalance between 
employer and employee should not benefit employees where there is in fact no such power 
imbalance. 
126  Reliance on remuneration rather than on the contract of employment will ensure that all those 
who earn an income, even in terms of an illegal contract, are also covered. 
127  Cheadle ‘Regulated Flexibility’ (n 71) at 700 (fn 83). 
128  Cheadle ‘Regulated Flexibility’ (n 71) at par 40. 
129  This is not to suggest that these labour practices need to be regulated. Elsewhere I have argued 
that the policy behind the regulation of labour practices in the LRA should be rethought. See 
Le Roux, R ‘The Anatomy of a Benefit: A Labyrinthine Enquiry’ (2006) ILJ 53 at 64-65. I am 
merely suggesting that the current definition of unfair labour practices in the LRA can 













Admittedly, there may be other provisions in the LRA for which the 
arguments postulated are not the ideal matrix. Also, how does this argument 
fit with legislation aimed at the regulation of the workplace where s 23 of the 
Constitution is not the stated purpose of that legislation, particularly in light of 
the claim made earlier that s 23 does not necessarily underwrite all incidences 
of employment? This can be illustrated by returning to the volunteer worker 
and the facts in ER 24 Holdings v Smith NO130 where it was held that a 
volunteer is not covered by the provisions of COIDA because there was no 
contract of service. (This interpretation would presumably also apply to illegal 
workers.) Some may say that even if the broad interpretation of worker could 
be read into COIDA, it will in effect mean that employers must make a 
contribution in respect of workers who are not paid and this may constitute an 
unfair burden on the employer. This is not quite correct. COIDA provides for 
contributions to be assessed also on the basis of what is equitable.131 The fact 
that the employer accommodates volunteers can thus easily be factored into 
the formula. For this reason, the reasons advanced in Chapter 4,132 and 
bearing in mind the social security agenda of labour law, it is suggested that 
volunteer workers and workers more generally (‘constitutional workers’) ought 
to be covered by COIDA. However, because employment in COIDA is defined 
in terms of a contract and because it is doubtful whether reliance can be 
placed on s 23 of the Constitution, it is conceded that the above argument can 
only be transplanted to legislation such as COIDA by legislative intervention.  
 
Such a legislative overhaul is in any event necessary, not only because 
of s 23 of the Constitution, but (as advanced in Chapter 3)133 to ensure that 
the required linkages are made between labour legislation and the right to 
have access to social security in s 27(1)(c) of the Constitution.  
 
                                                        
130  [2007] SCA 55 (RSA). Also see Sterris v Minister of Safety & Security and Others (2007) 28 
ILJ 2522 (C) and § 4.5.2.2.  
131  Section 82(2)(a) of COIDA. See Sterris v Minister of Safety & Security and Others (2007) 28 
ILJ 2522 (C) at par 32 for an explanation on how contributions are normally calculated. 
132  See § 4.5.2.2. The reasons include that the potential of vicarious liability will discourage 
employers from taking on volunteers and not all employers who take on volunteers will be 
able to afford common-law liability.  













It is proposed that all these statutes use the same definition of 
employment (similar to the current definition in the LRA) in which the broad 
meaning of ‘worker’ advanced earlier prevails. Support for this approach is to 
a certain extent found in post-LRA statutes which have generally all used the 
same definition. These include the BCEA, the EEA, the SDA and the 
Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 (PDA). The only notable exception is 
the UIA which defines an employee as ‘any natural person who receives 
remuneration or to whom remuneration accrues in respect of services 
rendered or to be rendered by that person, but excludes any independent 
contractor.’134 Of these statutes only the LRA and the BCEA contain a 
presumption as to who is an employee and only the UIA contains a definition 
of an employer. Such a standard definition will, it is suggested, in any event 
promote consistency. 
 
Diversification is, however, necessary in some instances. In this regard 
it is proposed that the various statutes provide for limitations to be placed on 
the worker either in respect of the statute as a whole, or in respect of certain 
chapters or even in respect of certain provisions. Such limitations can be 
justified on the basis of the purpose of the specific legislation and bearing in 
mind the reason for the limitation. Earlier the dismissal provisions in the LRA 
were advanced as an example of where a limitation is justified. In a similar 
vein it was suggested that COIDA ought to apply to the broader community of 
workers. The point about diversification can be illustrated by two further 
examples; one relating to externalisation and the other to whistle-blowing. 
 
In Chapter 4 the problems presented by externalisation were 
described.135 It was further suggested that externalisation could possibly be 
stemmed by moderating the provisions of the BCEA applying to casual labour. 
If the definition of employee is limited to accommodate this, it is suggested 
that the purpose of the limitation (to check externalisation and the evils 
associated with it) and the fact that the limitation relates to a contained 
category of workers will counter any constitutional attack in terms of s 36 of 
                                                        
134  Section 1. 













the Constitution, irrespective of whether the attack relies on the right to fair 
labour practices in s 23 or perhaps even on the right to equality in s 9 of the 
Constitution.  
 
Another example concerns protected disclosures (that is protection 
against whistle-blowing). Currently the PDA uses a definition of employee that 
is the same as the definition of employee in the LRA. In other words, 
independent contractors are excluded from the protection of the PDA. While 
there is perhaps a good reason for excluding independent contractors from 
the operation of the LRA and most other labour legislation, the purpose of the 
PDA may actually militate against the exclusion of even independent 
contractors. The purpose of the PDA is ultimately to expose the illegal 
conduct of the employer or its employees and to provide protection against 
victimisation for such exposure. It is not clear why an independent contractor 
(or even a volunteer) working side by side an employee (in terms of a contract 
of employment), witnessing the same illegal conduct by the employer and at 
the same risk of being victimised, should be any less protected than the 
employee, particularly in the absence of a general whistle-blowing statute.136 
Giving the broadest possible meaning to employee in the context of the PDA 
would therefore be consistent with the purpose of the Act. 
 
Some may say that giving effect to this will result in a myriad of 
exclusions and cause confusion. This can be countered by at least two 
arguments: first, although systematic diversification on a much wider scale is 
called for, the practice of diversification is not altogether inconsistent with 
current legislative practice, hitherto constitutionally unchallenged. There are 
numerous examples of such legislative practice: the presumption as to who is 
an employee applies only to employees earning below a threshold;137 chapter 
2 of the EEA which regulates the prohibition of unfair discrimination in the 
workplace adds applicants for employment to the definition of employee;138 
the provisions concerning workplace forums limit the meaning of employee by 
                                                        
136  Le Roux, R ‘Aspects of South African Law as it Applies to Corruption in the Workplace’ 
(2004) 17(2) SAJCJ 158 at 162. 
137  Section 200A of the LRA and s 83A of the BCEA. 













excluding senior management;139 s 5 of the LRA which regulates freedom of 
association in the workplace adds persons seeking employment to the 
definition of employee; volunteers working for a charitable purpose are 
excluded from the BCEA140 and soldiers and spies from the operation of both 
the BCEA and the LRA;141 and various basic conditions of employment in the 
BCEA provide for a number of exclusions based either on earnings,142 the 
type of work performed,143 the hours worked,144 the status of the employee145 
or even the number of employees working for the employer.146  
 
Second, most of the diversifications that are envisaged can be 
achieved by relying on two basic models: the number of hours worked and 
remuneration, which could sometimes be linked to a threshold. For instance, 
earlier it was suggested that dismissal provisions, in fairness to all, should 
only apply in respect of those who earn remuneration and perhaps only those 
who earn below a threshold.147 In the case of casual workers it is suggested 
that the diversification can be achieved by not providing protection (or 
providing different protection) to those working less than a certain number of 
hours. Exclusion based on the number of hours worked is already regulated in 
the BCEA and formulas for the determination of remuneration and thresholds 
in connection with remuneration already exist in the BCEA.148 The definition of 
an employee in the UIA is a clear example of where the fact that remuneration 
is earned is the distinctive factor, and not the amount of remuneration. 
 
In brief, the proposal is the following: first, all labour legislation should 
depart from the same base by using a definition of an employee which is 
broad and consistent with the worker concept in the Constitution and, second, 
                                                        
139  Section 78(a). 
140  Section 3(1)(a)(ii). 
141  Section 3(1)(a) of the BCEA and s 2 of the LRA. 
142  Section 6(3). 
143  Section 6(1)(b). 
144  Section 6(1)(c), s 19(1), s 28(1) and s 36.  
145  Section 6(1)(a). 
146  Section 28(2)(a). 
147  Also see note 125. 
148  See s 35 of the BCEA read with the regulation on the Calculation of Employee's 
Remuneration in terms of Section 35(5) of the BCEA and published under GN 691 in GG 













the purpose of the specific legislation should be allowed to carve out 
limitations suitable for that specific legislation. Such exclusions may often 
affect independent contractors, but provided that the concept is understood in 
very narrow terms, this can be justified. On the face of it the current definition 
of an employee in the UIA (based on the fact that remuneration is earned) 
appears acceptable since it clearly relates only to those who earn 
remuneration and who can contribute to an unemployment fund. However, 
even in respect of this Act it is suggested that ‘employee’ be given the 
broadest possible meaning. In Chapter 3 it was argued that legislation such 
as the UIA should assume a programmatic role and should aim to bridge the 
gap between the formal and informal labour markets. While it would perhaps 
be justifiable to limit contributions to those who receive remuneration, the 
(envisaged) programmes of the Act should be available to the broader 
community of workers, especially those who do not receive remuneration. 
This approach will lead the contract of employment into an era of 
diversification – this is a process, it is suggested, that is far more compatible 
with the modern world of work.  
 
Finally, what is proposed above (the ‘constitutional model’) is more 
than the evolution of the contract of employment. It is nothing less than a 
metamorphosis and it will perhaps be inappropriate and confusing to refer to 
what emerges from the cocoon as a contract of employment. Terms such as 
‘work arrangement’, ‘worker’ and ‘employer’ are more compatible with this 
new regime. This does not mean that the contract of employment will not live 
on in the common-law courts. That may well be the case unless the 
legislature decides to close that avenue, but then it will be an animal different 
from the one that lives in protective labour legislation. 
 
5.5 Alternative models 
 
How does the constitutional model compare with some of the 
alternative models that have been proposed or even experimented with in an 
effort to address the problems associated with the definition of an employee? 













in Britain, the personal employment contract model as conceived by 
Freedland149 and the labour force membership advocated by Supiot.150 A 
detailed analysis of these models is beyond the scope of this thesis, but below 
they are briefly considered and compared with the constitutional model.  
 
5.5.1 Deeming provisions 
 
Section 83(1)(a) of the BCEA151 provides that the Minister of Labour 
may deem any category of persons to be employees for the purpose of the 
BCEA and any other employment law which includes the LRA, the EEA, 
COIDA, the SDA and the OHS.152 Similarly it provides that the Minister has 
the power to deem certain categories of persons as contributors for the 
purpose of the UIA.153 
 
To date the Minister has never exercised this power. Benjamin explains 
that this provision was included in the BCEA to give effect to a sentiment 
expressed in 1996 Green Paper that preceded the passing of the BCEA and 
which proposed the extension of labour protection to independent 
contractors.154 Ultimately the BCEA does not use this terminology, but it 
provides the administrative framework for the extension of labour protection 
which ‘avoids the pitfalls and uncertainties of relying exclusively on judicial 
interpretations in individual cases to determine the scope of the employment 
relationship.’155 The fact that the Minister has never employed this method, 
Benjamin suggests is due to lack of capacity in the Department of Labour. 
However, Landman suggests that there may be another reason: the provision 
effectively enables the Minister to alter the BCEA and other labour legislation 
and such a provision, he argues, which ‘empowers a member of the executive 
                                                        
149  Freedland (n 100). It is not possible to do justice to this work in the paragraph below which is 
limited to the definition of personal employment contracts.  
150  Supiot, A Beyond Employment: Changes in Work and the Future of Labour Law in Europe 
(2001). 
151  Read with the definition of employment law in s 1 of the BCEA. 
152  Act 85 of 1993. 
153  Section 83(1)(b) of the BCEA. 
154  Benjamin, P ‘Who Needs Labour Law? Defining the Scope of Labour Law’ in Conaghan, J; 
Fischl, RM and Klare, K Labour Law in an Era of Globalization: The Transformative 
Practices and Possibilities (2000) 75-92 at 91. 













to alter the foundations on which so many other Acts rest . . . may not pass 
Constitutional muster.’156 
 
Whatever the reasons are for not using this provision, it does show an 
appreciation by the legislature that there is a need to extent protection to 
‘anomalous cases’.157 Nonetheless, such a provision can never provide a 
systematic and principled solution. While it is not argued that this provision 
should be scrapped (although it may need modification to survive 
constitutional challenge), it can never be more than a ‘tidying up operation’158 
and offers no long term roadmap. Therefore, at best, a deeming provision can 
supplement the constitutional model proposed above, but can never replace 
it. 
 
5.5.2 The ‘worker’ concept159 
 
The ‘worker’ concept developed in Britain from the 1970s onwards. At 
the time it was realised that a group of workers existed who are 
distinguishable from employees, ‘but nonetheless suffer from some of the 
same vulnerabilities, in particular being dependent on a single user of their 
labour’ and who needed some protection.160 This resulted in the introduction 
of two additional, but very similar, legislative categories in Britain: first, a 
contract personally to execute work or labour found in discrimination 
legislation,161  and second, a contract to do or perform personally any work or 
services for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the 
contract that of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking 
carried on by the individual, found in legislation regulating conditions of 
                                                        
156  Landman, A ‘Vocational Work – Basic Rights for Students’ (2003) 24 ILJ 1304 at 1306. 
157  Deakin, S ‘Employment Protection and the Employment Relationship: Adapting the 
Traditional Model?’ in Ewing, KD (ed) Employment Rights at Work: Reviewing the 
Employment Relations Act 1999 (2001) 137-154 at 146. Deakin discusses the impact of s 23 
of the Employment Relations Act 1999 (UK) which empowers the Secretary of State to extend 
statutory employment rights to individuals who are not protected by these provisions. 
158  Deakin (n 157) at 145. 
159  Also see § 2.2.4. 
160  Davidov, (n 45) at 62. Also see Brodie, D ‘Employees, Workers and the Self-Employed’ 
(2005) 34 ILJ (UK) 253. 
161  Equal Pay Act 1970, Sex Discrimination Act 1975, Race Relations Act 1976 and the 













employment.162 Deakin argues that the effect of the concept is to bypass the 
‘mutuality test’ that emerged in Britain from the 1970s onwards and which had 
the effect of excluding workers where there was no mutuality of obligations.163 
This test emphasises economic dependence and basically draws a line 
between ’those who are economically dependent on the business or 
undertaking of another (whether they are employees or not) . . . and those 
who contract through their own business’;164 in other words it ‘draw[s] 
distinctions within the category of the self-employed.’165 
 
 Freedland, while conceding that ‘[t]hese developments have certainly 
expanded the personal scope of employment legislation’,166 argues that they 
have also brought about uncertainties and questions whether they mean the 
same in the context of discrimination legislation and other protective 
legislation and the extent to which the ‘worker’ category and the ‘persons 
employed’ category differ from each other. Others have lamented the 
continued reliance on a contractual model and personal service.167 
 
Nonetheless, despite the relative merit of this concept, it is doubted 
whether it has the same reach as the constitutional model. Earlier, 
reservations were expressed about the role of economic dependence. It is 
difficult to measure and employment sometimes exists beyond the notion of 
dependence. The constitutional model, it is suggested, allows for the diverse 
nature of employment and takes account of all other factors, beyond 
dependence, that could possibly be relevant in the context of employment.  
The ‘worker’ concept simply does not have the capacity to cope with the world 
of work described in Chapter 4 in a systematic and principled way. And, as in 
the case of the personal employment contract discussed in the following 
paragraph, it provides no ready answers in respect of issues concerning 
                                                        
162  Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, Employment Rights Act of 
1996, National Minimum Wage Act 1998, the Employment Relations Act 1999, Working 
Time Regulations 1998 and the Part-Time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable 
Treatment) Regulations 2000. 
163  Deakin (n 157) at 148. 
164  Deakin (n 157) at 147. 
165  Deakin (n 157) at 148. Cf generally Brodie (n 160). 
166  Freedland The Personal Employment Contract (n 100) at 25-26. 













illegality and lack of contractual intent, and importantly, unlike the proposed 
model it has no natural motor, in the form of s 36 of the Constitution, ready to 
drive diversification. 
 
5.5.3 The personal employment contract/ personal work contract 
 
Freedland defines the concept of the personal employment contract (or 
personal work contract) ‘as comprising contracts for employment or work to 
be carried out normally in person and not in the conduct of an independent 
business or professional practice’.168 This concept is partially a reaction to the 
‘worker’ concept that developed in Britain from the 1970s onwards and 
discussed above.169 As a result of the uncertainties associated with the 
worker concept, Freedland developed the personal employment contract to 
address some of these uncertainties and to address the ‘very small gap 
between the statutory concept of the worker and that of an employed 
person’.170  
 
The first distinguishing feature o  the personal employment contract is 
that it aims to regulate work normally carried out in person, but it allows for the 
possibility that it need not necessarily be carried out in person. The second 
distinguishing feature of the personal employment contract is that it does not 
cover work in the conduct of an independent business or professional service. 
Freedland describes this more fully to mean conduct ‘”in the course of a 
process or practice of production of goods including intellectual goods or 
provision of services of which process or practice the contractor is the primary 
and substantially autonomous organiser”.’171 This aims to include those 
workers who are not working under a contract of employment, but under a 
different contract, but who are nonetheless semi-dependent. Elsewhere172 
                                                        
168  Freedland  The Personal Employment Contract (n 100) at 28. 
169  § 5.5.2. 
170  Freedland The Personal Employment Contract (n 100) at 29. 
171  Freedland  The Personal Employment Contract (n 100) at 29. 
172  Freedland, M ‘From the Contract of Employment to the Personal Work Nexus’ (2006) 35(1) 
ILJ (UK) 1 at 4. In many ways this notion is not dissimilar to the contract for the performance 
of work proposed by Brooks already in 1988. See Brooks, A ‘Myth and Muddle – An 
examination of the Contracts for the Performance of Work’ (1988) 11 UNSW Law Journal 48. 













Freedland has described this as a move across the binary divide ‘to include 
partly or even wholly independent workers.’ 173 
 
Regarding the contractual requirement of intent, Freedland   
distinguishes between, on the one hand, an intention to create a relationship 
that would give rise to ‘a legally binding contract of whatever sort’ as opposed 
to an arrangement which creates only a moral duty and, on the other hand, an 
intention to establish a personal work relationship that gives ‘rise to a legally 
binding personal employment contract in particular’ as opposed to other 
personal work relationships which are ‘not sufficiently concrete and 
reciprocally related to ground an intention to enter into a personal employment 
contract.’174 On the issue of legality, Freedland concedes that the personal 
employment contract requires the doctrine of illegality as known to the general 
law of contract to be tempered with reference to the policy and purposes of 
employment legislation.175  
 
The personal employment contract does not suggest that true 
independent contractors should benefit from labour laws and is ‘not a 
proposal to do away with the broad distinction between autonomous labour 
and independent labour; it is instead concerned with drawing that line in a 
different place’.176  
 
The concept of the personal employment contract has very attractive 
features, but it can be asked whether requirements such as ‘semi-
dependence’ and the tempered versions of intent and legality do not introduce 
new grey areas. Furthermore, does the nomenclature of the concept in itself 
not perpetuate the concerns about the need for a valid contract and does the 
                                                                                                                                                              
independent contractor are similar and that most labour protective legislation, including trade 
union rights, can easily be extended to all contracts in which the performance of work is the 
object. See 90-101. 
173  Freedland ‘Personal Work Nexus’ (n 172) at 4-5. 
174  Freedland  The Personal Employment Contract (n 100) at 61-62. 
175  Freedland The Personal Employment Contract (n 100) at 78. 
176  Deakin, S ‘Does the ‘Personal Employment Contract’ Provide a Basis for the Reunification of 
Employment Law?’ (2007) 36 ILJ (UK) 68 at 77. For more discussion of the potential of the 
personal employment contract see Davies ACL ‘The Contract for Intermittent Employment’ 













concept address the significance of the contractual terms between the 
parties?  
 
Above it was argued that the constitutional worker should be 
determined in broad terms by establishing whether there is a degree of 
personal service and whether at least one of the known elements of an 
employment relationship is present. These include factors beyond 
dependence. It was further argued that there is room in the presumption, as it 
is currently phrased, to argue that personal service is not an absolute 
requirement, provided that it is a predominant feature. Furthermore, it was 
suggested that the purpose of dedicated protective legislation should be 
allowed to place limits on this broad meaning of worker. Viewed thus, the 
personal employment contract and the model proposed above appear to 
achieve similar outcomes. The model based on the Constitution, however, 
removes all concerns about intent and legality (even the tempered versions 
proposed by Freedland) and in fact distances itself from the contractual model 
which the personal employment contract does not do. Furthermore, the 
proposed model has a natural motor that can drive diversification, namely s 
36 of the Constitution. It is not clear on what basis the personal employment 
contract model can justify diversification. It is these two aspects, it is 
suggested, that give the constitutional mode the edge on the personal 
employment contract.   
 
However, Freedland, realises that this model for reasons of non-
contractuality and the ’bilateral contractual way of conceiving of the personal 
work relationship’177 still excludes work relationships that ought to be included 
and that it does not regulate matters incidental to employment.178 He therefore 
suggests that a concept which he calls the ‘personal work nexus’ be 
developed to provide a platform from where these aspects could be regulated.   
 
                                                        
177  Freedland ‘Personal Work Nexus’ (n 172) at 18. Also see Freedland, M ‘Application of 
Labour and Employment Law Beyond the Contract of Employment (2007) 146 International 
Labour Review 4.   













The fact that this concept extends to ‘arrangements for personal work 
which does not necessarily consist of legally binding personal work 
contracts’179 brings it in line with the constitutional model. Nonetheless, it is 
suggested that the Constitution provides a ready paradigm in the South 
African context within which to achieve this extension of labour rights. The 
best way to describe the difference between the two models is to regard the 
personal employment contract as an explosion (extension) of the binary divide 
whereas the constitutional model amounts to an implosion (removal) of the 
binary divide. However, one way or another, both these models dispose of the 
common-law notion of the contract of employment because they recognise 
that the contractual model excludes work relationships that ought to be 
regulated by labour law. The personal work nexus will be returned to below 
when considering means to address the fixation with direct employment.  
 
5.5.4 Labour force membership 
 
This model is the product of a report to the European Commission 
(known as the Supiot Report)180 and was the result of a ‘prospective and 
constructive survey on the future of work and labour law’181 within European 
countries. 
 
Since its aim was to develop a conceptual framework, the Supiot model 
lacks the detail of the three models explored in the previous three paragraphs. 
For this reason a direct comparison would be inappropriate and the question 
should not be whether the Supiot model is better or worse than the 
constitutional model, but rather whether the latter, compared to the models 
discussed above, is a credible extension of the Supiot model.  
 
A defining feature of the Supiot model concerning individual 
employment is the recognition that labour force membership should not be 
dependent on paid employment and should accommodate non-marketable 
                                                        
179  Freedland ‘Personal Work Nexus’ (n 172) at 18. 
180  See Supiot (n 150). 













forms of work.182 It is therefore not pre-occupied with a contract of 
employment. This, it is suggested, is the cornerstone of the constitutional 
model.  
 
Other important features of the Supiot model is, first, the notion that 
labour force membership should not be contingent on current employment, 
but should continue to exist despite breaks in employment and, second, the 
concept of social drawing rights aimed at accommodating flexibility and which 
are triggered by the decision of the holder and not by the realisation of social 
risks: 
 
We are surely witnessing here the emergence of a new type of 
social right, related to work in general (work in the family sphere, 
training work, voluntarily work, self-employment, work in the public 
interest, etc). Exercise of these rights remains bound to a previously 
established claim, but they are brought into effect by the free decision 
of the individual and not as the result of risk.183 
 
While these notions fall beyond the immediate focus of this thesis, they 
certainly have merit and may be used as platforms from which to develop 
social security and other rights once the constitutional or similar model is in 
place. In that sense the Supiot model may therefore be a vanguard of the 
further development of the constitutional model.  
 
5.6  A return to status? 
 
A troubling question is whether the constitutional model and the 
argument for the irrelevance of a contract of employment valid at common law 
is not regressive in the sense that it reverses Sir Henry Maine’s claim that ‘the 
movement of progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status 
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to Contract.’184 In other words, is the model advanced not in effect a 
movement from ‘Contract’ to ‘Status’ in the sense that once a person is 
categorised as a ‘worker’ that status results in certain rights and obligations? 
Kahn-Freund has explained that ‘status’ as intended by Maine means ‘the 
sum total of the powers and liabilities, the rights and obligations, which society 
confers or imposes upon individuals irrespective of their own volition.’185 In the 
case of employment, although the employment relationship is moulded 
through norms imposed by legislation, it still presupposes ‘the existence of a 
contract of employment, or at least of an employment relation entered into by 
the parties.’186 
 
The model proposed does not deviate from this. Although a contract of 
employment valid at common law is not required, a working arrangement 
which depends on the free will and agreement of the parties is still 
envisaged.187 Any working arrangement devoid of such agreement would be 
unconstitutional. Section 13 of the Constitution provides that no one may be 
subjected to slavery, servitude or forced labour188 and an obligation to render 
personal service not founded in agreement would constitute one or more of 
these notions. This is not changed by the reality that there is often a need to 
impose terms and conditions extraneously once the work arrangement has 





                                                        
184  Maine, HR Ancient Law 10ed (1905) at 170. Jordaan, HA The Employment Relationship: 
Contract or Membership? unpublished LLD thesis University of Stellenbosch, 1991 at 73-95 
provides a useful overview of the status concept in employment. 
185  Kahn-Freund, O ‘A Note on Status and Contract in British Labour Law’ (1967) 30 Modern 
Law Review 635 at 636. 
186  Kahn-Freund (n 185) at 640. 
187  Some would argue that the regular exchange of service for remuneration still amounts to an 
implied contract. See Van Niekerk, A ‘Personal Service Companies and the Definition of 
“Employee” – Some Thoughts on Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber (2005) 26 ILJ 1256 (LAC)’ 
(2005) 26 ILJ 1904 at 1909. This proposition, however, assumes that there is still a need to 
find a contract and it does not address the dilemma presented by illegalities. This argument is 
not pursued here since it is the basis of this thesis that there is no need to find a contract, 
express, implied or otherwise. 













5.7  Multilateral employment 
 
At the end of Chapter 4, in the context of externalisation through an 
intermediary, it was remarked that the employment relationship is ‘subjugated 
to a commercial arrangement between the nominal employer and a third party 
and . . . the challenge is . . . to find ways to make the commercial entity (the 
third party) more directly accountable.’189  
 
Even if, as argued above, the process of diversification will stem 
externalisation, one must assume that it can never eradicate externalisation. 
In this regard, the possibility of having more than one employer in respect of 
the same employment will briefly be considered.  
 
A prominent comparative example is the National Labour Relations Act 
(NLRA) in the United States where, under certain circumstances, temporary 
service providers and their clients are regarded as joint employers of the 
temporary employee. The effect of this is that the client may be ‘held 
vicariously liable for violations . . . arising out of the other party’s unlawful 
discipline or discharge of a temporary employee [and be subject to] collective 
bargaining obligations’.190 Joint employer liability is generally determined by 
the extent to which the client exercises control ‘over another entity’s 
employees’ terms and conditions of employment’.191 Needless to say, this 
obviously reintroduces the problems associated with the control test. In 
Australia, subject to what is said later in this paragraph on supply chain 
regulation, some jurisprudential support can be found for the notion of joint 
employers, but only where an employee worked for entities within the same 
group of companies.192 This is also the position in South African law. Under 
                                                        
189  § 4.9. 
190  Jenero, KA and Spognardi, MA ‘Temporary Employment Relationships: Review of the Joint 
Employer Doctrine under the NLRA’ (1995) 21(2) Employee Relations Law Journal 127 at 
127. 
191  Bryson, CB; Klein, EI; Zimring, J and Wilson-Freelon, S ‘Joint Employer Liability: Ignore the 
Risks at your Company’s Peril’ (1999) New York Law Journal S1. 
192  Owens, R and Riley, J The Law of Work (2007) at 155-156 and Cullen, R ‘A Servant and Two 
Masters? The Doctrine of Joint Employment in Australia’ (2003) 16 AJLL 359, especially the 
reference to Justice Munro at 361. Also see Matthews v Cool-or-Cosy Pty; Ceil Comfort 













both the 1956 and 1995 LRAs, various courts, including the SCA, have held 
that it is possible for an employee to have more than one employer in respect 
of the same employment.193 However, but for one,194 all these cases 
concerned employees who were moved around within the same group of 
companies.195 
 
However, while the notion of joint employers196 (where the ‘employer 
parties’ are unrelated entities) is basically foreign to South African law,197 the 
sharing of responsibilities by unrelated entities associated with the 
employment of an individual is not entirely unknown. The best example198 of 
this is s 198(4) of the LRA199 which, in the context of temporary employment 
services (TES), provides that despite the fact that the person who renders the 
service is the employee of the TES and not the client where he or she is 
placed, the client and the TES are jointly and severally liable if the TES 
contravenes a collective agreement concluded in a bargaining council that 
regulates terms and conditions of employment, a binding arbitration award 
that regulates terms and conditions of employment and the provisions of the 
                                                        
193  However, there have been only a few judgments under the 1995 LRA and they all relied on 
judgments handed down in terms of the 1956 Act. For cases decided under the 1956 LRA see 
Boumat Ltd v Vaughan (1992) 13 ILJ 934 (LAC) at 939; Camdons Realty (Pty) Ltd & Another 
v Hart (1993) 14 ILJ 1008 (LAC) at 1016E and Board of Executors Ltd v McCafferty 2000 (1) 
SA 848 (SCA) at par 15. Cf McGlashan v City Council of Johannesburg (1992) 13 ILJ 561 
(W) at 565I-566E. For cases decided under the 1995 LRA see August Läpple (South Africa) v 
Jarrett & Others [2003]12 BLLR 1194 (LC); White v Pan Palladium SA (Pty) Ltd (2006) 27 
ILJ  2721 (LC) and Gogo v University of KwaZulu-Natal & Others (2007) 28 ILJ 2688 (D). 
194  Gogo v University of KwaZulu-Natal & Others (2007) 28 ILJ 2688 (D). In this matter there 
was a joint scheme between the University and the Provincial Administration to address the 
need of the University to have access to a hospital for teaching and training medical students. 
195  Also see Brassey (n 95) at B1: 20. 
196  The emphasis is on joint employers in respect of the same employment. The notion of an 
employee having different employers at the same time, but in respect of different employment, 
is not foreign to South Africa. In fact, the provisions in the BCEA (s 20(2)) on the calculation 
of leave allow for that possibility. For more views on this see Davidov, D ‘Joint Employer 
Status in Triangular Employment Relationships’ (2004) 24 British Journal of Industrial 
Relations 727; Davies, P and Freedland, M ‘Changing Perspectives Upon the Employment 
Relationship in British Labour Law’ in Barnard, C; Deakin, S and Morris, G (eds) The Future 
of Labour Law (2004) 129-158 and Freedland, M ‘Rethinking the Personal Work Contract’ 
(2005) 58 Current Legal Problems 517.  
197  See Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Rieck [2007] 1 BLLR 1 (SCA) at pars 
22-28 where this view led to a very narrow interpretation of the definition of employer. 
198  Some may regard the example as a form of joint employment. However, ‘joint employers’ 
suggest at least some parity in respect of employment obligations. The example that follows 
illustrates the absence of such parity and therefore it is more appropriate to refer to this as the 
sharing of some employer responsibilities rather than as an example of joint employers. 













BCEA. Since employers do not fear the costs of failing to comply with labour 
legislation generally, the prospect of joint and several liability in respect of the 
above issues does not trouble them. However, employers do fear the costs 
associated with dismissal proceedings.200 The fact that s 198(4) does not 
extend joint and several liability in respect of dismissal to the client where the 
employee is placed (insofar as the dismissal occurs while the employee is 
placed with the client) is an important force driving externalisation. This can 
only be negated by extending the joint and several liability of the client to the 
provisions of the LRA, or at least its dismissal provisions.201 This will remove 
one of the most important incentives to externalise and can be done by a 
simple amendment to s 198 of the LRA. However, while this will encumber 
one form of externalisation, it will not necessarily halt other forms of 
externalisation such as outsourcing, subcontracting and homeworking.202 
 
However, it is for two reasons doubtful whether the courts will be 
prepared to use the limited case law on joint employers and the few 
provisions on the sharing of employment responsibilities as the basis for 
finding, for instance, that somebody at the end of the supply chain is the 
employer of the homeworker. First, the interpretation under the 1956 Act was 
facilitated by the presence of the broad terms of the definition of an employer. 
There is no similar definition in the LRA. Second, the definition of employee in 
the LRA militates against such an interpretation. The use of the words ‘who 
works for another person’ and ‘assisting . . . an employer’ in the definition 
suggests that the legislature contemplated the employer to be a single entity. 
 
                                                        
200  Theron, J; Godfrey, S and Visser, M ‘Globalization, the Impact of Trade Liberalization, and 
Labour Law: the Case of South Africa’ Discussion Paper International Institute for Labour 
Studies DP/178/2007 at 8. Also see § 4.4.2.1.2. 
201  Cf s 128 of the Namibian Labour Bill 2007 which has now been abandoned on the basis that 
‘labour hire’ constitutes a crime in Namibia. See Jauch, H ‘Namibia’s Ban on Labour Hire in 
Perspective’ The Namibian 3 August 2007. 
202  While it does not go to the issue of multiple employers or joint liability as such, placing a time 
limit on the duration of the placement of the employee with the client before the employee 
becomes the employee of the client will also ensure that such placement is driven by needs 
which are genuinely temporary as the legislative nomenclature (temporary employment 














While the employee’s right to fair labour practices in s 23 of the 
Constitution, the courts’ inherent power to develop the common law and the 
duty to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights203 may all 
be bases for developing a concept of joint employers, one suspects that the 
courts will be slow to develop a notion that represents such a radical 
departure from accepted wisdom and that it will be left to the legislature to 
address this.  
 
What is envisaged is something that would, doctrinally at least, accord 
with Freedland’s personal work nexus where, on the basis that such a nexus 
exists, despite the absence of any contractual connection, it is recognised by 
employment law as an area for regulation. Achieving this does not require the 
legislature to perform quantum leaps. It can be achieved by introducing a 
definition of an employer. Precedent for the use of a definition of an employer 
is found in the 1956 LRA, in COIDA, the UIA and the OHSA, albeit all in 
different terms. Some indication on how such a definition ought to be phrased 
is, in a roundabout way, provided by COIDA. This Act defines employer to 
also mean ‘any person, who employs an employee, if the services of an 
employee are lent or let or temporarily made available to some other person 
by his employer, such employer for such period as the employee works for 
that other person.’204  
 
This has been suggested to mean that if the services of an employee 
are lent or let or temporarily made available to some other person (the host or 
user enterprise) by his or her employer, the host will be the employer for such 
period as the employee works for that host.205 This was not the interpretation 
of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands 
Poultry v Rieck.206 The court held that the person who lent, let or made 
available the employee remains the employer and the host does not become 
                                                        
203  See ss 39(2) and 173 of the Constitution. 
204  Section 1. 
205  See Thompson, C and Benjamin, P South African Labour Law Service Issue 42 (2001) vol 2 
at H1-H15. Also see ‘Changing Nature of Work and “Atypical” Forms of Employment in 
South Africa’ in Cheadle, H; Thompson, C; Le Roux, PAK and Van Niekerk, A Current 
Labour Law 2004 (2004) 135 at 167 where reference to the concept of a ‘host employer’ is 
made. (This document is also known as the Synthesis Report.) 













the employer.207 Nonetheless, developing a definition consistent with the 
‘incorrect’ interpretation, in combination with the notion of joint and several 
liability will, with the exception of homeworking, remove the attractiveness of 
most forms of externalisation.  
 
Theron argues that conceptually homeworking is no different from 
labour broking in that it entails the procurement of labour by an intermediary 
for a client.208 It is doubtful whether treating the intermediary in the case of 
homeworking on the same basis as a temporary employment service will 
resolve the problems associated with this form of externalisation. It is known 
that homeworking often involves a long chain of several intermediaries and 
identifying the one that should be deemed the employer for purposes of s 198 
of the LRA could be problematic. In this regard useful lessons can be learnt 
from recent developments in Australia. 
 
These developments relate to supply chain regulation, which was first 
introduced in New South Wales (NSW) as a response to the exploitation of 
outworkers in the textile, clothing and footwear industry, but later models tend 
to be of more universal application.209 While it was initially introduced to 
facilitate the recovery of wages, there is no reason why it cannot apply to the 
enforcement of labour legislation more generally. 
 
The original model, the Industrial Relations (Ethical Clothing Trades) 
Act 2001 (NSW) enables an outworker to:- 
 
. . . make a claim against any party in the contracting chain 
(aside from the retailer), including principal contractors (such as 
fashion warehouses) and a person directly engaging the outworker, 
despite there being no direct employment relationship or common law 
                                                        
207  At par 26. 
208  Theron, J ‘Employment is Not What it Used to Be’ (2003) 24 ILJ 1247 at 1254. 
209  Generally see Rawling, M ‘A Generic Model of Regulating Supply Chain Outsourcing’ in 
Arup, C; Gahan, P; Howe, J; Johnstone, R; Mitchell, R and O’Donnell,A  (eds) Labour Law 
and Labour Market Regulation (2006) 520-541. Also see Grieg, A ‘The Struggle for Outwork 
Reform in the Australian Clothing Industry (2002) 49(2) The Journal of Australian Political 













employment contract between the outworker and the person giving out 
work.210 
 
A later model, introduced in 2005, was the result of an amendment to 
the Fair Work Act 1994 (South Australia) and aims to regulate any person 
who gives out work or the giving out of work itself (but excludes consumers 
and retailers). In the case of both these models, the employee is relieved of 
identifying the person that would normally be legally liable as employer and is 
allowed to proceed against any party in the supply chain who would be liable, 
unless this party can prove that the work was not done or the amount claimed 
is not correct. Set-off or recovery of amounts is to be resolved between the 
different parties in the supply chain.211  
 
There is obviously more detail to this and while its focus seems to be 
the creation of havens of liability rather than joint employers, this model 
nonetheless represents a clear legislative effort to adopt the notion of bilateral 
employment. However, it is not suggested that it is necessary to use this form 
of regulation in respect of all protective legislation or that it needs to be done 
via dedicated legislation as in Australia. It is in this regard that it is suggested 
that the notion of diversification be applied universally; in other words, 
diversification need not apply only in respect of employees, but also to 
employers. In other words, while any person who gives out work (even though 
there may be a series of contracts before the work is actually performed) 
ought to be regarded as an employer, it is suggested that that this definition 
should apply only in respect of certain legislative provisions and again in 
tandem with the notion of joint and several liability. Ultimately, the justification 
for this will once again be the bipolar nature of s 23 of the Constitution which 
also entitles employers to fair labour practices. For example, while this 
definition will render a fashion warehouse the employer of the homeworker 
despite the ‘legal distance’ between them, it may be unfair to expect the 
warehouse to be liable for the dismissal of the homeworker for misconduct by 
her direct employer and, for that reason, the definition should not apply to the 
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dismissal provisions. On the other hand, when it comes to minimum wage 
regulations or basic conditions of employment, it may not be unfair to regard 
the warehouse as the joint employer. Admittedly this route will not necessarily 
connect all in the supply chain with what employers apparently fear most, 
namely liability for dismissal, but it will certainly ‘influence whether firms will 
decide to contract out work or not [and they will] consider the option of directly 
engaging employees more often.’212  
 
There may be more options than the few mentioned above, but it is 
clear that the practical identification of the personal work nexus and the 
demise of externalisation can in many ways be achieved by the use of a 
definition of an employer (which does not assume that employment is 
bilateral) combined with the notion of joint and several liability.213 The 
emphasis in this chapter on joint and several liability is deliberate and is 
aimed at providing the worker with additional insurance in the sometimes 
shady world of externalisation. 
 
This is not to say that there is no place for externalisation. There may 
be genuine operational reasons for externalisation, unrelated to the need to 
put legal distance between the worker and the user of the service, but the 
strategies proposed above will ensure that it does not happen for the wrong 
reasons.  
 
5.8 The constitutional model and informality 
 
This thesis will be incomplete if the proposed constitutional model is 
not juxtaposed with one of the aspects of the new world of work identified in 
Chapter 3, namely, the informal labour market.214  
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Throughout this thesis it was suggested that the processes of 
casualisation and externalisation culminate in informalisation. It was further 
suggested that, inasmuch as current formal labour market regulation 
stimulates informality, the proposed constitutional model will assist in 
reclaiming those in ambiguous, disguised or externalised employment for 
formal labour market regulation. However, it cannot be denied that the 
informality is not only the result of the erosion of the formal labour market by 
processes such as casualisation and externalisation. The truth is that the 
expansion of the informal labour market is the result of many other forces 
beyond the immediate reach of formal labour market regulation, such as 
poverty; poor education and lack of skills; inadequate macroeconomic, social 
and trade policies; the feminisation of work and the knock-on effect of 
globalisation.215 It is in respect of these forces, as was already pointed out in 
Chapter 3, that labour law has limitations.216 The proposed process of 
diversification will therefore admittedly not result in a comprehensive package 
of labour regulation and protection for informal workers, but it will shield some 
of them against the most invidious aspects of the informal labour market. 
 
Thus, while there is a role for labour law in the informal labour market, 
it must be conceded that the containment of the informal labour market, the 
encouragement of formalisation (that is, the migration of workers from the 
informal to the formal labour market) and the protection of those who 
nonetheless remain in the informal labour market may require, in addition to 
what has been suggested, intervention of a different nature, beyond the 
province of labour law. 
 
A study of these interventions is beyond the ambit of this thesis, but it 
may include taxation policies, the development of human capabilities, the 
establishment of social security schemes that can accommodate, first, own 
account workers and, second, the migration of workers in and out of the 
                                                        
215  See the Conclusions concerning decent work and the informal economy adopted at the 90th 
session of the International Labour Conference of the ILO in June 2002, accessed via 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc90/pdf/pr-25.pdf (28 February 2008). 













formal and informal labour markets.217 218 Two possible further interventions 
require some elaboration, namely voice regulation219 and the concept of 
‘buying social justice’.220 
 
Trade unions have experienced only limited successes in the 
organisation of the informal labour market. While this sector no doubt needs a 
voice, trade unions, considering the difficulties they already experience in 
organising the formal sector, may simply not be the ideal agent for the 
informal labour market. In Chapter 3 the co-operative model was suggested 
as a possible alternative, but it may be that a dedicated legislative model, 
similar to a trade union, needs to be created with the specific aim of giving a 
collective voice to the informal labour market. Following on what was said 
earlier about supply chain regulation, this may, for instance, include a 
mechanism or association representing all those in the supply chain. 
 
‘Buying social justice’ is a concept with strong South African roots221 
and basically suggests that the government should use its purchasing power 
to advance social justice.222 In other words, government procurement ought to 
favour a seller with a certain social justice record and agenda. It is suggested 
that this theme can be developed to also include the advancement of the 
informal labour market, either through the absorption by sellers of those in the 
informal labour market or by a direct investment by sellers in the informal 
labour market. This may include financial investment and/or providing 
education or training or even infrastructure to the informal labour market.) 
                                                        
217  See Olivier, M ‘Extending Employment Injury and Disease Protection to Non-traditional and 
Informal Economy Workers: The Quest for a Principled Framework and Innovative 
Approaches’ paper presented at the 7th International Work Congress, Hong Kong, June 2006 
for a discussion on how to accommodate in social security schemes workers migrating 
between the two labour markets. 
218  Also see Horn, P ‘Decent Work and the Informal Economy in Africa: Policy and 
Organizational Challenges’ paper presented at the 5th African Regional Congress of IIRA, 
Cape Town, March 2008 for a number of practical measures that can be taken to address the 
problems associated with informality. Also see Benjamin, P ‘Informal Work and Labour 
Rights in South Africa’ paper presented at the 5th African Regional Congress of IIRA. 
219  See generally Horn (n 218). 
220  In this regard see McCrudden, C Buying Social Justice (2007) and McCrudden, C ‘Social 
Policy Choices and the International and National Law of Procurement: South Africa as a 
Case Study’ paper presented at UCT-NYU-Global Administrative Law Conference, Cape 
Town, March 2008. 
221  McCrudden ‘Social Policy Choices’ (n 220). 













Informality is undoubtedly one of the emerging themes in labour law 
and, if unchecked, may become the new dichotomy of the world of work. 
Many forces are responsible for the expansion of the informal labour market. 
The constitutional model can, it is suggested, contain at least one of these 
forces. 
 
5.9  Conclusion 
 
The premise of this chapter is that a worker should be understood in 
very broad terms, disconnected from the common-law contract of employment 
and contract generally, and that, through a process of diversification, 
protection should be channelled to workers in varying degrees. The 
Constitution provides an ideal paradigm within which to develop this. Not only 
does it provide the scope for a broad understanding of the term ‘worker’, but 
the bipolar nature of s 23 of the Constitution, which also guarantees fairness 
to employers, and the limitation clause in s 36 provide a peg on which to hang 
diversification. Transplanted to protective labour legislation, this means that 
worker protection may vary depending on the purpose of the legislation.  
 
Disconnecting employment from the common-law contract of 
employment also requires a proper understanding of the role of illegality. 
While it is not implied that illegality of employment should as a general rule be 
ignored, it is suggested that simple justice will from time to time require the 
illegality to be ignored; also for, incongruous as it may sound, the sake of 
discouraging that illegality. 
 
A further premise of this chapter is that employment is incapable of 
precise definition and that the known traits of an employment relationship 
(which we know are present in different combinations in different employment 
arrangements) should be used, possibly through a device such as a 
presumption, to guide us towards identifying a worker. In this regard it was 
argued that personal service and economic dependence are but two of many 
traits of the employment relationship and relying on them alone will result in a 













Weaving the above notions into protective legislation can be fully 
achieved only through legislative intervention. Nonetheless, many existing 
provisions in protective labour legislation are quite capable of accommodating 
an interpretation consistent with the constitutional model. Most notable is the 
cornerstone of at least the LRA and the BCEA, namely the definition of an 
employee, which is capable of an interpretation completely removed from 
contractual rigidities. Furthermore, tools already exist on which to base 
diversification: hours of work and remuneration. 
 
While other helpful models do exist, most notably the personal 
employment/work contract and the personal work nexus, no other model 
provides a paradigm as appropriate as the South African Constitution within 
which to achieve an evolution of the contract of employment to the extent 
proposed. In fact, what is envisaged should rather be described as a 
metamorphosis. 
 
However, diversification will not eradicate externalisation. It will go a 
long way towards stemming it, but to ensure that externalisation is the result 
of genuine operational needs, the obsession with direct, bilateral employment 
must be addressed. The best way to do this is to use, subject to its own 
diversification, a definition of an employer which allows for joint employment in 
combination with joint and several liability. Similarly, it is conceded that while 
the constitutional model can contain some of the forces responsible for the 
expansion of the informal labour market, interventions beyond the province of 
labour law will be required to fully address this phenomenon.  
 
 None of what is suggested above is novel.  Already in Chapter 2 it was 
shown that diversification predates unification. Not even the legislative tools 
proposed above for driving diversification or the views on illegality are novel.  


















The focal research question that this thesis endeavours to answer is 
whether the contract of employment is still relevant in modern employment. 
The thesis concludes that since modern work relations manifest in such 
diverse and often complex forms, the need for an organising category such as 
the contract of employment remains, bearing in mind the purpose of labour 
law. However, unless the contract of employment transforms itself into a more 
supple institution, it will fail the purpose of labour law. It is further concluded 
that, in the case of South Africa at least, the Constitution can sponsor a model 
which allows for a broad understanding of the term ‘worker’ and which, at the 
same time, allows protective labour and social welfare legislation to limit the 
protection of some workers through a process of diversification. 
 
This conclusion follows a detailed consideration of the evolution of the 
contract of employment in South Africa and a brief reflection on the evolution 
of the contract of employment in Britain and the Netherlands; a short 
consideration of the purpose of labour law; a detailed analysis of the forms of 
engagement in South Africa; and a comprehensive consideration of the 
potential of s 23 of the South Africa Constitution which guarantees a right to 
fair labour practices to everyone. 
 
 The study of the evolution of the contract of employment in Chapter 2 
confirmed the flexible and evolutionary nature of the contract of employment 
and showed that, in all three countries reviewed, it reached a relative state of 
unity only during the twentieth century, and even more recently in South 
Africa.  
 
More particularly, in respect of South Africa, this conclusion is based 
on an analysis which showed that the Master and Servant laws in South 
Africa applied to lower status employees, while the common law applied to 
higher status employees. This division, which also happened to be a racial 













test, which developed under the influence of English law and tended to 
exclude higher status employees, was initially used as the basis for vicarious 
liability, and was not used to distinguish between an employee and an 
independent contractor. It was only after 1931, following the judgment of the 
Appellate Division in Colonial Mutual, that the control test lost its significance 
as the basis of vicarious liability. Henceforth control became the distinctive 
feature of employment. Almost all the judgments where this reasoning was 
employed concerned the application of social welfare legislation in the broad 
sense. The combination of exclusions in this legislation and the effect of the 
control test – which resulted in a very narrow application of this legislation – 
stultified the process of developing a unitary concept. 
 
There is no firm indication that, as hinted by Freedland, the Roman-
Dutch dichotomy was so ‘deeply embedded’ in the subconscious of the South 
African legal system that it drove a natural wedge into South African 
employment law: The existence of the locatio conductio operis and the locatio 
conductio operarum were certainly (eventually) acknowledged as two 
contractual forms but, even so, the courts almost always reverted to the more 
general locatio conductio to determine the outcome of a contractual dispute. 
To the extent that it can be claimed that the dichotomy was firmly established 
in Roman-Dutch law at the time of the British occupation of the Cape, it 
certainly had not by the 1930s become a dividing force in South African 
employment law. The Roman-Dutch dichotomy of locatio conductio operis and 
locatio conductio operarum became more prominent in case law as a result of 
the application of the control test on the authority of Colonial Mutual and its 
rather tenuous allusion to the Roman-Dutch dichotomy. However, in 1979, as 
a result of the influence of the purist school, the Roman-Dutch dichotomy was 
firmly established as the reason for the dividing line in the context of social 
welfare legislation. While it was certainly a powerful dividing line, it is doubtful 
whether it was a dormant force waiting to shape the South African labour 















The claim that the Roman-Dutch dichotomy was not an inherent force 
waiting to divide the South African labour market is substantiated by its lack of 
influence on early South African labour relations legislation. Until the 
introduction of the unfair labour practice doctrine into labour relations 
legislation in 1979, the dichotomy was nowhere to be seen in a legislative or 
jurisprudential sense. It was only after 1979 that the courts transplanted the 
dichotomy that had gained some momentum in jurisprudence on social 
welfare legislation to industrial relations legislation. 
 
While Deakin has linked the contract of employment as a unitary 
concept and the dichotomising of employment in England to the rise of 
welfare and tax legislation, the same pattern, admittedly less clear, can be 
distilled from the South African experience. On the one hand, the Master and 
Servant laws, the use of the control test, racial agendas and many exclusions 
in social welfare legislation delayed the, albeit imperfect, unification of the 
contract of employment until very late in the twentieth century. On the other 
hand, the control test and an over-zealous value attached to the judgment in 
Colonial Mutual, the need to delineate the boundaries of social welfare 
legislation, the drive of the purist school to hark back to another era and the 
influence of the PAYE system all conspired to dichotomise the South African 
labour market, but only in a discernible form from after 1931. The fact is that 
without social welfare and tax legislation neither would have happened; it is 
doubtful whether, in isolation, the categorisations of the locatio conductio 
operarum and the locatio conductio operis would have made it happen. Put 
differently, the Roman-Dutch dichotomy never was both the dividing line and 
the reason for the dividing line and need no longer assume either role. 
 
The study of the evolution of the contract of employment is followed by 
a reflection on the purpose of labour law in Chapter 3, which concludes that 
while the traditional purpose of labour law of countervailing employer power is 
still very relevant in South Africa, there is a general recognition, amplified by 
the imperatives of the Constitution, that labour law needs to engage with the 
advancement of social security delivery aimed at empowering the vulnerable. 













only illustrate the diversity of the modern forms of engagement, but also 
shows that the traditional understanding of the contract of employment is in 
many ways responsible for the emergence of these forms of engagement and 
is also incapable of regulating the demands of these forms of engagement. 
 
In Chapter 5 it is shown that the Constitution can facilitate a paradigm 
that brings a very broad range of workers within the protective net of labour 
and social welfare legislation and, at the same time, accommodates the 
realities of modern employment (which is in any event not capable of precise 
definition and which often include multiple employers) by channelling 
protection to workers in varying degrees. It is further shown that this 
constitutional model disconnects worker protection from the existence of a 
contract of employment valid at common law, a requirement which, in the 
case of South Africa, is in any event judge-made. The chapter further 
demonstrates that the tools for such diversification are already in place and 
that an extreme change in mindset is not required to accommodate this 
model. 
 
It is thus my thesis that a model allowing for diversification and 
disconnected from the common-law contract of employment can not only 
accommodate modern forms of engagement, but will also stem the forces that 
deprive many of legislative protection. However, I do not suggest that this 
study should be the last word, and clearly more research is required to 
substantiate this thesis. In Chapter 4 reference is made to the retail sector in 
South Africa which has adopted a more diverse approach to part-time 
workers. Further empirical research is required to verify whether this approach 
has indeed resulted in a more secure environment for these workers and 
whether it has had an impact on externalisation in this sector. Furthermore, in 
Chapter 5 only brief reference is made to the possibility of joint or multiple 
employers in respect of the same work or employment. This is a radical notion 
and clearly more research is required to understand fully the prospects of 














The above paragraphs reflect the essence of this thesis. It is, however, 
also conceded that the model addresses only some of the problems 
experienced in modern employment: For instance, other than bringing some 
workers currently in the informal labour market (most notably illegal foreign 
workers) into the formal labour market, the model does not suggest an 
obvious solution to the many who remain in the informal labour market. There 
is obviously a need for more research in this regard. Furthermore, this thesis 
does not address the apparent inability of the institutions of the labour market 
in South Africa to enforce existing protections – but perhaps this is an area 
that calls for political commitment and resources rather than research. 
 
Finally, the answer to the focal research question must thus be that the 
contract of employment has a very definite place in modern employment, but 
it must be allowed to transform itself into a notion that recognises the realities 
of the modern world of work. This may mean, as incongruous as it may 
sound, that the contract should sever ties with the notion of employment being 






















On 28 March 2008 Van Niekerk J handed down judgment in the Labour 
Court in a matter concerning a foreigner who was dismissed for not being 
in possession of a valid work permit. (See Discovery Health Limited v 
CCMA and Others Case No JR 2877/06.) The employer argued that since 
s 38(1) of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 prohibits employment of an 
illegal foreigner, it could no longer employ the foreigner. The employer 
further argued that the CCMA did not have jurisdiction to arbitrate the 
matter because of the invalidity of the underlying contract of employment. 
The judge found that the provisions of the Immigration Act are such that 
they do not invalidate the contract of employment. Since the contract of 
employment was not invalid, the foreigner was held to be an employee as 
defined in s 213 of the LRA. The judge further concluded that ‘[e]ven if the 
contract concluded . . . was invalid only because the [employer] was not 
permitted to employ [the foreigner] under s 38(1) of the Immigration Act, 
[the foreigner] was nonetheless an “employee” as defined by s 213 of the 
LRA because that definition is not dependent on a valid and enforceable 
contract of employment.’ This finding confirms the basis premise of this 
thesis, namely, that a contract of employment is not a sine quo non for 
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